Army

ARMY, “a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man” (Johnson); “a collection of troops of all arms formed into brigades and divisions, placed under the orders of one commander, with a general and special staff and administrative departments; provided with all necessary war materiel, and destined to act offensively and defensively against the enemy” (Block, Dictionnaire de l 1 Economie Politique). Neither definition is quite satis factory. The first is too comprehensive; the second excludes the forces of all but highly-civilised nations. The essential characteristics of an army, by which it is distinguished from other assemblages of armed men, are its national character—that is, its representing more or less the will and the power of the nation or its rulers—and its organisation. The degree of the latter must depend on the age and the state of civilisation; the armies of former days we should now call mobs. The art of war has kept pace with the arts of peace, and there is as much difference between the “armies” of the present and of the past as between an elaborate modern machine and an early stone implement. But armies of some kind have existed since the earliest periods of man’s history. At no time has industrial accumulation, with its results, progress and civilisation, been possible unless accompanied by the will and power to defend it. No nation has made -its mark in history that has not at some period of its existence been pre-eminently distinguished for martial spirit and proficiency in arms; or been allowed to throw its full energies into the pursuits of peace till it had proved what it was able and willing to do and endure in war. In studying the progress of military art we dwell in succession on the proudest days of all the great nations of the earth, and learn that when this art was neglected the fall of the nation was seldom far distant.

The art of war divides itself into two distinct branches —the first relating to the military institutions of nations, the manner in which armies are raised, their composition, characteristics, organisation, and government; the second to their employment in war. The first, commonly known as the administration or organisation of armies, is that of which this article treats. A modern army is a vast and complicated machine, so constructed that the whole aggregate force of its numerous parts may be exerted in any direction and on any point required. It is our province to describe this machine in a state of rest, explaining the construction, purpose, and combination of its several parts, but leaving its action to be treated of elsewhere (see War).

In the earliest stage of civilisation the army is identical with the tribe or nation. Every man is a warrior; even women and children accompany the expeditions, prepare and carry food, and bear such share as they are fitted for. In more settled communities the able-bodied men only take the field, while the women, the children, and the aged remain at home to watch the herds and till the fields. Production is still so small that no division of duties among the men is necessary. The armies consist of the whole male population, collected under their chiefs and hearts of families, or under warriors who have specially distinguished themselves. Such were some of the earliest armies mentioned in history, and such are still the armies of the savage nations with whom our colonial empire brings us in contact,—well fitted for petty warfare between neighbouring tribes or nations, when the assailants confine themselves to raids for plunder and captives, but not for distant expeditions or prolonged operations. As population and industry increase, a division of labour becomes both possible and necessary. A select portion of the inhabitants are specially devoted to military service, either permanently 01 for a time, while the remainder give undivided attention to pacific pursuits. Standing armies and permanent organisation are thus introduced, and lead to improvements in administration and progress in the art of war, till finally we attain to the perfection of modern organisation.

History points to Egypt as the first country in which a regular military organisation was established, and the warrior class, as such, distinguished from the rest of the population. By its earliest laws the revenues of the state were divided into three equal parts, of which one went to the priests, one to the king, and one to the warriors. Sesostris seems to have been the great military organiser of Egypt. Trained by his father from childhood to war, he early distinguished himself in military expeditions against the Arabians and against Lybia, and mounted the throne with visions of universal conquest. To pave the way for such schemes, he gave Egypt a military organisation, dividing it into thirty-six provinces, and establishing a militia or warrior class, called Kalasires and Harmatopoii, to each of whom was allotted land sufficient for the maintenance of himself and his family. These formed the nucleus of the vast army, amounting, according to Diodorus Siculus, to 600,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war chariots, with which he undertook the conquest of the world. We read that the command of this army was given to the companions of the king, who, like himself, had been trained to arms under his father, and that a strict discipline was maintained and a military code established which forbade corporal punishment, appealing to the higher instincts of the soldier; but of the details of organisation and administration by which so vast an army was moved and fed we can learn little. With this army, aided by a powerful fleet, Sesostris first subdued Ethiopia, and then extended his conquests eastward as far as the Ganges; thence turning northwards and westwards, he swept over the Punjab, the table-land of Tartary, and the north shores of the Caspian, and descended through Sarmatia and Dacia into Thrace. Finally, he overran Asia Minor, and having conquered the Assyrian empire and seated himself, on the throne of Ninus and Semiramis, returned in triumph to Egypt after a nine years’ absence, and devoted the rest of his life to the peace and prosperity of his kingdom. Such are the accounts handed down by the ancient historians; and if any faith is to be attached to tnem, it seems clear that he did actually raise and maintain large armies, and with them carry out prolonged and distant expeditions, extending over several years, without interrupting the industry and progress of his own country— facts which in themselves prove a high degree of national and military organisation.

The martial spirit of Egypt, however, seems to have expired with its first and greatest conqueror, and as a nation it has distinguished itself in the arts of peace rather than those of war: the country became the prey of conquerors and the battle-field of other nations, and the palm of military supremacy passed successively into the hands of the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Medes, and the Persians. The first two nations present no special features in their military systems; their armies, like those of Egypt, consisted mainly of infantry, horsemen and chariots forming but a small though highly-prized element. But the Persian empire introduces us to a more highly developed military organisation, and a Bystem of standing armio closely resembling those of modern times. Drawn from a hardy and nomadic race, its armies at first consisted mainly of cavalry, and owed much of their success to the consequent ease and rapidity of their movements. Constantly extending their power by fresh conquests, the warlike Persians established themselves as garrisons in the subjected provinces, gladly exchanging their own barren mountain lands for these rich and fertile countries, and for some time remained a distinctly conquering and military race. Their empire attained its highest power under Cyrus and Cambyses; the former, the founder of the great Persian empire, uniting on his head the crowns of Babylon, Media, and Persia, while the latter still further extended the empire by the conquest of Egypt. Cyrus seems to have been the founder of that complete military organisation of which we gather details from Xenophon and other writers. To each province of the empire was allotted a certain number of soldiers as garrison or standing army. These troops, formed originally of native Persians only, were called the king’s troops. They comprised two classes: the one devoted exclusively to garrisoning the fortified towns and castles, the other distributed throughout the country. To each province was appointed a military commander, responsible for the number and efficiency of the troops in his district; while the satrap, a civil governor, was answerable for their subsistence and pay. Annual musters of these troops were held either by the king in person or by generals deputed for the purpose, and invested with full powers. This organisation seems to have fully answered its original purpose, that of holding a vast empire acquired by conquest, and promptly repelling inroads or putting down insurrections. But when a great foreign war was contemplated, the standing army was augmented by a levy throughout the empire, and each province and tributary nation furnished its quota of men, horses, and provisions. The extent of the empire made such a levy a matter of time. Thus the preparations for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes took three w hole years; and the heterogeneous and unorganised mass of men of all nations so brought together was a source of weakness rather than strength. That the warlike Persians, whose reputation rose so high under Cyrus, who were distinguished for their powers of endurance, and a daring courage which despised stratagem and delighted in single combats, should within a century have failed so disgracefully against the Greeks, has often been matter of wonder. Something, doubtless, was due to the fact that their reputation was won over effeminate races,* very different from their later antagonists; something also to the degeneracy induced among themselves by years of success and luxury. But it must also be borne in mind that the vast hosts over which the Greeks gained such easy victories comprised but a very small proportion of the true Persians—of the race which had given Cyrus his conquests. The cavalry alone seems to have retained its national character, and with it something of its high reputation, even to the days of Alexander. Nevertheless, the first contact between the Asiatic and the Greek proved that the crown of military glory had passed to the western nation.

The earliest knowledge we have of the military institutions of the Greeks is derived from the pages of Homer. They are glimpses only that we obtain, but they suffice to distinguish many of their characteristics. Their compact formations and subordination and silence in the ranks are contrasted with the looser formation and noisy attacks of the Trojans. Their armies consisted almost entirely of infantry. The leaders fought either on foot, like the rest, or from chariots; and single combats between the chiefs on the two sides were common, and often served to open the battle. We have sketched for us the traits of a hardy, independent, enterprising race, sometimes cruel and quarrelsome, but gallant, high-spirited, and intelligent, and well fitted to become distinguished as soldiers. How these qualities were developed, till the Greek armies and Greek tactics acquired a renown which has lasted to our day, we learn from the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, and from the ample details handed down by Xenophon, Thucydides, and other historians.

By the laws of Athens every free man was liable to military service. It was not only his duty but his distinction and privilege. The slave worked, the freeman devoted his time to military exercises and to the gymnasium. At eighteen his name was enrolled on the list of fighting men; for two years his duties were confined to home service, and especially to the guarding of Athens; from his twentieth to his fortieth year he was liable to service wherever the good of the state might require. The collectors of taxes, the singers at some theatres, and a few others, were alone exempted. The only privilege granted to the wealthy was that of serving in the cavalry. The infantry, of which the army was mainly composed, consisted of three classes. First were the heavy troops, “hoplitai,” armed with a spear, a dagger, a corslet, and a large oval shield. These formed the phalanx or main line of battle, and were composed entirely of free citizens, natives of Attica. Secondly, the light troops, “psiloi,” armed with javelins, but carrying little defensive armour, and no shields. These were destined for skirmishing and covering the movements of the phalanx, and were mostly slaves, who followed their masters, serving among the “hoplitai,” to war. Thirdly, there were “gumnetai,” or irregular light troops, carrying no defensive armour, but provided with javelins, bows and arrows, and slings, to harass the enemy; these usually consisted of slaves or foreign troops. Besides these there was another class, “peltastai,” so called from the light shield or target (pelta) which they carried, and intermediate between thp “hoplitai” and “psiloi.” 1 The cavalry consisted entirely of the wealthier Athenians, and was intelligent and enterprising. Each of the tribes of Athens had its own military commander, chosen from itself, and elected for the year only; and an Athenian army thus obeyed ten chiefs (“strategoi ”) of equal rank. These commanded by turns for the day, while the ten together formed a council of war to consult and decide in cases of emergency. Practically the inconvenience of such a system was obviated by leaving nine of the ten behind, or by the appointment of a “polemarch,” a sort of permanent chief of the staff, who carried great weight in the councils.

The Spartans owed much of their specially soldierly qualities to the institutes of Lycurgus, which had for their aim to form a nation of warriors, and develop to the utmost those physical and moral qualities which render men invincible. Discipline, unquestioning obedience, uncomplaining endurance, and contempt of danger, were the principles inculcated on the young Spartan from his earliest years, while his body was strengthened by every exercise and trained to every fatigue. As with the Athenians, military service was the first duty of every citizen of Sparta. The age of enrolment was twenty instead of eighteen; but the service lasted till sixty, and was more severe. In peace as in war, the Spartan lived as if in presence of the enemy. War time was, indeed, his relaxation, for he was then accompanied by slaves, carriages, and beasts of burden, and relieved of every labour or fatigue, to keep him fresh for battle. Cavalry was held in disremite in Süarta: their infantrv was formed 1 The distinction between the psiloi and the peltαstαi is not clear, and it would almost seem that they were the same class of troops, the first name being applied to them when used as light troops, the second when formed, in close order and attached to the phalanx.

in five “moras,” or regiments, corresponding to the five tribes; later, a sixth, which included a small force of cavalry, was added. The armies were usually commanded by the kings of Sparta; when one only was formed, one king remained at home. The king was accompanied by a bodyguard, comprising the winners of the prizes at the athletic games, and had attached to him two polemarchs, or chief staff officers, and three administrative officers, who relieved him of all care of details, leaving him free to devote his mind to the great task of his command.

The phalanx, formed of the Jωplitai, or heavy-armed infantry, drawn up eight deep, was the basis of all Greek tactics. The Spartan and Athenian phalanx differed slightly in interior organisation and subdivision, but the general principles were the same. For marching and manoeuvring the ranks stood at open order, that is, 6 feet apart; for attack at close order, or 3 feet apart; and for defence at locked order, or 1∣ feet apart. The number of men in each phalanx, and the number of phalanxes into which the battle-array was divided, varied according to circumstances; but from 2000 to 4000 seems to have been the usual strength of a phalanx. The peltastai and light troops and the cavalry formed round or in rear of the phalanx; the light troops remaining in front and harassing the enemy till the actual moment of collision, and then falling back to the flanks or rear. In counting the forces engaged in a battle, it was usual to reckon only the hoplitai, who answered to the knights and men-at-arms of the Middle Ages; but the peltastai and light troops generally equalled, and often considerably exceeded, the former in numbers. The Athenian phalanx was less compact than that of Sparta, but more formidable in its attack, the offensive being best suited to the national character of the former, while the passive courage and endurance of the latter shone especially in the defensive. At Marathon and in subsequent battles the Athenians advanced to the attack at a run, while the advance of the Spartans was always deliberate and slow. The Thebans, under the direction of Epaminondas, modified the phalanx, forming it on a narrower front, with greater depth, and the soldiers standing so close in the ranks that they could not turn. This gave more weight at the point of impact, and the Theban column of attack, fifty deep" crushed the Lacedemonian phalanx, only eight deep, when opposed to it at Leuctra and Mantinaea. Xenophon compares the effect to that of a heavy vessel striking a light one amidships with her bow, and dashing her to pieces by the collision. The Macedonian phalanx was a combination and adaptation of the various earlier Greek forms.

The Greek armies were essentially militia. A few guards and garrisons were maintained, but no standing armies like those of Persia; and the troops by whom such perfection in tactics was attained, and such brilliant victories were won, were only called under arms when occasion required, and returned to their civil life when the danger was over. By constant wars, however, this militia had acquired all the character of a regular army; and the Spartan forces especially differed only in not receiving pay for their services. Beyond their own country the warlike reputation and soldierly qualities of the Greeks made them highly prized as mercenaries, and large numbers adopted that profession. Thus we hear of Greek troops in the pay of the Egyptian kings in the time of Cambyses, and later the garrisons of the Persian towns in Asia Minor were mainly furnished by them; while Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks who engaged under Cyrus the Younger did more to spread the fame of the arms of Greece than even the great victories of Marathon and Plataea, and, by exposing the weakness of the Persian empire, paved the way for the future conquests of Alexander.

Macedon, inhabited by rude but hardy shepherds and hunters, and far behind its southern neighbours in civilisation, had made no mark in history till Philip ascended its throne. But this monarch, who combined the highest military qualities with a far-seeing shrewdness which was fettered by no strict principles of honour, had no sooner established himself than he devoted all his energies to raising the military power of his country and extending his authority. The experience of his wars with the Athenians and other nations of Greece taught him that he could only overcome them by a discipline and training superior to their own, and he early saw that such was not to be given to a mere militia force. He set himself, therefore, to form a standing army, to which he gave an organisation, copied, but improved, from that of his adversaries. By force of arms, by treachery, or by policy, he increased his power and influence till it embraced all Greece; and he was about to make war on Persia at the head of her united armies when his death put an end to his ambitious projects. But his son Alexander had all his father’s military genius and ambition, and at the same time inherited the instrument he required in the highly-trained army so carefully prepared. Within a year he had chastised the Thracians in the north, stamped out the Greek revolt by the storming and destruction of Thebes, and received at Corinth from the representatives of the southern states the chief command over their united forces; and in the following year crossed the Hellespont at the head of an army of 35,000 men, and commenced that career of conquest which was not to cease till he had carried his victorious arms over India, and founded the largest empire the world had yet known. The army with which these astonishing campaigns were won was composed of native-born Macedonians, of their allies, and of mercenaries. The infantry was divided into heavy and light armed, the peltastai now forming a most important part of the force, besides auxiliaries or irregular troops. None but native Greeks were admitted into the phalanx or the cavalry. The cavalry, which was more numerous than that of the Spartans or Athenians, was also divided into heavy and light; the former carrying horse armour as well as body armour. The actual force with which Alexander crossed the Granicus, the frontier line, was 30,000 infantry and 4500 cavalry, of whom about 12,000 were Macedonians, 5000 foreign mercenaries, and the remainder Greeks and allies. Special attention was paid to recruiting, generals being left behind to attend to it, and numerous reinforcements were sent to Alexander during his expeditions, so that at the battle of Arbela his army amounted to at least GO,000 men. The tactical organisation of his army was adopted from the Greeks. The Macedonian grand phalanx, as finally formed by Alexander, numbered 16,384 heavy-armed infantry: it was formed 16 deep, each file of 16 men forming a lochos under a lochagos, who led the file, and thus became the front rank man. These files were variously grouped. Thus two files formed a dilochie, four a tetrarchie, two tetrarchies a taxiarchie, under a taxiarch or centurion, Ac.; and 32 taxiarchies, or 256 files, formed a simple phalanx of 4096 men. Four of these, with a due proportion of peltastai, light troops, and cavalry, formed the grand phalanx. The depth of 16 was chosen as giving greater solidity than the Spartan phalanx, while admitting of more subdivision. To form a solid column the phalanx was doubled, giving a depth of 32; to extend its front, its depth could be reduced to one-half, still· offering a firm line. The principal weapon was the samssa or pike, 24 feet long, of which 18 feet extended beyond the grasp. Thus the pike heads of six ranks projected beyond the front, and formed that bristling mass of spears which gave the phalanx its formidable appearance. The proportion of peltastai, cavalry, and irregular troops attached to the grand phalanx varied slightly, but as a rule the total about equalled that of the phalanx. Of these, the peltastai would form one-half, the cavalry and irregular troops about a quarter each. Thus the total strength of a grand phalanx and its auxiliaries amounted to about 32,000 men, and Alexander’s army at Arbela was formed of two such. The Macedonian phalanx was the crowning point of Greek military organisation, and therefore has been described at some length; but a still greater military power was already rising in the West, before whose legions the phalanx itself collapsed, and to this it is now time to turn.

The early or legendary period of Roman history is enveloped in a darkness which hides the rise and first development of those institutions which ultimately gave to Rome the empire of the world. Her earliest military organisation is attributed to Romulus, who grouped the great families or clans (“gentes ”) in three tribes; each required to furnish 1000 foot soldiers and 100 cavalry, and in the force so raised is traced the. origin of the Roman legion. But itis to Servius Tullius that the legend assigns the great classification, lasting to the time of the Caesars, according to which the burdens and duties of military service were determined. The whole population was numbered and divided, according to wealth, into six classes; the class determining the amount of war-tribute to be paid by the citizen, his position in the army, and the armour he had to provide. The legionary infantry, Triarii, Principes, Hastati , l were usually drawn from the first four classes; the light troops, “Velites,” from the fifth; while the sixth and poorest class was exempted from all military service and from the tribute. For voting purposes and for enrolment these classes were subdivided into centuries; and a certain number of special centuries of “equites” were formed from the patricians and most' wealthy citizens, who were required to provide horses as well as armour, and formed the cavalry of the legion. Every five years a fresh census was held, and the classification according to property revised. Liability to service commenced at the age of seventeen, and lasted until forty-six; and no Roman citizen could aspire to any office until he had served ten years in the infantry or five in the cavalry. The manner of raising the annual levy of troops is minutely described by Polybius. Immediately after the election of the consuls, twenty-four military tribunes were chosen from among the citizens of longest and most distinguished service. The consuls having published the day on which all persons liable to service were to assemble at the capital, the military tribunes were apportioned to the several legions. The magistrates then proceeded to choose from the different tribes, in order determined by lot, those most fit for military service, and sent them, in groups corresponding to the number of legions, before the military tribunes, who selected in turn for their several legions till the required numbers were raised. The conscripts then took the military oath, sacramentum, and were dismissed until the appointed muster-day, when the legion was formed and organised. The youngest and poorest were made Velites, the next in age Hastati, the most powerful were selected for the Principes, and the oldest or richest reserved for the Triarii. The legion was commonly composed of 600 Triarii, 1200 Principes, 1200 Hastati, and 1200 Velites, with 300 cavalry,—making a total strength of 4500; the number of Vehtes, however, often varied considerably. When the classification was completed, the three classes of Triarii, Principes, and Hastati were divided into ten manipuli or companies each,’ and the cavalry into ten turmoe or troops; while the Velites were distributed among the thirty manipuli. A first and second centurion was then chosen and appointed to each manipulus; and these again chose each two “ensigns” from their manipuli. The centurions ranked among themselves according to the class to which they belonged; thus a centurion of Triarii ranked above one of Principes or Hastati, and the first centurion of each class commanded the whole of his class or one of the lines of battle of the legion. Originally Roman citizens only, belonging to the five upper classes, were admitted in the army, and the soldier equipped himself at his own cost, and received no pay. Afterwards, the socii or allies of Rome were included in her armies, and in the. time of Polybius a consular army consisted usually of two legions, or 9000 Roman soldiers and about the same number of allies or socii. But under the pressure of the great Punic wars the consular armies were often doubled: at Cannae two double consular armies, or nearly 80,000 men, were brought together; and at one period of the second Punic war as many as 23 legions were raised. The system of payment, too, dating from the prolonged siege of Veii, removed the reasons, for exempting the poor from military service, and they were included in the levies, though usually detailed to the navy as an inferior service. Finally, when civil wars had shaken the old institutions, and everything was sacrificed to faction and party spirit, even slaves and criminals were enrolled, and the whole character of the army was changed. Other causes also tended to the same result. The system of raising the consular armies annually, and disbanding them at the conclusion of each campaign, required to be modified when distant wars were undertaken: legions were kept permanently under arms, and recruited annually by levies sent from Rome; ambitious generals found excuses for not disbanding the armies to which they owed their power, and by degrees a standing army was established; and these changes in the character of the army were accompanied by corresponding changes in its organisation and tactics. The distinction between the three ranks became gradually effaced, and the three corresponding manipuli were merged in the cohort. The legion was no longer divided into three lines and thirty manipuli, but into ten cohorts, and its force was raised from 4000 to 6000 men. The manner of fighting, too, was gradually changed, and the Roman soldier learned to trust less to his sword and heavy pilum, only useful at close quarters, and more to javelins and warlike instruments.

The turning-point in Roman military art is commonly fixed about the time of Marius, to whom the change in the organisation, as well as in the composition, of the Roman armies is attributed. But the evil effects did not make themselves felt immediately, and the legions, whose actions under Caesar shed the brightest lustre on the Roman arms, were organised on the new system. So long as discipline and the old military spirit remained, the Roman armies retained their superiority, whatever their tactics. This spirit was too deeply implanted to die out soon; and whenever men arose worthy to command them, the Roman soldiery regained its reputation. But under a succession of weak and profligate emperors all discipline was lost: the legions, degenerated into a feeble militia, sold the empire which they were incapable of defending, and ultimately fell.an easy prey to the rude and daring barbarians of the North.

The Roman armies owed their long and remarkable . ascendency to three principal causes: discipline; care in the selection, training, and exercise of the soldiers; and readiness in adopting improvements, whether from friends or foes. In the first the Romans surpassed all other nations. The second especially attracted the attention of contemporary students of their military institutions; Hirtius, Vegetius, Josephus, all speak of the constant exercises by which, in peace as in war, the Roman soldier was trained and inured to war. “If,” says Josephus, “we consider what a study the Romans made of military art, we must confess that the empire to which they have attained is not a gift of fortune, but a reward of virtue. They did not wait for war to handle their arms; nor, slumbering in the bosom of peace, move themselves only when awakened by necessity: as if their weapons were born with them, as if they formed part of their members, they allowed no truce to exercises; and these military games are real apprenticeship to combat. Each soldier tests his strength and courage every day; thus battles are neither new nor difficult to them; accustomed to keep their places, disorder never arises, fear never troubles their minds, fatigue never exhausts their bodies. They are certain to conquer, because they are certain to find enemies unequal to them; and one may say, without fear of mistake, that their exercises are battles without bloodshed, and their battles bloody exercises.” Josephus said truly, they would never meet their equals. When they fell, it was not because their adversaries were superior, but because they themselves were no longer what they had been.

Hitherto war had been a progressive art. Each great military power succumbed in its turn to an organisation and a science superior to its own. But with the fall of Rome we seem to begin afresh. The nations by whom the overthrow of this great empire was effected were in the condition from which the Latins had emerged ten centuries before; and more than ten centuries elapsed before the lost ground was regained, and such highly-trained armies again appeared.

The early institutions of the Frank and German races, the new masters of Europe, were those of a free, proud, warlike people. The right to bear arms was the privilege of the freeman, the mark of his status in the community. No man could assume it till publicly pronounced worthy, and solemnly invested before the assembly of the people. From that time he was never separated from his arms. The same word (wehr) denoted a weapon and a freeman; -even his plot of land (were) was named after that by which alone he held it, and his social existence ceased when no longer able to carry arms and mount his horse. Similarly, nation and army were convertible terms; the Longobards continued to call themselves an army (Heer) long after their settlement in Italy. Their organisation was rude and simple. The family was the basis of the social fabric; kindred families formed clans, and these again confederations (Markgenossenschaft), to which admission was only obtained by common consent. Finally, the kindred tribes or communities occupying a certain district (gau) formed a higher organisation (gaugemeinde), which usually included the whole of a particular race or stock, and had well-defined natural boundaries. For political and military purposes the gau or province was subdivided into “circles” (Kreis) and “hundreds,” names which have continued to this day; the latter calculated to include as many households as would suffice to place a hundred warriors in the field. Kings and commanders were, elected and were entrusted with absolute power in war time, but in peace every freeman claimed perfect liberty; all great questions w.ere determined by the people in public assembly, and all conquests were the property of the community, to be shared equally among them. It is hard to imagine a greater contrast than that between the perfect freedom and equality of the early German institutions, and the tyranny and unequal rights of the feudal system which succeeded it. But we can trace the gradual.transition. From early days the most adventurous youths attached themselves to the hero of the nation or tribe, to be instructed by him in peace and led to victory in war. Thus each great warrior collected round him a band of personal followers—retainers, whom he equipped with horses and armour, and rewarded with a share of the booty, and who in return followed him in . all expeditions, and obeyed no law but his word. When conquests were effected by such bands, the land was the property of the chief, and was distributed by him as a reward to his followers. Gradually kings and chieftains increased their retinues, extending protection to those who obeyed them, and enriching them by grants of lands acquired by conquest or seizure. These grants soon ceased to be free gifts, rewards for past service, but were held to entail future service also; and the chiefs assumed the right to revoke them. As the power of the nobles and the number of their retainers increased, so did the number and power of the independent freemen decrease; a prey to oppression and exactions of all sorts, they attached themselves in self-defence to some neighbouring lord, surrendering their lands, and consenting to hold them of him as vassals. Finally, the lords increased their pretensions, assuming the titles of “suzerains” or “seigneurs,” claiming absolute authority over the persons and property of their vassals, and requiring an oath of fealty from them; and the feudal system, with all its grinding tyranny, was established. Nations were broken up into small seignioralties, whose lords, at constant war with each other, only united to resist any interference with their privileges; and if occasionally a powerful ruler like Charlemagne succeeded for a time in establishing a real government, it was only personal, and collapsed as soon as the strong hand was removed. No great national undertakings, no great progress in the arts of peace or war, were possible under such conditions; and it was not till feudalism was nearly extinct that these arts emerged from the darkness of the Middle Ages.

The early Frank and German armies comprised the whole manhood of the nations, rudely organised by “hundreds,” or by tribes and families. Some knowledge of tactics had been gained from their adversaries the Romans, and from deserters and escaped slaves in their ranks; but they usually adhered to thèir own national formation, the wedge-shaped column of attack. The principal arm was infantry, divided into “heavy” and “light;” the light infantry being originally the élite, and trained to act with the cavalry, but afterwards degenerating into mere attendants of the latter. The transition from the national to the feudal system is seen in the armies of Charles Martel. These consisted in part of his personal followers, partly of mercenaries, and partly of national levies. At Tours the latter still formed the great bulk of the force, and fought, as of old, in heavy masses and with little tactical organisation. Under Charlemagne armies became more feudal, the chiefs and their retainers forming a larger proportion, the national levies a much smaller one; and the frequent levies ordered in his reign did much to extinguish the class of freemen, driving them to seek protection as vassals of the great nobles. The true feudal armies were formed entirely of the knights, men-at-arms, and vassals, who obeyed the summons of their suzerain, either at the call of the king, or for his own private wars, and whose service lasted variously for twenty or forty days or three months, at the end of which the army disbanded and returned home.

The change in the constitution of armies was accompanied by changes in their armament. As the equality of the old freemen gave placé to the classification of the people into lords, gentlemen, and -serfs, corresponding distinctions in arms and equipment followed; the horseman became the representative of the upper classes, the foot soldier of the serfs and peasants. The feudal system could only be maintained by the superior fighting power of the ruling class. All that money and art could do was therefore lavished on the equipment of the lord and his immediate retainers, while the peasant remained ill-armed and comparatively defenceless. The strength of armies was measured by the number of men-at-arms. Efforts to arm and train the mass of the people commonly originated with the kings, in their desire to form a more national force than the semi-independent feudal levies, and received small encouragement from the nobles. When they succeeded it was a sign of weakness in the feudal chiefs, and of a more popular government. In no country were the lower orders so warlike and used to arms as in England; and historians have shown how essentially popular was the rule even of our most absolute monarchs.

Two characteristics of feudalism were especially adverse to progress in military art: the undue preponderance given to one arm, mlmerically weak; and the impossibility of unity of action or combined organisation among so many independent and rival authorities. Among the causes tending to bring about a better military system must be reckoned the Crusades, those marvellous efforts of fanaticism that still excite a wonder and admiration mixed with pity. It is true they left no mark at all proportionate to the vastness of the efforts. The armies of the Crusaders, as they took the field, were mere tumultuary masses, as destitute of order and discipline as their leaders were ignorant of military science. But for the first time large bodies were kept continuously under arms, and some sort of organisation necessarily developed itself. The knights and leaders becoming conscious of their own numerical weakness, bestowed more care on the arms and discipline of their men, and learnt their value; and the first true infantry of the feudal times dates from the Crusades. An event of very different character, but not less exercising a most important influence, was the grant of the franchise to cities and towns, resorted to by Louis VI. of France in 1135 to establish a counterpoise to the power of the barons, and afterwards adopted in Germany and England. These enfranchised cities raised their own levies Cnihce des communes), and thus furnished the king with a military force independent of and antagonistic to the feudatories, and consisting mainly of an infantry superior in quality to the feudal vassals. Another cause was the ever-increasing employment of mercenaries, due partly to the growing wealth and luxury which made personal service irksome, partly to the proved unfitness of feudal armies for continuous operations. Lastly came the invention of gunpowder, which, though it exercised no immediate effect on tactics, and had little to do with the overthrow of feudalism, ultimately revolutionised the whole art of war.

The fall of feudalism as a military system, though -gradual, as all such changes are, may be said to have been accomplished in the middle of the 15th century. Two events occurring about that time gave it its death-blow— the defeat of the Burgundian chivalry by Swiss infantry in the three successive battles of Granson, Morat, and Nancy; and the establishment of “compagnies d ’ ordonnance” by Charles VII. of France. The first destroyed for ever the overwhelming prestige attached to the mailed horsemen, and restored infantry to the place which it had held in ancient armies, and has never lost since; from the second dates the origin of standing armies in Europe. Charles VI. had already sought to substitute a permanent national force fqr-the foreign mercenaries, who were as great a curse to their employers as to their enemies; but the attempt was interrupted by his insanity, followed immediately by internal discord and disastrous wars with England. It was not till sixty years later that Charles VII., having firmly established his power by a series of successes over the English, carried out his father’s idea; and (in 1445) organised fifteen “compagnies Tordonnances to be maintained in peace as well as in war. Each company consisted of 100 men-at-arms, or “lancers,” with their attendants, viz., squire, groom or batman, and three archers— the whole force amounting to 9000 men. Three years later, he organised a corresponding force of infantry, 16,000 strong, named franc-archers. The superiority of a standing army over an assemblage of feudal militia was soon, proved, and other states imitated the example of France. A change took place in the military system of Europe; the practice of calling out the feudal contingent ceased, and permanently paid troops, regularly disciplined and organised, were substituted for them. These troops were not always national. At first they were largely composed of the old bands of wandering mercenaries; but the proportion of foreigners decreased as the feudal spirit gave way to a more national one.

The development of the new system may be dated from the beginning of the 16th century. Armies, no longer undisciplined feudal levies, were permanently organised in. companies and in regiments. The use of fire-arms became general, though it was long before the pike was entirely supplanted. The distinctive duties and value of cavalry and infantry were recognised, and regular tactics introduced for the different arms, the battalion (originally battaglia y battle array) becoming the recognised tactical unit for infantry, as distinguished from the administrative organisation by regiments and companies. “Articles of war” were issued to their several armies by Ferdinand of Spain, Francis I. of France, and Charles V., and a regular discipline thus established. From this time to the outbreak of the great French Revolution but little change took place in the manner of raising armies, though their tactical organisation varied according to the arms in use. Armies were raised mainly by voluntary enlistment, compulsory levies being only resorted to under pressure of war. Usually the king or his commander-in-chief contracted with a nobleman, of repute as a warrior, or of large possessions, to raise a regiment—the nobleman to receive a certain sum down and an annual allowance for its maintenance, and to have the command of it. He in his turn engaged “captains,” some of whom brought companies with them, others raised companies under his authority, and others, again, merely commanded the men hσ himself had raised. Royal officers, “commissaries,” were appointed to muster these regiments periodically, and see that the colonels fulfilled their share of the contract; and, on the other hand, to issue the pay and provide for the subsistence of the forces. The regiments were sometimes raised for a fixed time, and disbanded at the expiration of that time or at the close of the war, but as standing armies became general, they were maintained. permanently, the command being transferred as occasion required; and, as the terms of the contract were always favourable to the colonel, the command of a regiment was a valuable piece of court patronage. The earliest form of organisation, both in the cavalry and infantry, was the company, originally representing the group of men who followed a knight to battle and fought under his banner, and later the bands of mercenaries who served under a “captain.” These companies were afterwards grouped and organised in regiments, but for a long time each company continued to carry its own banner, indicating its real origin. Both companies and regiments varied in strength according to the habita of the country, and according to the -wealth or personal influence of the leaders. In the days when men fought in compact masses, and one man’s voice could thus control a large number, 500 and even 600 men λvas not an uncommon strength for a company; and in some nations the numbers never fell very low. In France, however, the policy initiated by Richelieu, and afterwards adhered to by Mazarin and Louis XIV., of breaking the power of the French nobility, and making them followers and dependants of the king, reacted on the organisation of the army; for it was found desirable to give employment to as many of the young noblemen as possible in the royal armies, and therefore to multiply the companies and commands, and the French companies sometimes fell as low as 30 men. As the undisciplined melée of feudal battles gave way to regular and scientific tactics, the necessity of bodies of constant and uniform strength was felt, and the battalion and squadron were introduced as the fighting formations of infantry and cavalry respectively. Originally battalions were dense masses numbering several thousand men, and composed of many regiments. As changes in arms led to the adoption of more extended formations, it became necessary to subdivide into smaller fractions, and battalions were gradually reduced in size till they became mere fractions of a regiment. Finally, when the advantages of uniform and permanent organisation were more fully understood, and large standing armies enabled such improvements to be introduced, regiments also were made of uniform strength, and the battalion became a fixed fraction, usually one-half or one-third of a regiment, but still retained its distinctive character as a tactical unit; while for administrative purposes, recruiting, clothing, payment, <fcc., the regiment was the unit. Similarly, the company remained the lesser administrative unit,— that is, the captain was answerable for the pay⅞ equipment, and discipline of his company in camp and quarters; but on the parade-ground or battle-field the battalion was divided into a number of equal divisions not necessarily corresponding to the companies. In Frederick the Great’s time a Prussian battalion consisted of five (afterwards four) companies, but on parade was divided into eight “zugs” (divisions); and the Prussian company column, now so famous, is merely a return to the old formations adopted when the company acted independently.

The tactical changes effected in European armies between the beginning of the 16th and end of the 18th centuries, consequent on alterations in arms, need only be very briefly noticed here. In the earlier wars of the 16th century the musketeers formed but a small proportion of the infantry, and the great bulk consisted of pikemen, whose power lay in weight and mass: deep formations were consequently the rule. The cavalry still fought principally with the lance. In the latter part of the century, during the great war of independence of the Netherlands, improvements in fire-arms led to the proportion of musketeers being increased, and the front of battle proportionately extended to give effect to their fire. Thus Maurice of Nassau usually formed his armies in battalions of 500 men, of 250 pikemen, and 250 musketeers each,—the pikemen ten deep in the centre, the musketeers on the flanks. The cavalry also adopted fire-arms, and were taught to tnιst more to fire than to the effect of the charge. During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) the proportion of musketeers was still further increased. The imperial armies under Tilly and Wallenstein still fought in heavy masses, but Gustavus Adolphus reduced his formations to six ranks. The bayonet, introduced about the middle of the 17th century, gradually superseded the pike, and led to a further reduction of the ranks to four. During the prolonged wars of Louis XIV.’s reign, and under the auspices of the great generals of that age,—Turenne, Condé, Eugene, and Marlborough,— considerable improvements were effected in the tactics and organisation of armies, and the permanent grouping of battalions and regiments into brigades and divisions was first introduced. Still further improvements were made during the Silesian and Seven Years’ Wars (1740-63). Many changes ascribed to Frederick the Great are really due to Leopold of Dessau, who, under the first Frederick, formed the army which the second Frederick led to victory. He reduced the ranks of the infantry to three, trained them to manoeuvre rapidly and with extraordinary precision, and was the author of the drill-book which has remained the basis of all European systems of drill. But the improvements in cavalry tactics were unquestionably due to Frederick himself, who taught them the true secret of their strength, shock and rapidity, and further· developed their power by the introduction of horse artillery, able to move rapidly and accompany the cavalry anywhere.

At the close of Frederick’s brilliant career every army in Europe had copied that of Prussia more or less closely. Infantry was organised in regiments of two or three battalions, each battalion 500 or 600 strong—this number being determined by the length of line which it was considered one man could effectively control. Cavalry was organised in regiments of four squadrons, each squadron from 100 to 150 strong. Artillery organisation was still in its infancy, a large part of the guns being attached to regiments, and the heavy guns often horsed and driven by contractors. But Gribeauval was laying the foundation in France of the battery organisation afterwards adopted by all nations. The Prussian army, proud of its brilliant series of successes, equally proud of its manoeuvring power and drill, was looked up to by all Europe, and believed itself invincible, but in its pride forgot how much was due to the hand which had guided it. The French army had fallen very low in general estimation, and even the American war, and minor successful expeditions towards the end of the century, did little to raise it. The Austrian army was slow to adopt improvements, but had acquired a reputation for tenacity. England, recently driven out of her American colonies, was hardly acknowledged as a power on land.

Such was the military condition of Europe when the J French Revolution broke like a storm over the Continent, 1 sweeping away old landmarks and old systems, covering t the land for years with a flood, which, when it receded, left the whole face of the country changed. When, in 1792, the monarchs of Europe banded to crush the revolution, the military force of France was at a very low ebb. The old Royalist army was disorganised by revolutionary passions and frequent changes, and the constituent assembly had rejected the proposed “compulsory service” as at variance with the liberty of the citizen. But on the proclamation that “the country was in danger,” volunteers flocked from all parts to join the armies, and a levy en masse was ordered to repel the invaders. Officials vied in proving their zeal by the numbers of recruits they forwarded to the frontiers, and patriotism and terrorism combined to fill the ranks. Within three years nearly 1,200,000 men were thus poured into the army, and sufficed to repel the invaders, and form the armies which, under Hoche, Moreau, and finally under Bonaparte, brought France forth victorious in 1797. But the long and bloody war had exhausted the supply, large as it - was, and some new system of recruiting became necessary, for it was evident that voluntary enlistment would no longer suffice. In 1798, therefore, Jourdan brought forward and passed the law establishing conscription, the basis of all French military legislation since that date, and moro or less of that of other countries also. Every citizen was declared liable to service for five years, and the whole male population, between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, was divided into classes and enrolled by name, to be called out as occasion required. It was the terrible power of the conscription that enabled Napoleon to carry on the gigantic wars which characterised his reign, and after losing in the snows of Russia the largest army ever pμt in the field, to reappear in a few months with another almost as large. Other nations of necessity followed the example of France, and the conscription became general. Prussia still further developed its power by reducing the period of service in the ranks, and passing her soldiers as soon as sufficiently trained into a reserve, thus gradually training the whole of her population. The “short service and reserve” system, the greatest revolution ever effected in this branch of military art, and characterised by a recent foreign writer on political economy as “the greatest, and in its ulterior consequences probably the most important, of the events of our century,” owed its origin to the conditions imposed on Prussia by Napoleon at the treaty-of Tilsit. Restricted to an army of 43,000 men, the Prussian statesmen evaded the spirit of the clause by sending the trained soldiers to their homes, to be recalled when needed, and replacing them with recruits. This system, by which every citizen becomes also a trained soldier, and there is no limit to the size of the armies save that of population, was at first only partially adopted by other countries. The prejudice in favour of professional armies — soldiers whose business it was to fight and do nothing else—was too strong, and doubts were felt whether these semi-citizen armies would stand the rough trials of war. But after Sadowa, other nations had no choice but to copy it or resign their military position. It is true the lesson was not learnt at once by all, but 1870 and 1871 enforced what 1866 had already taught; and within the last few years every great Continental power has reorganised its military institutions on the model of Prussia.

If we glance back at the history of military institutions in Europe since the fall of Rome, we find it divides its-self into four well-defined periods. In the first or barbarous stage we hav6 .vast armies or hordes, formidable from their numbers and the courage of the warlike freemen composing them, but almost without tactics or organisation. In the second or feudal period we have armies nearly as numerous, but whose strength lay entirely in a small body of highly-equipped knights and men-at-arms,—the bulk of the army no longer freemen fighting for their country, but slaves fighting at their lord’s command. Little progress has been made in tactics and organisation, and the fighting power of nations is exhausted in constant petty wars. In the third or “standing army” period we have small armies of highly-trained professional soldiers forming a class distinct from the rest of the population, tactics and organisation becoming a science and making vast progress. Lastly, under the conscription we have armies, once more national, embracing the whole male population, more numerous than ever, but now trained and organised with all the science and skill of professional soldiers. Some remarks on the general principles involved in this branch of military art will serve as introduction to a more detailed account of existing armies.

The military institutions of a nation are governed by various considerations, the principal of which are geographical position, policy, national character, and wealth. A country like America, which is threatened by no powerful neighbours, can devote its whole energies to peaceful pursuits, and reduce its army to a mere police force. But a European state, surrounded by warlike and powerful nations, may depend for its very existence on its army, and must consequently keep pace with its neighbours, and develop its forces to the utmost that industrial and economical considerations admit of. Political economista class all military expenditure as non-productive. Perhaps it might more fairly be called indirectly productive, as necessary to the maintenance and extension of civilisation and the protection and development of trade. Further, the value of property increases with increased security, and military expenditure within certain limits thus tends to repay itself. Broadly, however, it may be treated as a. tax for insurance, and as so much withdrawn from the productive power of the nation. The object of all military institutions is to develop the highest amount of fighting power,—that is, attain the greatest security with least strain on the industry of the country,— the latter being measured not by the cost of the army as shown by the budget, but by the amount of productive labour withdrawn and disturbance produced. All questions, therefore, have to be considered under two aspects, military and economical—that of efficiency and that of cost.

The first question that presents itself is the manner of raising armies. There are two methods,—that of voluntary enlistment, and that of compulsory levies or conscription: the former once the universal system, but now retained by England alone; the latter adopted by all other European powers. By voluntary enlistment the burden of military duty is distributed evenly throughout the community, the soldier receiving fair wages for his service, while the citizen bears his share in the form of taxes. Personal liberty is not interfered with, the industry of the country generally is undisturbed, those members only are withdrawn who are likely to contribute least to its wealth, and the army becomes a useful school and refuge for the restless classes of the community. But the supply of recruits is fluctuating and uncertain, they are drawn almost entirely from the lowest class, every desired improvement is hampered by considerations of its effect on recruiting, and the army tends to become a class rather than a national one. Compulsory service gives unlimited command of men, introduces a higher class in the ranks, and raises the tone of the army generally; while military efficiency alone has to be considered in organisation. But it presses much more severely on the country. Military service becomes a tax inflicted by lot, falling with excessive weight on some, while others escape free. “Admit substitutes (or exemption by payment), and the hardship falls exclusively on the poor; insist on personal service, and the loss of time, which to the young man of fortune is nothing, and which to the lowest class of labourer is unimportant, because the pay while serving is as good as he would get elsewhere, becomes a very heavy tax on the skilled industry of the artisan or the professional man, or’those who have business habits to acquire.” Hence in all countries where personal service is enforced, it is necessarily accompanied with provisions for softening its hardships and reducing its inequality. The time of service is reduced to a minimum, and a special short course is established for men of means and education above the average. Exemptions are permitted on personal or family grounds, and in Prussia these exemptions are carried so far that the ballot is practically done away with; and in some countries money payments are required from all who do not serve. The relative cost of the two systems depends upon the size of the army. So long as the numbers required are small and can be obtained at a fair rate of wages, voluntary enlistment is the cheaper of the two; but when the numbers are large, and excessive wages are necessary to stimulate enlistment, compulsory service becomes economicaL Such an army as England maintains is actually raised with less cost to the nation by the former system; but armies such as those of the Continental powers are only possible under the latter. So heavily, however, does the conscription press on the life of a nation, that it may safely be asserted that no nation ever did or will accept it, except of necessity.

The next great question is that of the terms of service. No nation can afford to keep constantly under arms the whole force which it may require to put forth in war. In olden times fresh armies were raised on the outbreak of each war. The great step in modern organisation was the maintenance of permanent cadres and the formation of trained reserves. Military forces are now divided into “standing armies,” comprising those who are actually doing duty as soldiers, and forming in peace time the cadres and the school of instruction of the army; and “reserves,” under which name are included all who pursue their industrial callings in peace, but are called to arms in war. Such reserves, however, may be of very different value, from the Prussian “reservist,” a trained soldier in the prime of life, to the. garde mobile or volunteer who has only attended a few drills; and their value is always closely connected with the system and terms of service. There are practically three systems. The first, or long service system is now almost obsolete,—it partly lives in England alone. Under this the soldier was engaged for life, or for a long term of years, remained with the colours so long as fit for service, and was then discharged, usually with a pension. It produced a highly-trained army, in which discipline, mutual reliance, esprit de corps, constancy under discouragement, and all soldierly qualities, were carried to their highest pitch. The soldier made the regiment, his home, and knew no law but the word of his commander. But such an army was necessarily small, being maintained in peace as well as in war, and could form no reserve, as all remained with the colours till they were no longer fit for service. In war, therefore, it had to be increased, and its casualties replaced by untrained recruits; and its quality deteriorated when excellence was most required. Long service also tended to produce a class army, isolated from the life of the nation, and always a dangerous weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous ruler. Further, to condemn a man drawn by lot to lifelong service was felt to be incompatible with the maintenance of compulsory service; and when it was found by experience that soldiers could in three years be sufficiently trained for all purposes of war, and that by the application of short service armies could be trebled in numbers in war without increasing the cost in peace, the old long service armies disappeared from Europe.

The converse of this is the second, or militia system, actually in force in Switzerland and Canada, and to a certain extent in America. Under this no permanent army is maintained, but all, or a large proportion, of the inhabitants are liable to service, and undergo a partial training. The cost of such a force is very small, the industrial disturbance reduced to a minimum; yet the forces that are put in the field are formidable, in numbers at least. But its real economy is more than doubtful. History abounds with lessons that such forces can never carry on sustained operations against trained armies. They may show brilliant courage; but they want the mutual knowledge and reliance, the constancy in defeat, and the instinctive discipline which can be acquired by habit alone. The cost of putting them in the field is always disproportionately great. Opposed to trained armies, they invite defeat; opposed to similar forces, as in the great American war, decisive action on either side is impossible, and the war drags on till its cost far exceeds that of years of standing armies and peace preparations.

The third and intermediate system is that of short service and reserves, now adopted by all nations. The European details Of its application vary, but the general principles are the same in all,—to maintain the cadres of a large army in peace, capable of expansion in war, and to keep the recruit in the ranks only so long as is necessary to make him a trained soldier, and then pass him into a reserve. It combines the numerical strength of the militia system with the organisation, training, and discipline of a long service army. Its practical application will be seen in describing the various armies of Europe.

The principles of organisation are comparatively simple. Organisation is of two kinds, tactical and administrative; the first having reference to action on the battle-field, the second to general maintenance in peace as well as in war. Originally the two were often distinct; thus companies and regiments were originally administrative units, battalions tactical ones; and the two had not necessarily any connection. But the most perfect organisation is that which answers both purposes, and in this direction all modern improvements have tended; and as the battle-field is the ultimate object of all preparation, administrative considerations must give way to tactical ones when they clash, and all organisation must conform to the tactical requirements of the day. Great progress was made in this branch during the Revolutionary war. The origin of regiments and battalions has already been described. The first “mixed divisions,” ⅛.e., divisions comprising troops of all arms, were formed in the Revolutionary armies of 1792,and in 1804 Napoleon organised “corps d’armée,” each forming a complete army in itself, under the command of a marshal,—the necessity for such organisation arising from the size of his armies, which had grown beyond the immediate control of one man. This organisation was copied by other armies, and attained its highest perfection when combined by the Prussians with their territorial system—each corps d’armée being permanently located in and recruited from a particular province. A modern army usually comprises several such corps d’armée.

A Prussian army corps, which may be taken as the type of modern organisation, consists of a staff, two infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, a regiment (seven batteries) of corps artillery, a regiment of engineers, and a number of administrative services. An infantry division consists of a staff, two infantry brigades, a rifle battalion, four batteries of artillery, and a regiment of cavalry. An infantry brigade consists of a staff and two regiments (six battalions); a cavalry brigade of a staff, three regiments (twelve squadrons), and a battery of horse artillery. The engineers comprise a pontoon train, a light field bridge train, a column of entrenching tools, siege materials, and a field telegraph; while nine reserve ammunition columns accompany the corps artillery. The administrative departments include the commissariat, charged with the supply of the troops, and having at its disposal five provision columns and a large amount of hired or requisitioned transport, and provided with a field bakery;—the medical department, consisting of a staff; three ambulance detachments, each having a staff of medical officers, 120 trained stretcher-bearers to attend to and carry off the wounded on the battle-field, a supply of medical stores, covers for wounded, and a number of ambulance waggons, fitted for the conveyance of wounded; and the medical staff attendants, tents, and all appliances for 12 field hospitals, each calculated to receive 200 wounded;—the pay department, charged with the military chest;— a, field post, a depot for sick and supernumerary horses, and other services. Such an army corps has a fighting strength of 25 battalions, or about 25,000 infantry, 5 regiments (about 3000) cavalry, and 96 guns, and a total strength of about 40,000 men, 12,000 horses, and 1400 waggons and wheeled vehicles.

The following table shows approximately the military resources of the great powers of Europe :— [table]

Note.— It is impossible to form anything but an approximate comparison, owing to the different conditions of service and varying organisation of the several armies. Under “depot troops” are included all forces whose province it is to feed the active arms” Under “garrisons and reserves” are included all forces organised for home defence, and not forming part of the field armies; but in several cases a large proportion of these are available as reinforcements to the active army if required Only those forces that have received some training and have a permanent organisation are counted; thus the English volunteers are included, but not the Geπnan landstuπn, or French reserves of the territorial army. The British troops serving in India have been included in the military forces of Great Britain, and the expenses borne on their account by the Indian revenue in the military expenditure; but not the native forces in India.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

The history of the military institutions of England may be divided into three principal periods, each marked by a system peculiar to itself: the Anglo-Saxon, or militia period, preceding the Norman Conquest; the feudal period, extending from that to the great Rebellion; and the period of standing armies, lasting from the Restoration to the present day.

Prior to the Norman Conquest the armed force of England was essentially a national militia. Every freeman was bound to bear arms for the defence of the country, or for the maintenance of peace. Military service was not a debt due to the king or earl, the obligation of a dependent to his lord, but the service owed by a free citizen to his country. To give some organisation and training to this levy, the sheriffs had authority to call out the contingents of their several shires for exercise. The thanes appeared on horseback, and the bulk of the people, armed with swords, spears, and heavy shields, or with bows and spears, formed the infantry; This force, termed the “Fyrd,” was available for home service only, and could not be moved even from its county except in the case of invasion or great emergency; and it was principally to repel the invasions of Danes and others that its services were required. Yet even in those days the necessity of some more permanent force was felt, and bodies of paid troops were maintained by the king and some of the great earls at their own cost. Thus Canute kept up a household force (huscarle) of 6000 men, and paid troops also formed part of Harold’s army at the battle of Hastings.

Although William professed to reign by right of inheritance, not of conquest, and to maintain the existing laws of the country, its military institutions underwent a rapid and complete change under him. The great slaughter of the Anglo-Saxon nobility at Hastings, and the frequent and unsuccessful revolts of the survivors, and consequent forfeiture of their estates, enabled William to make large grants to his followers; and with these he introduced the feudal system of military tenure. Henceforth military service was a debt due by the dependent or vassal to the lord of whom he held his land, not the free service rendered by a citizen to his country. And William took advantage of his exceptional position as a conqueror, and as the original granter of nearly half the lands of England, to carry the feudal system to a perfection which it had never attained on the Continent. Assuming that “the king is the universal lord and original proprietor of all the lands of the kingdom,” he proceeded to divide the country into more than 60,000 military allotments or fees, to be held under tenure of “knight’s service.” By the conditions of knight’s service the tenant of a fee was bound to attend his lord in w ar, with horse and arms, at his own cost, for forty days in each year,—the tenant of half a fee doing like service for twenty days. Where one man held many fees—and some of the great barons held several hundreds — he became responsible to the king as tenant-in-chief for military service in proportion to his grant, and required the same from his tenants.

This important change in the tenure of land and military system of the country was not effected easily or at once. To the original Saxon proprietors, who still held much of the land, the feudal· system was a strange and intolerable burden. But the ever-growing preponderance of the Norman element, the dissensions among the Saxons themselves, which William skilfully made use of, the constant wars and revolts, and consequent necessity for improved military organisation, gradually overcame their resistance, and shortly before the Conqueror’s death the new system was finally accepted throughout the country. Thus the king could command the services of 60,000 knights and men-at-arms for forty days free of cost; and these feudal troops, unlike the Saxon levies, were bound to follow him anywhere. Such at least was the theory; but in practice modifications were soon introduced. Forty days might suffice to repel an invasion or crush a revolt, but not to prosecute a foreign war; moreover, many of the tenants’ fees were subdivided, and the holders only liable to twenty or ten days’ service. On the other hand, many holders of fees could not render personal service, or preferred submitting to a money penalty instead. Thus by mutual consent grew up a system'of fines or “esçuage,” and with the money levied from those who failed to do service the king was able to hire mercenaries, or pay such of the feudal troops as were willing to prolong their service. From time to time proclamations and statutes were issued reminding the holders of knights’ fees of their duties; but the immediate object was generally to raise money rather than to enforce personal service, which became more and more rare. Thus gradually departed the spirit of the feudal system, the principle that those who held the land should fight for it; armies lost their national character, the power of the king was increased, and the first steps laid towards the establishment of standing armies as instruments in his hand. The feudal system had not, however, abrogated the old Saxon levies; and while in the former we trace the source of our stipendiary forces, from the latter arose two national institutions,—the posse comitatus, liable to be called out by the sheriff to maintain the king’s peace, and later the militia force. The posse comitatus, or power of the county, included all males capable of bearing arms, peers and spiritual men alone excepted; and though its primary object was to maintain peace and pursue felons under the command of the sheriff, it was also bound to attend upon summons for the military defence of the country. This levy was organised as an armed force by an Act of 27 Henry II. (1181 a.d.), and subsequently by the 13 Edward I. (1285 A.D.), commonly known as the “Statute of Winchester,” which determined the numbers and description of weapons to be kept by each man according to his property, and also provided for their periodical inspection. This force was only liable to home service, but even in early days seems to have been used, as now, as a feeder to the army.

The armies with which our kings carried on their foreign wars -consisted mainly of paid troops. Many, in the days of the earlier kings especially, were foreign mercenaries, and these were sometimes imported to England to the great discontent of the country. But the Edwards found that there was better material to be had in this country than abroad; and the army which Edward III. took to France, and with which he won the battle of Crecy, was composed exclusively of English, Welsh, and Irish. A muster-roll, still preserved, of the army with which he besieged Calais is interesting as giving the numbers and rates of pay of the different ranks. The prince received £1 a day, and the bishop of Durham, 6s. 8d. Then follow:— [table]

These armies were raised partly from those bound to nerve by tenure, partly by forced levies, which, though illegal and often strenuously resisted by Parliament, were not unfrequent; but mainly by contracts entered into “with some knight or gentleman expert in war, and of great revenue and livelihood in the country, to serve the king in war with a number of men.” Copies of the indentures executed when Henry V. raised his army for the invasion of France in 1415 are in existence. Under these the contracting party agreed to serve the king abroad for one year, with a given number of men equipped according to agreement, and at a stipulated rate of pay, the items of which are set forth, and agree generally with those given above. A certain sum was usually paid in advance, and in many cases the Crown jewels and plate were given in pledge for the rest. The profession of arms seems to have been a profitable one, and there was no difficulty in raising men where the commander had a good military reputation; Edward III. is said to have declined the services of numbers of foreign mercenaries, who wished to enrol under him in his wars against France. The pay of the soldier was high as compared with that of the ordinary labourer, and he had the prospect of a share of plunder in addition.

The funds for the payment of these armies were provided pιrtly from the royal revenues, partly from the fines paid in lieu of military service, and other fines arbitrarily imposed, and partly by grants from Parliament. As the soldier’s contract usually ended with the war, and the king had seldom funds to renew it even if he so wished, the armics disbanded of themselves at the close of each war. To secure the services of the soldier during his contract, Acts were passed (18 Henry VI. c. 19; and 7 Henry VII. c. 1) inflicting penalties for desertion; and in EdwarcfVL’s reign an Act “touching the true service of captains and soldiers” was passed, somewhat of the nature of a Mutiny Act.

The six centuries which elapsed between the Norman Conquest and the Rebellion may be treated as one period in the history of the military institutions of England. Though considerable changes had taken place, though the feudal armies in which the great nobles rode at the head of their retainers, and whose main fighting strength lay in the number of knights and men-at-arms, had given place to armies raised by contract, commanded by officers having no personal connection with the men, and in which the common infantry formed the real fighting strength, still these changes had taken place gradually, and fundamentally the principles remained the same. The army seldom came in collision with the nation. Latterly indeed, in Queen Elizabeth’s time, the demands of the Irish wars had led to frequent forced levies, and the occasional billeting of the troops in England also gave rise to murmurs, but the brilliancy and energy of her reign covered a great deal, and the peaceful policy of her successor removed all immediate cause of complaint. But with the accession of Charles I. a new period commences, and we find the army a constant and principal source of dispute between the king and Parliament, until under William III. a standing army is finally established on its present constitutional footing. Charles wished to support his brother-in-law, the Elector Palatine, in his struggle for the crown of Germany, and for that purpose raised an army of 10,000 men. He was already encumbered with debts, and the Parliament refused all grants, on which he had recourse to forced loans to supply the funds. The army was sent to Spain, but returned without effecting anything, and was not disbanded, as usual, but billeted on the inhabitants. The billeting was in itself illegal, and was the more deeply resented as it appeared that the troops were purposely billeted on those who had resisted the king’s loan. Finally, the disorders committed by these troops caused the king to issue a commission to certain persons, officers and others, to proceed against offenders “according to the justice of martial law,”—thus establishing martial law in England in time of peace. These three breaches of the law—forced loans, billeting, and martial law—all directly connected with the maintenance of the army, formed the main substance of the grievances set forth in the celebrated “Petition of Right.” In accepting this petition, Charles gave up the right to maintain an army without consent of Parliament; and when in 1639 he wished to raise one to act against the rebellious Scotch, Parliament was called together, and its sanction obtained, on the plea that the army was necessary for the defence of England. This army again became the source of dispute between the king and Parliament, and later some of the hottest contests arose on the question of the command of the armed forces: finally both sides appealed to arms, and the parliamentary army, after having overthrown the monarchy, upset the Parliament also, and remained undisputed master. Under Cromwell, the force which had raised him to power was naturally augmented and encouraged. For the first timo a real standing army, amounting at one time to 80,000 men, was maintained. This army of the Commonwealth differed in character from those which preceded or followed it, the men as a rule being taken from a better class, the officers from a lower one. The common levies of the first parliamentary armies were no match for the gentlemen who gathered round the royal standard, till Cromwell leavened them with a different stamp of men, mainly drawn from the yeomen and middle class, — earnest resolute men, whose stern fanaticism was able to turn the scale against the headstrong valour of the Royalists. This class served largely in Cromwell’s army, and gave a tone to the whole, while the pay was sufficiently high to make it a desirable profession for others besides the poorest. But with the officers it was otherwise. The noble and gentle families who commanded the king’s armies remained faithful to his cause, and Cromwell had to draw his officers from a class little above the men. Few will be found now to dispute Cromwell’s capacity as a general and ruler, nor the high qualities of the army by which he maintained his power at home, and spread England’s prestige abroad. But such an army could not be maintained without great cost and hardship to the people at large, and before Cromwell’s death it had produced deeper discontent than even Charles’s exactions.

On the Restoration this army was disbanded. The king feared and distrusted it, for it was formed of his enemies, and officered by men who had approved his father’s execution, and it had made itself hateful to the nation. The permanent forces of the Crown were reduced to the “garrisons and guards” maintained by the king from the revenue allotted to him for carrying on the government of the country. The “garrisons” were commissioned to special fortresses,—the Tower of London, Portsmouth, &c. The “guards” comprised the sovereign’s body guards (the “yeomen of the guard” and “gentlemen-at-arms,” who had existed since the times of Henry VII. and VIII. ); Monk’s regiment of foot (now the Coldstream Guards), alone retained of the disbanded army; and two regiments of life guards and one of foot guards, raised principally from the cavaliers who had followed the king’s fortunes. Even this small force, at first not exceeding 3000 men, was looked on with jealousy by Parliament, and every attempt to increase it was opposed. The acquisition of Tangiers and Bombay, as part of the dower of the Infanta of Portugal, led to the formation of a troop of horse (now the 1st Royal Dragoons) and a regiment of infantry (now the 2d or Queen’s regiment), for the protection of the former; and a regiment of infantry (afterwards transferred to the East India Company, and now the 103d, or Bombay Fusiliers), to hold the latter. These troops, not being stationed in the kingdom, created no distrust; but when in 1670, on occasion of the' Dutch war, 12,000 men were raised for the protection of the coasts, Parliament immediately petitioned that they should be disbanded as soon as peace was made. On several occasions during Charles’s reign considerable armies were raised, but were mostly disbanded again when the occasion ceased. Several regiments, however, were added to the permanent force, including Dumbarton’s regiment (the 1st or Royal Scots) and the 3d Buffs; and on Charles’s death in 1685 the total force of “guards and garrisons” had risen to 16,500, of whom about one-half formed what we should now call the standing army.

James II. was more obstinate than his predecessor in his efforts to increase the army, and Monmouth’s rebellion afforded him the pretext. A force of about 20,000 men was maintained in England, and a large camp formed at Hounslow. Eight cavalry and twelve infantry regiments were raised, and given the numbers which, with few exceptions, they still bear. James even proposed to Parliament to disband the militia and further augment the standing army; and although the proposal was instantly rejected by the Commons, he continued to add to the army, and to billet, them on the country, in defiance of the remonstrances of Parliament, till the Revolution deprived him of his throne and put an end to the contest. The army which he had raised was to a great extent disbanded, the Irish soldiers especially, whom he had introduced in large numbers on account of their religion, being all sent home.

The condition of the army immediately engaged the attention of Parliament. The Bill of Rights had definitely established that “the raising or keeping of a standing army within the kingdom, unless it be by the consent of Parliament, is against the law,” and past experience made them very jealous of such a force. But James was making efforts to recover his throne, and seeking aid from France; Ireland and Scotland were disaffected, civil war was imminent, foreign war certain; and William had only a few Dutch troops, and the remains of James’s army, with which to meet the storm. Parliament therefore sanctioned a standing army, trusting to the checks established on the power of the Crown by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, and by placing the pay of the army under the control of the Commons. An event soon showed the altered position of the army. A regiment which was favourably inclined to James, and had therefore been ordered abroad, mutinied, and marched north, declaring for James. It was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms; but William found himself without legal power to deal with the mutineers. He therefore applied to Parliament, and in 1689 was passed the first Mutiny Act, which, after repeating the provisions regarding the army inserted in the Bill of Rights, and declaring the illegality of martial law, gave power to the Crown to deal with the offences of mutiny and desertion by courts-martial. From this epoch dates the history of the standing army as a constitutional force.

Under William the army was considerably augmented. The old regiments of James’s army were reorganised, retaining, however, their original numbers, and three of cavalry and eleven of infantry (numbered to the 28th) were added. In 1690 Parliament sanctioned a force of 62,000 men, further increased to 65,000 in 1691; but on peace being made in 1697 the Commons immediately passed resolutions to the effect that the land forces be reduced to 7000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The war that quickly succeeded obliged Great Britain again to raise a large army, at one time exceeding 200,000 men; but of these the greater number were foreign troops engaged for the Continental war. On the peace of Utrecht the force was again reduced to 8000 men in Great Britain and 11,000 in the plantations (f.e., colonies) and abroad. From that time to the present the strength of the army has been determined by the annual votes of Parliament, and though frequently the subject of warm debates in both houses, it has ceased to be a matter of dispute between the Crown and Parliament. The following table shows the fluctuations between that time and the present—the peace years showing the average peace strength, the war years the maximum to which the forces were raised :— [table]

Noie. — Prior to 1856 the British forces serving in India are not included.

During William’s reign the small English army bore an honourable part in the wars against Louis XIV., and especially distinguished itself by its intrepidity at Steinkirk, at Neerwinden, and in the assault of Namur. Twenty English regiments took part in the campaign of 1G94. In the great wars of Queen Anne’s reign the British army under Marlborough acquired a European reputation. The cavalry, which had called forth the admiration of Prince Eugene when passed in review before him after its long march across Germany (1704), especially distinguished itself in the battle of Blenheim; and Ramilies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet were added to the list of English victories. The army was permanently increased by one regiment of cavalry and eleven of infantry; and though the regiments were much reduced in strength during the following peace, the cadres remained untouched. During the reign of the first and second Georges an artillery corps was organised, and' the army further increased by five regiments of cavalry and thirty-five of infantry. Fresh laurels were won at Dettingen (1743), in which battle twenty English regiments took part; and though Fontenoy was a day of disaster for the English arms, it did not lower their reputation, but rather added to it. Six regiments of cavalry and six of infantry shared under Prince Ferdinand the honours of the victory of Minden (1759), and the English infantry was especially thanked by the prince for its conduct on that occasion. About this time the first English regiments were sent to India, and the 39th shared in Clive’s victory at Plassey. During the first half of George III.’s reign the army was principally occupied in America; and though the conquest of Canada may be counted with pride among its exploits, this page in its history is certainly the darkest. English armies capitulated at Saratoga (1777) and at Yorktown (1781), and the war ended in 1785 by the evacuation of the revolted states of America and the acknowledgment of their independence. Before passing to the great French Revolutionary wars, from which a fresh period in the history of the army may be dated, it will be well to review the general condition of the army in the century preceding.

Regiments were raised almost as in the days of the Edwards. The Crown contracted with a distinguished soldier, or gentleman of high position, who undertook to raise the men, receiving a certain sum as bounty-money for each recruit. In some cases, in lieu of money, the contractor received the nomination of all or some of the officers, and recouped himself by selling the commissions. This system—termed raising men for rank—was retained till’ very recently, and originally helped to create the “purchase system” of promotion. For the maintenance of the regiment the colonel received an annual sum sufficient to cover the pay of the men, and the expenses of clothing and of recruiting. The colonel was given a “beating order,” without which no enlistment was legal; and was responsible for maintaining his regiment at full strength. “Muster masters” were appointed to muster the regiments, and to see that the men for whom pay was drawn were really effective. Sometimes, when casualties were numerous, the allowance was insufficient to meet the cost of recruiting, and special grants were made. In war time the ranks were also filled by released debtors, pardoned criminals, and impressed paupers and vagrants. Where the men were raised by voluntary enlistment, the period of service was a matter of contract between the colonel and the soldier, and the engagement was usually for life; but exceptional levies were enlisted for the duration of the war, or for periods of three or five years. The army was officered entirely from the upper ranks, the low rate of pay and the purchase system combining to exclude all. but men of , ndependent incomes. Appointments (except when in the gift of the colonel) were made by the King at home, and by the Commander-in-Chief abroad; even in Ireland the power of appointment rested with the local commander of the forces until the Union. The soldier was clothed by his colonel, the charge being defrayed from the “stock fund.” The army lived in barracks, camps, or billets. Tho barrack accommodation in Great Britain at the beginning of the century only sufficed for 5000 men; and though it had gradually risen to 20,000 in 1792, a large part of the army was constantly in camps or billets—the latter causing endless complaints and difficulties. The drill of the army was mainly borrowed from that of Frederick, but the American war had trained many regiments to skirmishing. The administration was generally corrupt and defective, and the character of the army stood very low when England embarked on her long war with France.

Her first efforts in this war did not tend to raise it. After a campaign, fought with great gallantry but not much skill, the English army under the Duke of York was driven out of Holland, and that country annexed to France. But the appointment of the Duke of York to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army was the commencement of a better era. He did much to improve its organisation, discipline, and training, and was ably seconded by commanders of distinguished ability. Under Abercromby in Egypt, under Stewart at Maida, and under "Wellesley and Lake in India, the British armies again attached victory to their standards, and made themselves feared and respected. The energy and unbending resolution of Pitt seemed to communicate itself to the nation, and the threatened invasion of England excited her martial spirit to the highest pitch. Finally, her military glory was raised by the series of successful campaigns in the Peninsula, until it culminated in the great victory of waterloo; and the army emerged from the war with the most solidly founded reputation of any in Europe.

The events of this period belong to the history of England, and fall outside the province of an article dealing only with the army. The great augmentations required during the war. were effected partly by raising additional regiments, but principally by increasing the number of battalions, some regiments being given as many as four. On the conclusion of peace these battalions were redueed, but the regiments were retained, and the army was permanently increased from about 20,000, the usual peace establishment before the war, to an average of 80,000. The Duke of York, on first appointment to the command, had introduced a uniform drill throughout the army, which was further modified according to Dundas’s system in 1800; and, under the direction of Sir John Moore and others, a high perfection of drill was attained. At the beginning of the war, the infantry, like that of the Continental powers, was formed in three ranks; but a two-rank formation had been introduced in America and in India, and gradually became general, and in 1809 was finally approved.

In the Peninsula the army was permanently organised B in divisions, usually consisting of two brigades of three or cl four battalions each, and one or two batteries of artillery. The Duke of Wellington had also brought the commissariat and the army transport to a high pitch of perfection; but in the long peace which followed these establishments were reduced or broken up. The period which elapsed between Waterloo and the Crimean war is marked by a number of Indian and colonial wars, but by no organic changes in the army, with perhaps the single exception of the Enlistment Act of 1847, by which short service,— i.e., an original enlistment for 10 or 12 years, with power to rc-engage to complete 21,—was substituted for the life enlistments hitherto in force. The army went to sleep on the laurels and recollections of the Peninsula. The Duke of Wellington, for many years Commander-in-Chief, was too anxious to hide it away in the colonies, and to save it from further reductions or utter extinction, to attempt any great administrative reforms. The force which was sent to Turkey in 1854 was an agglomeration of battalions, individually perhaps the finest the world had ever seen, but unused to work together, without trained staff, administrative departments, or army organisation of any kind. They fought with distinguished gallantry at the Alma and at Inkerman, but succumbed under the hardships, the privations, and the sickness of the winter before Sebastopol—a sacrifice to maladministration. The lesson was dearly bought, but was not thrown away. From that time successive War Ministers and Commanders-in-Chief have laboured perseveringly at the difficult task of army organisation and administration. Foremost in the work was Lord Herbert, the soldiers’ friend, who fell a sacrifice to his labours, but not before he had done much for the army. The whole system of administration was revised. In 1854 it was inconceivably complicated and cumbersome. The “Secretary of State for War and Colonies,” sitting at the Colonial Office, had a general but vague control, practically limited to times of war. The “Secretary at War” was the parliamentary representative of the army, and exercised a certain financial control, not extending, however, to the ordnance corps. The Commander-in-Chief was responsible to the sovereign alone in all matters connected with the discipline, command, or patronage of the army, but to the Secretary at War in financial matters. The Master-General and Board of Ordnance were responsible for the supply of material on requisition, but were otherwise independent, and had the artillery and engineers under them. The Commissariat Department had its headquarters at the Treasury; and the militia until 1852 were under the Home Secretary. A number of minor subdepartments, more or less independent, also existed, causing endless confusion, correspondence, and frequent collision. In 1854 the business of the colonies was separated from that of war, and the then Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, assumed control overall the other administrative officers. In the following year the Secretary of State was appointed Secretary at War also, and the duties of the two offices amalgamated. The same year the Commissariat Office was transferred to the War Department, and the Board of Ordnance abolished, its functions being divided between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State. The minor departments were gradually absorbed, and the whole administration divided under two great chiefs, sitting at the War Office and Horse Guards’ respectively. Finally, in 1870 these two were welded into one, and the War Office as now existing was constituted.

Corresponding improvements were effected in every branch. The system of clothing the soldiers was altered, the contracts being taken from the colonels of regiments, who received a money allowance instead, and the clothing supplied from Government manufactories. The pay, food, and general condition of the soldier were improved; reading and recreation rooms, libraries, gymnasiums, and facilities for games of all kinds being provided. Special attention was directed to sanitary matters; large barracks were built on improved principles; more space allotted to the men; ventilation and drainage improved, and the rate of mortality greatly reduced. A large permanent camp was formed at Aldershott, where considerable forces were collected and manoeuvred together. Various educational establishments were opened, a staff college established for the instruction of officers wishing to qualify for the staff, and regimental schools improved.

The Indian mutiny of 1857, followed by the transference of the government of India from the hands of the East India Company to those of the Queen’s ministers, led to important changes. The East India Company’s white troops were amalgamated with the Queen’s army, and reorganised—a difficult task, and one which cannot yet be said to be completed.

Among recent alterations may be mentioned the localisation of the army, commenced in 1872, but which,cannot produce its full effects for many years to come; the transference of certain powers over the militia from the lords-lieutenant to the Crown, in 1871, and the placing the militia and volunteer forces directly under the generals commanding districts; the abolition of purchase, in 1871; the introduction of short service (6 years in the ranks) by the Army Enlistment Act of 1870; the institution of annual autumnal manoeuvres, at which considerable forces are collected and manoeuvred against one another over extensive tracts of country; the formation of the Control Department, Ac.; but these will be dealt with at length in the following pages.

British Army as it is.

The supreme command of all the military forces of the nation is vested in the Crown, but can only be exercised through an intermediate and responsible agent. The entire administration, therefore,’ of the regular army and reserve or auxiliary forces is under the control and responsibility of the Secretary of State for lVar, who is assisted by two under-secretaries, the Parliamentary and Permanent Undersecretaries of State. The actual army administration is divided among three great officers,—the Officer Commanding in Chief, the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, and the Financial Secretary. These officers are at the head respectively of the three great departments of the War Office, viz., the Military Department, the Control Department, and the Financial Department; their duties are defined by orders of Council of the 4th and 23d June 1870. The Officer Commanding in Chief is charged with “the discipline and distribution of the army, and of the reserve forces of the United Kingdom when embodied or called out for actual military service; the military education and training of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the army, and of the reserve forces when assembled for training, exercise, inspection, or voluntary military duty; enlisting men for and discharging· men from the army and army reserves; the collection and record of strategical information, including topography, in relation to the military circumstances of this and other countries; the selection of fit and proper persons to be recommended to Her Majesty for appointment to commissions in the army, for promotion for staff and other military appointments, and for ιhilitary honours and rewards.” The Surveyor-General of the Ordnance is charged with “providing, holding, and issuing to all branches of the army and reserve forces, food, forage, fuel, light, clothing, arms, accoutrements, munitions of war, and all other stores necessary for the efficient performance of their duties by such forces, of proper quality and pattern, and in proper quantities, according to the regulations governing the provision, custody, and issue of such supplies; exercising a strict control over the expenditure of such supplies, and seeing that they are properly accounted for by the several officers and others who may be charged with their custody, issue, and use; the custody of all buildings in which troops are quartered, and allotting quarters; providing transport for troops, and directing land and inland, water transport; preparing the estimates for the above services, and causing the expenditure for them to be duly and carefully examined.” The. Financial Secretary is charged with “preparing the annual estimate for the pay of the army and reserve forces; collecting and incorporating into a general estimate for army services the estimates of the other departments of the War Office, and financially reviewing the expenditure proposed in such estimates; submitting for the instructions of the Secretary of State for War any proposed redistribution of the sums allotted to the different subdivisions of the votes for army services; finally, allowing all cash expenditure, and recording the same under its proper head of service in the annual account for Parliament; issuing all warrants for the payment of moneys, making all imprests to accountants and others, and seeing that accoùnts are duly rendered for the same; advising the Secretary of State on all questions of pay, retired pay, and pensions for the army and reserve forces.” Any or all of the above-mentioned great officers may be in Parliament; and the Surveyor-General' of Ordnance and Financial Secretary have usually seats in the Lower House.

The Officer Commanding in Chief is nominated by a letter of service, and holds his appointment during Her Majesty’s pleasure, differing in this respect from the Surveyor-General and Financial Secretary, who are appointed by the Secretary of State, and removable at his pleasure. The appointment is therefore not a political one, and has been held by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge since 1856. He is assisted in his duties, and his orders are conveyed and executed through the agency of the General Staff of the army, comprising the Headquarter Staff of the Military Department at the War Office, and the general officers holding commands at home or abroad, with their subordinate staffs. The Headquarter Staff is subdivided into the Adjutant-General's Department, under the Adjutant-General to the Forces, a general officer of high standing, who is named directly by the sovereign, and is the chief staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief, and the channel through which all communications connected with the personnel, military operations, duties, discipline, and general efficiency of the army pass; the Qιιartermaster-General's Department, under the Quartermaster-General to the Forces,—a general officer of subordinate rank to the Adjutant-General, but also àppoihted by the sovereign—whose duties embrace the movement and quartering of troops, roster of regiments for foreign service, and military questions connected with barracks; the Military Secretary's Department, under the military secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, who is the channel of correspondence on all matters connected with the appointment, promotion, exchange, and retirement of officers, and honours and rewards; the Intelligence Department, including the Topographical Department, under a Deputy-Adjutant-General, charged with the collection and registering of all strategical, statistical, and topographical information, whether relating to the British Empire or to foreign countries and armies; the Recruiting Department, under an Inspector-General of Recruiting, charged with the supervision of the recruiting throughout the kingdom; the Auxiliary Forces Department, under an Inspector-General of Reserve and Auxiliary Forces, embracing all questions connected with the militia, yeomanry, volunteers, and army reserves; and the Military Education Department, under the Director-General of Military Education, charged with the instruction and examination of officers, and matters connected with military colleges and regimental or garrison schools and libraries. The artillery and engineers have a distinct headquarter staff, subordinate, however, to the Adjutant-General.

The Surveyor-General of the Ordnance is annointed by the Secretary for War, and removable at his pleasure; the appointment is therefore a political one, and usually connected with a seat in Parliament. His subordinates and assistants in the performance of his duties are the staff of the Ordnance Department at the War Office, and the officers of the Control Department at the various military stations at home and abroad. The Ordnance Department is divided into the Supply and Transport Division, under a Director of Supplies and Transport, .whose duties embrace questions connected with transport, food, forage, fuel and light, barracks, billets, and lodging; the Artillery and Stores Division, under a Director of Artillery and Stores, whose duties embrace all questions connected with the manufacture, maintenance, and supply of warlike stores of all kinds, and store and clotlιing accounts; the Contracts Division, under a Director of Contracts, who makes all necessary contracts at home, and examines those entered into abroad; and the Clothing Division, under the Director of Clothing, who has charge of the manufacture and supply of clothing for the army.

The Financial Secretary is appointed by the Secretary for War, and removable at his pleasure; the appointment, like that of the Surveyor-General, is therefore a political one, and usually connected with a seat in Parliament. He is assisted by an Accountant-General and large staff of clerks in his department of the War Office, but has no staff or subordinates outside its walls.

The number of men to be maintained and the amount of money to be expended are determined by an annual vote of Parliament, based on the estimates laid before the House by the Minister of War. The minister, with the advice of the Officer Commanding in Chief, decides on the number of men that Parliament shall be asked to provide for the ensuing year, and the estimates are framed accordingly. To obtain the greatest possible accuracy, every subordinate department at home and abroad is called upon for a detailed statement of probable expenditure. These are examined and amended by the heads of the several departments and divisions at the War Office, and passed on to the Finance Department, where they are collected and incorporated into a general estimate, which is submitted to the Secretary of State, with the remarks of the Financial Secretary; and being revised and finally approved of, is submitted to the Treasury and included in the annual budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Treasury may, however, reduce any item that appears excessive. When the amount has been voted by Parliament, the Treasury authorises the Paymaster-General to honour the orders of the War Office to the extent of the vote. At home the necessary funds are obtained by warrants issued by the Accountant-General, under authority of the Financial Secretary, and paid by the Paymaster-GeneraΓby means of orders upon the Bank of England; abroad they are obtained partly by remittances of specie, but principally by the negotiation of bills of exchange drawn upon the Lords of the Treasury by the local Control officers, acting’ in this respect on behalf of the Treasury. The army estimates, as laid before Parliament, are divided under a certain number of votes, and these again into sub-heads and items; and no money granted under one vote can be applied to a service included under another vote without the sanction of the Treasury. Within the limits of the vote, however, the War Office has the power of redistributing the sums allotted.

The following abstract of the army estimates for 1873-4 (which does not include, however, the cost of that part of the army which is serving in India), will indicate the classification under heads and votes, and the amounts allotted; and although these vary slightly from year to year, the general distribution of expenditure remains tolerably uniform :—

[table]

The whole of the military forces of England are raised by voluntary enlistment. Recruiting for the army is carried on partly by means of the large staff of non-commissioned officers attached to the brigade dépôts, partly by means of pensioners receiving a special rate of pay while so employed, and partly by sergeants or parties sent out by regiments and corps for the purpose—the whole being under the superintendence of the colonel commanding the brigade district. Infantry regiments of the line recruit as far as possible within the districts to which they are attached.; but the cavalry, artillery, engineers, guards, and rifles recruit throughout the country generally. Enlistment in the army is regulated by the annual Mutiny Act and the Army Enhstment Act; the former legalises the maintenance of an army, and lays down the number of men and manner of enlisting them; the latter fixes the period and conditions of service. By the Enlistment Act of 1870 men are enlisted for a first period of twelve years, which may be spent either entirely in the army, or partly in the army and partly in the reserve, as may from time to time be fixed by the Secretary of State for War. At present “short service” is fixed at six years in the army and six in the reserve for infantry, and eight years in the army and four in the reserve for the other ' branches. The Household cavalry, and a certain proportion in the other branches, are enlisted for “long service,” i.e., twelve years in the ranks.

On the completion of twelve years’ aπny service, soldiers may be allowed to re-engage for nine years, making a total of twenty-one, at the end of which they are entitled to discharge with a pension. Those who are passed into the. army reserve remain liable for the rest of their twelve years’ engagement to be recalled into the ranks in case of w⅜r or national emergency, and to be called out for eight days’ training in each year; but otherwise resume their positions as citizens, and are free to follow their callings.

A recruit for the army must be between 18 and 25 years of age, unmarried, free from physical infirmities, and of such height and chest measurement as may be laid · down from time to time. The standard has frequently varied, having been used as a means of regulating the supply of recruits, but stood in 1873 at a minimum of 5 feet 5 inches for the infantry, 5 feet 6 inches for light cavalry and engineers, 5 feet 7 inches for gunners, and 5 feet 8 inches for heavy cavalry; the minimum chest measurement being 33 inches. For rifle regiments and for artillery drivers the standard is reduced to 5 feet 4J inches, but increased chest measurement is required. Exceptions are also made in favour of artificers and others. When a recruit presents himself for enlistment he is asked certain questions as to age, and whether he has served before; if the answers are satisfactory, and he is otherwise suitable, he is given a shilling as enlistment money, and served with a notice warning him to attend before a magistrate for attestation. Within not less than twenty-four, and not more than ninety-six hours he is brought before the magistrate. If he then dissents from his enlistment, he may be discharged on payment of 20s. “smart money;” if he still wishes to enlist, he makes a declaration contained in the attestation paper as to his age, place of birth, trade, &c.; signs the attestation, and takes the oath of allegiance; and is thenceforth legally a soldier. No recruit, however, is finally accepted until he has been examined by a medical officer, and approved by an officer of rank detailed for the purpose. Formerly, recruiting was carried on largely at public-houses kept for the purpose; young men were entrapped by lying placards or by the misrepresentations of recruiting agents, and often enlisted whilst drunk, and then sent under escort to their regiments. Recently great improvements have been made in the recruiting service: the bounties formerly offered, and varying from £1 to £10, according to the demand for recruits, have been abolished, exaggerated placards forbidden, the recruiting taken away as much as possible from the public-houses, and the young soldier sent by himself to join his regiment. Under the system of long service the annual number of recruits required to keep up the army was from 8 to 10 per cent, of its strength, but in future the proportion will be largely increased. The average number actually raised annually was 16,000 in the ten years 1860-9, and 21,000 in the three years 1870-2; the largest number raised in any one year since the war being 28,000, in 1859.

The rates of daily pay of the soldier and of the noncommissioned ranks are shown in the following table :— [table]

The Household cavalry, horse artillery, and some ranks of the foot guards, receive a higher rate of pay, and the engineers usually earn working pay in addition. Every soldier further receives a free ration of bread and meat, valued at 6d. * Taking into consideration the value of the ration, lodgings, clothing, fuel, and light, the pay and allowances of the infantry private represent an average annual value of about £38, and that of the cavalry private about £41, exclusive of any prospective advantages in the way of pension; while the corporals and sergeants range from £45 to £70. Comparing this with the annual receipts of the average labourer, which range between £35 and £45 in different counties of England and Scotland, and are much lower in Treland, and bearing in mind that the soldier as a rule is called on to do less work, it is evident that his position on the whole is not a disadvantageous one. In addition to the above, the soldier may earn Id. a day good-conduct pay after 2 years’ service, 2d. a day after 6 years’, 3d. after 12 years’, and 4d. after 18 years’ service. The amount to which the soldier is entitled is indicated by “good-conduct badges” worn on the arm; but these, with the corresponding pay, are liable to forfeiture for misconduct.

A soldier may claim his discharge at the expiration of his first or second period of service ; or he may be discharged before the expiration of his service, either by sentence of court-martial or by order of the Commanderin-Chief for misconduct, or as an indulgence at his own request, or on reduction of the army, of as an invalid, if found unfit for further service. A soldier discharged after 21 years’ service is entitled to a pension varying from a minimum of 8d. a day for a private, to a maximum of 2s. 6d. a day for a non-commissioned officer ; every goodconduct badge the soldier was in possession of, or would have been entitled to, at the time of discharge, adding a Id. a day to his pension. A soldier discharged on the completion of his first period (12 years), or discharged at any time for misconduct, receives no pension. If discharged as an invalid, on account of unfitness for service, he receives a temporary or permanent pension, varying, according to the nature of the disability and the manner in which it arose, from a minimum of 6d. a day for a year, to the full pension given above. Pensions for wounds are given on a special scale, according to the nature of the wound, the maximum being 2s. 6d. for a private and 3s. 6d. for a non-commissioned officer. Soldiers are also allowed to purchase their discharge as an indulgence, according to a fixed scale depending on length of service and character ; £35 in the artillery and engineers, and £20 in the infantry being the maximum rates. After from 12 to 16 years’ service such discharge is* granted free.

There are ten ranks of combatant officers in the army,— viz., field-marshals, generals,·lieutenant-generals, and major-generals (classed as general officers) ; colonels, lieutenantcolonels, and majors (field officers)] captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants (regimental or company officers). The classification and promotion of officers is complicated by the system of brevet or army rank, by which an officer may hold a higher rank in the army than he holds in his regiment. Brevet rank is usually given for distinguished service in the field, or for length of service: it begins with the rank of major, and may be said to cease with that of major-general, .as in that grade and in those above it all rank is army rank. Relative rank and command within the regiment, regimental promotion and duties, and pay, are determined by regimental rank; but rank, command, and duties outside the regiment, and army promotion, are governed by army rank. Thus a regimental captain may receive the brevet of major for distinguished service: he is called captain and brevet major, retains his place among the captains of his regiment, and continues to perform a captain’s duties in his regiment; but on any duties where the officers of . several regiments are mixed he takes his place as major, and would command captains of his own regiment, though senior as such to himself.

Previous to November 1871 first appointments and regimental promotion in the cavalry and infantry were made under the purchase system. This system dates from the earliest days of the army, and arose partly from the mode in which regiments were originally raised Every regimental commission had a fixed regulation price, varying from £450, the price of an ensigncy in an infantry regiment, to £7250, that of a lieutenant-colonelcy of Life Guards; in addition to which an over-regulation price, which sometimes even exceeded the regulation price, had sprung up, and become established by custom, though contrary to law. An officer on retiring received the regulation price of his commission from Government, and the over-regulation from the officer who succeeded him; and the step went to the senior qualified officer of the lower grade in the regiment. who was able and willing to purchase it. An officer who could not afford to purchase rose with the others till he became senior of his rank, and there remained till a death vacancy or other “non-purchase step” gave him his promotion. Practically, however, the injury inflicted was less than at first sight appears, as the purchase system stimulated a rapid flow of promotion, by which the non-purchase officer profited also, and if he lost a year or two in promotion, he saved several thousand pounds. First appointments were given to gentlemen whose names were on the Commander-in-Chief’s list, and to cadets from the Military College at Sandhurst, on passing the required examinations and paying the price of the commission; a certain number of commissions without purchase being given to those who passed high examinations at Sandhurst, and to young men whose fathers’ services gave them special claims.

Purchase was abolished by warrant of 20th July 1871, Parliament voting the money to compensate the officers then holding saleable commissions, and a system of promotion by “seniority tempered by selection” was substituted by the present regulations.

First commissions as sub-lieutenants are now given to successful candidates at an open competitive examination, to non-commissioned officers specially recommended, to university students who have passed certain examinations, and to “Queen’s” and “Indian cadets,” and pages of honour. A certain number of first commissions as lieutenants are also given to lieutenants of militia regiments. The limits of age for candidates by competition are from 17 to 20; but this is extended to 22 in the case of university students and militia lieutenants, and 30 in the case of non-commissioned officers. The great majority of first appointments are given by open competition, examinations for the purpose being held periodically under the Civil Service Commissioners. The successful candidates receive commissions as sub-Eeutenants, and are sent to the Military College at Sandhurst (or to their regiments, if in India) for a course of instruction; and after passing the required examination in military subjects at the conclusion of the course, and serving a certain time with their regiments, are eligible for promotion to the rank of Eeutenant. A Eeutenant is eligible for promotion to captain after two years’ service, but the actual time is usually much longer—from eight to eleven years; to quaEfy, he must pass an examination in regimental duties, drill, &c., and also a special army examination in military law, tactics, field sketching, and field fortification. Promotion to the rank of captain is usually by regimental seniority; the senior qualified subaltern in the regiment succeeding to a vacancy among the captains. A captain may become regimental major by succession to a vacancy in his own regiment, or by being promoted to a majority in another regiment, or on half-pay; and brevet major by promotion for distinguished service, or by seniority in the army. Before promotion to a regimental majority a captain must pass a practical examination in subjects connected with the command of a regiment or of a small mixed force in the field. The appointment as major to a regiment is made for five years only, but is renewable. A major may become regimental Heutenant-colonel by appointment to the command of a regiment, or to an unattached lieutenant-colonelcy; and by brevet for distinguished service, or by seniority in the army. Certain staff appointments also carry with them the rank of lieutenant-colonel on appointment, or on completion of five years’ service in them. Regimental promotion ceases with the rank of Eeutenant-coloneL When a vacancy arises in a regiment by death or by the promotion of an officer to another regiment, the step goes in the regiment; if it arises otherwise, it is fiUed up as seems best to the Secretary of State and the Commanderin-Chief,—regimental considerations, however, receiving full consideration. A lieutenant-colonel becomes colonel by brevet, by promotion for distinguished service, on appointment as aide-de-camp to the Queen, after five years’ service in the command of a regiment, or an equivalent staff appointment, or eight years under certain conditions.

The promotion of general officers is by seniority, regulated by a fixed establishment, the numbers of which in 1870 were 71 generals, 115 lieutenant-generals, and 188 major-generals. Promotions may, however, be made independently of the establishment for distinguished service. Field-marshals are appointed at the will of the sovereign, and without reference to seniority.

All promotions are made upon the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief, with the approval of the Secretary of State for War.

The Artillery and Engineers have always been on a different footing from the rest of the army. First appointments to these services are made through the Royal Military Academy, entrance to which is by open competitive examination. After a course of instruction in. professional subjects, occupying three years, cadets are examined and finally classed, and receive commissions in the engineers and artillery according to their standing on the list. Those selected for the engineers are required to go through a further course of instruction at Chatham for two years before their commissions are confirmed. Regimental promotion in the two services is governed purely by seniority, and a separate establishment of general officers is maintained for them; in brevet promotion they are on the same footing as officers of the other branches.

The rates of pay of the several ranks are shown in the following table :— [table]

Officers of the horse artillery receive a higher rate of pay, slightly in excess of that of the corresponding ranks in the cavalry. Officers of the engineers, doing duty as such, receive extra pay, usually amounting to one-half of their ordinary pay if serving at home, or equivalent to it if serving abroad or in the London district. Lieutenant-, colonels of regiments, and other officers holding commands of wings, batteries, or dépôts, receive “command pay” of from 3s. to Is. 6d. daily. Captains holding higher rank by brevet receive 2s. a day additional; and lieutenants, after seven years’ service, Is. a day. Officers holding staff appointments receive the pay of such appointments in addition to their regimental pay or half-pay.

Officers holding certain appointments are “seconded ”— that is, their place in the regiment is filled up, and they become supernumerary, their names being shown in italics in the Army List; but they still belong to the regiment, and rise in it in due course.

Officers who entered the purchase corps under the old system can retire by the sale of their commissions, receiv ing from Government the value, over-regulation as well as regulation, of the commission which they held at the date of the abolition of purchase. Within certain limits officers are allowed to retire on the full pay of their rank after thirty years’ service,—the full pay of a lieutenant-colonel being reckoned at 20s. a day; and all officers have an unqualified right to retire on half-pay after twenty-five years’ service. The rates of half-pay amount usually to about three-fifths of the full pay of the corresponding ranks. Pensions are granted to officers who have received wounds in action equivalent to the loss of a limb, at the rate of £400 a year to a lieutenant-general, £300 to a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, £200 to a major, £100 to a captain, and £70 to a lieutenant. Such pensions continue as long as the effects of the wound continue, and are held in addition to any pay or retiring allowances the officer is in receipt of. Gratuities, varying from three to twelve months’ pay of the rank, are granted to officers who have received less serious wounds.

Pensions are granted to the widows of officers killed in action, or dying of diseases contracted in the field, at rates varying from £60 (lieutenant’s widow) to £200 (widow of colonel or lieutenant-colonel) in the former case, and £50 to £150 in the latter; and “compassionate allowances” are granted, at rates varying, according to rank of deceased officer and other circumstances, from £6 to £40 annually for each child. Such compassionate allowances, however, are not granted except in cases where it is shown that the means of the family are so limited that they actually require such assistance; and widows’ pensions generally cannot be claimed as a right, and are not granted where the widow is left in affluence, or where the Secretary of State sees reason to withhold them on account of misconduct or other causes. · A reduced rate of pension and compassionate allowances, ranging from £40 to £120 for the widow, and £5 to £20 for each child, is granted where the officer died under circumstances which do not entitle his family to the higher rates; but in such case the aggregate amount must not exceed the half-pay of the rank held by him at the time of his death. When an officer holding a saleable commission is killed in action, or dies within six months of wounds received, his family receive the value of such commission.

Strength, Composition, and Distribution of the Military Forces of the Empire (1873).

A. Regular Army—British Troops. [table]

[table]

The addition to thia of the regular army at home, 105,434, rives as the total of forces, active and reserve, within the United Kingdom, 452,085.

C. Indian and Colonial Troops. [table]

B. Colonial Militia, Volunteers, and Reserve Forces. [table]

Note.— The contingents furnished by Native Indian States under our protection are not included in the summary of our Indian forces; and the disembodied or untrained militia of Canada, amounting to about 600,000 men, has not been taken into account in the summary of Colonial Reserve Forces.

Staff.

The staff of the British army may be classed under three principal heads—

1. General Officers, commanding divisions, districts, brigades, &c.;

2. General Staff, including Adjutant-General and Quarter master-General’s Departments, brigade-majors, <fcc.;

3. Personal Staff, consisting of military secretaries and aides-de-camp.

Appointments to commands are made from the lists of superior officers of corresponding rank. Sometimes, however, commands are given to officers of lower rank than that of the appointment, in which case they receive local and temporary rank The command of brigades is usually given to colonels, with temporary rank of brigadier-general.

General officers are responsible for the discipline and efficiency of all the military forces within their commands. They are required to make annual inspections of every regiment or corps, and report minutely on them for the information of the Commander-in-Chief. They are assisted in their duties, and their orders conveyed to the troops, by the officers of the staff. Officers for the General Staff are selected exclusively from the regular army, and, except in cases of proved abilities in the field, must have passed through the Staff College. Admission to the Staff College is obtained by competitive examination, the number entering being limited to twenty annually. Candidates must have served not less than five years, and be reported to be thoroughly good regimental officers, qualified from general character, disposition, &c., for employment on the staff, and physically fit for its active duties. Before being allowed to compete, they are reported upon by a board consisting of the commanding officer and two next seniors of their regiment and corps, and also by a general officer, to whose staff they have been attached for a month on trial. Officers of not less than seven years’ service may present themselves at the final examination without having studied at the college; but the same qualifications and certificates are required from them. After completing the course and passing the final examination, officers are attached during the following summer drill season either to the staff of a general officer, or to the other arms of the service.

Officers appointed to the Personal Staff are not required to pass through the Staff College, but have to undergo a qualifying examination.

Staff appointments are held for five years only, at the end of which time the officer reverts to his regiment or to half-pay. Most of the lower appointments are held by regimental officers who are temporarily withdrawn from their regiments, but still borne on its establishment. No effective field officer of a regiment, however, can hold a staff appointment, and no regiment of cavalry may have more than one captain and one subaltern, and no battalion of infantry more than two captains and two subalterns on the staff.

The following table shows the principal ranks and rates of pay of the staff of the army :— [table]

The Headquarter Staff receive a special higher rate of pay. These rates are in addition to the pay or half-pay of their regimental commissions. Staff officers also receive an allowance for horses, varying from two for the lowest ranks to eight for a general.

The staff are the assistants of the general in all his duties, and the channels through which his orders are conveyed to the troops. The duties of the officers of the Adj ut ant-G eneral and Quartermaster-G eneral’s Departments, and of military secretaries, correspond generally to those of the same departments at headquarters; the Adjutant-General and his deputies or assistants being charged with the issue of all orders, and matters referring to drill, discipline, returns, duties, &c.; the Quartermaster-General, or his subordinates, with matters connected with the movement and quartering of troops, camps, military positions, reconnaissances, embarkations, and disembarkations, &c.; and the military secretaries with questions relating to promotions and appointments, miscellaneous confidential correspondence, and communications with the civil authorities. A brigade-major performs the duties of the Adjutant and Quartermaster-General’s Departments within his brigade. The duties of an aide-de-camp are of a more personal nature. In the field he is employed to carry orders, &c.; in peace he attends his general at inspections and on all public occasions, and renders such services as his general requires of him. Officers of the General Staff, as a rule, are not under the rank of captains; aides-de-camp are appointed without regard to rank, but no officer may hold a staff appointment till he has served three years with his regiment or corps. Appointments to the General Staff are made by the Commander-in-Chief by selection from the qualified officers; appointments on Personal Staff are made on the recommendation of the general officer. The total numbers of officers employed on the staff of the army are 241 in the United Kingdom and colonies (British establishment), and 278 in India (Indian establishment). About two-thirds of the staff on the British establishment belong to regiments, and are borne on their establishments, the remainder being officers on half-pay or unattached. In India the rules regarding staff appointments vary a little, and most of the appointments, with the exception of the higher fl commands, are filled from a special “staff corps but some are also held by officers from the British regiments serving in India.

Cavalry.

The cavalry consists of 31 regiments: viz., 2 of Life Guards and 1 of Royal Horse Guards, forming together the “Household Brigade;” 7 regiments of Dragoon Guards, 3 of Dragoons, 5 of Lancers, and 13 of Hussars.

The Household Brigade form the body-guard of the sovereign, furnishing the escorts on all state occasions. They are recruited regimentally, and take none but picked men, of good character, and over 5 feet 10 inches in height. They wear helmet, cuirass, and long jack-boots, and are armed with a breech-loading carbine and long straight sword, 40 inches in the blade. From the great size of the men, added to the weight of the cuirass, they ride very heavy—from 21 to 22 stone when equipped, for service. They are quartered in or near London, and are only sent abroad in war.

The other regiments are classed as “heavy,” “medium,” and “light.” The dragoons are classed partly as heavy, and partly as medium; the lancers as medium; the hussars as light. The heavies recruit from men of 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, and ride, in “service marching order,” from 19 to 20 stone; the mediums from men of 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 9 inches, and ride from 18⅜ to 19 stone; the lights from men of 5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 8 inches, and ride from 17⅜ to 18^ stone. The dragoon guards, dragoons, and hussars are armed with breechloading carbines and sword. The lancers carry a bamboo lance (9 feet long), sword, and pistol. The colour and facings of the uniform vary in different regiments, the dragoons mostly wearing red, while the hussars and lancers wear blue. The dragoons wear helmets, with the exception of the 2d Dragoons (the “Scots Greys”), who wear bearskins; the lancers, the lancer square-topped cap; and the hussars, a busby with plume and bag. The Household Brigade are the only cuirassed regiments.

A regiment of cavalry on war footing consists of 8 troops, forming 4 squadrons in the field, and numbering 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, 8 captains, 12 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, 5 regimental staff officers, 11 staff sergeants, 8 troop sergeants-major, 24 sergeants, 32 corporals, 8 trumpeters, 20 farriers, shoeing smiths, and saddlers, and 504 privates; in all, 27 officers and 607 men, with 559 horses. They take with them in the field 2 forgewaggons, 1 small-arm ammunition-cart, and 7 baggage and store-waggons. The peace establishment is 29 officers, 506 men, and 320 horses. Of the 28 regiments of the line, 9 are usually in India, and 19 at home. The principal cavalry stations in the United Kingdom are Alder-shott, the Curragh (with Newbridge), and Dublin; at each of the two first there is a general commanding the cavalry, who also inspects all the cavalry regiments in that portion of the kingdom. The depots of regiments serving abroad, and the riding establishment, are at Canterbury. Cavalry regiments are not connected with particular counties or districts, but recnιit throughout the kingdom.

The horses for the cavalry are mostly obtained by purchase from dealers, at the headquarters of the several regiments; no breeding establishments or special arrangements for securing a sufficient supply of a good class of horses, such as have been generally introduced on the Continent, exist in England. The horses are usually bought at four years old, £40 being the maximum government price; the average height is 15 hands 2 inches. Officers provide their own chargers, but are allowed to select from the troop horses under certain restrictions and on payment of £50; sub-lieutenants are provided with horses and horse equipments at the public expense.

The oldest cavalry regiments are the Horse Guards, raised by the Earl of Oxford, and first known as the Oxford Blues; and the two regiments of Life Guards, raised in 1661-2. The privates in these regiments were for the most part of good family, and were addressed as “Gentlemen of the Life Guards.” The youngest regiments, the 19th, 20th and 21st Hussars, were formed from the European regiments in the East India Company’s service at the time of the amalgamation.

Artillery.

The artillery, notwithstanding the great augmentations it has received of late years, consequent on the increased importance of its arm, still retains the title of the “Royal Regiment of Artillery.” It consists of 205 batteries, forming 28 brigades, of which 5 brigades, or 31 batteries, are horse artillery; 10 brigades, or 83 batteries, are field artillery; and 13 brigades, or 91 batteries, are garrison or siege artillery. In addition to these, there is a depot brigade of 12 batteries, and the “coast brigade” of 10 batteries. The battery is the true unit of our artillery, the brigade being rather a grouping for administrative purposes; in the field and horse artillery, the batteries are almost entirely independent.

The establishment of a battery of horse artillery on war footing is—1 major, 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 assistantsurgeon, 1 veterinary surgeon, 2 staff sergeants, 6 sergeants, 12 corporals and bombardiers, 2 trumpeters, 10 artificers (including shoeing smiths), and 153 gunners and drivers; altogether 7 officers and 185 men, with 206 horses and 6 guns, 9 ammunition-waggons, and 5 forge, store, &c., waggons. The peace establishment varies; the present home establishment is 5 officers, 151 men, and 113 horses. The guns now in use are 9-pounder rifled muzzle-loaders, of wrought iron. In the horse artillery every man is either mounted, or carried on the limber or ammunition-waggons, to enable them to keep pace with cavalry.

A battery of field artillery on war footing has the same establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers, but more gunners and drivers, and fewer horses. The numbers are—7 officers, 197 men, 184 horses, 6 guns, 12 ammunition and 4 miscellaneous waggons. The peace establishment at home is 5 officers, 152 men, and 85 horses. The guns in use are 16-pounder rifled muzzle-loaders, drawn by 8 horses.

A garrison l>altery consists of 1 major, 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 1 staff sergeant, 5 sergeants, 10 corporals and bombardiers, and 140 gunners. They are all dismounted, and are employed in garrisons in working the heavy guns, at sieges, and on other similar duties.

Besides the above, heavy batteries of position, mountain batteries, and ammunition columns are formed in war time. A heavy battery has 4 guns only, 40-pounder breech-loading rifled guns on the Armstrong principle. Mountain batteries are only organised when the nature of the warfare requires it, and their detail varies accordingly.

Artillery and infantry reserve ammunition columns are formed when an army takes the field, one being attached to each division. Their establishment is 4 officers and 138 men, with 4 artillery and 1G small-arm ammunitionwaggons, 2 spare gun-carriages, 5 miscellaneous waggons, and 142 horses; carrying 360 rounds of gun, and 307,200 of small-arm ammunition.

The coast brigade is formed entirely of old soldiers of good character, drawn from the other brigades. It is broken up in small detachments, often numbering one or two men only, distributed along the coast; the men being employed to take charge of unoccupied forts and batteries, and of the guns and artillery stores in those which are occupied. The number of officers in the coast brigade is small, but there are 121 master gunners, ranking as warrant officers, attached to it, who take charge of the more important works and command the small detachments of coast brigade men.

The uniform of the whole of the artillery is blue with red facings; the horse artillery wear a jacket, the others a tunic. The head-dress for all is a busby with bag. The non-commissioned officers and gunners of the horse artillery, and the mounted men of the field batteries, are armed with the cavalry sword, the dismounted men with a sword-bayonet; the drivers carry no arms. Twelve carbines are carried with each horse battery, and 24 with each field battery. The garrison batteries are armed with breechloading carbines and sword-bayonets.

The headquarters of the artillery are at Woolwich, the great arsenal for the whole kingdom. Two or three brigades are usually stationed there, besides the permanent dépôt and riding establishment. Three horse brigades (15 batteries), six field brigades (43 batteries), and four garrison brigades (28 batteries) are stationed in India; four garrison brigades (28 batteries) in our colonies and foreign garrisons,—Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda, Halifax, <fcc.; and the remainder distributed throughout the United Kingdom. The principal artillery stations besides Woolwich are Alder-shott, Portsmouth, Dover, Dublin, and Plymouth. There is a second depot at Sheerness; and a school of gunnery, with an extensive establishment, has been formed at Shoe· buryness, for the double purpose of instructing officers and men in the higher branches of gunnery, and carrying on artillery experiments—the long reaches of sand near the mouth of the Thames being peculiarly favourable for this purpose.

The artillery are not connected with particular districts or counties, but recruit generally throughout the kingdom. The horses for the artillery are obtained by purchases made from dealers, or by officers specially appointed for the purpose, £45 being the maximum price allowed.

Engineers.

For purposes of administration, promotion, <fcc., the Royal Engineers form a single regiment or corps, consisting of 40 companies, 3 troops, and a large establishment of officers, not attached to any companies, but employed in superintending works and buildings, and in other’ professional and scientific duties. Of the 40 companies, four are “survey” companies, and two are attached for service with the postal telegraph; the remainder are employed in works and buildings, or undergoing instruction at Chatham. The war establishment of a company is 1 captain, 3 subalterns, 1 assistant-surgeon, 6 sergeants, 12 corporals, 2 buglers, and 100 privates (termed “sappers”) of various trades, viz., carpenters, masons, bricklayers, smiths, painters, printers, telegraphists, <fcc.; in all, 5 officers and 120 men. The peace establishment is 3 officers and 93 men.

The three engineer troops are,—the field equipment troop, telegraph troop, and pontoon troop, each of which forms the nucleus of several similar ones to be raised in war. The war establishment of a feld equipment troop is 6 officers and 233 men (of whom 100 are drivers), with 186 horses and 33 waggons and carts. It is divided into three sections, each of which carries the camp equipment and all necessary tools and implements for a company of engineers, and a “field park.” The troop is kept together for convenience in peace time, but in the field would be broken up, and the sections attached to the companies of engineers. The field equipment troop carries mining and entrenching tools, sandbags, rope, gunpowder and fuses for mines and blasting, a portable forge, sets of carpenters’, smiths’, farriers’, stonemasons’, bricklayers’, collar-makers’, &c., tools and materials; also instruments, drawing materials, printing-press, and photographic apparatus.

A telegraph troop consists of 6 officers, 245 non-commissioned officers and men, with 24 carriages, 42 riding and 114 draught horses. Twelve of the waggons are fitted as wire waggons, and carry each three miles of insulated wire, on rollers, besides staples and telegraph poles for carrying the wire along trees or houses, or over obstacles. Four waggons are fitted as offices, with recording instruments (Morse). The troop is so organised that it can be broken up into three sectioħs, each complete in itself. A certain proportion of the men are trained to act as signallers, and all the materials for visual signalling—flags for use by day, rockets and lime-lights for flashing signals by night—are carried with the troop.

A pontoon troop consists of G officers and 296 non-commissioned officers and men, with 31 carriages, 20 riding and 210 draught horses. It carries 22 pontoons, being sufficient to construct 120 yards of bridge, capable of bearing cavalry, infantry, and field artillery; and a supply of trestles for light field bridges.

It is further in contemplation to organise a railway battalion, composed of men trained to all duties connected with the construction, repair, and working of railways.

The daily pay of the several ranks has been already given; but in addition to this ordinary rate, officers, when regimentally employed, receive extra pay, usually equal to the ordinary pay, if abroad (or in the London district), or to one-half of it if at home; and the non-commissioned officers and men receive “working pay,” varying according to their skill and to the nature of their employment, but commonly ranging between Is. and 2s. a-day. The uniform of the Royal Engineers is scarlet, with blue facings, the head-dress a low busby and plume. The men are armed with a Lancaster breech-loading rifled carbine and sword-bayonet In the engineer train the non-commissioned officers and sappers carry swords; the drivers carry no arms.

The sappers are recruited entirely from men of good character, able to read and write, and who have been brought up to, or served apprenticeship in, some suitable trade. All men on enlistment are sent to Chatham to go through a long course of training and instruction in the special duties connected with military engineering, such as siege operations, field works, mines, bridging, &c.

The headquarters and depot of the Royal Engineers are at Chatham, where their great instructional institutions are established. The distiibution of the force depends on the works in progress in différent parts of the empire. A considerable number of officers are stationed in India, but no men. Thirteen companies are now stationed abroad in our colonies and foreign garrisons—Bermuda, Gibraltar, Malta, <fcc.; and 27 companies, with the three troops of engineer train, are at home. Two companies are employed, under the direction of the Post-Office, in the construction and maintenance of the telegraph lines throughout the country, thus acquiring in peace time the practical experience necessary to enable them to undertake the working of telegraphic communications in war and in an enemy’s country; and four are permanently engaged on the great ordnance survey of the kingdom. The others are distributed throughout the principal garrisons; eight or ten usually remaining with the headquarters at Chatham.

The duties of engineer officers are very various. Besides the actual command and superintendence of their men, and their instruction in all branches of field engineering, they include the charge, construction, and repair of fortifications and barracks, the survey of the kingdom, the management of a number of scientific and experimental establishments, the development of all the scientific appliances of war, such as armour plating, torpedoes, field telegraphy and signalling, &c., Engineer officers are also largely employed under the civil government in connection with the educational departments, railways, prisons, <fcc.

Infantry.

The infantry consists of 3 regiments of Foot Guards (7 battalions), 109 of the Line (137 battalions) and the Rifle Brigade (4 battalions,)—total, 148 battalions.

The three regiments of guards are the Grenadier Guards, of 3 battalions; and the Coldstream and Scots Fusilier Guards, of 2 battalions each. These form together the brigade of foot guards. They are stationed principally in London, and rarely leave the country except for active service in the field; they furnish the guards on the royal palaces, and guards of honour on state occasion®, receive a special rate of pay, and have certain privileges. Up to 1872 their lieutenants had the rank of captains in the army, and their captains that of lieutenant-colonels. This privilege, however, was abolished by a warrant of July of that year as regards officers entering subsequent to that date.

Of the line regiments, Nos. 1 to 25 have two battalions each, two rifle regiments (the 60th and Rifle Brigade) have four each, and the remainder one only. By the localisation of 1873, the single battalion regiments have been grouped in pairs to form “district brigades.” The several battalions are altogether independent of one another in matters of command, internal economy, &c.; but recruiting is carried on for the brigade, and men or officers may be transferred from one battalion to another within it. A district brigade comprises two line battalions, a brigade depot, and a certain proportion of reserve and auxiliary forces.

A battalion of infantry consists of eight companies. Its war establishment is 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 8 captains, 16 lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, 1 adjutant, 1 paymaster, 1 quartermaster, 1 assistant-surgeon, 10 staff sergeants, 8 colour sergeants, 32 sergeants, 16 drummers, 40 corporals, 4 hospital orderlies, 10 pioneers, and 946 privates,—in all, 31 officers and 1066 non-commissioned officers and men. On service it takes with it 62 horses (of which 9 are officers’ chargers and 53 draught horses), and 14 waggons and carts (3 ammunition carts, 1 entrenching tool waggon, 1 for quartermaster’s stores, and 9 for camp equipment and baggage). The peace establishment varies. Most of the battalions at home are kept at a reduced establishment of 520 rank and file, the guards at 750, the battalions next for foreign service at from 700 to 820, and the battalions in India at 820.

The infantry is at present armed partly with the Snider (converted Enfield) rifle, and partly with the Martini-Henry, but will ultimately be armed entirely with the latter. This weapon, which was selected in 1870 after a careful and protracted series of trials, is a breechloading rifle, 4 feet 1 inch long, weighs 8 lb. 12 oz., and ranges up to 1000 yards. It is seven-grooved, bore , 451 of an inch, carries a bullet weighing 1 oz., and has been fired at the rate of 25 rounds a minute. The soldier carries 70 rounds of ammunition, viz., 20 in each of two pouches on the waist belt, 10 in expense bag, and 20 in a pocket in his valise. The bayonet (Elcho sword-bayonet) is a short heavy sword, with saw-back, which can be attached to the rifle as a bayonet, or used independently as a sword, or to cut up firewood, chop bushes, &c.

Although the regiments are named Rifles, Fusiliers, Light Infantry, <kc., the organisation, armament, and training is the same throughout, the only distinction being in matters of dress. The two rifle regiments wear dark green; all the rest of the infantry wear red. The guards are distinguished by their tall bearskins; the fusilier regiments (9) wear sealskin caps, resembling the bearskins of the guards, but smaller. There are 9 Highland regiments, of whom 5 wear the kilt and bonnet; the others have minor distinctions in dress. The light infantry regiments, 11 in number, are distinguished by a horse-hair plume to the shako in place of a ball. The “facings” vary with the different regiments, but all “royal” regiments have blue.

All regiments now carry the valise equipment, substituted for the knapsack in 1870. It consists of a black leather bag slung from the shoulders by straps and fitted to lie in the hollow of the back, connected with a waistbelt and ammunition-pouches in such a manner as to distribute the weight evenly over the body, and cause it to hang direct on the shoulders. The greatcoat, when not worn, is strapped above it. The valise holds a spare shirt, pair of boots, socks, cap, towel, and other small articles, and when full weighs about 15 lb; the total weight carried by the soldier, including arms, ammunition, and the clothes he has on, amounts to about 52 lb.

Each battalion has four hospital orderlies, picked men specially trained to the care of sick and wounded, and relieved from all other duties; and ten pioneers, skilled artificers of various trades, who carry a complete set of carpenters’ and other tools, and are employed, sometimes under the quartermaster of the regiment and sometimes under the engineers, in executing repairs and other works.

The guards and rifle regiments recruit through the country generally: the former maintain a high standard, usually 2 or 3 inches above that of the line; the latter take men of low standard, but require special chest measurement. The other infantry regiments recruit as far as possible within the brigade districts in which the depots are permanently stationed. Of the 141 line battalions, 50 are stationed in India, 20 in the colonies and foreign garrisons, and 71 at home; thus allowing one battalion at home and one abroad from each brigade. The chief foreign garrisons are Malta (7 battalions) and. Gibraltar (5 battalions). The largest home stations for infantry are London (for the Guards), Portsmouth, Dublin, Cork, Plymouth, Chatham, Dover, and the camps of Aldershott, Colchester, Shorncliffe, and the Curragh,

The oldest infantry regiments are the Coldstream Guards (General Monck’s regiment), the 1st “Royal Scots” (originally the “Douglas” regiment), the Grenadier and Scots Fusilier Guards, the 2d “Queen’s” (raised for the defence of Tangier), and the 3d “Buffs” (raised from the London train-bands). These regiments were formed between 1660 and 1662. The principal augmentations madeto the army between this date and the Crimean war have been already detailed. Second battalions were added to the regiments from 1 to 25 in 1857—59, and the 100th was raised in Canada in 1858. The nine regiments from 101 to 109 were formed from the European regiments in the service of the East India Company, on the transference of the powers of that company to the Crown.

Reserves and Auxiliary Forces.

The reserves are divided into classes. The “1st Class Army Reserve” consists—(a) of men who, after a service of not less than three years in the ranks of the army, have been passed into the reserve to complete the unexpired portion of their engagement; and (&) of soldiers who have been discharged by purchase or on completion of limited engagement, and have enrolled themselves for 5 years. The men of the 1st class reserve receive 4d. a-day, paid quarterly in advance, and an annual allowance of £ 1 for necessaries. In peace time they may be called out for 12 days’ training annually, or to aid the civil power, receiving daily pay at the rate of 2s. in the first case, and 2s. 6d. in the second. In case of war or national danger, they may be recalled to service by proclamation, and attached to any regiment or corps of their own branch of the service, or formed into separate corps. They then resume their position in all respects as soldiers of the regular army, and are liable for service at home or abroad, and until completion of their term of engagement. The 2d class army reserve consists of enrolled pensioners,—men who have completed their second period of service in the regular army, and been discharged to pension. They receive no bounty, but an annual allowance of £1 for necessaries, and daily pay at the rate of 2s. or 2s. 6d. when called out for training or in aid of the civil power. They are subject to the same regulations as the 1 st class, except that they are only liable for service "within the United Kingdom.

By the Act of 1867, a militia reserve was created in addition to the above, consisting of men actually serving in the militia who voluntarily enrol in this reserve for a term of six years, during which they remain with their militia regiments in peace time, but in case of war may be drafted into the regular army. They receive an annual bounty of £1 in addition to their militia pay and bounty. Their number is limited to one-fourth of the effective strength of the militia, and in 1873 amounted to 28,286 men.

The first attempt to organise a reserve of men who had passed through the ranks of the army was made in 1843, when the enrolment of pensioners for home service in special cases was authorised by Parliament. The number was originally limited to 10,000, but afterwards increased to 20,000. In 1859 when the military power and threatening attitude of France caused the alarm in England which led to the volunteer movement, an effort was made to organise a more efficient reserve from men who had taken their discharges on completion of their first period of service, but the inducements offered were insufficient, and the scheme proved a failure. In 1867, after the proved success of the short service aud reserve system in Prussia, a new Reserve Force Act was passed, which, with subsequent modifications, laid the foundation of the present first-class reserve; but it required increased inducements, and the Short Service Act of 1870, to give the reserve any importance. The militia reserve was formed as a temporary expedient, to be reduced as the army reserve increases. It has been objected to on the grounds that it entails increased expense without any real addition to the armed force of the country, as the men are merely passed from one force to another, and that it takes away the best men from the militia at the moment this requires to be most efficient But, in the absence of a sufficient reserve of fully-trained soldiers, a reserve of partly trained men is essential. Practically the militia always has been the feeder of the line in war time, and it was thought better to enrol a number of men in peace time, when they could be selected, and all necessary preparations made for drafting them in at once in war, rather than adhere to the old system of offering high bounties at the last moment, and getting a worse class of men.

For auxiliary forces, Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, see separate articles.

Local Organisation of the Military Forces of the Kingdom.

The United Kingdom is divided into 10 military districts, or general officers’ commands,—viz., England, 6; Scotland, 1; Ireland, 3. Within the district the general officer’s authority extends over all the military forces— regular, reserve, or auxiliary. These districts, again, are subdivided into 66 infantry brigade or sub-districts under colonels; of these 50 are in England, 8 in Ireland, and 8 in Scotland. Each brigade comprises 2 battalions of the line, a brigade dépôt, 2 militia battalions, and such reserves and volunteers as are included in the sub-district; the average male population of the sub-districts being 200,000. The two line battalions are independent of the colonel of the sub-district. One is always abroad, one at some home station, usually a garrison or camp of instruction. But they draw their recruits and reserves from the sub-district, and supply the officers and non-commissioned officers for the brigade dépôt, and for the staff of the militia and volunteers. The brigade depot is the connecting link between the line battalions and the district. It is permanently established at some principal town in the sub-district, and is formed of two companies from each line battalion, under the command of a major of the home battalions. To it are attached 2 captains (adjutants of militia battalions) and a large staff of noncommissioned officers, who join the militia battalions when embodied, but at other times are employed at the depot in recruiting and drilling recruits. The duties of the colonel of the district include recruiting for the line and militia, the training of recruits and of all reserve and auxiliary forces, the annual inspection of the militia and volunteers, the registry and payment of the army reserve and enrolled, pensioners, and the care of arms and stores of reserve and auxiliary forces.

For cavalry purposes Great Britain is divided into 2, and for artillery into 12 sub-districts, under colonels, whose duties correspond in the main with those of the infantry colonels as regards recruiting and supervising the training of the auxiliary forces of their respective arms, but are more restricted, as they have no dépôts and staff of regulars under their immediate command.

The colonel of the brigade depot is especially charged with the measures for mobilisation in case of war. On the order being given, the army reserve and militia reserve men are collected at the dépôt, and sent to the home battalion to complete it to war strength. The supernumerary men of the reserve, and all men of the field battalion that are unfit for immediate service, are drafted to the depot, which is increased to the strength of an eight-company battalion, by calling in officers from the half-pay list, and by recruiting. A.t the same time, one, or, if necessary, both militia battalions are embodied. If an expeditionary force is to be despatched, the militia battalions relieve the regular army in all the home garrisons; and probably, as was the case during the Crimean war, in some of the foreign ones also.

Civil Departments of the Army.—Control Department.

The Control Department was formed in 1869 and 1870 by the amalgamation of the five formerly distinct administrative departments, viz., Commissariat department, Barrack department, Store department, Purveyors’ department, and Military Train. At the head of the Control Department is the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, assisted by a director of supplies and transport, and a director of artillery and stores; the general duties of the department have already been defined in treating of the administration of the army.

The personnel of the Control Department consists of— (a), administrative officers, named controllers; (δ), executive officers, divided into two sub-departments, and named commissaries and paymasters; (c), the non-commissioned officers and men of the Army Service Corps. The ranks of administrative officers are—controller, ranking with major-general; deputy-controller, ranking with colonel; and assistant-controller, ranking with lieutenant-colonel. Appointments as assistant-controller are made from commissaries in the supply and transport sub-department, or from combatant officers of the army. In the latter case the officers selected must have five years’ full-pay service, be not under the rank of captain, not over 35 years of age (40, if belonging to the artillery,) and have passed through the Staff College or the advanced class at Woolwich. They serve on probation for two years, at the end of which, if found competent and willing to serve in the Control Department, they resign their military commissions, and receive commissions as assistant-controllers. Artillery officers are generally selected to fill the appointments in the artillery and store branch, but the great majority of appointments are made from the sub-departments, and but few from the combatant ranks of the army. Promotion to the higher grades is by selection, after a service of not less than ten years for the rank of deputy-controller, and thirteen years for that of controller, at least three years having been in the next lower rank. After thirty years’ full-pay service, Control officers are entitled to retire; and retirement is compulsory at the age of 60.

Officers of the Control Department conduct their duties under the direct orders of the officer commanding the district or station, whose advisers and agents they are in all matters connected with the raising or issue of money, the supply of provisions, stores, and transport. They hold a position analogous to that of officers of the general staff, except that they are at the same time directly responsible to the Secretary of State for War for the proper conduct of their duties. Where the orders of the officer commanding appear inconsistent with the War Office instructions, it is the duty of the Control officer to point out the inconsistency, and apply for special authority from the commanding officer, which being granted, must be implicitly obeyed, and relieve the Control officer from the responsibility

The executive sub-departments are the supply and transport sub-departments, and the pay sub-department. The ranks in the former are—commissaries, ranking with majors; deputy-commissaries, ranking with captains; and assistant-commissaries, ranking with lieutenants. The ranks are the same in the pay sub-department; but the officers are called paymasters instead of commissaries. First appointments in the supply and transport sub-department are conferred on civilians selected by open competitive examination, or subaltern officers of the army, and on deserving non-commissioned officers; the limit of age is 17 to 20 for civilian candidates, and 22 for subalterns of the army or militia. Retirement may be claimed after thirty years’ service, and is compulsory at the age of 55.

The Army Service Corps consists of 12 transport companies and 11 supply companies, officered from the supply and transport sub-department. The establishment of a supply company is 2 officers, 27 non-commissioned officers, and 97 rank and file; of a transport company, 3 officers, 13 non-commissioned officers and 117 rank and file, with 91 horses and 26 carriages. In war time these would be largely augmented, according to the requirements of the army and the nature of the service. The supply companies consist of butchers, bakers, issuers, clerks, mechanics and tradesmen of various kinds; the transport companies of drivers, with a proportion of smiths, wheelers, saddlers, farriers, &c. The ranks of the Army Service Corps are filled by volunteers from the army,—men of good character, specially recommended, and of not less than two years’ service,—or by recruits specially enlisted for it under authority from the Secretary for War. The rates of pay are nearly the same as in the cavalry, but the artificers and tradesmen usually earn working pay in addition. The uniform is blue. The supply companies are armed with breech-loading carbines and sword bayonets, the transport companies with cavalry swords.

The executive duties that devolve on the Control may be classed broadly under four heads—pay, provisions (“munitions de bouche”), stores (“munitions de guerre”), and transport; and officers of the sub-departments are selected as far as possible for service in the several branches according to their special training. The provision branch is the most important, and occupies the largest number of officers. In peace time the soldier is fed partly by the Control, partly by means of purchases made by himself. He receives a free ration from Government of 1 ft of bread and ∣ft of meat, and in addition expends a sum varying from 3∣d. to 6d. a day on groceries, vegetables, &c. Under certain circumstances the Government ration is slightly increased, and in the field it is raised to 1∣ ft bread and 1 lb meat; and rations of groceries, spirits, and vegetables are also provided by the Control, though paid for by the soldier. The forage ration for a horse is 10 lb oats and 12 lb hay, with 2 ft extra oats to horses picketed out, and 2 ft oats and 2 ft hay additional to draught horses doing very heavy work. In peace time the army is supplied by contract, the contractor usually delivering the bread and meat or forage at the Control store, where it is inspected by a board of officers before issue. At some of the large camps and stations, however, ovens and slaughter-houses have been established, at which the bread is baked and the meat killed and prepared for the troops by the men of the Army Service Corps. When troops are encamped on flying columns, or for autumn manoeuvres, iron field-ovens or steam baking waggons are commonly used; the former turning out about 480 ft of bread in a day of 12 hours, the latter about 900 ft. Biscuit and salt meat are largely used abroad and at sea, but not at home. (For the supply of an army in the field, see article War.)

The transport duties of the army in peace time, when all the civil resources of the country are available, and most articles are delivered at the required point by the contractor, are very slight; but to be efficiently organised for the field, an army requires a vast amount of transport, of which the existing establishment would only suffice to form the nucleus. The British army is differently situated from the great Continental armies in this respect, that its operations extend over the most distant and varied countries, involving the most different conditions; and as the transport service must always be specially organised to suit the peculiar conditions of the theatre of war, it is impossible in peace time to maintain an establishment which shall be equally applicable in all cases. In some countries railways and water transport are largely available, and the duties thrown on the train are comparatively light; in other countries the local resources in carts and waggons, if properly organised, are ample, and a sufficient cadrei of officers and superintendents is alone required; in others, again, the local resources are nil, and the army has to bring with it every man, horse, and waggon of the vast train it requires.

And the character of the transport varies as widely as the quantity required. In some countries large waggons are most suitable, in others, light carts only can be used; in others, again, recourse must be had to pack animals,— horses, mules, bullocks, camels, and elephants,—or to coolies and native carriers. Evidently no establishment can be framed that shall be equally suitable in all cases. The existing transport, therefore, is based on the requirements of an army operating in a civilised country, with good roads, where the transport can be mainly done by waggons; while for special expeditions, such as those to Abyssinia and Ashantee, special transport is organised. The waggon in common use is the “general service waggon,” a strong four-wheeled (equirotal) waggon, drawn by four horses, weighing 16 cwt., and carrying a load of 30 cwt.

The transport companies at the disposal of the Control have to carry the equipment and baggage of the staff and departments, to horse and drive the ambulance and field hospital waggons, and, above all, to carry the supplies and reserve stores of the army, the bringing the daily 'supplies to the troops being the duty which taxes them most heavily.

The charge and issue of warlike stores is a duty of ever-increasing importance and difficulty in these days of scientific warfare. In most armies this duty devolves on the officers of the artillery, whose education specially qualifies them for it, and the question was warmly discussed when the Control Department was formed. It was ultimately decided to unite all supply duties under the Control, providing, however, by an admixture of artillery officers for the necessary scientific knowledge within the department.

The following table shows the establishment of officers of the Control Department in 1873, with their full pay, and the daily rates of half and retired pay to which they become entitled:— [table]

Note.— In the ranks marked thus * the full pay is increased after five years’ service in the rank by amounts varying from 2s. 6d. to 5s. daily. A reduced rate of retiring pay is allowed to officers of over twenty but less than thirty years' service, who are permitted to retire. In addition to the numbers shown above, 40 sub-assistant commissaries are appointed, on probation, at a rate of 6s. 6d. per day.

Medical Department.—Hospitals.

The Medical Department comprises 4 ranks of medical officers—viz., Surgeon-General, Deputy-Surgeon-General, Surgeon-Major, and Surgeon,—and the officers and men of the Army Hospital Corps; the whole being under a director-general at the War Office. The officers of the two higher grades are employed chiefly as administrative officers superintending districts or large hospitals; while the surgeons-major and surgeons are attached to regiments and corps, or employed as executive officers in the hospitals. Every battalion serving at home or in the colonies has one medical officer attached to it; and every battalion in India has one surgeon-major and two surgeons. First appointments in the Army Medical Department are given to candidates who possess two diplomas or licences for medicine and surgery, and, after attending a probationary course at a general military hospital, pass a satisfactory examination in military medicine, surgery, hygiene, and pathology. On appointment as surgeons they rank as lieutenants, and after 6 years’ full-pay service, as captains. Promotion from surgeon to surgeon-major is by seniority, but officers may be specially promoted for distinguished service. Surgeons-major rank as majors on appointment, and after 20 years’ full-pay service (in the two ranks), as lieutenant-colonels. Promotion from surgeon-major to deputy-surgeon-general, and from that to surgeon-general, is by selection of the Commander-in-Chief, with approval of the Secretary for M r ar. Deputy-surgeons-general rank as lieutenant-colonels from the date of appointment, and after 5 years’ service in the rank as colonels; and surgeons-general as brigadiers for three years, and afterwards as major-generals. The establishment and rates of pay of the several ranks are shown in the following table :— [table]

All officers have a right to retire on half-pay after 20 years’ service. Surgeons and surgeons-major must retire at the age of 55, and surgeons-general and deputy ditto at the age of 65. Officers retiring after 20 years’ service receive a rate equal to half their full pay at the time; after 25 years’ full-pay service, a rate equal to seven-tenths of full pay.

The Army Hospital Corps consists of 11 “captains of orderlies,” 10 lieutenants, 264 sergeants-major and sergeants, and 1060 rank and file. They are employed entirely on hospital duties, and are under the direction and control of the medical officer of the station, though subject for discipline to the military authority. The officers and non-commissioned officers rank with the corresponding grades in the army, but their authority is confined to their own men and to patients and men attached to military hospitals on duty. Appointments of officers are made from the non-commissioned officers of the corps: the ranks of the corps are filled by volunteers from the army,— men of good character, able to read and write, of not less than two years’ service, and not over 30 years of age; and by recruits, whose direct enlistment is specially authorised. They are variously employed as clerks, compounders of medicines, cooks, &c., but principally as attendants on the sick in the general hospitals in peace, or in field hospitals and ambulances in war.

Hospitals are either “general” or u station” hospitals: to the former special governors or commandants are appointed; in the latter the internal administration is under the senior medical officer. The Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley, whither all invalids from abroad are sent, is the largest General Hospital; it has a large staff, a medical school, and accommodation for 973 patients.

Station Hospitals are organised at all Large military stations, for the sick of all regiments or corps quartered there. The hospital is under the immediate supervision of the principal medical officer, usually a deputy-surgeon-general, and all medical officers at the station are available for such general service in it as he may direct; but separate wards are allotted to the different regiments and corps, and their sick are kept as far as possible distinct, and under the immediate attendance of their own medical officers and orderlies. The hospital staff consists of the medical officers attached to regiments at the station, a certain number of medical officers specially attached to the hospital, the officers and men of the Army Hospital Corps, and the hospital sergeants and orderlies of the regiments at the station. At small stations a building or block is specially fitted as a hospital, and is under the charge of the medical officer of the regiment or corps. When an army is organised for service in the field, field hospitals and ambulances are formed. The latter consist of a number of ambulance waggons, light waggons specially constructed for the carriage of sick and wounded, with a sufficient staff of medical officers and attendants, and a company of “stretcher bearers,” provided with stretchers; these are charged with the immediate removal of the wounded from the battle-field, their first dressings, and conveyance to the nearest field hospital· The field hospitals are provided with large hospital tents, beds, and all the requirements of an hospital, and a sufficient staff of medical officers and attendants, and either accompany the army in its march, or establish themselves in suitable places in rear. The ambulance waggon commonly used is four-wheeled, weighing 16 cwt., drawn by two horses, and constructed to carry eight wounded (two lying down and six sitting), besides a water keg, stretchers, and other medical appliances.

For care of sick and wounded in war, see, article War.

The general health of the army has greatly improved of late. The disasters of the Crimean war first drew attention to the importance of proper sanitary arrangements in the field; but what, perhaps, aroused public attention still more strongly was the report of the Royal Commission of 1858, by which it appeared that the mortality in the army generally was twice as great, and in the foot guards three times as great, a3 in the corresponding classes of the civil population. Since then, improved barracks, better meals, gymnasia, recreation-rooms, and out-of-door amusements provided for the soldier, have reduced the death-rate to one-half; while the Contagious Diseases Act, severely attacked as it has been, has materially lowered the sick-rate at those stations where it is in force. The admissions from causes under its control have, within five years, been reduced to less than a third at some of the large stations; while a comparison of 14 stations at which the Act is in force, with 14 to which it has not been extended, shows 54 - 5 cases per 1000 men at the former, and 113’3 at the latter. The annual death-rate in the army generally averages about 14 per 1000. In 1870 Gibraltar, Malta, and Canada were the healthiest stations, showing a death-rate of only 8'7 per 1000. The United Kingdom came next, with a rate of 9’5; while in India the death-rate rose to 22 ’ 8. But to appreciate the improvement that has been effected in the health of the army, it is necessary to turn back to the fifteen years preceding the Crimean war, when the death-rate in the United Kingdom averaged 17 - 5, and that of the army generally 33 per 1000; while the death-rate in India averaged 62 per 1000 between 1837 and 1853, and 81 per 1000 in the twenty years preceding 1837.

Veterinary Department.

The Veterinary Department is charged with the supervision of the sanitary condition of horses, and their treatment when sick; also the selection of such as are proposed to be cast as unfit for the service, and the examination of remounts. The grades are—staff veterinary surgeons, ranking as majors; veterinary surgeons, 1st class ranking as captains, and 2d class ranking as lieutenants; the whole under a principal veterinary surgeon, who ranks as a colonel. Candidates for appointment are required to pass an examination before a board of veterinary surgeons. Veterinary surgeons of the 2d class must have served five years, and passed a further examination, to be promoted to the 1st class; and a service of fifteen years is required for promotion to staff veterinary surgeons. All officers of the department are entitled to retire on half-pay after twenty-five years’ service, and are placed on the retired list at the age of 55. The establishment (1873) and rates of daily pay of the several ranks are as follows :— [table]

A limited number of acting veterinary surgeons are employed at the discretion of the Secretary for War.

Staff veterinary surgeons are employed to supervise districts or great military stations, the others are attached to cavalry regiments, horse and field artillery, &c. The uniform of the staff surgeons is blue, similar to that of officers of hussars, but with cocked hat and red plume; the veterinary surgeons attached to regiments wear the uniform of the corps, with cocked hat and red plume.

ClM]dain ’ S Department.

The Chaplain’s Department is under the Chaplain-General at the War Office. Chaplains to the forces are appointed by the Secretary for War; they must previously be in holy orders, and belong either to the Church of England or Ireland, to the Presbyterian, or to the Roman Catholic Church, and must serve six months on probation before their appointment is confirmed. They are divided into four classes,—the first ranking as colonels, the second as lieutenant-colonels, the third as majors, and the fourth as captains. Promotion is governed by length of service, —chaplains being promoted to the third class after ten years, to the second after fifteen years, and to the first after twenty years; but for distinguished services any chaplain may be promoted to the next higher class without regard to length of service. Chaplains are entitled to retirement after twenty-five years’ service. The establishment (1873) and rates of daily pay of the several classes are as follows :— [table]

Of these, fifteen are Roman Catholics and six Presbyterian. Chaplains are not attached to particular regiments or corps, but are stationed at the principal garrisons and military stations at home and abroad. Garrison chapels, used also in many cases as schools, exist at all the large stations. At smaller stations the troops attend divine service at the parish churches, and an allowance is made to a local clergyman for attending the troops, performing special services when necessary, and visiting the sick.

Education Department.

The educational establishments for the army consist of the military colleges, a staff of instructors for officers serving with their regiments, and army or regimental schools for the instruction of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the army and their children. The supervision of the education of the army rests with the Director-General of Military Education at the War Office.

Military Colleges.— The Staff College was established in 1858, with a view to train officers for employment on the staff of the army; replacing the “senior department” of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, which had existed since the beginning of the century. The present building, near Sandhurst, was completed in 1862, and accommodates forty students. The qualifications and manner of admission of students have already been noticed (under “Staff”). The course lasts two years, beginning in February, and with vacations at Christmas and Midsummer. The subjects of instruction are military history and art, fortification, military administration and law, surveying and sketching, reconnaissance, mathematics (including a short course in mechanics and practical astronomy), sciences, and languages; a large part of the course being devoted to out-of-door work and practical instruction in the duties of staff officers in the field. The Staff College is open to officers of all arms of the service, and twenty students are admitted each year. At the end of the first year they are required to pass a qualifying examination; and at the end of the second, the final examination is held, at the close of which the names of the successful candidates are published in general orders, divided into two classes,—“Honours” and “Pass.” Those officers who fail at the qualifying or at the final examination rejoin their regiments at once. The staff of the establishment consists of a commandant and ten professors, of whom four are military, the others civilians.

The Royal Military College, Sandhurst, -was originated in 1786, and in 1801 was transferred from Marlow to its present site, and officially recognised by Parliament. This institution was formerly devoted to preparing young gentlemen for commissions in the infantry and cavalry, the ages of admission varying from thirteen to sixteen and eighteen at different periods. Now it is devoted to the instruction of young officers of these arms after they have passed the requisite examination for commissions, and before they are appointed to regiments. The course lasts a year, and the instruction is confined altogether to purely military subjects,—fortification, military sketching, tactics, military law, correspondence, and accounts. At the conclusion of the course the students are required to pass an examination in these subjects, and their commissions are dated according to the result,—those in the first class being antedated two years; those in the second, twelve months; and those in the third dating from day of examination. The present building accommodates about 150 students, and it will probably be necessary to increase it considerably. The staff of the establishment consists of a governor, with an assistant and five staff officers (paymaster, surgeon, <tc.), and twelve military professors and instructors. A riding establishment and master are also kept up for the instruction of the students both of the Royal Military College and of the Staff College.

The Royal Military Academy at Woolwich was first established in 1741, and is devoted to the training of candidates for commissions in the artillery and engineers. The course of instruction, which lasts for three years, is mainly scientific and professional, mathematics playing an important part in it. The students are finally classed by the results of the examination held at the end of the course, those who pass the highest having the option of appointment to the engineers, and seniority in the army being determined by their position on the list. The present building accommodates about 250 students. The staff consists of a governor, with a secretary and adjutant, a “captain of cadets” and three “lieutenants of cadets” for purposes of discipline, and twenty-one professors and instructors.

Garrison Instructors.— For the instruction of officers serving with their regiments, and to enable them to qualify in the special examinations for promotion, staff officers, wdth the title of garrison instructors, are appointed to all the principal garrisons and military statione at home and abroad. Classes under these are formed for instruction in tactics, field fortification, military sketching and reconnaissance, and law. The course of instruction usually lasts four months, during which time the officer is struck off all other duties. At the close of the course an examination is held, and those who pass satisfactorily are certified as qualified for promotion. Garrison instructors hold the rank and receive the staff pay and allowances of brigademajors, and are selected from officers who have passed through the Staff College. The establishment consists of one superintending officer (with rank and pay of assistant quartermaster-general) and seventeen garrison instructors, stationed at home or in the foreign garrisons on the British establishment, and one superintending officer and ten garrison instructors in India.

Army Schools are established in every regiment and detachment, for the purpose of giving to non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and to their children, a sound and useful education. These schools are divided into adult, grown children, infant, and industrial schools. To every regiment are appointed a schoolmaster and schoolmistress, and a certain number of assistant schoolmasters, pupil teachers, and monitresses, on a scale according to the number of men and children attending school. Batteries of artillery and detachments of other corps are allowed an acting schoolmaster, with such assistants as may be necessary. All soldiers, soldiers’ children, and children of men belonging to the army reserve, of warders of military prisons, and of discharged soldiers holding military employments, are admitted free of charge to these schools; and children of pensioners and others indirectly connected with the army, on a weekly payment of 3d. Recruits, on first joining, are required to attend these schools; and soldiers who are candidates for promotion must obtain certificate} of proficiency before they are eligible. Advanced classes are also formed for the instruction of non-commissioned officers. Army schoolmasters receive a rate of pay varying, according to service, from 4s. a-day on appointment to a maximum of 7s. a-day, and rank as non-commissioned officers next below the sergeant-major. Candidates are required to go through a course in the training schools of the Royal Military Asylum, Chelsea, admission to which is by competitive examination, open to non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the army (of good character and especially recommended), to civilian pupil teachers, and certificated schoolmasters. Before appointment the candidate must enlist for general service for twelve years.

Schoolmistresses are classed in three classes, receiving from £30 to £44 yearly. Candidates must be certificated schoolmistresses, or have been employed as teachers in an army school, and in the latter case must pass an examination before appointment. All first appointments are made to the third class, and promotions are made according to merit and services.

At all important military stations and garrisons large and commodious schoolhouses have been specially built; at smaller stations barrack-rooms are told off and fitted up for the purpose. Schoolmasters and mistresses are permanently attached to regiments, and accompany them from station to station, and the schools are under the immediato and constant supervision of the commanding officer. They are also periodically visited and examined by inspectors, who report to the director-general, for which purpose a staff of one inspector of army schools, two local inspectors (officers of the army, receiving an additional rate of pay for performing these duties), and twelve sub-inspectors, are maintained. The improvement that has taken place in the education of the army generally may be gathered from the reports and returns of the director-general, by which it appears that between the years 1858 and 1871 the proportion of “uneducated” fell from 40 per cent, to 12 per cent., and that within the last few years the number possessing a superior education has risen from 6 to 32 per cent. And although much of this is doubtless due to the spread of education throughout the country, a comparison of the educational statistics of the recruits with those of the army generally proves that still more is due to the regimental schools.

Garrison Libraries and Regimental Recreation-Roams have also been established at the principal barracks at home and abroad, and are open to the troops on payment of a small subscription, which must not exceed threepence a month for a private soldier. The garrison library forms a central depot from which the recreation-rooms are supplied with books. All the rooms are furnished, warmed, and lighted at the public expense, and the recreation-rooms provided with billiard and bagatelle tables, chess, backgammon, and other games. An annual allowance of £2, 10s. is granted by Government for each troop or company; this, with the subscriptions, forms a fund to defray the cost of purchase and repair of books in garrison libraries, and of games, newspapers, &c., for recreation-rooms. Many recreation-rooms have a refreshment bar attached to them, where the men are supplied with tea, coffee, and other light refreshments at a very low price. A garrison librarian, usually a non-commissioned officer or a pensioner, takes charge of the library, and a regimental librarian has charge of the recreation-rooms. These are managed by a committee composed of non-commissioned officers and privates; and the garrison libraries are managed by a committee consisting of members chosen from the regimental committees, under the approval of the officer commanding the station.

Scientific and Educational Establishments.

The Department of Artillery Studies was established to give officers of the artillery the means of continuing their studies after they have completed the regular course at Woolwich, and of qualifying by a special training for appointments requiring exceptional scientific attainments. The establishment consists of a director, an assistantdirector, and two instructors of artillery, and a number of instructors and lecturers for mathematics, languages, and sciences. Its duties include the instruction of an advanced class of artillery officers, selected by competition, to qualify for scientific appointments; and the formation of classes in topography, astronomy, and languages, open to all officers of the artillery wishing to join them. A School of Gunnery is maintained at Shoeburyness for the purpose of giving practical instruction in gunnery to officers and men of the artillery, and carrying on all experiments connected with artillery and stores. The present site was selected for the school in consequence of the facilities afforded by the sands at the mouth of the Thames for artillery practice and firing at long ranges. The establishment consists of a commandant and brigade-major, with six instructors for the gunnery department; and two superintendents of experiments. Officers and non-commissioned officers are selected from brigades of artillery to go through a long course of instruction in gunnery, use of military machines, <fcc., and qualify as instructors to brigades and batteries; and squads of officers and men are sent there for instruction in the various branches of artillery service.

Υ∖iq Royal Artillery Institution at Woolwich was originally a private military society, but the present building was erected at Government expense, and the institution is now supported partly by the subscriptions of members, partly by a Government grant. It contains a museum, lecture theatre, laboratory, and a printing-press; and minutes of proceedings, containing papers on professional and scientific subjects, are periodically issued from it.

The School of Military Engineering at Chatham constitutes a special training school for officers of the Royal Engineers after they have passed through the course at Woolwich, as well as for recruits on first enlistment. Companies are also sent there previous to going abroad, and on return from foreign service, to keep up their knowledge. The establishment consists of a commandant and brigade-major, two discipline officers, and eleven officer instructors in construction, surveying, field fortification, telegraphy, &c.

The School of Musketry at Hythe was established shortly after the introduction of rifled fire-arms, to give a special training in the theory and practice of musketry to officers and non-commissioned officers qualifying to act as musketry instructors to their regiments, and to secure a uniform system of instruction and practice throughout the army. With this view also, squads of officers and men from all regiments in the service are periodically sent there for a short course. The establishment consists of a commandant, a deputy assistant adjutantgeneral, and five officer instructors. The commandant is also inspector-general of musketry, and exercises a general supervision over the instruction and practice throughout the army; for which purpose periodical reports are made to him from all regiments, and the annual musketry returns are carefully examined by him before being submitted, with his remarks, to the Commander-in-Chief. To secure sufficient attention to this important part of a soldier’s training, musketry instructors are appointed in every regiment; and staff officers, formerly termed district inspectors of musketry, are appointed to the principal districts. Every recruit is required to go through a course of instruction and practice before being dismissed drill, and every trained soldier is put through an annual course, lasting about a fortnight, in which he fires 60 rounds at fixed distances from 150 to 800 yards. Extra pay of Id. a day is given to those men who qualify as “marksmen,” and additional rewards to the best shots of companies and battalions.

An Army Medical School was formed in connection with the great military hospital at Netley, to which candidates for appointments as surgeons are sent for a probationary course. The school is under the immediate direction of the principal medical officer at Netley, and has a staff of nine professors and assistant professors of military surgery, medicine, hygiene, &c.

The Military School of Music at Kneller Hall, Hounslow, was established in 1857 with the view of instructing noncommissioned officers and soldiers in music, and supplying competent bandmasters and trained musicians to the various regiments. The staff consists of one officer and a number of civil professors: the students, limited to 148, are soldiers selected for good conduct and promise of musical proficiency, and remain for two years.

The Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea (also known as the Duke of York’s School), and Royal Hibernian Military School at Dublin, are establishments for the maintenance and education of a limited number of boys who are the sons of soldiers. Candidates for admission must be between the ages of 5 and 12 years, and they are allowed to remain till 14, or, if they belong to the band, till 15. They are then allowed to volunteer into any regiment they may select, or, if not fit for the service, are apprenticed to a trade or placed in some other civil employment. The Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea is also a normal school and training institution for army schoolmasters.

Administration of Justice—Judge-Advocate-General's Department—Military Prisons.

Justice is administered by the commissioned officers of the army: by the commanding officer for minor offences, and by regimental, district, or general courts-martial for more serious crimes. (See Military Law.) The administration of justice as pertaining to discipline falls under the Adjutant-General’s branch of the department of the Commander-in-Chief. But to ensure these disciplinary powers being exercised in strict conformity with the law, a Judge-Advocate-General, a legal adviser to the Crown and to the Com-mander-in-Chief, is appointed by patent. This officer is usually a lawyer of high standing, having a seat in the House of Commons, holding his office as a member of the Government, and quitting office with his party. His department includes a deputy judge-advocate-general, who is also a lawyer and civilian, and three deputy judge-advocates, military officers; of the latter, two are attached to the Judge-Advocate-General’s office in London, and one to the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. A separate Judge-Advocate’s department is maintained in India, where deputy judge-advocates are appointed to every important command. All general courts-martial held at home are sent to the Judge-Advocate-General, to be by him submitted to the Queen for confirmation; and all district courts-martial, after having been confirmed and promulgated, are sent to his office for examination and custody. The Judge-Advocate-General and his deputy, being judges in the last resort of the validity of the proceedings of courts-martial, take no part in their conduct; but the deputy judge-advocates frame and revise charges, and attend at general courts-martial.

The punishments that can be awarded to officers and soldiers for various offences are detailed in the Mutiny Act, the Articles of War, and the Queen’s Regulations. A commanding officer can “reprimand” a commissioned officer, but can award him no other punishment. Arrest is not, as in most armies, recognised as a punishment, but is merely a preliminary to further proceedings. An officer, on the commission of an offence, is placed under arrest— that is, deprived of his sword and confined to his room— until the matter has been investigated and disposed of, or sent before a court-martial. A commissioned officer can be tried by a general court-martial only, and can be sentenced to death, penal servitude, imprisonment, cashiering, or dismissal, reduction on list of his rank, or reprimand. A soldier, on commission of an offence, is placed in confinement—that is, deprived of his arms and confined in the guard-room. At “orders” (i.e., commanding officer’s office hours) the next morning he is brought before the commanding officer, and the case investigated in presence of the officer commanding his troop or company, the adjutant, and the prisoner. If the offence is a minor one the commanding officer disposes of it summarily; his powers including admonition, confinement to barracks for periods not exceeding 28 days, carrying with it punishment drill up to 14 days, imprisonment not exceeding 168 hours, and stoppage of pay for absence. Drunkenness is punished by fines ranging from 2s. 6d. to 10s. If the offence is more serious, the man is remanded to the guardroom while the necessary steps are being taken for bringing him to trial, and is finally tried by a regimental, district, or general court-martial, according to the nature of the offence. The punishments that can be inflicted by court-martial are death, penal servitude for any period not less than five years, imprisonment for any period not exceeding two years, dismissal from the service, stoppages of pay, and forfeitures of pay, medals,service, &c. Flogging has been abolished except on active, service, as also branding, and all such disgraceful punishments. Practically, military offences, with very few exceptions, are disposed of by regimental or district, courts-martial, and by sentences of imprisonment not exceeding six months. A non-commissioned officer can only be reduced and punished by sentence of court-martial.

Sentences of penal servitude awarded to soldiers are carried out in the convict prisons with other convicts; but sentences of imprisonment are usually carried out in the military prisons. Military prisons were established in 1844, in order to avoid the necessity of mixing soldiers sentenced for military offences with ordinary criminals in county gaols. They are of two classes, the larger ones being under a governor, and the smaller ones under a chief warder. They are under the control of the Secretary of State for War, and under the immediate supervision of the officer commanding on the station (acting as his representative) and of the military visitors,—field officers serving at the station, by whom the prisons are periodically visited, and all serious offences investigated and punished. They are also inspected from time to time by the Government inspectors of convict prisons. There are eight military prisons in the United Kingdom, and six in the colonies; and the number of prisoners has recently averaged about 12 per 1000. Besides these prisons, “provost cells” are provided in every large barrack, in which short sentences of imprisonment not exceeding 28 or 42 days are carried out under the charge of a provost-sergeant.

Barracks.

In the earlier days of the standing army the barrack accommodation in England was altogether insufficient for the force maintained, and such as there was, was miserably bad. A considerable portion of the army was constantly billeted, camped, or lodged in buildings hired for tho time, and every proposal to build barracks was jealously opposed in Parliament Thus, in 1704 the total accommodation in barracks was only sufficient for 5000 men, and in 1792 did not exceed 20,000; but during the long war with France, partly in consequence of the large force kept permanently under arms, and partly also in consequence of the fears aroused by the revolutionary spirit which had penetrated into many of the large towns, barracks were constructed in all parts of the kingdom, and after the peace the accommodation far exceeded the wants of the army. Many barracks were then dismantled and sold, and others were allowed to fall into disrepair; but little was done towards improving the condition of the existing barracks until the Crimean war brought the army into notice again, and attention was drawn to the heavy rate of mortality among soldiers in peace time, mainly attributable to the defective construction and overcrowding of barracks. New barracks on improved designs were then built, and existing ones altered and reappropriated, so as to allow each man at least 600 cubic feet of air, and, in addition, provide recreation-rooms and other resorts for the soldier during the day.

The following estimate of the number and size of rooms required for a battalion of infantry on peace establishment will show the accommodation provided in modern barracks: —Officers.— Messroom, 45 feet × 25 feet, and 18 feet high; ante-room, 24 feet × 18 feet; kitchen, servants’ rooms, larder,—altogether 13 rooms and cellars, <tc. Commanding officer’s quarters—6 rooms, of from 16 feet × 14 feet to 18 feet × 16 feet. Two field officers’ quarters — 3 rooms each; 30 officers’quarters of one room each (often made with a recess or bunk for the bed), and 15 rooms for officers’ servants. Sergeants.— Messroom, 40 feet × 2C feet; kitchen and storehouse for ditto; separate rooms for 7 staff-sergeants and 40 company sergeants. Men.— 32 rooms to hold 18 men each, 45 feet × 20 feet, arranged by companies in blocks of four, with an ablution-room attached to each block; 48 separate quarters for married soldiers, each 16 feet× 14 feet. Offices, Stores, and Workshops.— Orderly-room, commanding officer’s, paymaster’s, and quartermaster’s offices,—4 rooms; quartermaster’s store, 40 feet × 20 feet; provision and issuing stores, two rooms, 18 feet × 16 feet; armourer’s, tailor’s, and shoemaker’s shops, 3 rooms, from 16 feet × 14 feet to 16 feet × 32 feet; guard-room, with prisoners’ room and lock-up; cook-house, 40 feet × 20 feet, with separate apparatus for each company; women’s washing-house, 66 feet × 20 feet; latrines partitioned and screened. Schools, Pecreation-Pooms, Canteens, &c.—Where no garrison schoolroom exists, a building, 50 feet square, divided into 2 large and 4 small class-rooms for the school. Recreation-rooms—2 rooms, 40 feet × 20 feet, fitted with bar in one room, and bookcases in the other. Canteen—bar, including counter and space in front, 24 feet× 12 feet; sitting-room for men, another for noncommissioned officers, and quarter for canteen sergeant. Skittle-alleys and ball-courts are also usually provided. Where no garrison hospital exists, a complete hospital establishment, including medical officer’s office, surgery, dispensary, and store-rooms, quarters for sergeant and orderlies, cook-house, wash-houses, &c., and wards for 10 per cent, of the force, are included in the barrack. In constructing barrack-rooms the beds are usually, arranged in two rows, with a passage of 5 feet between the beds, and 1 foot between head of bed and wall; giving a width of 20 feet The barrack beds are of iron, made to double in the middle; during the day they are folded back, and the centre of the room thus cleared. Straw mattresses, blankets, and sheets are provided by Government; also forms and tables for day use. The arms are kept in racks by the side of the bed; knapsacks, kit, and accoutrements on shelves and pegs over the bed; 5 feet lineal space and 600 cubic feet are allowed per man. In hospitals 1200 cubic feet are allowed. In cavalry and artillery stables 1500 cubic feet are allowed per horse; the stalls are 5 feet or 5∣ feet by 9 feet, with 12 feet down the centre of a double stable, or 7 feet on each side where the horses stand head to head.

Since the formation of the Control Department the construction, maintenance, and repair of barracks have devolved on the Royal Engineers; but the charge of them when once finished and handed over, the allotment of quarters, and the supply, maintenance, and repair of all barrack stores and movable furniture, rest with the Control Department. The existing barrack accommodation in the United Kingdom, according to the new appropriation, is sufficient for about 122,000 men,—88,000 in Great Britain, and 34,000 in Ireland; and when the works now in progress, or about to be undertaken, are completed, this will be raised to about 135,000. Of this, however, about 2 per cent, must be deducted for small detached forts and coast batteries, which cannot be occupied without great inconvenience to the troops so dispersed, and a margin of at least 10 per cent, must be left for barracks and rooms only partially filled, so that the available accommodation will not exceed 120,000.

Arms, Equipment, and Clothing.

The arms issued to the several branches of the service are supplied partly by contract, but mainly by the ordnance manufacturing establishments. The, principal of these is the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich (see article Arsenal), divided into the carriage factory, laboratory, gun factory, and experimental branch. From these factories are produced the whole of the guns and gun carriages for naval as well as land service now in use, and the greater proportion of the ammunition and equipment belonging to them. Rifles, sword bayonets, and swords are manufactured at the Royal Small-Arms Factory at Enfield, and gunpowder at the Royal Gunpowder Factory at Waltham Abbey; a considerable quantity of powder, however, is also supplied by contract. The various articles worn and carried by the soldier in the field, or issued to him and under his care, are usually classed under the three heads of arms and accoutrements (or equipment), clothing, and necessaries. Of these, the first are supplied and maintained by Government (though the soldier is held answerable for damage by carelessness or neglect), and under no circumstances become the property of the soldier. The articles included under the second head (clothing) are issued periodically to the soldier, and expected to last a given time; during this time he is required to maintain them at his own cost, but at the expiration of the period, and when replaced by the next issue, they become his property. Lastly, the articles termed necessaries are supplied free to the soldier on first joining, but afterwards have to be replaced and maintained at his own cost. The articles supplied as “clothing” vary slightly in different branches of the service, but usually consist of a tunic, a pair of trousers or overalls, and two pairs of boots annually, and a second pair of trousers biennially. Head-dresses, greatcoats, and leggings are issued at intervals varying from three to ten years, but these articles do not become the property of the soldier when done with. All clothing is supplied from the army clothing depot at Pimlico; a certain amount is manufactured there, but the greater part is obtained by contract, and only examined and stored there. The bulk of the clothing is sent to regiments ready made-up, in sizes according to a size-roll furnished by the regiment; but a certain proportion is sent in material unmade, and an allowance is made to the master tailor of the regiment for making up such articles, and fitting the clothing generally. “Necessaries” include serge frocks or stable jackets, forage caps, shirts, socks, towels, brushes, combs, and other small articles, of which a stock is always kept on hand by tho quartermaster of the regiment, and supplied by him to companies as required. These articles can either be obtained (on payment) from the clothing depot at Pimlico, or purchased independently; but in the latter case the articles must be compared and found equal to the sealed patterns, and the price must not exceed the Government tariff.

England, from its insular position, has always been a great naval power rather than a military one. On her own element she has for years maintained an empire more undisputed than any power or potentate has ever claimed on land. The rule of Napoleon in the height of his fame was not so haughty and despotic on the Continent as was that of England at sea. Men still living remember the times when the British flag was saluted by every sail that traversed the sea in any quarter of the globe, and no ship, of any nation, dared to pass a British man-of-war without striking its flag. It was to the victories of her navy, and especially to Trafalgar, that England owed her immunity from invasion. It is natural, therefore, that the fame and popularity of the navy should partly have eclipsed the deeds of the army. And yet the British army has a history of which any nation might be proud. If it cannot count such a list of victories as Napoleon emblazoned on the banners of France, neither has it suffered such disasters; and it may lay claim to the longest continuous history of any army in Europe. The French army dates all its traditions from Napoleon’s time; not a trace remains of the regiments that served under Turenne, and Condé, and Luxemburg in the glorious days of the old monarchy, and even the banner under which they fought is proscribed. The Prussian army was almost unknown until the time of Frederick the Great; and Austrian regiments have been so often changed that it is difficult to trace their antecedents. But many English regiments trace back an unbroken history of more than two centuries, and fought, under the numbers and the names they still retain, with William III. in the Netherlands, and with Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramilies, and Malplaquet. And their traditions are not confined to Europe. India conquered and permanently held; every colony in the world at one time wrested from its owners; the British flag planted on the ramparts of Cabul and Peking; and her arms carried into the fastnesses of Abyssinia and the forests of Ashantee;—such are among the deeds that attest the valour and enterprise of the English army. From time immemorial the inhabitants of the British Islands have been distinguished for a determined bravery and a physical power exceeding that of any other nation.

Modern peaceful experiences have confirmed the opinion as to the physical superiority of the Briton, and in this respect no rival has yet been found to the highly-fed English navvy. The army is composed of Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen, in the proportion of about 75 per cent of the first, 10 per cent, of the second, and 15 per cent, of the last. The Englishman generally is above the average of nations in height and physical power. Even when the standard for the army has been at its lowest, it has been several inches above that of Continental armies. His strength lies especially in the upper part of the body—in the chest, shoulders, and arms—and he is ponderous rather than active. His lower limbs are not always proportionately developed, and the Englishman as a rule is not a good marcher, nor is he so hardy as the inhabitants of many other -countries. In temperament he is calm and rather stolid, not easily roused to enthusiasm, and not full of romantic visions of glory, though not so insensible to such emotions as is often believed; slow, somewhat wanting in resource, and apt to grumble and show his discontent under hardships. On the other hand, he has a strong sense of justice, of right, and of duty, which can generally be successfully appealed to. His spirits rise to danger; he can always be depended on for battle; and his courage, if less fiery, is of a more stubborn and enduring kind than that of any other race. The Scotchman is less ponderous in frame, but more sinewy and active,—a better marcher, and more capable of enduring hardships and fatigue; more impetuous in action, though capable of a restrained energy very different from the reckless valour of the Frenchman or Irishman. The Scotch regiments have always been distinguished by a strong national feeling and clanship, producing an esprit de corps that cannot be surpassed by any corps d’élite. The Irishman is active, gay, careless, more ready in resource than the others, and often more reckless in fighting; but, on the other hand, less to be depended upon, and more difficult to hold in the bonds of discipline.

The English officer is drawn exclusively from the upper classes. His early education, his habits, and his traditions all fit him to be a leader of men. His physique, his intelligence, and the spirit of enterprise, are developed by those athletic exercises and field sports which distinguish the aristocracy of England. The character which especially distinguishes him is a love of enterprise. Much of his spare time is spent in travelling, or in sports of a more or less dangerous character. Not a war takes place in the most distant and unhealthy colonies, but crowds of volunteers are found for it. There is not a country in the globe but has been explored and traversed by English officers for their amusement, and wherever a war takes place they flock to it. Not so devoted, perhaps, as the officers of some nations to the details of their profession, they yet carry out all that is required of them with rigorous exactitude and a high sense of duty. But it is in the field, and when thrown on their own resources, that they show to most advantage. Trained by our Indian empire and colonial possessions to the life of a conquering nation, command comes natural to them; and the youngest subaltern, suddenly called to a position of responsibility, raises armies and carries on wars, and dominates all around him by his daring and energy. The histories of Clive, Sir Herbert Edwardes, and others, repeat themselves on a smaller scale whenever the occasion offers.

The social life of the English officer is unlike that of any other army. Off duty, the gradations of rank almost disappear, and all meet on a footing of equality as gentlemen. Our mess system, envied and copied by foreign nations, is only possible where such freedom exists. The officers live together, dine at a table always handsomely furnished, and often rich with trophies and records of the old history of the regiment, at which the president, perhaps the junior officer, is for the time superior; and wherever stationed, and under all conditions, retain the forms of high-bred society. The discipline of the English army, once proverbial for cruelty and harshness, is now the very reverse, and there is perhaps no army in which officers and men stand together on a more pleasant footing.

Of the character of the English army in war it is almost unnecessary to speak; it has written itself, in history in a series of battles, often won against heavy odds, from Crecy, Poictiers, and Agincourt, to Waterloo. The highest eulogiums passed on it have been wrung from its adversaries. “L’infanterie Anglaise est la meilleur du monde; heureusement il n’y en a pas beaucoup,” was Bugeaud’s comment. “Le soldat Anglais,” says General Foy, “possède la qualité la plus precieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère.” Readers of military history will remember Napier’s vivid picture of the assault of Badajoz, when the troops, unable to advance, and yet scorning to retire, remained in the ditches to be shot down by the garrison. And our account may well close with Foy’s description of the British infantry at waterloo :—“La mort était devant eux, la honte derrière. En cette terrible occurrence les boulets de la Garde Imperiale et la cavalerie de France victorieuse ne purent pas entamer l’immobile infanterie britannique. On eut été tenté de croire qu’elle avait pris racine dans la terre, si ses bataillons ne se fussent ébranlés majestueusement quelques minutes après le coucher du soleil.” Indian Army.

The history of the armies of India is the history of our Indian empire, and as such, in its most striking features, is treated elsewhere. The present notice, therefore, is confined to those details of organisation which do not fall within the province of a general history.

For military purposes India is divided into three great sections—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Under the term Bengal must be included Bengal proper, Assam, the North-West Provinces, Oudh, and the Punjab; under Madras, Burmah; and under Bombay, the province of Sindh. The army of India has always consisted of three native armies, corresponding to the three presidencies, each associated with a certain number of British troops, Europeans in the service of the late East India Company, and forces furnished by the Imperial Government. This separation into three distinct armies was the natural result of the original foundation of separate settlements and factories in India; and each retains to the present day its own separate history and traditions.

Half a century after the establishment of the associations of merchant adventurers, whose first charter bears date 1600, the English traders in Bengal were still restricted by the native princes to a military establishment, as guard, of an ensign and 30 men; and this Liliputian force may be taken as the germ of the splendid army which now occupies India from Peshawur to Calcutta. In 1681 Bengal received the first reinforcement from Madras, in the shape of a “corporal of approved fidelity and courage, with 20 soldiers;” and two years later a company was sent from Fort St George (Madras), raising the little Bengal army to a strength of 250 Europeans. In 1695 native soldiere were first enlisted. The English had by this time moved to Calcutta, and there entrenched themselves; and in the years 1701-2, the garrison of that now flourishing capital consisted of 120 soldiers and seamen gunners. In 1756 Fort William was captured by Surajah Dowlah, and the terrible tragedy of the Black Hole of Calcutta was enacted; but vengeance followed promptly. An expedition was at once despatched from Madras, and on the 23d June 1757 the battle of Plassey established the British supremacy in Bengal. The little force, not exceeding 3000 men, with which Clive gained this astonishing victory, was formed mainly of Madras troops, and the 39th regiment, recently despatched from England,—the first royal regiment sent to India, and which now bears the motto, “Primus in Indis.” The Bengal army was represented by a few hundred men only; but from this date the military power and conquests of the Company rapidly increased. A company of artillery already had been organised in 1748; and in 1757, shortly before the battle of Plassey, the 1st regiment of Bengal native infantry was raised. In 1759 the native infantry had been augmented to 5 battalions; in the following year 3 troops of dragoons were raised; and in 1763 the total forces amounted to 1500 Europeans and 12 battalions of native infantry, giving a strength of 11,500 men. In 1765 the army was further increased; the European infantry was divided into 3 regiments, and the whole force was organised in 3 brigades, each consisting of 1 company of artillery, 1 regiment European infantry, 1 troop of native cavalry, and 7 battalions of Sepoys. In 1766, consequent on the reduction of some money allowances, a dangerous combination of the officers of the Bengal army took place, by which they agreed to resign their commissions simultaneously. This combination was promptly put down by the then Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Lord Clive, to whom the Bengal army may be said to owe its existence. He found Bengal a ruined commercial agency in 1756; he left it, ten years after, a powerful empire.

The constant wars and extensions of dominion which took place during the next thirty years led to further augmentation of the army; the number of brigades and of European regiments was increased to 6; and in 1794 the Bengal army numbered about 3500 Europeans and 24,000 natives.

The first armed force in the Madras Presidency was the little garrison of Armegon, on the Coromandel coast, consisting of 12 guns and 28 soldiers. In 1644 Fort St George w as built and garrisoned by 100 soldiers, and in 1653 Madras became a presidency. In 1745, when Fort St George was surrendered to the French, its garrison consisted of 200 Europeans, while a similar number, with the addition of 200 “Topasses” (descendants of the Portuguese), garrisoned Fort St David. In 1748 the various independent companies of factory guards at settlements on the Coromandel coast and other places were consolidated into the Madras European regiment. In the following year, Clive, with only 200 soldiers and 300 Sepoys, seized and held Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, and on three several occasions defeated the troops of the Nabob and their French auxiliaries. From this year the military power of Madras may be dated. In 1754 the first royal regiment, the 39th, was sent there, followed in 1758 by three others. In 1772 the Madras army numbered 3000 European infantry and 16,000 natives, and in 1784 the number of native troops had risen to 34,000.

The island of Bombay formed part of the marriage portion received by Charles II. with the Infanta of Portugal, and in 1662 the Bombay regiment of Europeans was raised to defend it. In 1668 the island was granted to the East India Company, and the regiment at the same time transferred to them. In 1708 Bombay became a presidency, but it did not play so important a part as the others in the early extension of our power in India, and its forces were not so rapidly developed. It is said, however, to have been the first presidency to discipline native troops, and Bombay Sepoys were sent to Madras in 1747, and took part in the battle of Plassey in 1757. In 1772 the Bombay army consisted of 2500 Europeans and 3500 Sepoys, but in 1794, in consequence of the struggles with the Mahratta power, the native troops had been increased to 24,000.

In 1796 a general reorganisation of the Indian armies took place. Hitherto the officers in each presidency had been borne on general “lists,” according to the branches of the service to which they belonged. These lists were now broken up, and cadres of regiments formed. The colonels and lieutenant-colonels remained on separate lists, and an establishment of general officers was created, while the divisional commands were distributed between the royal and Company’s officers. Further augmentations took place, consequent on the great extension of territory and the complete assertion of British supremacy. In 1798, at the outbreak of the war with Tippoo Saib, the native infantry in India had been increased to 122 battalions; and the force which General Harris took from Madras for the attack on Seringapatam consisted of 5000 Europeans, 14,000 native troops, 40 siege guns, 64 field guns, and the Nizam’s contingent, numbering 6000 men. In 1808 the total force in India amounted to 24,500 Europeans and 154,500 natives.

The first half of the 19th century was a history of wars and annexations, and further augmentations of the army took place. Horse artillery was formed, and the artillery service increased to a most powerful footing. “Irregular cavalry” were raised in Bengal and Bombay, commanded by picked officers, and recruited from a better class of troopers, who received high pay, on the condition of finding their own horses and equipment. “Local forces” were raised in various parts from time to time, the most important being the Punj<4b irregular force (raised after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849), consisting of 3 field batteries, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 5 of infantry, and the Nagpore and Oudh irregular forces. Another kind of military force, which had been gradually formed, was that called “contingents,”—native troops raised by the native states under our protection. The strongest of these was that of Hyderabad, originally known a⅛ the Nizam’s army, and consisting of two brigades of infantry and cavalry, with artillery. Changes were also made in the organisation of the army. The staff was enlarged, sanitary improvementseffected, manufacturing establishments instituted or increased, and the administration of the army generally improved.

The officering and recruiting of the three armies was in all essentials similar. The officers were mainly supplied by the Company’s Military College at Addiscombe (established in 1809), and by direct appointments under the patronage of the directors. The Bengal army was recruited from Hindustan, the infantry being mostly drawn from Oudh and the great Gangetic plains. The soldiers were chiefly high-caste Hindus, a sixth being Mahometans. The cavalry was composed mainly of Mahometans, recruited from Rohilcund and the Gangetic Doab. The only other elements in the army were the four Ghoorka regiments, enlisted from Nepaul, and the local Punjâb irregular force. The Madras army was chiefly recruited from that presidency, or the native states connected with it, and consisted of Mahometans, Brahmins, Mahrattas, Telingas or Gentoos, and Tamils. The Bombay army was recruited from its own presidency, with some Hindustanis, but chiefly formed of Mahrattas and Mahometans; the Bombay light cavalry mainly from Hindustan proper.

In the year preceding the great mutiny the Indian army had reached its highest strength. The establishment in the several presidencies was as follows :— [table]

Including the local and irregular troops (about 100,000 strong), the total strength amounted to 38,000 Europeans of all arms, with 276 field guns, and 348,000 native troops, with 248 field guns,—truly a magnificent establishment, and, outwardly, worthy of the great empire which England had created for herself in the East, but inwardly unsound, and on the very eve of crumbling to pieces.

It would be impossible, within the limits of a short article, to do more than briefly summarise the causes which led to the great Sepoy mutiny of 1857. For many years the discipline of the Bengal army had been relaxed. The system under which the ablest regimental officers were withdrawn to staff and civil employ was incompatible with efficiency, the centralisation of the army administration was excessive, and the powers of commanding officers had greatly diminished. The supposed wrongs of Oudh stirred up the soldiers so largely recruited from that province, and the religious prejudices of those otherwise well disposed were inflamed by the secret emissaries of the disaffected. The Sepoys were told that the Government wished to force them to break their caste and abjure their religion, that they were to be sent across the sea to die in foreign and detested lands, or to be sacrificed on their own shores. Even the ridiculous endeavour to assimilate native to British soldiers in outward appearance was turned to account by these emissaries. The “greased cartridges” were but the spark which set the whole aflame. The miserable delusions spread, the loyally-disposed east in their lot with the disaffected, feeling that when once a mutinous spirit had been shown all was lost to them as a military body, and the Bengal native army was in a short space of time only a chaotic mass of disbanded and mutinous soldiers. 1 The story of the rebellion is the history of those days, and cannot be treated in this place. Fortunately for our power in India, the mutiny did not spread to the Madras or Bombay armies; and in the darkest days our ancient enemies the Sikhs not only remained faithful, but came forward to render us powerful assistance.

By the autumn of 1858 the mutiny was virtually crushed, and the task of reorganisation commenced. On the 1st September 1858 the East India Company ceased to rule our Indian empire, and Her Majesty’s Government took up the reins of power. On the important question of the reorganisation of the Indian army the opinions and advice of the most distinguished soldiers and civilians were invited. Masses of reports and evidence were collected in India, and by a royal commission in England. On the report of this commission the new system was based. They recommended the abolition of a local European army, and the amalgamation of the existing one with the royal army; that the native army should be enlisted for general service, and be of mixed nationabties and castes, .that the irregular system should mainly obtain in the native cavalry; and that the native infantry should be mainly regular.

The European force was permanently increased, while the native army was largely reduced. The Indian artilleries were transferred to the Royal Artillery, the Company’s European cavalry became the 19th, 20th, and 21st Hussars, and their European infantry became regiments of the line, numbered 101 to 109. The transference of the Company’s Europeans to the Crown was not unattended with trouble. The men considered that faith had not been kept with them, and a mutinous spirit was shown. Ultimately they were offered their discharge, which a large number accepted.

The European officers of the native armies, and those officers and men who did not accept service in the new royal regiments, now formed with the native soldiers the new Indian army. The reorganisation of this by the Indian Government was a task of no ordinary difficulty, involving much besides reconstruction. Many of the levies hastily raised during the mutiny had to be disbanded, or formed into line regiments, and various miscellaneous corps had to be got rid of. The Government was further hampered by the necessity for providing for the large number of officers whose regiments no longer existed. In 1861 a “staff corps” was formed in each presidency, “to supply a body of officers for service in India, by whom various offices and appointments, hitherto held by officers borne on the strength of the several corps of the Indian forces, shall in future be held.” Promotion in this corps was to be by length of service,—twelve years to attain the rank of captain, twenty years that of major, and twenty-six years that of lieutenant-colonel. The staff corps was filled up by a large number of Indian and British officers holding various staff employments (the new regimental employments being counted as staff duty), and all kinds of civil posts and situations, and has been gradually opened wider, till it includes the great majority of the Indian officers. The new organisation of the cavalry and infantry of the Indian army was promulgated in 1863, but did not take effect in Bombay and Madras till 1864 and 1865. Cavalry regiments are on the “silladar” or irregular system; their establishment consists of 1 commandant, 1 second in command (also commanding a squadron), 2 squadron officers, 1 adjutant, 2 doing duty officers (Europeans), and 13 native officers, 444 non-commissioned officers and troopers, or “sowars.” The infantry battalions have each 1 commandant, 2 wing commandants, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-

1 Of 74 native infantry regiments, 45 mutinied, 20 were disarmed, and 3 disbanded. Six only remained true.

master, and 2 doing duty officers (Europeans), 16 native officers, and 696 natives of all ranks.

The total strength of the army of India in 1873 was 6162 European officers, 60,174 European non-commissioned officers and men, and 123,671 natives. The supreme military power is the Viceroy and Governor-General in council. The military member of that council is de facto War Minister, and the military department of the Government of India the War Department. The Commander-in-Chief of the army is the executive military power, and the responsible adviser of Government, as well as local Com-mander-in-Chief in Bengal. The Madras and Bombay Presidencies have military departments and local Com-manders-in-chief, but subordinate to the supreme Government of India; each presidency, however, has certain local peculiarities in its own military system and its own army departments. The army departments are the commissariat (charged with the supply of provisions, forage, fuel, light, and transport), the ordnance department (charged with the custody and supply of all warlike stores), the clothing department, medical department, stud department, &c. The commissariat is officered from the combatant ranks of the army, the subordinates being also drawn permanently from its ranks, and is a most excellent and powerful department. The ordnance department is officered from officers of the Royal Artillery, who, as “commissaries of ordnance,” have charge of the various arsenals and magazines in the country. The whole of British India is divided into divisions and districts, and the command is exercised by royal or Indian officers according to a proportion fixed. The staff is selected from the officers of the British corps in India, the staff corps, and the Indian army, and the system is similar to that in England and the colonies, except that the tenure of brigade majorships is limited to three years.

The following table shows the detailed constitution of the army of India in 1873 :— [table]

The following gives the strength of the several arms :— [table]

The Punjâb field force of 4 batteries of artillery, 5 regiments cavalry, 4 regiments Sikh infantιy, and 6 regiments Punjâb infantry, is included in the Bengal army. The “Hyderabad contingent,” of 4 field batteries, 4 cavalry and 6 infantry regiments; the “Mysore” troops, of 6 regiments of cavalry and 4 of infantry; the “Nair brigade,” of 2 battalions of infantry and four guns; and other minor local forces and contingents, are not included in the above.

The Bengal army is composed chiefly of Mahometans, Brahmins and other Hindu castes, Rajpoots, Jâts, Pun-jâbees, natives of Trans-Indus, and hill-men. Some are regiments entirely of one race, as the Ghoorkas, while others are mixed entirely or by companies; but the composition of every regiment has been definitively laid down. There are no special restrictions on caste or race, but care is taken to prevent an undue preponderance of any class. Enlistment is purely voluntary. Recruiting is carried on by parties detached, or by non-commissioned officers and men on furlough. Pay and pension are fairly good, though depreciated by the general rise in prices; pension being obtainable by men invalided after fifteen years’ service. The native officers are appointed from the noncommissioned officers, and though a respectable body of men, are not sufficiently educated. It is, however, contemplated to give natives of rank and position direct commissions. The British officers of the Indian army, generally, are obtained through the medium of the staff corps, which is filled by volunteers from the British army, and now supplies the native armies of India with regimental officers.

The Madras native army is composed of a few Christians, Mahometans, and Mahrattas, and a large number of Telingas or Gentoos, and Tamils. The infantry battalions are organised as in the Bengal army. The cavalry are mostly composed of Arcot Mussulmans, descendants of the soldiers of the Nawab of the Carnatic. This cavalry is not “silladar,” as in Bengal or Bombay, and the native establishment is weaker, consisting of 12 native officers, 75 non-commissioned officers, and 300 privates. The army is recruited as in Bengal, but has a peculiar institution of its own, viz., the “recruit and pension boys” (sons of soldiers or pensioners) attached to each regiment, and transferred to the ranks when of sufficient age and approved of,—a valuable institution, and one which gives a powerful hold upon the fidelity of the men.

The Bombay army resembles that of Bengal in recruiting, organisation, and equipment. It is composed of a few Christians, some Brahmins and Rajpoots, and other Hindu castes, but mainly of Mahrattas and Purwarees, with a few Punjâbees and natives of Trans-Indus. <

It is difficult to draw comparisons between the soldiers of our Indian forces, recruited from so many different parts of the empire. The most warlike, undoubtedly, are the inhabitants of Scinde, the Punjâb, and Trans-Indus. Perhaps next come the men of Rohilcund, Rajpootana, Oudh, and the Mahrattas. These races possess a greater aptitude for military training, and are generally of a better physique than the inhabitants of the Southern Peninsula. But it is too much to affirm that the former are “born soldiers,” the latter only “soldiers by education.” The ploughshare has already replaced the sword in many parts, and more and more are once turbulent tribes becoming peaceful tillers of the soil. Of the actual value of native troops it is still more difficult to form a true estimate. The Sikhs, both as friends and foes, have proved themselves gallant soldiers, not unworthy of being matched with Europeans. The ordinary Sepoy, under the guidance of British officers, has furnished many examples of heroism and devotion. It is said that a Bengal regiment successfully stood the brunt of a charge from the French at the battle of Porto Novo in 1782; and the devotion of Clive’s Sepoys at Arcot has passed into a proverb. At the siege of Dehli in 1857, native regiments sustained losses which few European troops could have borne, and crowds of men in hospital, with wounds only part healed, volunteered to join in the final assault. But without their English officers they are of little value; the Asiatic, as a rules, cannot face the European, and it would be daDgerous tc trust to them in a war against a Western invader. They are usefid auxiliaries, and relieve the European soldier of much of the fatigue inseparable from the task of garrisoning so large an empire and protecting its frontiers. But the mutiny proved the danger of relying on them, and taught the lesson, never, it is to be hoped, to be forgotten, that our Indian empire must be held, not by native armies, but by British armies.

Many important changes and improvements have taken place since the great reorganisation of the Indian armies was commenced in 1858. The education of the whole army has been improved; musketry, gymnastic, and garrison instruction has been introduced; and strict tests are now required of candidates for the staff, and for promotion in all grades. Annual camps of exercise have been instituted, where large bodies of troops are massed, and opportunities for higher tactical training afforded. The commissariat department has been enlarged, the military account department remodelled, the matériel of war and its manufacture vastly improved. The new Bystem of reliefs of British troops has greatly shortened the tour of Indian service, splendid barracks have been built, hill sanitariums extended, so that about 10,000 British troops are now located in the hills during the hot weather; by these means, and a liberal expenditure on sanitary requirements, the deathrate among European troops has been reduced to one-half. Other great questions still remain to be dealt with. The local peculiarities of the presidencies seem likely to give way before the increasing intercommunication throughout India. The staff corps was an expedient, and answered its purpose for the time as such, but experience has shown defects in. its constitution. The officering of the native regiments will always remain a subject for careful and anxious consideration. The British rule in India may never again be put to such a severe test as that of 1857, but a wise government will not the less prepare for a day of danger which may yet come for our Indian empire.

Canadian Militia.

To complete the account of the military forces of the British empire some notice of the Canadian militia is necessary. Until recently Canada was one of the great military out-stations of the English army, and was garrisoned by a considerable force of British troops distributed throughout the Dominion. Recently these troops were gradually withdrawn, and the colony left to its own resources; and since 1871 the regular forces maintained in the Dominion have been reduced to the 2000 men forming the garrison of Halifax, which alone is still occupied as an imperial station. The defence of Canada is provided for by a large volunteer and militia force. By an Act passed in March 1868, all male inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 60 are liable to serve in the militia, exemptions being granted to judges, ministers of religion, professors, and a few others. The men thus liable are divided into four classes, denoting the order in which they would be called out for service—the first including all single men between the ages of 18 and 30; the second, single men between 30 and 45; the third, married men, or widowers with children, between 18 and 45; the fourth, all between 45 and 60. The militia is divided into an active and a reserve force. The active force includes the volunteers, and the regular and the marine militia. Its strength is fixed at 45,000* divided among the various districts in proportion to their population. The contingent must be furnished either by volunteers, or, if sufficient volunteers do not present themselves, by means of the ballot.

Service in volunteer corps lasts for three years, and in the regular militia for two years; the periods of training last from eight to sixteen days annually. Money is granted for this purpose by Government; and every year camps of instruction are formed in each of the eleven military districts into which Canada is divided, at which the militia of the district are assembled and trained. Two schools of military instruction for infantry officers are established in each of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and one in each of the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. There are also two schools of gunnery, which have permanent batteries of artillery, at Kingston and Quebec. The infantry are armed with long Snider rifles, the cavalry with Spencer carbines and swords. The field artillery includes nine batteries, all. well horsed. The “reserve militia” number 656,066 men, but have not hitherto been organised or drilled. The command of the whole force is vested in Her Majesty, who may call it to arms, wholly or in part, whenever necessary.

German Army.

By the “constitution of the German empire,” bearing date the 16th April 187⅛ the land forces of all the states of Germany form a united army under the command of the emperor. The German army thus includes the contingents of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirtemberg, Baden, and a number of minor states, all raised and organised (with insignificant variations) on the Prussian model. The peace strength of the army is fixed at 401,659 men, 1 or about 1 per cent, of the population; and the budget is established on the basis of 257 thalers, or £38, 11s. per soldier present with the colours. The army is organised in 18 army corps, of which 14 are furnished by Prussia and the states whose contingents are amalgamated with hers, 2 by Bavaria, 1 by Sax⅛ny, and 1 by Wiirtemberg. As the Prussian army thus constitutes three-fourths of the military forces of the empire, and is the model on which not only the other contingents, but to a certain extent the armies of most European powers, have been formed, a detailed account of its organisation will serve as an introduction to the necessarily brief notices of the other armies of Europe.

The Prussian army, like the monarchy, is of comparatively recent origin. Its European reputation dates from the wars of Frederick the Great, but it was his father, Frederick William I., aided by Prince Maurice of Dessau, who really created the army which Frederick II. led to victory, and which numbered 70,000 men, admirably trained and equipped, when the latter ascended the throne.

The infantry had been especially perfected by Prince Maurice; and under Frederick’s care the cavalry soon rivalled, if it did not excel it. The gallant struggle against overwhelming odds, and the series of brilliant victories which marked the Seven Years’ War, raised the reputation of the army to the highest pitch; and the superb force of 200,000 men which he bequeathed to his successor was justly accounted the best in Europe. It was hardly, however, a national army, and its excellence was owing rather to Frederick’s genius, and to his system of discipline and instruction, than to the goodness of the material. The cavalry, it is true, and the hussars especially, were recruited almost entirely from the Prussian states, and from the sons of the small farmers or better class peasants; but the infantry was raised from all sources, and was largely composed of foreigners, deserters, and vagabonds of all kinds. With Frederick’s death, the genius which had animated it, and which alone gave value to such heterogeneous materials, was gone. It still retained its imposing appearance and precision of movement, and its overweening self-confidence. But at the first encounter with the armies of Napoleon it 1 One-year volunteers are not included in this number.

felito pieces; and after a series of crushing defeats, Prussia found herself at the feet of the conqueror, shorn of half her territory, obliged to receive French troops in all her towns and fortresses, and only existing as it were by sufferance. But in these very disasters were laid the seeds of her future greatness. By the treaty of Tilsit the Prussian army was limited to 43,000 men. ' This limitation suggested to Scharnhorst what was known as the “krumper,” or “shortservice” system already described. The bitter humiliation and suffering endured under the French yoke aroused a national spirit which was capable of any sacrifices. Every Prussian was eager to be trained to fight against the oppressor of his country; and when Prussia rose in 1813, the armies she poured into the field were no longer mercenaries, but national armies, imperfectly trained and organised it is true, but animated by a spirit which more than compensated for these defects. At the close of the war her rulers, with far-seeing sagacity, at once devoted themselves to organise on a permanent footing the system which had sprung up under the necessities and enthusiasm of the moment. The conscription, compulsory personal service, and a three years’ term in the ranks, with further periods in the reserve and landwehr, were then introduced^ and though variations have subsequently been made in the distribution of time, the principles were substantially the same as those now in force. By the law of 1814 the periods of service were fixed at three years in the army, two in the reserve, and fourteen in the landwehr, and the annual contingent at 40,000 men. As the population increased, it was felt that the service was unequally distributed, pressing unnecessarily heavily on some, while others escaped altogether. Further, the experiences of 1859, when Prussia armed in anticipation of a war with France, aroused great doubts as to the efficiency of the landwehr, which then formed the bulk of Prussia’s forces, and of whom many had been as long as ten years away from the colours. Accordingly, by the law of 1860 the annual contingent was fixed at 63,000, the period in the reserve was increased from two to four years, and that in the landwehr reduced from fourteen to five. The total armed force thus remained nearly the same (12 contingents of 63,000, in place of 19 of 40,000), but the army and its reserves were more than doubled (increased from 5 × 40,000 to 7 × 63,000) while the landwehr was proportionately reduced.

This change was not effected without great opposition, and led to a prolonged struggle between the king, guided by his able and ambitious minister Bismarck, and the parliament; for some time the king ruled and levied taxes in open defiance of parliament and the constitution; and it required the brilliant successes of 1866, and the position thereby won for Prussia, to reconcile the nation to the new law.

By the present “military law of the German empire,” every German is liable to service {wehrpflichtig'), and must render such service personally. Neither substitutes nor purchase of exemption are allowed; and those who are physically unfit for the ranks may .be required to render such other services—as hospital attendants, tradesmen, &c.—as they are capable of. Every German capable of bearing arms belongs to the army for· seven years, commencing at the age of 21, and afterwards to the landwehr for five years. Army service is divided between the ranks and the reserve, three years being spent in the former and four in the latter. The annual contingent of recruits is not now permanently· fixed, but is determined by the number required to keep up the peace establishment, and is estimated at from 120,000 to 130,000 annually. By fixing the total peace establishment instead of the annual contingent, the authorities have gained the power of largely augmenting the army without raising the budget or attracting public attention, as by passing men into the reserve before their time they can always increase the contingent required to complete the regiments, and thus the total number of trained men available in war. Thus, before the war of 1870, commanding officers of regiments were directed to send home a certain number of the most intelligent men after two years’ service; and since the war a large proportion of the infantry have been subjected to two years’ training only. 1

The military organisation of Germany is based on the territorial divisions of the empire. With the exception of the Prussian guard corps, which is recruited generally throughout the kingdom, each army corps has a corps district {Bezirk) within which it is raised, recruited, and stationed. The first six army corps districts correspond to the six provinces of old Prussia, the 7th and 8th to the Rhenish provinces. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were formed from Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and the minor states annexed by Prussia in 1866; the 12th by the kingdom of Saxony, the 13th and 14th by Würtemberg and Baden, the 15th by Alsace and Lorraine, and the 16th and 17 th (called 1st and 2d Bavarian army corps) by the kingdom of Bavaria. The following details apply strictly to the Prussian provinces only.

The corps districts are subdivided into division and brigade districts, and these again into landwehr battalion districts, corresponding to the civil Kreis, or circle. As a rule, for each infantry regiment there are two corresponding landwehr battalion districts, from which the former draws its recruits and reserves. The battalion districts, again, are subdivided into company districts, of which there are from 3 to 6 to a battalion. Every town and village has thus its appointed place in the general organisation, and this is indicated on notice boards conspicuously placed at all the entrances.

At the beginning of each year lists are prepared from the parish registers of all young men who have attained their twentieth year, and to these lists are added the names of those who, though still liable to service, have been allowed to stand over from previous years. In the spring, about May, the battalion recruiting commission commences its labours. This commission is composed of the landwehr battalion commander, the landrath or chief civil functionary, ' two officers, and a surgeon, as permanent members, and four local members taken from the more respectable inhabitants of the different villages.

The commission having notified the days of its visiting the headquarters of the several company districts, the youths are mustered there accordingly, and inspected. Those who are found physically unfit for any service are struck off the lists altogether. Others who are too young and unformed for military service are put back for -a year. Many also are permitted to stand over on personal or family grounds, the commission being allowed great latitude in granting temporary exemptions.

Every young man can be called up three years in succession, and as a rule the majority of the recruits are put back one year at least on medical grounds, but at the end of the third he must either be definitely passed or exempted. Those who are exempted in their third year are passed into the Ersatz reserve, where they undergo no training, and are free of service in peace time, but in war can be called out and sent to the dépôts to replace the casualties in the active army. Men below the regulation stapdard, but otherwise fit for the army, are passed into the Ersatz 1 The contingent of recruits for 1872-3 was fixed at 190 per battalion. As the peace strength of the battalion, exclusive of the permanent cadres, is about 450, it is evident these cannot all receive their full three years’ training.

reserve; as also only sons of widows, and others who are the sole supports of families, or who have, or have lost, brothers in the army. Although exemptions afe much more charily granted in the third than in the first and second years of liability, they are still sufficiently numerous to soften materially the hardships of compulsory service. Finally, after all “exemptions” and “adjournments” have been made, there remain those passed as fit for service, and from these the required number are chosen by ballot. But the ballot is almost nominal. In 1862, for instance, when the number coming of age amounted to 227,000, only 69,000 were left on the lists for the ballot—63,000 being the required contingent — and in many districts the ballot was not applied at alL In 1867, 262,000 came of age, 110,000 were passed for the service, and about 100,000 taken. The system of exemptions is so elastic that practically the recruiting commission can select, by a process of elimination, those best fitted for service, and abolish the element of chance. A margin of about 10 per cent., however, is usually allowed; those who draw the lucky numbers are passed into the Ersatz reserve, but remain liable for a year to fill any accidental vacancies in the peace establishment.

The men drawn for the army are then told off to the different branches of the service; men with good chests and good feet to the infantry, men accustomed to horses to the cavalry, gamekeepers and foresters to the rifles, men of high standard to the guard, those of inferior physique to the train, carpenters and mechanics to the engineers, and a certain proportion of shoemakers, tailors, saddlers, &c., to all regiments and corps. The guards recruit throughout the kingdom generally; the cavalry, artillery, fusiliers, and rifles throughout their own corps districts; while the infantry regiments draw their recruits as far as possible from the corresponding landwehr battalion districts. The proceedings of the battalion recruiting commissione are revised by brigade commissions, who distribute the recruits to regiments and corps, and these again by a corps commission. The final decision and allotment to regiments is usually completed about September. From that time the men are called recruits, and amenable to military law, but are given passes until the 15th October, the date on which they join their regiments.

These conscripts form the great bulk of the army; but there are other classes, also, serving under varied conditions. Of these the most important are the “one-year volunteers,” young men of means and education who, on condition of passing certain examinations and bearing all expenses of clothing, equipment, &c., are allowed to pass into the reserve after one year’s service only. This system is a great boon to the middle·and professional classes, who thus materially reduce the interruption which the full term in the ranks would cause in their education; and every effort is made to render the service as light as is consistent with thorough instruction. Many of these pass the requisite examinations for officers’ rank, and become officers of landwehr, or qualify as non-commissioned officers, and serve as such if recalled on mobilisation. A certain number of youths enter voluntarily for three years, gaining the privilege of serving at an earlier age, and choosing their own regiments. The non-commissioned officers are mostly “re-engaged men.” Re-engagements are allowed for various periods, and each squadron or company has several “Capitu-lanten,” smart young men, who have engaged to prolong their service in the ranks with the object of getting promotion. In the cavalry it is common for men to engage to serve four years instead of three, in consideration of which their time in the reserve is reduced by one year, and that in the landwehr by two years. Finally, there are a certain number who serve for a given number of years in return for advantages received in the way of education or maintenance from Government; such are the pupils of the non-commissioned officers’ school and of the school of forestry, &c.

After completing his term in the ranks the soldier is passed into the reserve, retaining, however, his place in his regiment, borne on its books, and liable to be recalled to it in case of war. The reservist is supposed to take part in at least two manoeuvres, not exceeding eight weeks, during his term of reserve service. On completing his seven years’ army and reserve service he leaves his regiment and passes into the landwehr, and is taken on the lists of the corresponding landwehr battalion for the remaining five year3 of liability. The landwehr battalion is the basis of the local organisation, both for recruiting and mobilisation. As a rule, to each three-battalion regiment of the line is attached a two-battalion landwehr regiment. These two are connected as closely as possible; they bear the same number, the line regiment draws its recruits from the battalion districts, furnishes the staff for their cadres, and passes its men into their ranks.

In peace time the landwehr battalions exist only in cadre, viz., a commanding officer, adjutant, and three clerks and orderlies per battalion, and a sergeant-major and two non-commissioned officers per company. These are charged with kéeping the registers of the names and addresses of all reserve and landwehr men in their districts, and on mobilisation the whole labour of summoning, collecting, and forwarding the men to their destination falls on the landwehr battalion commander and his staff. The fusilier reserve landwehr battalions form a peculiar feature in local organisation. Each army corps haβ a fusilier regiment, which does not draw its recruits from a particular subdistrict, but, like the cavalry and special corps, from the corps district generally. But to each fusilier regiment is attached a reserve landwehr battalion and district, bearing the same number, but used to equalise and fill up the regiments throughout the corps district generally, remedying deficiencies in the regimental quotas of recruits or reserve men, and forming, in fact, a great central depot of recruits and reserves. It has always for its district some important town or centre of commerce, where the floating population is largest and local attachment weakest, and whence also the communications to all parts of the province are easiest, and is allowed a considerably larger staff.

The following is an approximate estimate of the resources in men at the disposal of the German empire :— [table]

When the army is mobilised, about 1,250,000 of these are embodied, and 100,000 remain still available of men not trained, but registered and liable to bo called out; then there are the next year’s contingent of recruits, 120,000, and Ersatz reserve, which cannot be estimated under 800,000,—making, with her trained soldiers, a total of about 2∣ millions.

Prussian Army.

The Prussian army is divided into field troops, who in peace time form the standing army and the school of instruction in arms for the nation, and in war time, augmented by the reserves, become the active army; Depôt troops (Ersatztruppen), who have no existence i∏ peace time; but in war time are formed of cadres supplied from the field troops, and filled up by recruits and reserve men, and whose duty it is to maintain the active army at full strength; and garrison troops (Besatzung struppen ∖ principally formed of the landwehr,. and existing only in cadre in peace time, but who are embodied and take up the garrison duties and home defence when the active army takes the field, and also occasionally reinforce it.

The field troops consist of— [table]

Infantry.— The infantry is classed as guards, grenadiers, fusiliers, and line. The nine regiments of guards are composed of picked men, and are in every way troupes Télite ; four of them are maintained at a special increased peace establishment. The grenadier regiments only differ from the line in name and in some trifling badges, relics of former times. The fusiliers are the representatives of the old light infantry, and are specially intended for outpost duty, skirmishing, &c. The men are chosen for activity and intelligence, and their armament differs slightly, but in organisation they are the same as the line. A fusilier regiment is attached to each army corps.

An infantry regiment has three field battalions, of which the third is called the fusilier battalion. A battalion consists of four companies, and has a peace strength of 552 of all ranks, and a war strength of 1022. A regiment on war footing numbers 60 officers, 3000 men, 73 non-combatants, with 105 horses and 19 waggons. Besides the three field battalions, a fourth or dépôt battalion, 1240 strong, is formed on mobilisation. This includes a company of tradesmen 200 strong, who are required to supply all clothing, <fcc., and execute all repairs required by the battalions in the field. The depot battalion is formed partly of the next contingent of recruits, who are called out at once on mobilisation, and partly of the oldest classes of reserve men, or, if these do not suffice, of the youngest class of landwehr; any men in the field battalions who, from want of instruction or other causes, are not considered fit for immediate service, are also transferred to the depot. The field battalions always maintain direct communication with it, and as soon as their losses amount to 10 per cent, of their strength, draw on it for the necessary reinforcements.

The Prussian infantry stands in three ranks on parade, the third rank being composed of picked shots {Schützen), who formerly did all the skirmishing. But for drill and manoeuvring the common formation is that of company columns, the company being divided into two “Zugs” or subdivisions, standing at six paces’ distance, and the third rank being withdrawn and formed into a separate Zug {Schützenzug), two deep, in rear of the others. The Prussian drill, which for many years was the model for Europe, has lately become so again, and since 1866 the company column formation, by which more independence is given to the captains, and greater freedom of movement to the battalion generally, has been adopted by most armies.

The Prussians were also the first to adopt the breechloader, which they used with marked success against the Danes in 1864 and the Austrians in 1866. Up to 1870 they were armed with the needle-gun, the earliest, but probably also the worst, form of breech loader; but their losses from the French chassepôt convinced them of the necessity of an improved weapon, and the infantry is now being armed with the Mauser rifle. The infantιy soldier of the line carries a long breech-loading rifle, with bayonet always fixed, a short sword, and 80 rounds of amnïunition; a reserve of 20 rounds per man is also carried in the battalion ammunition waggon. Fusilier regiments, and fusilier battalions of other regiments, are armed with a shorter rifle without bayonet, but carry a sword which can be fixed and used as such when required. The uniform is a darkblue tunic, grey trousers with red stripe, helmet of black leather, with brass ornaments and spike {Pickelhaube), and boots into which the trousers are generally tucked for marching. The different army corps are distinguished by the colour of the shoulder cords. The knapsack is of brown calfskin, rather large, but shaped to fit the back. The belts of grenadier and line regiments are white, those of fusilier regiments black.

Rifles.— The rifles {Jdgeτ and Schützen) are not organised in regiments, but form independent battalions, of which the guard corps has two and the other army corps one each. Their organisation, and peace and war establishment, are almost identical with that of a line battaiion, but on mobilisation each battalion forms a fifth or depot company, which performs the same duties as the depot battalion does for the line regiments. They are recruited by picked men chosen throughout the army corps district. Unlike the rest of the infantry, they always stand in two ranks; and they are further distinguished by carrying a short rifle, and by their green tunics with black belts. The rifle battalions of the guards are mainly recruited from the rangers of the royal forests.

Cavalry.— The cavalry consists of 73 regiments, of which 10 are cuirassiers, 26 dragoons, 19 uhlans (or lancers), and 18 hussars. The cuirassiers and lancers are classed as heavy cavalry, dragoons and hussars as light cavalry. The cavalry of the guard numbers 8 regiments, of which 2 are cuirassiers, 2 dragoons, 3 uhlans, and 1 hussars, and are all carefully-picked men.

The organisation and establishments of all" cavalry regiments are alike. In peace time they consist of 5 squadrons of 4 officers and 135 men each; in war the regiment takes the field with 4 squadrons of 150 men each, while the fifth squadron remains behind to form the depot.· The total strength of the 4 field squadrons is 677 men and 706 horses, and of the dépôt squadron 267 men and 112 horses. The depot includes an artificers’ detachment, of 54 men. A cavalry regiment thus requires a very small augmentation in war, and the field squadrons are completed at once from the fifth or dépôt squadron, they sending to it their recruits and untrained or unserviceable horses. Owing to the terms of service usual in the cavalry, the actual proportion of “reservists” is much smaller than in the infantry, but they still far exceed the number required to complete the regiments, and accordingly are used to form the staff escort, field gendarmerie, field post and other special corps, and to furnish non-commissioned officers to the military train.

The Prussian cavalry first won its reputation under Frederick the Great, and his brilliant cavalry leaders Ziethen and Seydlitz. In the battles of Hohen Friedberg, Rossbach, and. Zorndorf the cavalry decided the fortunes of the day, and gloriously verified their old motto—

Wenn alles wankt und schwankt

Dann wäge nicht und zähle nicht, dann d’rauf!

In recent campaigns they have more especially distinguished themselves by their intelligence and enterprise as scouts and outposts, covering the movements of their own armiee with an impenetrable screen, while constantly feeling the enemy and reporting his movements. But their desperate charges at Mars la Tour and Rezonville, where they sacrificed themselves to check the enemy and give breathingtime to their own overmatched and exhausted infantry, will always be classed among the most heroic deeds in the annals of cavalry.

The light cavalry (hussars and dragoons) are armed with breech-loading carbines and swords. In the heavy cavalry, 16 men per squadron carry carbines, the remainder pistols. The cuirassiers are armed with a long heavy sword (7¼‰sc∆), and wear a black cuirass weighing 16 Eb, and supposed to be bullet-proof. The uhlans carry a lance and the usual cavalry sword. The cuirassiers use saddlery of the “German” pattern, very cumbrous; the rest of the cavalry use the “Hungarian” saddle. On the whole, the Prussian cavalry ride slightly heavier than the corresponding troops in England. Great attention is paid to the selection of horses for the cavalry, and constant efforts are made, by the importation of valuable stallions and brood mares, to encourage the breeding of a suitable class of horses. The remounts are bought by commissions appointed for the purpose, and either sent direct to the regiments, or, if too young for work, to the remount dépôts, where they are carefully broken. In war time the necessary augmentation is obtained partly by purchase in the market and partly by contracts previously made in peace time. If these measures are not sufficient, the Government has the power of compulsory purchase. For this purpose all the horses in the kingdom are registered and periodically inspected, and returns kept of those considered fit for military service. On the order for mobilisation the owners may be summoned to attend with their horses; these are inspected by a military board, who select as many as they require, and take possession at once; and a mixed board afterwards determines the compensation to be given to the owners.

Artillery— The artillery of an army corps consists of two regiments of field artillery and a regiment of garrison artillery. One of the two field artillery regiments is organised in two divisions {Ahcheilunf) of four batteries (two heavy and two light) each; this furnishes the divisional artillery, oneAl>theilung to each infantry division. The other consists of three divisions, two of field and one of horse artillery, of three batteries each; and furnishes the corps or reserve artillery, and the horse artillery, which is attached to the cavalry divisions. A field battery on peace footing has only 4 guns, with 114 men, 37 horses, and 2 waggons. In war time it has 6 guns, with 155 men, 125 horses, and 10 waggons. A horse battery has a war establishment of 6 guns, 154 men, 207 horses, and 10 waggons. On mobilisation a dépôt division is formed for each army corps, consisting of 1 heavy, 1 light, and 1 horse battery, and a detachment of artificers. Further, a Colonnen AbtheUung, consisting of 9 ammunition columns (of which 5 carry artillery ammunition and 4 small-arm ammunition) is formed, and attached to the field artillery. The regiment of garrison artillery is composed of two divisions of four companies each, with a peace strength of 108, and a war strength of 209 men per company. On mobilisation the field artillery is augmented by men of the reserve, and by men drawn from the garrison artillery regiment; the garrison artillery is principally reinforced from the artillery men in the landwehr. Sometimes the number of companies of garrison artillery is doubled. The Prussian artillery are armed with rifled breech-loading guns of cast steel, the heavy batteries with the 6-pounder gun, throwing a shell weighing about 15ft; the light batteries and horse artillery with the 4-pounder gun, throwing a 9 ft shell. The extreme range of these guns is about 5000 paces, but their effective range does not exceed 2500. A heavy battery carries 134 rounds per gun, a light battery 157 rounds; and the corps ammunition columns carry a further supply of about 100 rounds per gun.

Pioneers.— Each army corps has a battalion of pioneers, of four companies, of which the first is the pontoon company, the second and third sapper companies, and the fourth the miner company. The men of each company are thoroughly instructed in their own special duties, but know also the duties of the other companies sufficiently to be able to assist if required.

The peace establishment of a company is 146 men. In war time the second sapper company remains behind, and forms three garrison companies, and a depot company is also formed. The other three companies, augmented to a war strength of 218 men, take the field, and furnish the personnel for a light field bridge train or pontoon train, and an entrenching tool column, which also accompany the army corps. Further, four railway detachments and four field telegraph detachments are formed for the whole army. The railway detachments are formed from the railway battalion, which was organised immediately after the war of 1870-71, and is composed entirely of men trained to the various duties connected with railways, the officers and non-commissioħed officers being qualified to act as railway managers, station-masters, Ac. On mobilisation they receive their augmentation from reserve and landwehr men who are actually holding these positions on the various lines; and in war time they are charged with constructing, repairing, and working or destroying the lines in an enemy’s country. The field telegraph detachments, in the same way, are trained in peace time to everything connected with telegraphy; in war they carry a light line, which they lay down as required, or work the existing lines.

Military Train. —The train is a mere skeleton in peace time. The battalion which is attached to each army corps is little but a cadre maintained for instructional purposes, and only numbers 240 men of all ranks, while the train soldiers attached to an army corps on war footing amount to 3500. The men are only subjected to six months’ training, and by the constant renewal the number passed into the reserve is enormously increased; additional men are drawn from the cavalry reservists. In war time the train battalion is broken up altogether, and forms a number of separate detachments, viz., five provision columns, three ambulance detachments, a horse depot, a field bakery column, and an escort squadron, to take charge of the five Fuhr Park columns which’are organised of hired or requisitioned transport. Further, nearly 1000 train soldiers are sent to the various regiments (65 to an infantry regiment, 37 to a cavalry regiment) to drive the regimental baggage train, act as servants to staff and field officers; 800 to the artillery, principally as drivers, &c., for the ammunition columns; and 300 to the pioneers, for the pontoon and tool train; and 400 to the various administrative services. The whole Of the transport in the Prussian service is departmental,—that is, is told off to certain special departments and duties, and is not available for general service. Thus the regiments have their regimental transport, the artillery their ammunition columns, the commissariat their provision columns, the medical department their field hospital and ambulance train, <fcc.

Dépôt and Garrison Troops.— The depot troops have been described in speaking of the field troops whom they have to feed. The garrison or reserve troops have no such immediate connection with the active army, and are almost entirely formed of the landwehr; they are specially intended for home defence and "garrisoning the fortresses, but are also used to maintain communications, and relieve the active army of all detachménts to its rear, and sometimes, as in the latter period of the Franco-Prussian war, are organised in divisions, and pushed forward to reinforce the active army. Every battalion district forms a landwehr battalion, and every army corps district forms a reserve rifle company, one or two reserve cavalry regiments, and three reserve batteries, from the landwehr men on its lists. The garrison companies of sappers and the garrison artillery have already been spoken of, and are more closely connected with the active army than the rest of the garrison troops. The officers for the landwehr and reserve regiments are supplied partly from the field troops, partly from one-year volunteers who have qualified, and non-commissioned officers of the army who have retired with the rank of landwehr officers, and partly from the half-pay list. Tn addition to the forces above named, a certain number of “garrison battalions” are sometimes formed from the surplus landwehr men, and some of the Ersatz reserve. This was done in the war of 1870-71 to relieve the depot troops Of the garrison duties which had devolved on them in consequence of the landwehr being sent to the front. The organisation and armament of the landwehr are generally similar to those of the field troops, but the infantry wear a broad flat-topped cap instead of the distinctive Pickelhaube.

The total war strength of the 14 army corps composing the Prussian army is [table]

The general organisation of the Prussian army remains the same in peace and war. The king is the Com-mander-in-Chief, and exercises his authority through the War Ministry. The War Ministry is divided into a number of departments, of which the principal are the Central Department, which includes the minister’s office; the General War Department, which deals with all questions of organisation, mobilisation, quartering, training, &c., and all strategical and purely military questions; and the Military Finance Department, which deals with all questions of pay clothing, equipment, and supply. Directly under the king and the War Minister come the commanders of the army corps districts into which the kingdom is divided. In peace time each corps command comprises two divisions, a rifle battalion, a brigade of artillery, and a battalion of pioneers and of train; each division consists of two infantry brigades and one cavalry brigade; each infantry brigade consists of two line regiments (exceptionally three) and one or two landwehr regiments; each cavalry brigade of two or three cavalry regiments. On the order for mobilisation the regiments are completed to war strength, the depots formed, and the landwehr or garrison troops organised. A few slight alterations are made to equalise the army corps (the details of the' war strength of which have been already given) to a uniform strength of 25 battalions, and a portion of the cavalry and one or two batteries of horse artillery are withdrawn from each corps to form separate cavalry divisions. The active army then takes the field, with the same organisation and under the same officers, corps and divisional commanders, brigadiers, staff, &c., that they have been accustomed to in peace.

The instructions for mobilisation are minute and complete. Every year a “paper mobilisation” scheme is drawn up, showing the number of men and officers required to place every corps and detachment on war footing, and whence these would be obtained, and showing also on what duties the officers and men actually present would be employed.· This scheme is completed at the army corps headquarters, and after revision by the War Minister, is approved and promulgated. Every individual thus knows beforehand what would be his duties in case of war, and the pith of the system lies in two short sentences in the “Secret Instructions”—“Every person in authority should know in peace what will be required of him on the order to mobilisé, and must expect no further orders. All orders which have to be issued are to be kept ready in peace.” The steps‘to be taken on mobilisation are detailed day for day. On the first day the War Ministry acquaints the commanders of army corps and principal military authorities, and also telegraphs direct to the commanders of landwehr battalion districts, to summon the reserves. On the second and third days the landwehr commanders complete the written summons, which are kept always ready, notifying to each man when and where he is to join; and these are sent out by aid of the civil authorities. The reserves for the field troops are called in first, the landwehr men one or two days later. On the fourth and fifth days the reserve men assemble, and are forwarded to their regiments, whence a few officers and non-commissioned officers have been sent to take charge of them. Meanwhile the regiments have formed their depots, drawn the reserve clothing and equipment from their stores, and get everything in readiness to receive their augmentation men. Most regiments are complete and ready to take the field by the seventh day. As soon as the reserve men have all been despatched, the landwehr men are collected, and equipped from the stores at the headquarters of the battalion district. The landwehr battalions are mostly completed about the eighth day. The reserve cavalιy and some of the administrative departments take a little longer, but in 1870 the mobilisation was so far completed that the movement of the army corp3 to the front could be commenced on the ninth day. The commanders of army corps, divisions, &c., accompany their commands, and are replaced in their local commands by temporary {stellvertretende) officials.

Appointment and Promotion of Officers.— The Prussian army draws its officers mainly from the Kleinadel or lesser nobility, corresponding to the country gentry of England. Promotions from the ranks are very rare, and generally carry with them retirement or transfer to the landwehr. A certain number of young men of. middle class obtain commissions, but principally in the scientific corps or in the landwehr. First appointments are obtained either from the cadet schools or by entering the ranks as avantageurs. More than one-half the officers enter by the latter system. A young man seeking a commission obtains a nomination from the colonel of a regiment, which admits him to serve as a private, but with recognition of his being a candidate for the rank of officer, and as such he is called an avantageur. He is usually required to sleep and mess with the privates in their barrack-room for the first two months; after that he has more liberty given to him, and is sometimes received at the officers’ table. After six months’ service, and passing an examination in the subjects of a liberal education, he becomes qualified for promotion to the rank of Porte épée Fähnrich (swordknot ensign), a sort of intermediate position between the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks. After six months’ further service in this rank he is sent to a military school for a ten months’ course of instruction, at the close of which he is required to pass an examination in purely military subjects; and then becomes qualified for a commission, subject to being accepted by the officers of the regiment as worthy of admission among their number. The career of those youths who enter from the cadet schools does not differ materially from the above. The great majority enter as “avantageurs,” and serve their time as already described, only passing the first or ensign’s examination before they enter, and being appointed to regiments by the king, instead of obtaining nominations from the colonels. A certain number who pass through the higher classes of the cadet school enter the army at once as Porte épée Fähnrich, and serve their probation in that rank only; while a very few, the selecta, who take the highest honours, are given commissions direct. Promotion in the army depends solely on the will of the king, but in the main is governed by seniority; but exceptions are made in favour of officers of the general staff, who commonly receive a step of rank oh completing a term of duty in any staff appointment, aide-de-camps of higher generals, instructor’s at the cadet and war schools, and officers who have specially distinguished themselves in the field. As a rule, promotion to the rank of captain is by seniority in the regiment, but above that rank by seniority throughout that branch, or by selection. Officers are also freely transferred from one branch to another; thus, after the battle of Gravelotte, the command of the rifle battalion of the guard was given to an engineer officer. Especial attention is bestowed on the selection of officers for the general staff. These are generally taken from those who have passed through the War Academy at Berlin, the highest educational establishment in the Prussian army. . Candidates for admission to this academy must have served at least three years with their regiments, must pass a qualifying examination, and must be favourably reported upon by their commanders. The course lasts three years, and those officers who give proof of sufficient abilities are afterwards employed for a time on various military works, under the immediate supervision of the chief of the staff, who thus acquires a personal knowledge of the character and abilities of all staff officers. Occasionally officers specially recommended are taken direct from their regiments; but they are always tested by the chief of the staff before receiving appointments. The anxious care bestowed on the selection of officers for these important duties has borne its fruit: the Prussian staff has made itself a worldwide reputation, and to it and to the genius of its chief, Von Moltke, may be awarded a large share in the success of the Prussian arms. The army is equally fortunate in its corps of officers generally,—men who unite the power of command and the high qualities of an aristocracy with the most thorough knowledge of their profession and devotion to it. The .pay of the Prussian officers in the lower ranks is small, usually about half that of the corresponding ranks in the English army, and lower than in most of the Continental ones; but the higher ranks are well paid, probably better than in any other army, if the relative value of money and cost of living are considered.

The strength of the Prussian system lies in its close localisation and permanent organisation. The first secures the strongest possible esprit de corps and the greatest simplicity and speed in mobilising; the second that familiarity of every individual with his position, duties, and surroundings, which is essential to the smooth working of so complicated a machine as a great national army. It is to these, coupled with the careful training, the subordination of everything to the army, and the ever-watchful foresight with which every contingency is studied and provided for beforehand, that the remarkable successes of the Prussian armies are to be attributed, rather than to the excellence of the material or to the special military qualities of the nation. Physically the Prussian soldier is not much if at all above the average. It is true that the guards and some of the regiments from the northern provinces are exceptionally fine, but the army is very unequal, and men of practical experience have declared-the German, as a rule, to be not equal in power or in endurance to the Frenchman. In quick aptitude for war the Frenchman has always had the advantage. .Generally, where the two have met on equal terms the Frenchman has been victorious; and even through the disasters of the late war, impartial witnesses have asserted that, man for man, the Frenchman was the better. But such natural qualities as the Prussian soldier possesses have been developed to the utmost by a civil education superior to that of any other nation, and by a military training, physical as well as mental, which may well serve as a model to all armies. He is docile, temperate, simple in his tastes and aspirations; and though not so demonstrative as his French neighbour, and with no fanatical enthusiasm, has a deep love of his country and loyalty to his king. If not easily excited to heroism, neither is he easily discouraged. No Englishman can forget that memorable march, when the Prussian army, unshaken by the disaster of Ligny, undeterred by the difficulties of the road or the enemy thundering in their rear, pushed on with indomitable energy through all obstructions to succour their hard-pressed allies at Waterloo. The Prussian army, more than any other, is the élite of a nation; and so long as the nation consents to submit to the burdens of her present military system, and her affairs are guided by chiefs as able and far-seeing as her present rulers, she will hardly forfeit the position she has won as the first military power of Europe.

Saxon Army.

The kingdom of Saxony, with a population of 2 j millions, furnishes one strong army corps (29 battalions of infantry and 6 regiments of cavalry) to the German army. The Saxons were long renowned as a warlike race, and played a prominent part in all the wars of Northern Europe; and her princes twice mounted the throne of Poland. At the outbreak of the wars of the French Revolution she maintained an army of over 30,000 men, and at first sided with Prussia. After the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt she allied herself with France, and for some years furnished a contingent to the armies of Napoleon, who in return recognised her elector as king, and largely increased his territories. The newly-made king remained faithful to Napoleon even in his reverses; but the army was too German in feeling to fight willingly under the French flag. In 1809 they did not distinguish themselves at Wagram, and their defection at Leipsic contributed not a little to the results of that bloody day. After the peace the king retained his title, though shorn of a great part of his dominions, and the army was reconstituted on a smaller scale. In 1866 Saxony sided with Austria, and her army shared in the disasters of that brief campaign and the crowning defeat at.Koniggratz. At the close of the war she was compelled to ally herself with Prussia, and, as part of the North German Confederation, to place her military forces at the disposal of the Prussian monarch. In 1870 and 1871 her troops, under the command of the crown prince (now king) of Saxony, formed the 12th corps of the great German army, and bore their share in the battles of Gravelotte and Sedan and in the siege of Paris. Her army is organised in every respect as a Prussian army corps, and is under the command in chief of the German emperor, who, in concert with the king of Saxony, names the officers for the higher commands. She retains, however, her separate War Ministry, budget, <kc.; and appointments and promotion to all but the highest commands are made by the king of Saxony. The Saxon troops fought well in the late war between Germany and France. In appearance they are smarter than most of the German troops, and have a certain resemblance to the English; but their uniform and equipment are assimilated in all respects to the Prussian.

Bavarian Army.

The kingdom of Bavaria, with a population of a little under five millions, furnishes two army corps to the German · army. Like Saxony, Bavaria, originally an electorate, was enlarged and made into a kingdom by Napoleon. Under the command of Marshal Wrede, a distinguished Bavarian, her troope fought side by side with the French through the campaigns of 1805 to 1812, but in 1813 she seceded and joined the Alliance, and attempted to intercept the French on their retreat from Leipsic. Napoleon, however, inflicted a severe defeat on his old general at Hanau, and opened his road to France. In 1866 the Bavarians took part against Prussia, but owing to their dilatoriness in taking the field, the Prussians were able to beat them in detail, nor did their generals or troops shine in this war. In 1870, however, they joined their former enemy in the war against France, and bore their full share in the glories and losses of the campaign, the second Bavarian corps having suffered more heavily than any but the third Prussian corps. Her army has now been assimilated to that of Prussia in most respects, but still retains certain distinctive peculiarities of dress and equipment, such as her old light blue uniform, and helmet with black plume.

Würtemberg Army.

Lastly, Würtemberg, with a population of a little under two millions, furnishes one army corps, organised, clothed, and equipped in all respects like the Prussian army. Like the Bavarians, the Würtembergers fought against the Prussians in 1866, but in 1870 made common cause with them against the French, and by the convention entered into the following year, placed their army permanently under the command of the Prussian king as emperor. The emperor nominates to the highest commands, but the king of Würtemberg retains the nomination and appointment of officers in the lower grades.

The total military forces of the German empire (war strength) are shown in the following table :— [table]

But even this does not represent the entire force at the disposal of the empire in war. More than 100,000 trained soldiers still remain available; while the Ersatz reserve of men untrained, but registered, and ready to be drafted into the depots, raises her total to over two millions of men.

French Army.

From the earliest times the inhabitants of Gaul were distinguished for bravery and enterprise. First as enemies and afterwards as subjects and auxiliaries, they played an important part in the great wars of Rome; and though they yielded to the irruption of the Franks, the admixture of races seemed only to heighten the warlike spirit of the nation. Under Charlemagne, and, later, in the Crusades, and under Philip Augustus and St Louis, the chivalry of France especially distinguished itself. The excessive power and independence of the great vassals, however, long prevented the formation of any permanent national force, and made France a prey to intestine wars and foreign invasions. Charles VII. availed himself of the lull which followed the final expulsion of the English in the middle of the 15th century to organise his compagnies d'ordonnance, and thus laid the foundation of a national standing army. But the armies that followed the kings in their wars s.till consisted mainly of foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion; and the creations of Charles and his successors. fell to pieces during the religious wars. Lou vois, War Minister of Louis XIV., was the true creator of the French royal army. On his accession to power, the king’s guards, some squadrons of gendarmerie, and a few infantry regiments (afterwards distinguished as the “old”), constituted the whole of the standing ariny. All other forces had to be created at the outbreak of a war, being usually raised under contracts allotted to generals and others. Lou vois first transferred the army from the hands of contractors and speculators to those of the king. He abolished the arriere-ban, and substituted a money tax for the liability to service, thereby obtaining funds for the maintenance of a regular army. In 1672, after ten years of his administration, Louis XIV. was able to take the field with a force of 91,000 infantry, 28,000 cavalry, and 97 guns, all permanently organised troops, the largest national army that had yet been seen; and six years later the military forces of France had been raised to nearly 280,000 men. The last half of the 17th century is a brilliant period in the annals of the French armies. Organised by Lou vois, animated by the presence of the great king, and led by Condé, Turenne, Luxembourg, Catinat, and Vendome, they made head against coalitions which embraced nearly all the powers-of Europe, and won a series of victories that extended the bounds of France, and made her for a time the first military nation of Europe. But after the death of Louis XIV. the French army gradually deteriorated. In the Seven Years’ War it was disgracefully defeated. Under the reign of Louis XV. confusion and maladministration prevailed everywhere, and the highest idea of military art was to copy servilely every minute detail of the Prussian army. The higher officers, usually nobles about the court, seldom went near their regiments; and Madame de Genlis relates how, when young courtiers departed to join their regimente for a few weeks’ duty, the ladies of the court decked them with scarfs and favours, as if proceeding on a distant and perilous expedition.

Under Louis XVI. the army improved somewhat; the American war and the successes of Lafayette and Rocham-beau revived a more warlike spirit; instruction was more carefully attended to, a good system of drill and tactics was elaborated at the camp of St Omer, and attempts made to reform the administration. But the Revolution broke over France in the midst of these attempts at reorganisation; the old royalist army disappeared with the monarchy, and was merged in that revolutionary army which under à new flag was destined to raise the military fame of France to its greatest height.

If Louvois was the creator of the royal army, Carnot was so of the revolutionary army. At the outbreak of the Revolution the royal army consisted of 105 infantry regiments of 2 battalions each, 14 rifle battalions, 7 regiments of artillery, and 62 regiments of cavalry, numbering about 173,000 in all, but capable of augmentation on war strength to 210,000. To this might be added a provincial or militia force of about 60,000, but nominal rather than real. At the very outset it was deemed necessary to reorganise and augment this army. Voluntary enlistment under the system, of racoleurs or “bringers,” by which the army had hitherto been fed, was found insufficient. “Compulsory service” was proposed in 1789, but rejected as “contrary to the liberty of the citizen.” An appeal was then made to the patriotism of.the nation, and 200 battalions of volunteers were enrolled; but though many presented themselves, and these volunteers contained much of the best blood and highest intelligence of France, the numbers fell far short of the expectations, and the proportion that reached the frontier was small. In the winter of 1792-3 the French armies, notwithstanding the unexpected successes of the preceding campaign, seemed on the point of dissolving altogether, and the Convention was driven to order a compulsory levy of 300,000 men.

To eradicate the royalist element from the army, the old regiments were broken up and amalgamated by battalions with the volunteers; and the name even of· “regiment” was abolished. Promotions were made, not by seniority of rank, but length of service; thus an old sergeant succeeded to the command of a regiment over the heads of all the captains. In August. 1793 the affairs of France were at their lowest ebb. Its armies had been driven from the Rhine and out of Belgium, and a dangerous.insurrection had broken out in La Vendée. The compulsory levy, slowly and imperfectly carried out, had not yielded the full number; and those that were obtained deserted by hundreds. The nominal strength amounted in all to 480,000 men, but one army with a paper strength of 90,000 had really only 33,000 in the ranks, and the others were little better. Under the new system of promotion commands changed almost daily, and fell into the hands of men who had never before been entrusted with more than a section; and confusion reigned everywhere.

Such was the position when Carnot, then a captain of engineers, was called to the Ministry of War. A few days later a levy en masse of all the male population between the ages of 18 and 2o was ordered, and was carried out with more method and success than former levies. The muster-rolls, of the armies filled rapidly, and by the end of the year the effective force had risen to 770,000. The amalgamation of the old army and the volunteers, which had been commenced, but imperfectly carried out, was effected on a different and more thorough principle; the white uniform distinctive of the old days of royalty was abolished, the infantry organised in demi-brigades of three battalions (usually one of the old army to two of volunteers), and the men and cadres intermixed within the demi-brigade. A. permanent organisation in divisions, composed of all arms, was introduced, and able officers selected for the commands. Jourdan, Hoche, Pichegru, Kleber, Moreau, were at the head of the armies of the republic. Arsenals and manufactories of warlike stores were created, schools of instruction were established; the republican forces were transformed from hordes to armies, well disciplined, organised, and equipped. The enemies of France were defeated at all points; and in tracing the plan for the campaign of 1794 Carnot showed that his genius shone in strategy as much as in administration. “Twenty-seven victories, of which 8 in pitched battles, 120 combats; 80,000 enemies hors de combat', 91,000 taken prisoners; 116 fortresses or important towns taken, 36 of them after siege or blockade; 230 forts or redoubts carried; 3800 guns, 70,000 muskets, 1900 millions of powder, and 90 colours captured;”—such was the account Carnot was able to give of eighteen months of office; and at the close he returned to his duty as a simple major of engineers. And even this did not do justice to all he had effected. Himself of an almost Roman type of character,—severe, but a true patriot and republican,- -he had succeeded in infusing much of his own spirit into the army; he had given it not merely discipline and organisation, but honour and soldierly feeling. When Moreau promulgated to his army the decree of the Convention, which forbade them to give quarter to any Englishman or Hanoverian, he added, in general orders, “I have too high an opinion of French honour to believe that such an instruction will be obeyed;”—and he was right.

In the year 1796 Napoleon appeared on the scene, and by a series of brilliant victories enlarged the frontiers of France and secured a glorious peace. But the exhaustion of years of continuous warfare had made itself felt: the armies were reduced to mere skeletons, and no sufficient means existed of replenishing them, till in 1798 the conscription was introduced. From that time there was never a dearth of men: the whole male population of France was practically at her ruler’s disposal; and Napoleon had full scope for his genius in organising these masses. His principal improvements were effected in the interval between the peace of Amiens and the War with the third coalition, while threatening the invasion of England. His armies were collected in large camps on the coasts of the Channel, and there received that organisation which, with minor variations, they retained during all his campaigns, and which has since been copied by all European nations. The divisions, as organised by Carnot, consisted usually of two brigades (twelve battalions) of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two or three batteries of artillery. This was a great improvement on former organisation, and worked well in the comparatively small armies which then took the field. But in large armies of 150,000 men and upwards the number of isolated commands was too great. Further, it had been found by experience that the very completeness of the divisional organisation—each division forming a miniature army complete in all branches—tended to excessive independence of action on the part of the divisional commanders. Napoleon therefore grouped two or three divisions into corps T armée, commanded by marshals. He withdrew the whole of the cavalry and a portion of the artillery from the divisions, and with the light cavalry and batteries so obtained formed a reserve corps under the immediate orders of the corps commander; while he kept the whole of the heavy cavalry, amassed in cavalry divisions, his guards, and a certain proportion of artillery, in his own hands; as a reserve to the whole army. Thus was organised that “grande armée” which immortalised itself at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, and Borodino; and after planting the tricolor on every capital of Europe, perished at last in the snows of Russia.

The frightful expenditure of life during Napoleon’s wars almost drained France of her manhood, and his frequent calls on the country made the name of the conscription detested. One of the first acts of the Restoration was to abolish it, and return to voluntary enlistment; but it was soon evident that this means of recruiting no longer sufficed, and within three years compulsory service had to be again resorted to. In 1818 the annual contingent was fixed at 40,000, and the period of service at six years; in 1824 the contingent was increased to 60,000, and in 1832 to 80,000. Of this, however, a part only, according to the requirements of the service, were enrolled; the remainder were sent home on leave or furlough. Up to 1855 certain exemptions were authorised, and substitution or exchange of lots amongst young men who had drawn was permitted, but the individual drawn was obliged either to serve personally or find a substitute. In 1855 the law of “dotation” or exemption by payment was passed, and put an end to personal substitution. The state now undertook to provide substitutes for all who paid a fixed sum, and did so by high bounties to volunteers or to soldiers for re-engaging. Although the price of exemption was fixed as high as £92, on an average 23,000 were claimed annually, and in 1859 as many as 42,000 were granted. Thus gradually the conscription became rather subsidiary to voluntary enlistment, and in 1866, out of a total establishment of 400,0.00, only 120,000 were conscripts. Changes had also taken place in the constitution of the army. On the Restoration its numbers were reduced to 150,000, the old regiments broken up and recast, and a royal guard created in place of the old imperial one. When the revolution of July 1830 had driven Charles X. from his throne, the royal guard, which had made itself peculiarly obnoxious, was dissolved; and under Louis Philippe’s reign the army was augmented to about 240,000-with the colours.· Under the Provisional Government of 1848 it was further increased, and in 1854, when France allied herself.'with England against Russia, the army was raised to 500,000 men. The imperial guard was re-created, and every effort made to revive the old Napoleonic traditions in the army. In 1859 Napoleon III. took the field as the champion and ally of Italy, and the victories of Montebello, Magenta, and Solferino raised the reputation of the army to the highest pitch, and for a time made France the arbiter of Europe. But the campaign of 1866 suddenly made the world aware that a rival military power had arisen, which was prepared tα dispute that supremacy. From this time a trial of strength between France and Prussia was looked forward to as inevitable, and both sides prepared for the coming struggle. Niel, the then War Minister of France, saw clearly that the organisation which had with difficulty maintained 150,000 men in Italy, was no match for that which had within a month thrown 250,000 into the very heart of Austria, while waging a successful war on the Maine against Bavaria and her allies. In 1867, therefore, he brought forward a measure for the reorganisation of the army, by which he calculated to raise the military force to 800,000 men—half of them with the colours and half in reserve—besides forming a separate army for home defence in case of need. It is not necessary to dwell on the law of 1868, for it remained but two years in real operation. To complete NieΓs scheme many years were re,quired: but Niel himself died within a year, and the next year saw the French army annihilated, or existing only as prisoners of war in Prussia.

At the outbreak of the great Franco-German war the French field troops consisted of 368 battalions, 252 squadrons, and 984 guns. The strength of the entire army on peace footing was 393,000 men; on war footing, 567,000. The forces immediately available for the war on the Rhine were estimated at 350,000, but they actually fell short of 300,000. They formed 8 corps T armée, each composed of from two to four infantry divisions and one cavalry division,—making a total of 26 infantry divisions of 13 battalions each, 11 cavalry divisions of from 4 to 7 regiments each, and 756 guns. Within seven weeks the whole of this army, with trifling exceptions, was either captive in Germany or hopelessly shut up in Metz. But the spirit of the nation rose to the occasion, and though, as the result proved, extemporised armies can do little against veteran ones, the efforts of the people and the creative energy of her rulers will always command admiration. The next year’s contingent of recruits was called out and hastily trained. Fourth battalions were formed from the depot cadres, and organised into regiments de marche. The gardes mobiles were mobilised, and by successive decrees and -under various names nearly all the manhood of the country called to arms.

The regular troops raised as régiments de marche, <fcc., amounted to 213,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery. The garde mobile exceeded 300,000, and the mobilised National Guard exceeded 1,100,000—of whom about 180,000 were actually in the field and 250,000 in Paris; the remainder in camps or dépôts.- Altogether the new formations amounted to nearly 1,700,000, and if to that be added the army existing at’the beginning of the war, the total forces developed by France during the struggle reach the enormous amount of 2∣ millions.

The reorganisation of the army took precedence of all other questions when the conclusion of peace with Germany and the suppression of the communist revolt gave rest once more to the country. By the law of recruiting of 1872 compulsory personal service was introduced, and substitution or purchase of exemption was abolished. The period of liability was fixed at twenty years—five years of the time to be passed in the regular army, four years in the reserve of the regular army, five years in the territorial army, and six in the reserve of the territorial army. The annual contingent is not a fixed one, or determined by the actual requirements of the army, but includes all capable of bearing arms; certain exemptions in favour of only sons of widows, sole supports of families, teachers, and theological students excepted. But as the peace establishment, governed by financial considerations, would not admit of retaining the whole of five years’ contingents with the colours, it was provided that the contingent should be divided by lot into two classes, the first to serve the full five years, the second to be sent home after six months’ or a year’s training. One-year volunteers are admitted on conditions similar to those existing in Prussia. In the calculations on which the law was based it was estimated that about 300,000 annually came of age, of whom about one-half would be rejected as unfit, or exempted on personal or family grounds. Of the remaining 1’50,000, one-half would serve for the full five years, the remainder for six months or a year only; and the peace army would thus comprise four yearly contingents of 75,000 and one of. 150,000. Deducting the one-year volunteers, a percentage for casualties, and the men of the fifth year who would usually be sent home on furlough, the remaining four classes give about 350,000; and adding 120,000 to this for the permanent part of the army, the total of 470,000, being the proposed peace establishment, is obtained.

The organisation of the army was made the subject of a separate law passed in 1873. The land forces are divided into the active army and the territorial army or landwehr. The active army consists of 18 corps d'armée, besides a special corps for service in Algeria each corps is composed of two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, a brigade of artillery, a battalion of engineers, and a squadron of the military train, and retains its organisation permanently in peace and war. The total strength of an army corps is about 40,000 of all ranks, or about 30,000 combatants, with 108 guns. The country is divided into 18 “regions,” and each region has always a corps stationed within it, and is provided with magazines and stores of all sorts required to equip the corps for the field, and to furnish out the depot and territorial army as well. The army corps are not permanently localised, but are moved from district to district; and on mobilisation they draw their reserves and stores from the districts in which they happen to be stationed. Recruiting is partly general and partly regional; those recruits who are drawn for five years being distributed throughout the army, while those who have to serve one year only are attached to the corps stationed in their district. For recruiting and for purposes of mobilisation the “regions” are subdivided, each subdivision comprising one or more recruiting offices, in which the recruiting lists, as well as the registers of all furlough or reserve men, and men· belonging to the territorial army, are kept. As a rule, each such office corresponds to a battalion of the line, and ha3 from 2000 to 3000 names on its books. The general commanding an army corps has under his orders all militaιy forces (territorial or reserve troops as well as active) and establishments within the district. He is assisted by a staff divided into two sections, of which the first or active part accompanies the active army on mobilisation, while the second or territorial part is permanently attached to the district, and is specially charged with recruiting, remounts, and all local affairs, and remains stationary on mobilisation. No general can hold the command of an army corps for more than four years. At the head of each subdivisional recruiting office is placed an officer of rank corresponding closely to the landwehr battalion district commander in Prussia. All soldiers of the active army, reserves, or territorial forces who are living at their homes, under whatever conditions, and are domiciled within his subdivision, are under his orders. The territorial army exists in cadre only in peace time; but its cadres are always formed and its organisation established. It is officered by retired or half-pay officers and one-year volunteers, or old non-commissioned officers who, on completing their army service, have qualified as officers of the territorial army. The reserve of the territorial army is not called out except in case of absolute necessity, and then by classes beginning with the youngest.

The military forces of France under the new laws are estimated as follows, allowance being made for casualties:— [table]

In estimating the numbers available for the active army, however, deductions must be made for the last class of recruits (150,000) and the temporary exempts (141,000), who are untrained, and for a number of non-effectives, estimated at from 150,000 to 200,000, which would reduce the total to about 1,000,000. And further, in comparing these numbers with those of the German army, it must be borne in mind that, whereas almost every man on the German lists has received his three years’ training, nearly one-half of the French army is composed of men who have served a year or less with the colours. The peace establishment of the French army is fixed at 450,000; the war establishment of the field army, exclusive of depots and garrison troops, at 780,000.

The French field army now (1874) numbers 496 battalions of infantry, 380 squadrons of cavalry, and 380 batteries; being 126 battalions, 56 squadrons, and 158 batteries in excess of its strength at the outbreak of thé war of 1870. The imperial guard has been broken up, and its soldiers distributed throughout the army. Of the creations of the war, the mobilised national guard has been disarmed and dissolved; the gardes mobiles sent home, but inscribed as reserve of the army; and the regiments de marche have been partly disbanded, partly amalgamated with the regiments from whose dépôts they had been formed. The infantry consists of 144 line regiments, each of 3 active and 1 dépôt battalion; 4 regiments of Zouaves and 3 of Turco3, each of 4 field battalions and a weak depot; 36 rifle battalions {chasseurs) of 6 field and 2 depot companies each; a foreign regiment; and 3 battalions of Algerian light infantry (“Zephyrs ”). The peace establishment of a regiment of the line is about 2000; the total strength of the infantry, 298,000.

The cavalry consists of 12 regiments of cuirassiers, 26 of dragoons, 12 of hussars, 20 of chasseurs-h-cheval, 4 of chasseurs d ’ Afrique, and 3 of Spahis. Notwithstanding the reputation which the Prussian uhlans had acquired in the war, one of the first acts of the French Government was to abolish the lance, and transform the old Γancer regiments into dragoons. Each regiment consists of 5 squadrons, 4 of them field’ and 1 depot, and numbers about 900 men and 800 horses; the total strength of the cavalry is 58,000 men and 50,000 horses.

The artillery consists of 38 regiments, of which 19 have each 10 field batteries, and 19 have 6 field and 4 horseartillery batteries. The battery has six guns. The artillery further comprises 30 garrison batteries, a regiment of ponto-niers, 15 companies of artificers, and 2 regiments of artillery train. The total peace strength of the artillery is 45,000 men and 24,000 horses.

The engineers consist of a staff of 462 officers and 570 men, and 3 regiments, forming 48 companies of sappers, 6 of miners, and 3 of engineer train. These are ultimately to be formed into 19 independent batteries.

The key to the French military character, its strength and its weakness, is well given by one of their own writers, Blυadel :—“We love the roll of the drum, the coquetry of uniform, the roar and tumult of battle; but obedience is burdensome to us,—it is strange to our character and to our time. The ruling spirit of criticism is injurious to discipline, and too often the study of duties is overlooked in the study of rights. The warlike spirit of the ancient Gauls has remained as an inheritance to their descendants: but notwithstanding the fame which our arms have achieved in all epochs of our history, the true military spirit is rare in France.” This warlike spirit, which the French possess perhaps beyond any other nation, is 'a matter of race and temperament; the military spirit is the result of a nation’s training, and in that the French have been singularly unfortunate. From the time that the Franks, fourteen centuries ago, subdued the original Gallic or Celtic population of France, the nation was divided into two sharply-defined classes, the conquerors and conquered. The former alone were warriors and free; the latter were mere serfs condemned to till the ground and labour. The Frank chivalry was renowned through Europe; but the peasant was perhaps the most abject of his class. This it is that explains the difference between the helpless crowds of footmen that followed the French nobility to battle, and seemed only brought there to be slaughtered, and the sturdy British archers who formed so important an element of strength in the English armies. Hence also the difficulty found in raising an efficient national infantry; as their own king, Francis I., says in his manifesto to the German princes—“We have in our land no foot soldiers, because our ancestors trained our peasantry to agriculture rather than war.” Even in the days of Loùis XIV. and Louis XV. the foreign troops amounted to one-third or one-fourth of the army, and formed distinct corps, usually receiving higher pay. The brilliant feats of arms that gave such prestige to the French name were mostly performed by her gay and gallant aristocracy. It was the “Maison du Roi” who seized Valenciennes in broad day by a coup de main, who decided the battle at Steinkirk, who broke the column of Fontenoy. The common soldiers were canaille, separated by an infinite gulf from their officers. All this was changed by the great Revolution. The former slaves became masters, but they had had no training to qualify them for freedom, and that “law-abiding” spirit that marks the German and Anglo-Saxon races was wanting in them. The old warlike spirit was revived and stimulated by the enthusiasm of newly-acquired liberty; and Napoleon knew how to turn to account the admirable material he found to hand. But while he knew better than any one how to stimulate this martial ardour, he did nothing to raise the tone of the army or inculcate a sense of duty. Glory and rewards were the two levers of action he trusted to; and the extravagant “dotations” bestowed on all occasions on his followers did much to create that mercenary spirit that has ever since tainted the army. To the French soldier war means glory, promotion, plunder: if these are not immediately attainable, lie becomes impatient, and blames his leaders. Physically the Frenchman is smaller than the German or Englishman, but is usually better formed about the hips and lower limbs, more active, and more enduring. Mr Brassey, the great contractor, ranks him next after the Englishman and before the German for power of work. Of a gay, volatile, excitable temperament, he has always distinguished himself by impetuosity in attack, but has not shown equal constancy and perseverance in maintaining the contest. A brilliant offensive brings out all his best qualities; he has a natural aptitude for war, a quick eye to seize the situation, and the furia Francese has become proverbial; but on the defensive he becomes impatient and discouraged, and he is soon demoralised by defeat and disaster. It is then, when discipline and duty alone hold men together, that the want of the true military spirit makes itself felt, and till this is created in France, even her most brilliant successes must be uncertain and transitory.

Austrian Army.

The imperial army of Austria may be said to date from the Thirty Years’ War. Long before that, Maximilian I. had established a corps of “kyrisser” (original of the modern cuirassiers), and taken into his pay a considerable force of “landsknechts,” the early German infantry. But the latter were companies engaged for the war only, and disbanded at its termination; and it was not till the reign of Rudolph II. (about 1600) that, any permanent regiments were formed. Even these can hardly be counted as belonging to the imperial army, for the men composing them were only indirectly subject to the sovereign, and really obeyed their own chiefs, who could transfer their services to other powers. It was Wallenstein who first raised a distinctly imperial army of soldiers owing no duty but to the sovereign; and it was the suspicion that he intended to use this army, which was actually raised largely at his own expense, to further his own ends, that led to his assassination. From that time the regiments belonged no longer to their colonels, but to the emperor; and the oldest regiments in the present Austrian army date from the Thirty Years’ War. At the close of the war Austria had 19 infantry and 7 cavalry (6 cuirassier, 1 dragoon) regiments. Half a century later her forces had increased to 40 regiments of infantry and the same of cavalry; and in 1809, when she put forth her whole strength for the great struggle with Napoleon, she had 61 infantry regiments (46 German and 15 Hungarian) and 45 of cavalry. Up to the beginning of this century, her armies were recruited almost entirely by voluntary enlistment; but, like all the other powers, she was compelled to follow the example of France, and have recourse to the conscription during the great Revolutionary wars. During the half-century which intervened between the final overthrow of Napoleon and her struggle with Prussia for supremacy in Germany, various minor, alterations were introduced, but in the main her military system remained as it was at the close of the great war. The conscription continued in force, the period of service being fixed at ten years, eight of them in the ranks and two in the reserve; unlimited furloughs, however, were largely granted, and the actual service in the ranks seldom exceeded six years, and was often reduced to two or three in the infantry. The disastrous war with Prussia in 1866, and the new constitution finally granted in 1867, led to an entire revision of her military institutions in the following year, and her present organisation is based on the law of 1868.

The armed forces of - Austria consist of the standing army, which in peace time, on a reduced footing, serves as a school for training the nation to arms, and in war time, completed by its reserves, forms the field army; the landwehr, which in war time acts as a support to the field army and provides for home defence; the Ersatz reserve, from which casualties in the field army are replaced; and the landsturm, a national levy only called out to resist invasion. The war establishment of the standing army is fixed at 800,000; the peace establishment varies, being governed by financial considerations, but is usually about 250,000.

Every male citizen capable of bearing arms becomes liable to military service on completing his twentieth year. Exemption by payment, or by providing a substitute, is not allowed; and those who are exempted on physical grounds are required to pay a sum of money, proportioned to their means, into the military pension fund. Temporary exemptions are, however, granted, as in other armies, to only sons of widows and others who are the sole supports of families. The period of service, or liability to service, lasts for twelve years. The annual contingent of young men passed as fit for service is divided by lot into three classes. The first form the standing army, and serve for three years in the ranks, seven in the reserve of the army, and two in the landwehr. The strength of this first class is determined by the annual requirements of the army, and was fixed at 95,000. The second class forms the “Ersatz” reserve, or reserve for recruits of the standing army. They are not trained at all, but for ten years remain liable to be called in in case of war to fill the depots and replace the casualties of the field aπny. The total strength of the “Ersatz” reserve may not exceed that of one year’s contingent for the active army; the annual “Ersatz” reserve contingent is therefore fixed at τ ⅛th of this. The third class, including all who are not drawn for the two preceding ones, are passed at once into the landwehr, in which they serve their twelve years. The organisation of the landwehr varies in the different provinces. Austria, as far as its military institutions are concerned, is divided into four distinct provinces, viz., Austria proper, Hungary, Tyrol and Vorarlberg, and the military frontier. The landwehr of these provinces are distinct, and cannot be moved out of their own provinces except by authority of the Reichsrath or central parliament. Most of the landwehr are trained for eight weeks on first joining, and fourteen days annually afterwards. The Hungarian militia, or “honveds,” as they are called, are better trained than the others. Apparently with the object of providing a more distinctly national force, the Hungarian diet has made arrangements by which one company of each regiment is kept permanently embodied for instruction purposes, so that every man shall have a full year’s training. The landwehr also includes the men who have completed their ten years in the army and reserve, and have to serve for two years in the landwehr. These are intended to provide a steadying element of old soldiers; but as many of them have only actually served two years in the ranks, and been away from their colours for eight, their value is doubtful. The number of young men coming of age and fit for service amounts to 140,000 to 150,000 annually. Of these, 95,000 are passed into the army, and about 10,000 into the “Ersatz” reserve; and the balance, averaging about 40,000, into the landwehr. The landwehr thus comprises two years’ contingents of old soldiers (which, after deduc-thms, may be estimated at about 150,000), and twelve years’ contingents of about 40,000; or a total, after allowing for casualties, of between 500,000 and 600,000. The actual organisation, however, only provides for incorporating about one-third of this number. Service in the landsturm is voluntary, except in Tyrol, where all the male population capable of bearing arms are enrolled, and divided into two classes; the first including all between 18 and 39 who are not actually serving in the army or landwehr, the second those between 30 and 45. All liability ceases at the age of 45.

The standing army consists of— [table]

with 644 guns on peace establishment, and 1600 on war establishment. There is no special corps of guards, as in the Prussian and Russian armies; the “imperial and royal guards,” which include the archers of the bodyguard, the palace guard, the Hungarian crown guard, <fcc., only number 600 in all; and their duties are ceremonial and police rather than combatant.

Infantry.— An Austrian infantry regiment consists of 5 field battalions of 4 companies each, and 1 depot battalion of 5 companies. In peace time the first three battalions are maintained on a peace establishment of 386 of all ranks, the fourth and fifth on a reduced or· cadre establishment of 300, and the depot battalion in cadre only (21 officers and non-commissioned officers). The first three battalions are mobile, their stations being determined by the ordre de bataille; and they are always under the immediate command of the colonel of the regiment. The fourth and fifth and dépôt battalions remain permanently at the headquarter station of the regimental recruiting district, and are under the command of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel (regimental second in command), called the reserve commander, who is .also head of the recruiting district, and charged with all duties connected with the annual conscription, calling out of reserves, &c. The captain commanding the depot battalion acts as his assistant in these duties. The staff of the depot battalion conduct all business relating to the muster-rolls and registers of reserve and furlough men, and have custody of the augmentation stores of clothing, arms, ammunition, <fcc. Its own muster-roll is composed mainly of men who, after an eight weeks’ training, have been sent on furlough, but held ready to fill vacancies occurring in the field battalions. The annual contingent of recruits is distributed among the five field battalions, and trained at their headquarters. In war time the five field battalions are raised to a war strength of 952 of all ranks, and the depot battalion to 1155, by calling in the reserve and furlough men.

If the field force is still found insufficient, a sixth field battalion may be formed from the first four companies of the depot battalion; and the fifth dépôt company, under the command of the deputy of the district commander, then takes over all the depot duties, being augmented for the purpose. The regiment forms two distinct bodies, the first three battalions, under the regimental commander, taking their place in the active army according to the ordre de bataille; the remaining two (or three) forming a “reserve regiment,” bearing the same number, which may or may not be brigaded with its own regiment.

A. rifle battalion consists of four field companies, a reserve company, and a depot company: the four field companies forming a field battalion, which is stationed according to the ordre de bataille, while the reserve and depot companies remain at the recruiting headquarters. In peace time the field battalion has a strength of 460 of all ranks, the reserve company 72, and the depot company a cadre only. In war the field battalion is augmented to 989, the reserve company to 240, and the depot company to 232. The 40 reserve companies are formed into 10 reserve battalions of 4 companies each; and, if necessary, 10 additional reserve battalions can be formed from the dépôt companies, leaving only a sufficient staff to train the “Ersatz” reserve and perform the other depot duties. Seven of the existing rifle battalions form together the “Imperial Tyrol Rifle Regiment;” the remainder are single battalions, numbered from 1 to 33.

The Austrian infantry stand two deep, but in somewhat looser order than is usual in other armies; their usual formation is in line of company columns, with intervals of three paces if in “mass,” or deploying intervals if extended, the companies being formed in columns of sections. Their movements are rather loose but quick; and their new drill gives great independence of action to captains and subordinate commanders. They are armed with breech-loading rifles, partly on the “Wänzl” pattern, and partly on the “Werndl.” The troops armed with the former carry 60 rounds, those armed with the latter 72 rounds of ammunition; and the regimental ammunition waggons carry in addition 30 rounds for the former and 36 for the latter. The old white tunic, long distinctive of the Austrian army, has been abolished, and replaced by a serviceable blue-grey uniform. The Hungarian régiments are distinguished by wearing pantaloons, fitting close to the leg and going inside the boot, instead of the trousers worn by the rest of the infantry.

Cavalry.— The cavalry consists of 14 regiments of dragoons, 16. of hussars, and 11 of lancers. The cuirassiers were converted into dragoons after the war of 1866 (only 2 dragoon regiments existed at the outbreak of that war), and the distinction between the heavy and light cavalry was abolished at the same time. The dragoon regiments are mostly raised in the German provinces of Austria, the hussars in Hungary, and the lancers in the Polish provinces.

A cavalry regiment consists of 6 field squadrons, a dépôt, and a reserve squadron. The 6 field squadrons are kept permanently on a war footing, and form the field regiment which in peace time is stationed according to the ordre de bataille, and in war joins the active army: its establishment is 30 officers, 996 non-commissioned officers and men, and 900 horses. The reserve squadron does not exist in peace time, but is formed on mobilisation from the depot, and has the same establishment as a field squadron (171 men and 150 horses); it is chiefly employed as “staff” cavalry,—to furnish orderlies, escort convoys, watch lines of communication, <fcc. The depot squadron is maintained as a cadre only (19 of all ranks) in peace time, but in war time, besides forming the reserve squadron, is itself raised to a strength of a field squadron. The dépôt cadre is permanently stationed in the recruiting district (a cavalry regiment recruits from one or more adjoining infantry recruiting districts), and has charge of the clothing, arms, and equipment of all kinds of the furlough and reserve men, and the registers and muster-rolls, but· has nothing to do with the training of either recruits or young horses, who are sent direct to the field squadrons. In recruiting for the cavalry, young men of strong frame, accustomed to horses, and of a minimum height of 5 feet 3⅛∙ inches, are selected. The remounts of horses are bought by commissions, and are trained and broken at the headquarters of the field squadrons; 12 per cent, of its establishment being the maximum number of remounts allowed yearly to a regiment. The Austrian cavalry has always borne a very high reputation, and its drill is considered by competent judges to be the best in Europe. Much of the old pedantry of drill has recently been swept away, and replaced by a more serviceable system. The soldiers now rise in their stirrups, ride with both hands, and only draw swords when necessary. The instruction of recruits and training of the horses falls almost entirely on the subaltern officers of the field squadrons—commencing on the 1st October, when the annual contingent of recruits is called in, and lasting till the end of June, when the tactical instruction of the squadron is supposed to be complete; from July to September is devoted to drilling in regiments and larger bodies. The hussars and dragoons are armed with breech-loading carbines and swords; of the lancers, 32 men per squadron carry carbines, the rest lances, pistol, and sword.

Artillery.— The artillery consists of 13 regiments of field artillery and 12 battalions of garrison artillery. A regiment of field artillery on peace establishment consists of 12 batteries, viz., four 4-pounder field batteries, three 4-pounder horse batteries, and five 8-pounder field batteries; and the cadres for two more 8-pounder batteries, a depot battery, and five ammunition columns. The batteries have only 4 guns horsed in peace. The cadres of the depot and two 8-pounder batteries remain at the headquarter station of the recruiting district; the other batteries are stationed and detached according to circumstances. In war the batteries are raised to a strength of 170 or 200 men, with 8 guns, 8 ammunition and 6 other waggons, and 109 to 147 horses. Two additional 8-pounder field batteries and a depot battery are formed by each regiment from its cadres, and 5 (in some regiments 6) ammunition columns. A field artillery regiment on war establishment thus numbers 14 batteries or 112 guns; and as a rule a regiment is attached to each army corps of 3 infantry divisions Of the ammunition columns, 3 carry artillery and infantry ammunition in about equal proportions (12 infantry ammunition waggons and 14 artillery waggons), and are attached, one to each infantry division; the others carry principally artillery ammunition, and small-arm ammunition for the cavalry, <fcc., and are attached to the army corps headquarters or the army ammunition park. The Austrian field guns are rifled muzzle-loaders, of bronze. The 4-pounders and their ammunition waggons have four horses in the field batteries, and six in the horse batteries; the 8-pounders and their ammunition waggons are six-horsed. A 4-pounder battery carries 156 rounds per gun an 8-pounder 128 rounds. The remounts of horses are obtained by purchase as in the cavalry, but a larger and heavier class of horse is selected for the artillery.

A battalion of garrison artillery consists of 6 companies, of which in peace time 5 are maintained on a peace establishment of 113 of all ranks, and 1 on a cadre establishment. In war they are all augmented to a strength of 234. The companies of garrison artillery are employed in the defence or attack of fortresses. A small number of mountain batteries, armed with 3-pounder rifled bronze mountain guns, are attached to the garrison battalions.

The artillery further includes a certain number of “artillery reserve establishments” (siege parks, reserve ammunition parks, &c.), which are only organised in war, and the “artülery material department,” which is charged with the construction and supply of all warlike stores in peace, and in war has further to furnish companies of field artificers to the siege parks and artillery reserve establishments. The great factory and depot for all artillery materiel is the artillery arsenal at Vienna, an establishment of. great antiquity and celebrity. The principal powder factory is at Stein, near Laibach. Laboratories are established at Wiener-Neustadt, at Vienna, in immediate connection with-the arsenal, and at most of the principal artillery stations.

Engineers.— The engineers include two regiments of engineers and one of pioneers. A regiment of engineers consists of 5' field battalions of 4 companies, 8 reserve companies, and a depot battalion. In peace time the reserve companies and depot battalions are maintained in cadre only. In war time all the companies are raised to a strength of about 230 of all .ranks; the field battalions accompany the active army, a company bèing usually attached to each infantry division, and a battalion to the army reserve; the reserve companies are employed on the lines of communication. The general duties of the engineers consist in carrying out all works connected with the investment, attack, and defence of fortresses, strengthening positions, opening communications, <fcc. The pioneers form 1 regiment of 5 battalions; each battalion composed of 4 field companies, 1 reserve company (in cadre only in peace time), and a materiel reserve. In time of war each battalion forms a depot company as well. The pioneers are chargéd with the pontoon equipment; the construction of all bridges; and the construction, repair,, and working or destruction of railways and telegraphs. They form 15 “field railway divisions” in war, 5 of which are kept mobilised in time of peace, to afford instruction in this most important branch of modern military engineering. The officers of the pioneer corps are trained at the cadet school at Hainburg. Special care is taken in the selection of recruits for the engineer and pioneer regiments. As a rule, they must be of a minimum height of 5 feet 6 inches, of considerable physical strength, and of some education; and most of them must be mechanics. The standard of height is, however, relaxed in the case of skilled workmen.

Military Train.— The transport of the Austrian army is provided for partly by the military train, partly by the regimental transport attached to the several arms. The military train consists of 36 field squadrons, 36 reserve squadrons (in cadre only in peace time), 6 dépôt squadrons, and 6 matériel depots. In peace time the train forms a mere nucleus, capable of expansion in war, and supplies the transport required by the military authorities in some of the chief garrison towns; its whole strength is only 2500 men, with 500 waggens and 1250 horses. In war time it is raised to a total of nearly 31,000 men, with 12,000 waggons and 36,000 horses. The 36 field squadrons are raised to a strength which varies from 173 men and 197 horses, to 547 men and 718 horses, according to the special duties they have to perform. The 36 reserve squadrons are raised to the same strength, and a similar number of “Ersatz” divisions are formed to carry out the duties which in peace time were performed by the field squadrons. On .mobilisation the field squadrons, as a rule, transfer the horses actually in their possession to the field artillery; and are themselves completed in horses partly by purchase and partly by requisition, and in men.

from the reserve, who have been trained in their ranks, and from the cavalry reserve men who are not required to complete the cavalry regiments. When an army takes the field, one squadron of military train is allotted to. each infantry or cavalry division, one to each army and army corps headquarters, one to each pioneer battalion for the transport of its bridge equipment, and one to the artillery reserve - and ammunition park. A squadron attached to an infantry or cavalry division is formed into five sections, of which the first provides the necessary transport for the divisional and brigade staffs and the field hospital; the second, third, and fourth for the provision column; while the fifth or reserve section supplies all necessary reliefs and minor miscellaneous requirements. Regimental transport is provided for by the regimental train, each infantry regiment having permanently attached to it 8 baggage waggons, 6 commissariat store waggons, and 3 ammunition waggons; and each cavalry regiment, 4 baggage and 13 supply waggons.

'General Organisation and Administration of the Army.— Since 1867 the Austrian empire has consisted of two distinct states, a German or Cis-Leithan empire, commonly known as Austria proper, and a Magyar, or Trans-Leithan, kingdom, known as Hungary. Each of these countries has its own parliament, ministers, and government. The connecting ties between them-are a common hereditary sovereign, a governing body known as the Delegations, and a common army and navy. The war strength of 800,000, at which the naval and military forces of the empire are fixed, is distributed between Austria and Hungary in proportion to their populations; Austria contributing 470,368, and Hungary 329,632. The annual contingents are divided in similar proportions. The cost of the maintenance of the army, which in 1871 was estimated at £10,500,000, is charged in the budget for the “common affairs of the empire,” laid before the Delegations. A portion of this is met by the proceeds of the customs, and other sources of revenue set apart to meet the common expenditure; the rest is defrayed by the two states in the proportion of ∙⅛ths from Austria, and -⅛ths from Hungary. The emperor is commander-in-chief of the army; the military and administrative business is centred in the War Department, which is presided over by the War Minister and his deputy. The empire is divided into 16 military territorial districts. Of. these, 7 are called “general commands,” and have general officers of high rank specially appointed to them’; the remainder are termed “military commands,” and are commanded by the senior divisional commander stationed in the district. Each commander of a district is assisted by a general officer of lower rank, who has special duties to perform, and takes the place of the commander in the event of the latter being called away on mobilisation. The military districts again are - Subdivided into 80 regimental recruiting districts, corresponding to the 80 infantry regiments, each under the superintendence of the reserve commander or second colonel of the regiment, whose duties correspond closely to the landwehr battalion commanders in the Prussian organisation.

The Austrians have no permanent corps organisation; their standing army is formed into independent divisions, which have no fixed stations, but are distributed about the empire according to circumstances, and occasionally relieve one another. There are 32 such divisions, of 2 infantry brigades each, 18 of these have cavalry brigades attached to them. In war time 3 infantry divisions, with a regiment of artillery and proportion of cavalry, would usually l>e united to form an army corps; but the division remains the principal unit of organisation. The following gives the strength and details of an Austrian infantry division in the field :— [table]

This includes all, non-combatants as well as combatants, or the “rationing strength” as it is termed. The combatant strength of a division is 12,884 infantry, 472 cavalry, and 24 guns.

The Austrian army, though long the most perfectly equipped in Europe, and always distinguished for its appearance, its discipline, the strong esprit de corps of its officers, and the scientific training of its staff, has yet the most unfortunate history of all the great European armies. Defeated repeatedly by Frederick in the Seven Years’ War, by Napoleon in the Revolutionary wars, and later by the French in 1859 and the Prussians in 1866, the Italians are the only nation over, whom it can claim to have been generally -victorious. Yet its spirit has always remained unbroken; and however severe the defeat, however disastrous the campaign, no reverse ever brought Austria to the condition of Prussia after Jena, or of France after Sedan. There are several causes to which this almost uniform ill-success may be attributed. Trusting to diplomacy rather than force of arms, her strategy has always been cautious and vacillating. The hands of her generals have repeatedly been held when in the act of striking. But the same, caution which often prevented her reaping the successes actually within her reach, or retrieving disasters which were not yet irremediable, also left her always with a reserve and a show of power still formidable. Austria has also suffered from the heterogeneous composition of her army. Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Croats, Italians, served together under officers who frequently could not communicate with their men. The Germans, or Austrians proper, are loyal and faithful to the house of Hapsburg; but the other nationalities were not only indifferent, but frequently hostile, and instances of whole regiments surrendering to the enemy rather than fight for a cause they detested, are common in the history of her wars. The only ties by which this heterogeneous mass was bound together, was a strict and somewhat harsh discipline, and the strong loyalty and esprit de corps of its body of officers. The Austrian officers have always been distinguished by a cameraderie peculiar to themselves. Officers of various nations and of very different social standing meet on terms of perfect equality and intimacy as the “emperor’s servants,” and no distinctions are acknowledged within the. army save those of military rank. The general physique and intelligence of the rank and file of the army is rather below than above the average. Some of the Hungarian regiments are fine bodies of men, but the standard in other parts of tho empire is very low, and education has made but little progress in the outlying provinces. The men are generally docile and somewhat phlegmatic, but have neither the élan of the French nor the stubbornness of the northern nations.

Since 1866 a great change has taken place in the character of the Austrian forces. The disastrous campaigns of 1859 and 1866 shook the confidence of the nation in that fine imperial army that ever showed so gallantly on parade, and yet seemed ever to suffer defeat in the field.

The army was reorganised on something of the Prussian model, universal personal service introducing a more intelligent and more highly educated element into the ranks° The cession of her last possessions in Italy, and the independent constitution granted to Hungary, removed the principal causes of disaffection. Her regimental officers, who formerly, though gallant and loyal gentlemen, were not distinguished for study of their profession, are now subjected to tests more severe than in any other country; while the constant renewal of the rank and file, and even of the non-commissioned officers, under the three years’ system, throws on them almost the whole of the arduous and ever-recurring labour of training the annual contingents of recruits. Her rigid drill has given place to one of exceptional freedom. Even the outward appearance of the army is changed; and the gay uniforms for which Austria was once celebrated have given place to more sober and serviceable ones. Whatever may be the result of the next struggle she finds herself engaged in, none who have watched her military development will deny that she deserves success, so far as success can be earned by a frank acceptance of the lessons taught in her disasters, by honest and persevering efforts to remedy the defects, laid bare, and by the loyal devotion with which the officers and the country have accepted the new and arduous duties thrown on them.

Russian Army.

Of all European powers, Russia maintains by far the largest army. In 1870 its peace establishment amounted to three-quarters of a million, and its war establishment to a million and a quarter; and when the changes which were commenced in that year have taken full effect, her available war strength will be increased to nearly two millions. But even this enormous force is not excessive when measured by the vast extent of her possessions (7,500,000 square miles), or her population (82 millions); it is calculated that a levy of 25 per cent, of the young men coming annually of age will suffice for the requirements of the army, and that military service will thus fall more lightly in Russia than in any other great nation of the Continent.

Before the recent changes the Russian army was a reflex of the social condition of the country. As in civil life there was practically no middle class, so in the army there was a wide gulf between the officer and the soldier. The officers were mainly drawn from the nobility, every young man of rank being practically compelled to serve; the soldiers were entirely drawn from the serfs. Although every one was nominally liable to serve, numerous exemptions were made in favour of merchants, skilled mechanics, and others whose services were accounted more valuable to the nation in their civil capacities, and the purchase of substitutes was allowed; so that actually the recruits were drawn almost entirely from the lowest class of agricultural labourers. Service was nominally for life, though after a certain number of years the soldier was allowed his discharge on pension. The army was recruited by an annual levy of so many per thousand of the male population (usually from 4 to 6); the number of men required from each village or district being notified, and the headmen and elders charged with furnishing them. The power thus placed in the hands of the small local authorities was most despotically used, and a youth who had incurred the displeasure, of his superiors was surely drafted off to the army. Although the army carried with it the advantages of ultimate freedom and a pension, the time in the ranks was so long, its hardships so great, and the pay so miserably small, that the service was very unpopular, and severe measures were necessary to prevent the recruits deserting on their way to the depots. Subsequent to the Crimean war, however, various steps were taken to improve the condition of the soldier; the term of service in the ranks, first fixed at twenty years, was reduced to fifteen, and a system of unlimited furloughs introduced, under which the soldiet was sent to his home after seven or eight years’ service, though liable to recall if needed. The liberation of the serfs in 1861 paved the way for still further reforms, and by an imperial ukase of the 4th (16th) November 1870, the principle of universal personal liability to service was established. By the new army organisation law, every Russian is liable to service on attaining his twenty-first year. The purchase of exemption or of substitutes is prohibited; but it seems doubtful whether this clause will be fully enforced, and hitherto the purchase of exemption at a fixed rate of 800 roubles (about £120) has been permitted. The conscription takes place annually between the 1st November and 15th December, when the number required to complete the active army (estimated at about 25 per cent, of those liable to service) are chosen by lot. . The period of service is fifteen years,—of which four are spent in the ranks; two years on furlough, liable to recall at any moment; and nine years in the reserves, which can only be called out in case of war or national danger. In the cavalry and horse artillery, the time with the colours is extended to five years, and that in the reserve is shortened. Those who are not’ drawn for the active army are put through a short course of training, and then sent to their homes; but for six years they remain liable to be called in to replace casualties in the active army in case of war. After this they pass into the national legions, which include all able-bodied men* between the ages of 20 and 38 not actually serving in the army or navy. As in Prussia, certain advantages are given to young men of means and good education, who are allowed to shorten their period of service in the ranks. Special regulations apply to the Ukraine and provinces which furnish the Cossacks and other irregular troops.

The military resources of Russia thus consist of the active army, or men serving with the colours; the reserves, who have completed their period in the ranks, but rejoin the army in case of war; the irregular troops, or Cossacks; and the national legions, or armed levies, only called out in exceptional cases, such as invasion. The regular army is formed by the active army, completed in time of war from the reserves, and is divided into field troops and local troops, —the former furnishing the armies for the field, the latter the garrisons, and the dépôts at which the recruits are assembled and trained, and whence the field troops are fed. The local troops, as their name implies, are permanently localised; the field troops are not,'as in Prussia, connected with certain districts, but draw their recruits indiscriminately from the whole empire, and are moved from one part to another as occasion demands.

The field troops of the regular army consist of 612 battalions of infantry, 236 squadrons of cavalry, 16 battalions of sappers and engineers, and 306 batteries of guns and mitrailleuses. They are divided into guards and line, each having its due proportion of all arms, and are organised in detail as follows :—

Infantry.— The infantry consists of— [table]

A battalion of the guards or line consists of 4 line companies and 1 of rifles; it has four different establishments, viz., “cadre" strength of 320 rank and file, “peace” strength of 500, “increased peace” strength of 680, and “war” strength of 900 rank and file. This is exclusive of musicians, officers’ servants, <fcc. A regiment on war establishment numbers 81 officers, 270 non-commissioned officers, 2700 rank and file, 96 drummers and buglers, and 259 artificers, officers’ servants, and other non-combatants; and is accompanied by 12 officers’ horses, 173 draught horses, and 41 ammunition, ambulance, and baggage waggons. Rifle battalions consist of 4 companies only, and have three establishments,—“war,” of 720 rank and file; “increased peace,” of 544; and “peace,” of 400 rank and file.

The Russian infantry is formed in two ranks. On parade the four line companies of a battalion stand in order from right to left, while the rifle company stands at fifty paces in rear of the centre; but for manoeuvring purposes the three rifle companies of the regiment are often united to form a separate battalion. The guards still maintain on parade much of the stiffness and precision for which the Russian army was once famous; but generally the movements of the infantry are loose and rapid. In the main their drill resembles that of the German army; the commonest formation for march and manoeuvring is the company column of sections. The men are armed with the “Berdan” breech-loading rifle, a bayonet (which is always carried fixed), and a short two-edged sword. They carry 60 rounds of ammunition in two pouches, and 40 rounds are carried in the regimental -ammunition carts, so that there is always present with the regiment 100 rounds per man; and the divisional reserves carry 60 rounds per man besides. A certain number of entrenching tools are issued to each company, and on service are carried by the men in turns. The clothing is of somewhat coarse texture, but very serviceable; that of the guards is of slightly finer material than is supplied to the rest of the army. All infantry alike wear tunic and trousers of dark green cloth (or white linen trousers in summer time), long boots into which the trousers are tucked in the field or for marching, cap or “kepi” of black cloth with straight peak, metal badge, and horse-hair plume, and cloak of reddish-grey cloth with a dark-coloured hood. The tunics of the guard are turned back in front, and faced with red or yellow. Regiments are distinguished by the colour of the “paroli” (a strip of cloth worn on the collar) and of the shoulder straps. The belts of the first three regiments of the guard and grenadier divisions (with the exception of the rifle companies) are white; those of all others black. The knapsack is rather large, and made of black calf-skin. A white smock frock, intended as a fatigue dress, is worn in summer at drill.

A Russian regiment is very completely equipped with transport. Every company has two waggons attached to it, one carrying ammunition (40 rounds per man), the other six days’ rations of biscuit, salt, and other provisions and stores. In addition to these the regiment has an orderlyroom waggon, a paymaster’s waggon, a store and implement waggon, four ambulance waggons, and two hospital and medicine carts. All these are kept in store in peace time with the headquarters of the regiment; but only one waggon per company is horsed. In war time most of the waggons are four-horsed; but some still have shafts, and are drawn by three horses abreast.

The regimental staff comprises 1 colonel, 3 lieutenantcolonels, 1 supernumerary field officer, a regimental adjutant, paymaster, quartermaster, and instructor in arms, 3 battalion adjutants, a chaplain, and 4 surgeons. In the field each company is attended by an apothecary, provided with the necessary appliances; and the officers’ servants and other unarmed men are taught the elementary principles of military surgery, and trained to the duties of stretcher-bearers.

Cavalry.— The regular cavalry consists of 10 regiments of the guard, 18 regiments of dragoons, 14 regiments of lancers, and 14 regiments of hussars.

The cavalry of the guard comprise 4 regiments of cuirassiers, 2 of lancers, 2 of hussars, 1 of dragoons, and 1 of horse grenadiers. ‘ There are also 2 regiments of Cossacks of the guard, who in peace time furnish 2 squadrons each for duty, and in war take the field with 6 squadrons, and may fairly be included among the regular troops.

All regiments of cavalry are organised in the same manner, and consist of 4 field squadrons and 1 reserve squadron, the latter belonging to the “local troops.” They have two establishments, viz., “war,” of 128 men per squadron (mounted); and “peace,” of 112 men per squadron. The war establishment of a cavalry regiment-is 32 officers, 73 non-commissioned officers, 512 rank and file, 16 trumpeters, and 305 non-combatants, including dismounted men in reserve, officers’ servants, artificers, àc.; or a total of 938 officers and men, with 693 horses and 11 carriages. The formation and manoeuvres of the Russian cavalry do not differ materially from those of other armies of Europe, except in the case of dragoons, who are armed with a rifle and bayonet, and specially trained to act as infantry. In all other cavalry the front rank is armed with a lance in addition to sword and revolver. The rear rank is armed with sword and carbine in lancer and hussar regiments, and sword and revolver in cuirassier regiments. The cuirassiers wear white tunics with shoulder scales, cuirass, and helmet; the dragoons a dark green tunic, with scales and cloth cap; the lancers, a blue tunic with metal epaulettes, and the czapka, or lancer cap; and the hussars, a blue tunic and cloth cap. Only the hussars of the guard wear bearskin caps and pelisses. The guards have parade trousers of black or dark blue with stripes; but in the field, trousers or pantaloons of a greyish blue cloth are worn by all cavalry alike. The saddlery is simple in construction, though somewhat heavy and cumbrous. Four separate folds of felt, each ∣ inch thick, support a wooden frame previously fitted to the horse’s bare back; on the wooden frame is strapped the horse rug, and the saddle is complete. When one fold of felt is wet or hardened by dried perspiration, it is replaced by another, and sore backs are almost unknown. The men as a rule ride fairly well, though not so well as the Austrian or English cavalry; and the peculiar seat, and height of the saddle above the horse’s back, strike the eye as ungainly. The horses, though often small, are hardy and enduring; they are provided partly from the Government breeding establishments and partly by purchase, and come mostly from the south-eastern provinces of the empire. They are not taken on the strength of the regiment until rising six years old, and are cast on completing their twelfth year; this securing that they shall always be in their prime, and fit for the severe work of active service.

The staff of a cavalry regiment consists of a lieutenantcolonel commanding, two field-officers commanding divisions (of two squadrons each), and regimental adjutant, paymaster, quartermaster, and instructor in arms. Each regiment has also a chaplain, two surgeons, and a veterinary surgeon. Each squadron has its provision waggon, and each regiment has an ambulance waggon, and three store and office waggons. Dragoon regiments have two ammunition waggons carrying 30 rounds per man; other regiments have only one.

Artillery.— The field artillery consists of 3 brigades of field and 1 of horse artillery of the guard; 44 brigades of field and 7 of horse artillery of the line; and 3 Turkestan brigades.

A brigade of field artillery consists of six batteries, viz., three heavy, two light, and one of mitrailleuses. The horse artillery brigade of the guard comprises five light batteries (including one of the Don Cossacks of the guard); the remaining horse brigades have only two batteries each. The Turkestan brigades vary slightly in composition. The Russian artillery thus numbers—143 heavy field batteries; 100 light field batteries; 19 batteries of horse artillery; 4 mountain batteries; and 50 batteries of mitrailleuses; or a total of 2128 guns and 400 mitrailleuses.

A battery has three establishments—“peace,” with only 4 guns and 2 waggons horsed; “increased peace,” with 8 guns and 8 waggons; and “war,” with 8 guns and 16 (or 24) waggons. On war establishment a heavy field battery numbers 6 officers, 316 non-commissioned officers and men (including artificers, &c.), and 214 horses; with 8 guns, 24 ammunition waggons, and 9 provision and store carriages. A light battery has 261 officers and men, 160 horses, 8 guns, 16 ammunition and 8 other waggons and carriages. The guns are of bronze or cast steel, breechloading and rifled on the Prussian system. The mitrailleuse batteries are armed with a 10-barrelled gun on the Gatling system, slightly modified by the Russian general Gorloff. A heavy battery carries 120 rounds per gun, a light battery 130, and a mitrailleuse battery a total of 6290 rounds. The harness is rough and clumsy, with long rope traces. The dress of the men of the field batteries is similar to that of the infantry, and that of the horse artillery to that of the dragoons.

Engineers.— The corps is divided into sappers and pon-toniers. The sappers form 11 field battalions, 1 field company (Turkestan), and four reserve battalions (local troops); also 2 engineer field parks, 2 siege parks, and 6 field telegraph parks. The pontoniers form 6 half-battalions. A field battalion of sappers consists of 4 companies, and has a war establishment of 900 rank and file, and a peace establishment of 600. The half-battalions of pontoniers consist of two companies, and have a war establishment of 13 officers, 469 non-commissioned officers and men, with 392 horses, 52 pontoon and 10 other waggons and carriages; and carry 26 iron pontoons and 12 trestles, sufficient to form 700 feet of bridge.

Organisation of the Field Army.— The organisation of the Russian army is entirely divisional; two or more divisions »may be brought together to form an army corps, but no such organisation exists permanently. The infantry is formed in 47 divisions, viz., 3 of guards, 3 of grenadiers, 1 of Caucasus grenadiers, and 40 of the line. Each division consists of 4 regiments or 12 battalions (with the exception of the divisions of the Caucasus, which have 16 battalions), and has attached to it a brigade of field artillery, but no cavalry or rifles. The rifles are organised in separate brigades of 4 battalions each, and form 8 brigades (1 guard, 1 of the Caucasus, 1 of Turkestan, and 5 of the line); and the cavalry in cavalry divisions of six regiments, to each of which is attached a brigade of horse artillery. With the exception of the guards (of whom two divisions are always stationed in St Petersburg) and some of the troops of the Caucasus and Turkestan, these divisions have no permanent stations, but relieve one another from time to time. Five infantry and two cavalry divisions are usually stationed in the St Petersburg district; 15 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions in the Warsaw and 'Vilna districts (Poland and Polish frontier); 8 infantry and 2 cavalry in Kiev and Odessa (south-eastern provinces); 7 infantry and 1 cavalry in Moscow; and 6 infantry and 1 cavalry in the Caucasus. Of the cavalry, the guard divisions and three line divisions are usually maintained on war footing, the remainder on the peace establishment; the artillery all on peace establishment. Of the infantry, a few battalions in Turkestan are alone maintained on war footing; the divisions in the Caucasus are mostly on the “increased peace” establishment; the guards and grenadier divisions, and those occupying Warsaw and the great fortresses, on “peace” footing; and those distributed about the interior on cadre establishment.

The following was the peace and war strength of the field army in 1873:— [table]

Local Troops.— That portion of the Russian army which is stationary in peace is distinguished by the name of “local troops;” and these again are divided into “reserve and dépôt troops” and “troops for service in the interior.” The reorganisation of these forces was commenced in 1873, but will take some years to complete.

According to the new organisation, the reserve and dépôt troops will consist of 120 local battalions of infantry, each forming on mobilisation a three-battalion reserve regiment and a depot battalion; 56 reserve squadrons of cavalry; 24 local batteries of artillery, forming in war 24 reserve artillery brigades (96 batteries) and 24 dépôt batteries; and 5 reserve companies of sappers. In peace time they are little more than cadres, distributed according to population, and are charged with the training of recruits and reserve and furlough men. In war they form a reserve army of 30 infantry divisions and 24 artillery brigades, or about 420,000 men and 768 guns, available to reinforce the field army; and dépôts numbering about 85,000 men.

The “troops for duty in the interior” consist—First, of 48 “frontier battalions,” of which 24 are stationed in the Caucasus, 12 in Turkestan, and the remainder in the military districts of Orenburg and Eastern and Western Siberia. They are organised in all respects like the rest of the infantry, and have a war establishment of 1074, and a peace establishment of 615 of all ranks. Secondly, of “garrison infantry and artillery,” intended for the defence of fortresses, and numbering 98 battalions and 59 (in war time 91) artillery companies. Thirdly, of “government battalions” and “local detachments,” who do garrison duty in the capitals and towns, and act as police, guards, &c.; of these there are 70 battalions and 400 separate detachments, distributed throughout the empire, maintained on a reduced establishment in peace, but raised to a total war strength of 120,000 men when the field army is mobilised. Lastly, of “etappen detachments,” stationed on the military roads, and charged with furnishing escorts to recruits and prisouers, and providing them with lodging and subsistence; and local artillery detachments, charged with the care of artillery material stored in large towns.

The total strength of the “local troops,” when the new organisation has been completed, will amount to about 784,000 men and 816 guns.

Irregular Troops.— The irregular troops or Cossacks have always borne a most important share in the wars of Russia. In 1812 more than 100,000 were raised, and the services they rendered in that and the following campaigns made their name famous and a terror throughout Europe. In 1856 they raised 184,000 men, of whom about three-fourths were cavalry; but the Crimean war did not give the opportunity of utilising this class of troops.

The Cossacks have always been a race of free men; neither serfage nor any dependence upon the land has existed among them. It has been the policy of the Russian Government to foster their martial spirit, and various privileges have been granted to them with this object. They pay no taxes; but in lieu of this render military service, from the age of 19 to 40. Only a portion of this time is actually spent in the ranks; but in war time, by order of the emperor, the whole male population between the ages of 15 and 60 may be called to arms. The Cossacks are organised in “polks” or regiments of light cavalry, about 900 strong, and formed usually of six “sotnias” or squadrons; in battalions of infantry, about 1100 strong; and horse artillery batteries of 8 guns. In peace time a few squadrons are stationed at St Petersburg and Warsaw, furnishing escorts to the emperor and viceroy. The rest are distributed about the Cossack provinces and on the frontiers, maintaining the lines of communication in the wild Asiatic provinces. The force under arms in 1871 amounted to 66,000, forming 323 sotnias or squadrons, 35 companies of infantry, and 12 batteries. In war time this can be raised to— [table]

with 232 guns. In war time the divisional cavalry of the regular army is furnished by the Cossacks, one polk being attached to each infantry division for purposes of outpost duty, escorts, and orderlies.

Militia.— The militia or national legions include all men •within the ages liable to service who have not served actively in the army. There is as yet no regular organisation for the militia, nor have the men been drilled; notwithstanding this, on the three occasions on which they have been called out (viz., 1807, 1812, and 1855), they have always been rapidly formed, and have done good service to the country. In 1855 the number actually raised was 366,000. The number liable to service in 1871 was over 500,000; and as the new law comes fully into action that number will be enormously increased.

Organisation and Administration.— The emperor is the Commander-in-Chief of the army, and exercises his authority through the War Minister. The War Ministry is divided into twelve sections or departments, including the imperial headquarters or military cabinet of the emperor; the council of war, which is the highest legislative and administrative authority in the empire; the headquarter staff; and the artillery, engineer, intendance, medical, &c., departments. For purposes of military administration the empire is divided into 14 military districts, corresponding to the civil “general governments,” and 51 governments or military sub-districts. At the head of each military district is a general, who is also viceroy or governor-general, and has the supreme control of all affairs, civil as well as military. The local forces belonging to each military district are commanded by a local divisional commander, and the forces of each government by a local brigadier. In addition to the command of the local troops, these officers are charged with the keeping of the muster-rolls of men on furlough, <fcc., and generally with the arrangements for mobilisation. The field troops stationed in the district are under the command of their own divisional generals, subordinate to the district general. The guards and some of the regiments stationed in the fortresses and great towns are lodged in fairly comfortable barracks; but the accommodation generally is quite insufficient. The erection of barracks for the whole army is projected, and the necessary buildings have been commenced in many places; but it must be long before the plan can be fully carried out. Meanwhile a large part of the troops are billeted in the towns, and in some country districts are distributed among the villages, living with the peasants, and for months without seeing their officers or any opportunities for drill. During the summer months, May to October, the regiments and divisions are brought together in large standing camps for training, commencing with battalion and regimental drill, rifle practice, instruction in field fortification, <fcc., and concluding with brigade and divisional field-days and great manoeuvres. In 1873, 445 infantry battalions, 238 squadrons, 93 sotnias of Cossacks, and 828 guns were thus assembled at the various camps of instruction, the largest of which were at Warsaw, where nearly 50,000 men were collected; and at Krasnoe Selo, near St Petersburg, where about 30,000 men, principally of the guard, were encamped.

The Russian guards, selected as they are with care from the vast military population of the empire, are perhaps the finest body of men in Europe; and with their brilliant and various uniforms, relieved by the Oriental picturesqueness of the Cossack squadrons, certainly present the most gorgeous and imposing military display to be seen anywhere. They have many special privileges, and all officers of the guards rank two grades higher than the corresponding ones of the line. The ordinary line soldier is rather below the average of European armies both in physique and intelligence; but he is generally a good marcher, capable of enduring great hardship and fatigue, and is good-natured, cheerful, obedient by instinct and habit, and imbued with a certain religious and superstitious loyalty, which is always apowerful motor, and at times can be excited to fanaticism. Of all their commanders, Suwaroff knew best how to appeal to this semi-barbarous and superstitious instinct, and to this he owed much of his extraordinary influence and brilliant successes. Generally, however, the Russian’s strength lies rather in endurance than action; no army, the British perhaps excepted, fights so stubbornly and will endure such heavy losses without flinching. Hence the most bloody battles in modern history have been those fought against Russian troops,—Zorndorf and Kunnersdorf in Frederick’s wars, Eylau and Borodino in Napoleon’s time. Outwardly the discipline is good, though the intercourse between men and officers retains somewhat of that mixture of familiarity and servileness characteristic of a stage not far removed from slavery; but it may be questioned whether it is of the kind that will withstand the strain of war, or gives the officers that moral influence which alone tells in moments of danger or discouragement. The non-existence of a class corresponding to the lesser nobility of Germany or the gentry of England has always made the officering of the Russian army a matter of peculiar difficulty. The staff and scientific corps are largely officered by foreigners, mostly Germans; in the infantry the want is supplied to a certain extent by promotion from the ranks. The Russian army, like the nation, is in a transitional state. The liberation of the serfs was a vast constitutional change which could not make itself fully felt in less than a generation, and which affects the army as well as the nation. The introduction of personal service, applied to all classes, must materially alter its character. The Russian Government, fully alive to the present defects of the army, and also to its importance as a means of raising, educating, and disciplining the nation, is using every endeavour to instruct and improve the soldier. Regimental schools have been established throughout the army, at which the soldier is taught, either by or under the immediate supervision of his officers, for many hours a day during the long winter months. Higher class schools are also formed for the instruction of non-commissioned officers, where they receive not only a military education, embracing tactics, military history, field fortification, &c., but also a general education which qualifies them, on leaving the army, to become, as many do, teachers in the national schools, or to fill civil appointments. The physical training of the soldier is also attended to; gymnastics of all kinds are constantly practised, and with such effect that the Russian soldier contrasts very markedly with the awkward, ungainly peasant.

The military power of Russia has been vastly increased of late years by the construction of the great strategic lines of railway which now traverse the empire in all directions, and enable her to concentrate her vast resources with ease and quickness. The immense extent of the empire has hitherto been an insuperable obstacle to the full development of her power. In 1854-56 the efforts made to hold the Crimea exhausted Russia more completely than a series of defeats in the heart of the empire could have done. For every man who actually reached the Crimea four were expended on the road from sickness and fatigue, and the total losses suffered in this war were estimated at the enormous amount of 450,000 men. Now reinforcements can be brought with ease by rail from the most distant provinces, and for a concentration on her south-western frontiers she has four distinct main lines of railway, connected by branch ones with every important military station. It is not to be wondered at that Prussia and Austria watch with uneasiness the development of the military resources of their powerful neighbour.

Italian Army.

The old Piedmontese law of conscription is the basis of the present military organisation of Italy, as its constitution is of the constitution of the new kingdom. The Piedmontese have long borne a high reputation among southern nations for their military qualities. The dukes of Savoy have played a not unimportant part in history, and showed special ability in preserving the independence of their small kingdom between two such powerful neighbours as France and Austria. During the wars of the French Revolution Piedmont was temporarily absorbed into thé French republic; but the kingdom of Sardinia was restored in 1815. Various causes combined to place Piedmont at the head of the national and liberal movement which agitated Italy during the ensuing thirty years, and bring her in direct antagonism to Austria. Charles Albert, her then ruler, had paid great attention to the army, and when Italy rose against Austria in 1848 he took the field with an excellent force of nearly 70,000 men. At the outset fortune favoured the arms of Italy; but the genius and energy of Radetsky, the veteran Austrian commander, soon turned the tide, and in the summer of 1849 the Piedmontese army was decisively defeated at Novarra, and her king compelled to sue for peace. Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his son Victor Emanuel, a prince who had already distinguished himself by his personal gallantry in the field. Under his care the army soon recovered its efficiency, and the force which joined the allied armies in the Crimea attracted general admiration from the excellence of its organisation, equipment, and discipline. In 1859 Piedmont again took up arms against Austria for the liberation of Italy; but this time she had the powerful assistance of France, and played but a subordinate part herself. In this campaign the Sardinian army was composed of one cavalry and five infantry divisions, and numbered about 60,000 combatants. By the peace of Villa Franca, Italy, with the exception of Venetia, was freed from the Austrians, and Lombardy was added to Piedmont. The revolutionary campaign of Garibaldi in the following year united the whole peninsula under the rule of Victor Emanuel, and in 1866, when Italy for the third time took up arms against Austria—this time as the ally of Prussia—her forces had risen to nearly 450,000, of whom about 270,000 actually took the field. But in quality these were far from being equal to the old Piedmontese army; and the northern army, under the personal command of the king, was defeated at Custozza by a much smaller force under the Archduke Albrecht of Austria. Since 1866 the army has been somewhat reduced, but increased care given to its organisation and training, and in manoeuvring power it now stands high among the armies of Europe.

The existing organisation of the Italian army is determined by the laws of 1873. Every Italian is liable to personal service from the age of 18 to 40. Substitution (except in the case of brothers) and exemption by payment are abolished. Absolute exemption is only allowed to such as are physically unfit for service. Partial exemptions are allowed to only sons of widows, supports of families, &c., who are passed at once into the local militia without serving in the army. Temporary exemptions or “adjournments” may be granted for three successive years on urgent personal or family reasons. Tho remainder of the annual contingent is divided by lot into two classes. The first class serve eight years in the army, four in the active militia, and the rest of their time in the local militia. Of the eight years in the army, three in the infantry and five in the cavalry are usually spent with the colours; the remainder on furlough. Further, the Minister of War has the power to send home on furlough, after a year’s service only, young men of exceptional character or intelligence, school teachers, artists, &c. The second class are liable to service in the several forces for the same periods, but are considered as on unlimited furlough, and only subjected to six months’ training. One-year volunteers are received on the same conditions as in other armies. The numbers of the first class contingent are determined annually by law, and are distributed among the districts and cantons according to the number of men found fit for service. This is estimated at from 90,000 to 95,000; and the contingent of the first class was fixed in 1872 and 1873 at 65,000. The war strength of the army, exclusive of local or “sedentary” militia, is estimated at 750,000, of whom 375,000 are in the active army, or first line; 250,000 in the active militia, or second line; and 125,000 in the depots. The peace establishment is fixed at 200,000.

The Italian army consists of 80 regiments of the line, 10 of l)Crsaglieri (riflemen), 20 regiments of cavalry, 10 of artillery, and 2 of engineers. A regiment of the Hne consists of 3 battalions of 4 companies each, and numbers about 1500 men on peace and 3000 men on war footing, Eight of the existing regiments are grenadiers. The lersaglieri are formed in regiments of four battalions each, and are picked troops, armed with a shorter rifle, and especially trained to traverse long distances at a run. They are frequently used in conjunction with cavalry, and it is proposed to relieve them of their knapsacks, to increase their mobility still further. The cavalry consists of 5 regiments of the line, 7 of lancers, 7 of light horse, and 1 of guides. Each regiment has six squadrons, with a war strength of 150 horses per squadron. Of those squadrons, two are intended to be detached to the infantry divisions in war time, while the remaining four form the corps cavalry. The artillery comprises 10 regiments of field artillery, and 4 of garrison artillery, besides a certain number of coast and artificer companies. A regiment of field artillery consists of 10 batteries of 8 guns each, and 3 companies of artillery train. A regiment of garrison artillery consists of 15 companies. The engineers consist of a separate staff of officers, and 2 regiments, each divided into 4 companies of pontoniers, 16 of sappers, and 3 of engineer train. In addition to the above field organisation, every regiment of cavalry, infantry, artillery, or engineers has a depot, which in peace time is maintained on cadre establishment only, but in war is completed from the surplus furlough men, and replaces casualties in the field army.

The total strength of the Italian active army on peace and war footing is approximately as follows :— [table]

Tn war time this force is organised in 20 divisions, forming 10 army corps,—each corps comprised of 24 infantry battalions, 4 bersaglieri battalions, 2 cavalry regiments, and 10 field batteries, giving a fighting strength of 28,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 80 guns. The corps and divisional organisation is not permanent in peace time; but the divisional staffs are kept up in those of 16 territorial and 4 active divisions maintained in peace.

The dépôts and active militia, or second line of troops, are maintained in cadre only in peace time; the depots on mobilisation are raised to a strength of 125,000, or a third of the active army. For the militia the cadres of 960 companies of infantry, 60 companies of bersaglieri, 10 of engineers, and 60 of artillery, are formed in peace time. On mobilisation these will give a force of about 250,000 men, of whom 200,000, with 40 batteries or 320 guns, could take the field if necessary. The local or “sedentary” militia is not organised in peace time, and is only called out in the last extremity, corresponding generally to the landsturm of Germany.

The kingdom of Italy is divided into 16“ territorial divisions,” and these again are subdivided into “districts,” of which there are 62, each comprising one or more of the 80 provinces of the kingdom. These districts are under the supervision of a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, whose duties correspond generally to those of the commander of the land wehr battalion districts in Prussia. He has under him a staff, and the cadres of from 1 to 6 companies, forming the depots of the active army in peace time, and in war furnishing each the cadres for one militia battalion. He superintends the first instruction and forwarding of the annual contingent of recruit3 for the army, and the periodical training of the men belonging to the second class, who are on permanent furlough.

The Italian army is composed of very various materials, and in its reorganisation it has been the object of the Government to blend these together as much as possible. Going exactly contrary to the Pnιssian principle of localisation, the kingdom is divided into five “zones,” and special arrangements are made to provide that each regiment shall receive recruits in due proportion from all five of these. The Piedmontese are a hardy, athletic race, superior, perhaps, to any in Europe in power of work and endurance of fatigue, privations, and hardships. They are temperate, intelligent, and combine a certain natural independence with a traditional respect for their princes and aristocracy, which makes them docile and amenable to discipline. The aristocracy of North Italy, like that of England, has always associated itself with the welfare and progress of the country, and deservedly kept the respect of all classes, and furnishes an excellent class of officers to the army. The southern Italian, on the other hand, is generally indolent, and incapable of much exertion, physical or mental; occasionally roused to enthusiasm, but wanting in steadiness of character; usually either bigoted and a slave to his priest, or a free-thinker, with little respect for any authority human or divine. Since enervated and luxurious Rome fell before the more vigorous northerner, the southern Italian has shown but little military spirit. Whether the amalgamation of the various races will raise the whole army to the level of the Piedmontese, or lower the old Piedmontese army to the level of the others, is a problem which can only be solved practically; but one may fairly hope that the new national life which is dawning on Italy will restore to its inhabitants something of the qualities which once made Rome mistress of the world.

Spanish Army.

Spain, once the proudest of nations, has been brought so low by years of misrule and anarchy that she can scarcely now be classed among the powers of Europe; and the army which under Charles V., the Duke of Alba, and the Constable of Bourbon had proved itself so formidable, has been reduced to a state of disorganisation that makes any detailed notice of it impossible. The martial spirit of old Spain, roused by the protracted struggle with the Moors, and fanned by the exploits of the Cid and the successes of Ferdinand of Castile, culminated in the reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella, and of their successor, Charles V. At the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century the Spanish army was renowned throughout Europe; while the discoveries of Columbus and the conquests of Cortes and Pizarro had extended her power and the fame of her arms to the New World. Gonsalvo de Cordova, Ferdinand’s “great captain,” was the creator of the Spanish infantry, which, modelled originally on that of the Swiss, soon eclipsed the latter, and became in its turn the model for other nations. More heavily armed than the Swiss, it trusted, like them, to massive formations and the irresistible weight of its attack. During the 16th century the Spanish infantry maintained its reputation, and it was not till the close of the century that its renown began to fade before the new school of Maurice of Nassau, and that the deep masses of the “Spanish brigade” gave way to the smaller and more mobile formations of the Netherlaud ordonnance. Under the disastrous reigns of the last princes of the house of Austria the army rapidly degenerated, and when Philip V. ascended the throne in 1700 it scarcely amounted to 15,000 men. During the 18th century it was largely augmented, and at the outbreak of the French revolution numbered about 120,000 of all arms. But though formidable in numbers, it was no longer so in quality; and throughout the long war with Napoleon it distinguished itself principally by its uniform ill success, and the haste with which it abandoned even the strongest positions. After the peace the army was reorganised, and efforts were made to improve its general condition. But the series of civil wars, or of risings in which the army was a principal actor, thwarted all such attempts. When Isabella was driven from the throne in 1868 the army espoused different sides, the bulk of the infantry joining Prim and the revolutionists, while the artillery and some of the corps d’ 'élite remained faithful to the queen. In 1867 the total armed forces of the kingdom (including navy and colonial troops) were fixed at 200,000. The land forces in Spain itself amounted to 150,000, of whom 80,000 belonged to the regular army, and the remaining 70,000 were made up of carabiηeros or gendarmerie, guardia civil, and provincial militia. The law of recruiting passed in 1870 made all Spaniards liable to service on reaching the age of 20, and fixed the terms of service at four years in the ranks and two in the reserve. Substitution by exchange of numbers or by remplaçants, and exoneration by payment, were sanctioned—the price of the latter being fixed at .£60. In 1872 the draft of a new military law was laid before the Cortes, by which substitution and exoneration were abolished, and the annual contingent required to complete the army was to be taken by position (according to age) on the lists, instead of by ballot. The term of service was fixed at seven years,—three to be passed in the army, two in the first reserve, and two in the second reserve; the first reserve being liable to be called out at any time to complete the active army, but the second reserve only in case of war, and by a vote of the Cortes. The abdication of King Amadeus, however, prevented the carrying out of the contemplated reorganisation of the army.

The contrast between the conduct of the Spanish soldiers and of the Spanish people during the Peninsular war presents a curious problem. At the very time that the armies of Spain were dispersed on every occasion, often almost without firing a shot, the people were signalising themselves by the heroic defence of their towns, and by carrying on a desperate guerilla warfare that nothing could subdue. The Spaniard possesses many of the highest qualities of a soldier: he is hardy, temperate, individually brave, high-spirited, and independent; and though naturally indolent and idle, is easily roused, and capable of great heroism, as well as of sustained exertion. Yet this people, when brought together, form without exception the worst soldiers of Europe. They are impatient of discipline and restraint, and as easily discouraged as they are excited; and that mutual confidence in one another and in their leaders, which alone gives moral strength to a mass of men, is altogether wanting. How much of this may be due to the want of good leaders may be a question; but discipline must always be the basis of all military efficiency, and of discipline in the true sense of the word neither the soldiers nor the people of Spain have any idea.

Portuguese Army.

The~existing army dates from the Peninsular war, when a considerable force of Portuguese, at one time exceeding 60,000 men, was organised under Marshal Beresford. Trained and partly officered by English officers, it proved itself not unworthy of its allies, and bore its full share in the series of campaigns and battles by which the French were ultimately expelled from Spain. At the peace the army numbered about 50,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, formed on the English model, and all in the highest state of efficiency. This force was reduced in 1821, under the new constitutional government, to about one-half. By the present law of military organisation, passed in 1864, the strength of the army is fixed at 30,000 men on peace footing, and 68,000 on war footing. The number under arms, however, has never approached this; and in 1869 the actual strength and composition of the army was as follows :— [table]

The number of troops in the Portuguese colonies amounted to 8500 infantry and artillery, besides a reserve of 9500 men.

The army is raised partly by conscription and partly by voluntary enlistment, more than one-half being obtained by the latter method. Exemption may be purchased by the payment of a fixed sum, amounting to about £80. The time of service is eight years, of which five are spent in the regular army and three in the militia. The Portuguese have distinguished themselves rather by naval enterprise than as soldiers. Physically they are inferior to the Spaniards; but they are more amenable to discipline, and proved themselves far more valuable and trustworthy auxiliaries in the long Peninsular struggle.

Dutch Army.

The military power of the “United Provinces” datesits rise from the middle of the 15th century, when, after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating themselves from the yoke of Spain; and in the following century it received considerable development in consequence of the wars they had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay upwards of 100,000 men, exclusive of 30,000 in the service of the Dutch East India Company. At the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution the army had fallen to 36,000 men. In 1795 Holland was conquered by the French under Pichegru, and in the course of the changes which ensued the army was entirely reorganised, and under French direction bore its share in the great wars of the empire. In 1814 Holland was relieved of the yoke of France, and in the following year, her armies, under the gallant Prince of Orange, fought side by side with the British at Waterloo. At the peace of 1815 the Belgian provinces, subject before the war to Austria, were annexed to Holland, and the whole formed into a constitutional kingdom; but the union between the northern and southern provinces of the Netherlands was dissolved by the Belgian revolution of 1830, and in 1839 Belgium was finally acknowledged as an independent kingdom.

The military forces of the Netherlands consist of a home or regular army, a colonial army, and a militia. The regular army is in theory raised by conscription, five years being the term of service, but substitutes are allowed, and a great part of the force under arms are volunteers, the conscripts being drilled for ten months only, and then sent home on furlough, subject to six weeks’ annual training. The colonial army is raised entirely by voluntary enlistment. The infantry of the regular army consists of 8 regiments of the line, each of 4 active and 1 depot battalion, a regiment of guards, composed of 2 battalions of chasseurs and 2 of grenadiers, and a battalion of instruction. A battalion consists of 5 companies, of a peace strength of about 100 men, and a war strength of 200. The cavalry consists of 4 regiments of hussars, each regiment having 6 squadrons, viz., 4 field, 1 reserve, and 1 dépôt. The strength of a squadron in time of peace is about 100 men, in time of war about 200. The artillery consists of 5 regiments, viz., 1 field, 3 garrison, and 1 of horse artillery. The field artillery regiment has 14 active batteries of 6 guns each, and 1 depot company; the horse artillery has 4 active batteries and 1 depot; the garrison regiments have each 14 companies, of which 1 is for torpedoes and 1 instructional. The engineers consist of a scientific staff, and 1 battalion of sappers and miners. The war strength of the Dutch army in 1872 was as follows :— [table]

with 108 guns. The colonial army numbered about 28,000 men,—13,000 Europeans, and 15,000 natives.

The militia, or garde civique, is divided into two classes: the first, or active militia, numbering about 26,000; the second, or resting militia, about 61,000. The whole are organised in battalions according to locality. They are generally well clothed and armed, and of fair physique, but are very badly drilled. The men of the regular army are well drilled, and sturdy and robust, though rather small. They have had the advantage of the services of many Prussian officers as instructors, and a large camp of instruction is formed annually. The officers are mainly supplied from the military academy at Breda, and are of the upper classes; promotions from the ranks are very rare.

Belgian Army.

By a law passed in 1868 the strength of the Belgian army was fixed at 100,000 men on war footing, and 40,000 in time of peace. It is formed by conscription, to which every able-bodied male is liable on completing his 19th year. Substitution, however, is permitted, and substitutes or volunteers actually form a large part of the army. The annual contingent is 12,000 men. The period of service is eight years, of which two-thirds are passed on furlough; the actual time in the ranks has recently been increased from twenty-six to thirty months for the infantry; in the other services, it is three years. The infantry consists of 1 regiment of carabineers, 3 of chasseurs, 1 of grenadiers, and 14 of the line. Each regiment has 3 field and 1 reserve battalion of four companies each, the latter in cadre only in peace time. The cavalry consists of 4 regiments of chasseurs and 4 of lancers, each of four field and one depot squadron. The chasseurs form on mobilisation the divisional cavalry, the lancers the reserve cavalry. The artillery is formed in 4 regiments, and numbers 34 field and 6 reserve batteries of 6 guns each. The engineers are organised in 1 regiment of 3 battalions (four companies each), and 5 special companies, viz., two telegraph, one railway and. one pontoon, and one of artificers. On mobilisation the army forms two army corps, each of two infantry divisions and a reserve of cavalry and artillery, and numbering 26 battalions, 16 squadrons, and 96 guns.

Besides the standing army there is a civic militia {garde nationale), available for the defence of the country in time of war. This force, which numbers 125,000 men without, and 400,000 men with the reserve, is formed of all citizens between 21 and 40 able to bear arms, but is only organised in the large towns and fortresses. In time of peace it is under the Ministry of the Interior, but in time of war under the Ministry of War.

The organisation of the Belgian army was subjected to a practical test in 1870, when it was suddenly mobilised and placed in observation on the frontier. The results were not satisfactory. The actual numbers fell considerably short of the estimated ones, and of the men present a large number were quite unfit for service. The number of officers was altogether insufficient, and the army was in many respects incompletely equipped. A bill for the reorganisation of the army, based on compulsory personal service, was introduced in 1871, and adopted in principle by an overwhelming majority of the commission appointed to examine it. But public opinion pronounced so decidedly against the abolition of substitution that Government gave way, and the bill was withdrawn. Ultimately, General Thiebault accepted the Ministry of War, and introduced a modified measure, which yielded the disputed point of substitution, and contented itself with additional guarantees for the character and quality of the substitutes, and reform in various branches of army administration. In a rich and enterprising commercial country like Belgium personal service would naturally fall peculiarly heavily; but, further than that, a not inconsiderable portion of the inhabitants are opposed to the maintenance of any standing army. The Belgians are not a military nation; the martial spirit which once made them a match for the trained soldiers of the most powerful and warlike kingdom of Europe, seems to have given place to mercantile instincts and industrial pursuits. The troops that fought at Waterloo alongside the British did little to raise Belgium’s military reputation, some having deserted the battle-field in the midst of the conflict. The modem Belgian soldier is active, fairly intelligent, and a good marcher, but undersized, of inferior physique, and in most respects a bad copy of the French soldier.

Danish Army.

The Danish army, though small in numbers, has always been of excellent material, and the gallant stand made in 1864 against the overpowering forces of Austria and Prussia deservedly won the admiration of Europe. Since then she has reorganised her army on the principle of universal service; but has applied that principle in a manner peculiar to herself, and intermediate between the militia system of Switzerland and the three-years’ system of Germany. By the law of 1867 every Danish citizen is liable to serve in the army or navy. Those who have been brought up as sailors, and have served at least eighteen months as such, are inscribed on the reserve lists of the navy; the rest serve in the army. Service commences at 22, except in the case of volunteers, who are allowed to join at 18. The period of service is fixed at eight years in the army, and eight years in the reserve or “reinforcement” (for-staerkning). The actual service with the colours is very short, and is divided into two periods. The first or recruit’s course of instruction, which all must go through, lasts for six months in the infantry, five in the guard, field artillery, and engineers, and nine and a half in the cavalry. The second course lasts for nine months in the infantry, eleven in the cavalry, and one year in the artillery and engineers, and is confined to those who are considered insufficiently trained, to non-commissioned officers selected for promotion, and to a certain number, selected by lot, who are retained to complete the cadres and carry on garrison duties. In the infantry the bulk of the recruits are sent home after the first six months, about one-third to one-fourth remaining for the second term. On the other hand, the great majority of the cavalry, and almost the whole of the field artillery, are retained for the second period, and thus receive respectively twenty and seventeen^ months’ training. For every three months of service in excess of the six months’ course, one year is deducted from the period of service in the reserve. Those who were sent home after six months are called out again for a supplementary course of six weeks during their second year, which is passed at the camp of instruction at Hald, near Viborg, where from 8000 to 10,000 men are annually assembled for large manoeuvres.

The Danish army is organised territorially, the kingdom being divided into five brigade districts, each of which is again subdivided into two regimental districts. A brigade consists of two infantry regiments, each of two line and one reserve battalion, and a cavalry regiment. The infantry regiments draw their contingent of recruits from the corresponding regimental districts, the two line battalions taking it by turns annually to receive and train the whole of the recruits for the regiment. The cavalry are recruited from the brigade districts, and the guard, artillery, and engineers from the kingdom generally. After remaining for four years on the lists of the line regiments, the conscripts are transferred for the remaining four years to the reserve battalions, in which they have to perform one course of training, the reserve battalions being mobilised during four weeks annually for the purpose. The Danish army thus consists of 1 regiment of infantry of the guard and 10 of the line, each of three battalions—two active and one reserve; 5 regiments of cavalry, each of three active and two reserve squadrons; 1 regiment of field artillery of twelve batteries, and 1 regiment of garrison artillery of two battalions; 1 regiment of engineers, of six active and three reserve companies, and 2 companies of military train. The total strength of the army, exclusive of reserves, is about 38,000 men; the number serving with the colours varies according to the time of year.

The Danish soldiers are, generally speaking, a fine body of men, of considerable physical power, and inured to hardship and rough living. They combine a good deal of northern stubbornness with the romance and martial feeling of the old Scandinavian. Nursed in old traditions and chivalrous legends, the quiet, hard-working Danish peasant has within him a vein of poetry and a sympathy for heroic deeds strongly contrasting with his outward demeanour. He still retains much of the character of the feudal ages —instinctive respect and attachment to his leaders, and implicit confidence in them; and in the army this feeling has been strengthened by the local character which the regiments have always had, officers and soldiers serving together for generations. The officers are all drawn from the upper class, and are as a rule highly-educated gentlemen; they are trained from an early age at the Academy at Copenhagen, where the languages and literature of all countries are taught, as well as purely scientific subjects, and undergo strict examinations before they pass as cadets.

Swedish and Norwegian Army.

Although the crowns of Sweden and Norway are now permanently united, each country retains its own government, constitution, and laws; and the military forces of the two countries are separate and differently organised. The Swedish army is composed of three distinct classes,— the “värfrade,” or enlisted troops, to which belong the royal guards, one regiment of hussars, the artillery, and the engineers; the “indelta,” or national army, paid and kept by the landowners, each of whom furnishes a certain number of men, to whom, besides a small annual pay, a cottage and a piece of land are allotted during the period of service; and thirdly, the “beräring,” or conscription troops, drawn by annual levy from the male population between the ages of 20 and 25 years. The “indelta” are called out for a month’s training annually in time of peace. Besides the above, there is a Gothland militia force of 30 companies of infantry and 3 batteries of artillery, numbering about 8000 men; these, however, are not compelled to serve beyond the confines of the isle of Gothland, and have a separate command. The royal guards number 2240, the line (under which is included the “indelta”) about 25,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, 5000 artillery with 234 guns, and 1000 engineers. The “beräring” amount to about 95,000 of all arms. The Swedish troops are physically the finest in Europe,—powerful, hardy, and brave, and retaining much of the old Scandinavian heroic spirit; and, though strictly a militia only, their peculiar aptitude for all warlike exercises would make them formidable antagonists, even to the best trained armies. Few nations have so brilliant a military history. Under Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years’ War, and later under the heroic but insatiate Charles XII., they achieved a reputation almost unrivalled in Europe; and their armies and tactics served for many years as models to the great military powers.

The military forces of Norway are differently organised, and though divided into line and militia, are in fact purely a militia force. By the law of 18G7 all young men past the age of 21 are liable to the conscription, with exception of the inhabitants of the three northern provinces, who are free from all military service. Actually the troops are raised partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by. conscription. The term of service is for ten years, divided into three in the line, four in the reserve, and three in the militia or “landvaern.” The cadres of the army are formed entirely of volunteers. The young men raised by conscription are required to go through a recruit’s course of forty-two days, and subsequently an annual training of twenty-four days. On the 1st January 1872 the troops of the line numbered 13,000 men, the reserves 19,000, and the landvaern 11,000. The landvaern are only liable to service within the frontiers of the kingdom.

Swiss Army.

The inhabitants of Switzerland were always a hardy and independent race, but their high military reputation dates from the middle of the 15th century, when the comparatively ill-armed and untrained mountaineers signally defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy and the flower of the chivalry of Europe in the battles of Granson, Morat, and Nancy. The Suabian war, towards the end of that century, and the Milanese war, at the beginning of the following one, added to the fame of the Swiss infantry, and made it the model on which that arm was formed all over Europe. The wealthier countries vied with each other in hiring them as mercenaries, and the poor but warlike Swiss found the profession of arms a lucrative one. Whatever discredit may attach to the soldier who sells his services to any country or cause, and fights for money alone, the Swiss at least have done much to redeem the position by their unswerving loyalty to their employers. The devoted faithfulness of Louis XVI.’s Swiss guard is proverbial, and has been commemorated with just pride by their countrymen. The French Revolutionary armies overran Switzerland, as they did all the small neighbouring states, and during Napoleon’s career she had to submit to his rule, and furnish her contingent to his armies. On the fall of Napoleon she regained her independence, and returned to her old trade of furnishing soldiers to the sovereigns and powers of Europe. Charles X. of France had at one time as many as 17,000 Swiss in his pay; Naples and Rome had each four regiments. The recruiting for these foreign services was openly acknowledged and encouraged by the Government. The young Swiss engaged usually for a period of four or six years; they were formed in separate regiments, officered by countrymen of their own, and received a higher rate of pay than the national regiments; and at the close of their engagement returned with their earnings to settle down on their paternal holdings. A series of revolutions, however, expelled them from France and Italy, and recently the advance of liberal ideas, and the creation of great national armies based on the principle of personal service, has destroyed their occupation. Switzerland is now remarkable in a military sense as being the only country that maintains no standing army; and the fact that, with an annual expenditure of only £200,000, she shows a force of 200,000 men, has made her military institutions the study of economists and the model for many would-be military reformers.

The 13th article of the constitution of 1848 forbids the maintenance of a standing army within the limits of the confederation; but every citizen is required to bear arms for the defence of the country, and for this purpose a certain military training is given at all schools. The actual forces of the republic consist of a militia divided into three classes,—the “auszug” or élite, the reserve, and the landwehr. The strength of the elite is fixed at 3 per cent, of the population, and that of the reserve at 1J per cent.; the landwehr includes all who have passed the élite and reserve up to the age of 44. The total service is limited to twenty-five years. Within these conditions the cantons are allowed to raise their contingents and distribute the service as they please; and it thus happens that service in the élite lasts for five years in some cantons, and for fourteen years in others. Exemption from service is granted to certain Government and public officials, to the clergy, surgeons, <fcc.; all other citizens become liable on attaining the age of 20. No substitutes are allowed, and any one rejected for bodily infirmity, or exempted from any cause, is required to pay a small tax.

The strength of the armed forces of Switzerland was given as follows in 1872 :— [table]

Of these, however, the landwehr exist on paper only, and may be left out of consideration; and the available force is estimated at about 105,000, of whom 70,000 belong to the “auszug,” and 35,000 to the reserve.

The infantry are armed and equipped by their cantons, the recruit himself having to bear a portion of the expense. Before being placed on the rolls of the “auszug” he has to undergo a training of four weeks for the line, or five weeks for the rifles; and subsequently an annual training of eight days while in the élite, and six days in the reserve. Practically, however, the élite are commonly called out every second year only, and the training of the reserve is often omitted altogether The cavalry, artillery, and engineers have a recruit’s course of six weeks, and an annual training of (nominally) a. fortnight; but in practice the latter has been reduced to eight days every second year. The cavalry resemble our yeomanry, consisting of a wealthier class of men, who find their own horses; the engineers are selected from men following suitable trades. The whole army is formed in six divisions, and annually one or two of these are assembled for divisional manoeuvres. A handsome federal barrack for infantry and cavalry and a permanent instructional establishment exist at Thun. Officers are required to go through a six weeks’ course at this federal school, and to attend one course of recruit training on appointment. The nomination of officers, and promotions up to the rank of captain, are made by the cantonal governments; promotion to the higher grades and appointments to the staff by the federal authorities, though usually on the recommendation of the cantons. Candidates for the staff are required to go through a two months’ course at a staff school which is annually opened for the purpose.

A study of the military system of Switzerland will at once explain its apparent cheapness. The expenditure shown in the federal budget is only a portion of the real cost of the army; to it must be added the expenses borne by the cantons and by the men themselves. The actual cost is estimated by the best authorities at £533,000 per annum, or about £5 per head for an effective strength of 105,000 men. In England the annual cost of the militia is about £8 per head, of the volunteers £3. The Swiss so-called army may take its place between our militia and volunteers. The men are less trained than our militiamen, but are generally better educated and of a more intelligent class. They show at least as much independence as our volunteers, and many things of acknowledged necessity are left undone, simply because the men will not do them. The officers are in all respects inferior, and that class who have previously seen service in the army is wanting. In equipment the army is far behind our auxiliary forces, and an attempt made in 1872 to improve its organisation generally, and give the federal authorities more power, was successfully resisted by the cantons. During the war of 1870-71 five divisions of the Swiss army, amounting in a 1 l to about 37,000 men, were mobilised and assembled on tho frontier; and superficial observers were enthusiastic in their praises of the organisation and efficiency of this citizen army. But their own commander reported that there was “incredible friction in the mechanism of the whole force; ’’ that many of the battalions were in the lowest condition of discipline and efficiency; and that “to march against an enemy with such troops as these would indeed be a bold enterprise;” and urged that “it would be far preferable to have an army weaker in point of numbers, but of better quality.” What becomes of such forces when opposed to a real army has been abundantly illustrated by the history of the French gardes mobiles in the war of 1870. Switzerland exists by the sufferance of her powerful neighbours, and her military institutions are suited to such conditions, but not to a power that relies on itself for its independence.

Turkish Army.

The Ottoman empire, whose power at one time seemed to threaten the very existence of the Christian states, has long lost her terrors, and her military institutions are now studied rather to see what elements of resistance to foreign aggression she still possesses, than for the part she may play in European politics. Her armies have lost their peculiar character and constitution, and with it much of the spirit which once made them formidable. In the early days of her rising power every 0smanli was a soldier; and the whole nation was animated with that martial fanaticism that was the secret of her strength. As her conquests extended, her warriors were rewarded with grants of land, and a system of military tenure arose resembling the feudal system of Western Europe. And though the 0smanli retained his simple habits and warlike spirit, the unfitness of such a militia for prolonged operations soon led, as in the Christian states, to the establishment of a more permanent force. Sultan Amurath I. in 1360 first formed a bodyguard of Christian captives; and this force, highly privileged and rewarded, soon swelled to large dimensions. Such was the origin of the janissaries, the earliest standing army in Europe, and for long the scourge and terror of the neighbouring Christian states. Like most proselytes, they were more fanatical even than the genuine Osmanli; and this, added to a permanent organisation, made them for a time almost invincible. But success and indulgence produced their usual results; they became overbearing, corrupt, and formidable only to their own country. From being the sultan’s slaves they became his masters, and the history of Turkey shows a long list of rulers appointed, deposed, or murdered by the janissaries. Two attempts to break their power failed disastrously. But Sultan Mahmoud II. was not daunted by a first failure, and when in 1826 he commenced his reorganisation of the army, and the janissaries again rose against him, they found him prepared. The new troops remained faithful, and in a terrible three days’ struggle, in which 20,000 of their number were killed, the janissaries as a body were annihilated. Mahmoud now hastened to reconstitute his army on European models; but while his measures were still in embryo he found himself involved in a war with Russia, and though the newly-raised troops behaved with gallantry, the war soon took an unfavourable turn, and ended disastrously for Turkey with the humiliating peace of Adrianople. The reforms instituted by Mahmoud were, however, carried on vigorously by his successor, Abdul Medjid, and form the basis of the present military institutions of Turkey.

As now constituted, the Turkish forces consist of the “nizam,” or standing army; “ichtjat,” or first reserve; “redif,” or second reserve; “hijade,” or landsturm; and a certain number of irregular levies.

Although in principle every one is liable to service, the army is recruited entirely from the Mussulman population, Christians and others being exempted on payment of a tax called the “bédel.” The capital, the island of Crete, and certain frontier districts, are by ancient privilege exempt both from service and from the tax. The burden of the conscription therefore falls on a comparatively small proportion, considerably less than one-half of the population. The actual conscripts, however, are not numerous. A considerable proportion of the army is raised by voluntary enlistment, the pay being sufficiently high to attract poor Mussulmans; and as personal substitutes, or exemption on payment of a fixed sum (in which case Government finds the substitute), are both allowed, all possessed of any means can and usually do escape service. The period of service is fixed at twenty years,—four in the ranks, two in the “ichtjat,” six in the “redif,” and eight in the “hijade.” The strength of the standing army remaining at 150,000 men, the annual levy is fixed at one quarter of this, or 37,500; and it is estimated that this will give 70,000 (two years’ contingents, deducting casualties) in the “ichtjat,” about 200,000 in the “redif,” and 250,000 in the “hijade,” or a total of 670,000 men. Practically, however, these numbers would never be attained, and a great part of the necessary organisation exists only on paper.

The standing army is divided into six army corps, corresponding to the six military districts or “ordus” into which the empire is divided; each army corps consists of 6 to 7 infantry regiments, 6 or 7 rifle battalions, 2 to 7 cavalry regiments, and 1 artillery regiment. There is no divisional or brigade organisation in peace time, the regimental commanders communicating direct with the corps commanders; but in war time brigades of two regiments and divisions of two brigades are formed. The infantry of the standing army consists of 41 line regiments of 3 battalions each, and 38 rifle battalions, or a total of 161 battalions. A line or rifle battalion has 8 companies, and a normal or war strength of 33 officers and 800 men; the peace strength is variable, being reduced by furloughs granted at the discretion of the corps or regimental commander, and seldom exceeds 400. Their regimental organisation, parade formations, and drill, are copied from the French. The infantry uniform, which until recently was also on the European pattern, is now more national, and consists of an open blue jacket, an ornamental waistcoat, leather sash, wide Turkish trousers, yellow lace boots, and fez cap. The cavalry numbers 25 regiments, all light cavalry, each of 6 squadrons, and numbering on war establishment 42 officers, 914 men, and 856 horses. The four centre squadrons are armed with lances, the two flank ones with breech-loading carbines; all carry sword and revolver besides. The uniform is an open jacket and waistcoat like that of the infantry, but differently laced; the saddle is that known in Austria as the “Hungarian” saddle.

The artillery consists of 6 regiments of field artillery, attached to the several army corps, a reserve artillery regiment, and 7 regiments of garrison artillery. A field artillery regiment consists of 15 batteries of 6 guns each; the reserve artillery regiment is similarly organised, and acts as a depot to the others. The garrison regiments are distributed to the different fortresses; they are formed of 4 battalions of 3 companies, and have a war strength of 2040 men, but in peace scarcely number a third of that. The fortification corps, or corps of engineers, belongs to the artillery, and consists of 2 battalions of 4 companies each. The artillery has always been the best organised and most highly trained branch of the Ottoman army. Mahmoud paid special attention to it, and it was the fidelity of that branch that gave him the victory in the struggle with the janissaries. Foreign officers, Germans especially, have always been largely employed in it, and by their exertions have brought it to a state of efficiency contrasting most favourably with the rest of the army.

The following gives the actual strength of the “nizam” or standing army in 1870, and its estimated strength on war establishment (combatants only) :— [table]

After completing four years service m the ranks, the Turkish soldier is passed into the “ichtjat,” or first reserve, for two years, during which he is liable at any time to be recalled, and cannot leave his district without permission. The men of this first reserve, estimated at 70,000, are intended to form separate battalions, but are in all respects available for service like the standing army. Actually a large number would be required to complete the “nizam,” and the cadres and officers for these reserve battalions only partially exist. A few such battalions were, however, formed at the time of the Yemen expedition in 1870. After two years in this first reserve, the soldier is passed on to the “redif,” or second reserve. The “redif” can only be called out in war time, and is not liable for service except within the country. It is divided into two levies, each of three years’ contingents, and forms separate regiments and batteries; and it is proposed to form these into army corps corresponding to the existing corps of the standing army, and consisting each of 6 infantry regiments, 6 rifle battalions, 3 cavalry regiments, and 1 artillery regiment of 6 batteries. But this organisation exists on paper only, and it is very doubtful if the necessary cadres and officers would be forthcoming. Lastly, after six years in the “redif,” the man is passed on to the “hijade,” or landsturm, for eight years; but this force, though liable to be called out in war, is not organised even on paper.

The irregular troops, winch are raised in war, and at one time formed a principal element of strength, are of two kinds,—paid troops (Bashi-Bazouks) and volunteers (Spahis, Bedouins, &c.) The former are usually raised by contract, the governor of a province receiving orders to raise a certain number, and being supplied with the necessary funds, and thereupon contracting with such chiefs or adventurers as undertake to furnish the men at the lowest cost. Most of the money finds its way into the pockets of the governor or contractor, and but little goes to the Bashi-Bazouks. In the last war between Russia and Turkey (1853-55) 20,000 to 30,000 of these were raised, for the most part ill-armed and worse disciplined infantry; but most of them were disbanded before the close of the war. The volunteers, on the other hand, though deficient in organisation, are zealous Mussulmans and brave soldiers. They come mostly from the wild border tribes, in small bodies, under their own chiefs and beys, and furnish a very valuable irregular cavalry.

The Turkish soldier of the present day is generally docile, faithful, temperate, and capable of undergoing great hardships or fatigue. The familiar terms on which the subordinate officers mix with the men would be considered subversive of discipline in any other army, but do not appear to be so in the Ottoman army, and serious military offences are rare. "When well commanded, he has shown himself capable of great personal devotion and even heroism, but of a passive rather than an active character. Naturally calm and rather apathetic, he seems to have retained that fatalism which is a special characteristic of his religion, but to have lost the fiery zeal that distinguished his ancestors, and made them, whether individually or as a nation, such formidable assailants. It may be questioned whether, in a purely military aspect, Mahmoud did not lose more than he gained by the destruction of the janissaries and reorganisation of his army on modem models, and whether any amount of drill and science will compensate for the old fanatical spirit. But some such reforms were necessary; Turkey could not continue to hold a place in Europe, yet live the life of an Eastern nation and of an age long past. Her new armies have showed themselves formidable on many occasions; her artillery promises to rival that of most Western nations; and if the Osmanli character is in some respects ill-suited to the scientific and far-seeing character of modern warfare, it still retains enough of its old religious fanaticism to make her more than ordinarily dangerous in a defensive and, as it would seem to her, a holy war.

In a notice of the military forces of Turkey mention must be made of her vassal states, Egypt and Tunis, each of which is bound to furnish an auxiliary contingent in war. The military forces of Tunis and Tripoli are too insignificant to require special notice: her contingent is from 2000 to 4000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 8 guns, and during the Crimean war she did actually send about 4000 men to the seat of war in Asia Minor. Egypt is now pledged to furnish an army corps of 30,000 men complete with cavalry and guns. In the Crimean war she furnished first one and afterwards two divisions, amounting to about 21,000 men; and during the insurrection in Crete she furnished a contingent of 10,000 men. The Egyptian army is almost the creation of its present ruler, Ismail Pacha, who on his accession found only two infantry regiments and a few detachments of irregulars. It now consists of 15 infantry regiments of 3 battalions each, 3 rifle battalions, 4 cavalry regiments, 2 regiments of field artillery, and 3 of garrison artillery, and 1 battalion of sappers; and numbers on war strength about 52,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 144 guns. The peace strength is little more than half this. These troops are all organised and drilled on European principles, mainly after French models. Many of the highest officials are actually old French officers. In addition to these, Egypt maintains a force of about 8000 sandschaks or irregular troops, who receive a higher rate of pay, but are required to arm, clothe, and feed themselves, and are permanently stationed on her frontière. In case of war Egypt can raise about 10,000 irregular cavalry among the tribes that are subject to her.

American Army.

The army of the United States of America is the last that calls for notice. Threatened by no powerful or warlike neighbours, the United States are saved from that ruinous competition in armaments which presses on the industry of European countries. The American army is little more than a police force, of which a few regiments serve as a reserve to the civil power in the great towns, while the rest are dispersed in small posts along the frontiers or among the Indian districts. By an Act of 1870 its strength was limited to 30,000 men. It consists of 10 regiments of cavalry, each of 12 companies or troops; 25 regiments of infantry, of 10 companies each; 5 regiments of artillery, and one engineer battalion. The cavalry, broken up in small detachments, partake more of the character of mounted police than of that of European cavalry. They are armed with swords and breech-loading or repeating rifles, and trained to act on foot as well as on horseback; and the whole cavalry drill is assimilated as closely as possible to that of the infantry. The infantry are organised after the old English fashion in single battalion regiments of 10 companies. The army is raised entirely by voluntary enlistment; the term of service is three years, but it is now proposed to extend it to five, and re-engagements are encouraged. Two regiments of cavalry and three of infantry are composed of negro soldiers, but commanded by white officers. The officers of the army are furnished by West Point Academy, a military school equal to any in Europe. The course of instruction lasts four years, and includes all subjects of general education besides purely professional ones. West Point is sought by young men of the best families in America, and the number educated there considerably exceeds the requirements of the army. It is thus the means of spreading a certain military education throughout the country, and it was to this West Point training that the Southerners owed the large number of excellent officers that were found in their ranks in the war.

For military purposes the territory of the United States is divided into ten departments, and those grouped into four military divisions: the South, comprising the departments of the South and of Texas; the division of the Missouri, comprising the departments of Dakota, the Platte, and Missouri; the division of the Pacific, comprising the departments of Columbia, California, and Arizona; and the division of the East, comprising the departments of the East and the Lakes.

By the constitution of September 1787 the President is Commander-in-Chief of the army and militia of the Union, and Congress has power to raise and support armies, to make rules for their government and regulation, and to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. The Articles of War, by which all troops when mustered into service are governed, were enacted in 1806, and are a close but somewhat improved copy of those in force in the English army, and much of their army regulations is identical with the old general regulations and orders of the royal army.

The military history of the United States is as strange as the rise and rapid growth of the nation. In 1790 the rank and file of the army, as fixed by Act of Congress, amounted to 1216 men; and in 1814 an English expedition of only 3500 men was able to seize and burn Washington, the capital of a country which even then numbered eight millions of inhabitants. In 1861, at the commencement of the war of the secession, the whole regular force amounted to only 14,000 men. In April of that year the President called out 75,000 volunteers for three months to defend the capital, which was threatened; and in May a further call for 42,000 was made. In July two calls for 500,000 each were authorised by Congress, and as even this vast force proved insufficient for the gigantic struggle which America had now embarked in, it was found necessary to introduce the conscription. In October 1863 a levy of 300,000 men was ordered, and in February 1864 a further call of 500,000 was made. Finally, in the beginning of 1865 two further levies, amounting in all to 500,000 men, were ordered, but were only partially carried out in consequence of the cessation of hostilities. The total number of men called under arms by the Government of the United States, between April 1861 and April 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied by the Southern States during the same time, the total armed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly four millions, drawn from a population of only 32 millions,—figures before which the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or the recent efforts of France and Germany in the war of 1870-71, sink into insignificance. And within three years the whole of those vast forces were peaceably disbanded, and the army had shrunk to a normal strength of only 30,000 men. (g. p. c.)