NAVY
THE beginnings of the British navy may be traced back to the long-continued struggle of Alfred and his successors with Danish invaders and pirates. Alfred has been called the first English admiral, as he was, it is supposed, the first English sovereign who commanded his own fleet in battle; and it was still to check these marauders, and protect the coasts of the kingdom, that William I., in 1066, established the Cinque Ports, and gave them certain privileges, on condition of their furnishing 52 ships, with 24 men in each, for fifteen days, in cases of emergency. We should not, perhaps, be far amiss in dating the period of English naval architecture from the Conquest; but there is little to record of the navy till the period of the French wars. In these very numerous fleets were sometimes engaged. King John is said to have fitted out 500 ships in 1213 against Philip of France; and in 1293, in the reign of Edward I., a battle took place in mid Channel where both the French and English fleets met in force, and about 240 ships of the former were captured. In the reign of John a close approach was made to a regular naval establishment, and encouragement given to foreign commerce by a declaration of safe-conduct to all foreign merchants to pass to or repass from England.
There cannot be any doubt that the earlier fleets comprised many private ships pressed into the king’s service. A fleet of Edward the Confessor in 1049 consisted partly of “king’s ships,” partly of “people’s ships.” In the Black Book of the Admiralty (which is a collection of sea-laws and customs drawn up for the use of the judge of the Court of Admiralty) it is provided that “in case a man be indicted that he hath broken the arrest of his ship, arrested for the king’s service, and be thereof convicted by twelve men, he shall lose his ship unless he obtaineth pardon of the king or the high admiral.” Richard I. at Grimsby expressly combated by an ordinance the notion that ships were not liable to be pressed; and in a mandate of Sir Thomas Beaufort, admiral of England, Ireland, and Aquitania, temp. Hen. IV., are to be found instructions to his lieutenant of the North to arrest twenty-four vessels for service abroad, “upon certain weighty matters.” Orders were sent at the same time to press mariners for one of the king’s barges.
In an action with the French fleet off the harbour of Sluys (1340), Edward III. is said to have slain 30,000 of the enemy, and to have taken 200 great ships, “in one of which only there were 400 dead bodies.” All writers agree in describing the battle as one of the most sanguinary and desperate sea-fights ever known. The same monarch, at the siege of Calais, is stated to have blockaded that port with 730 sail, having on board 14,956 mariners, 25 only of w hich were of the royal navy, bearing 419 mariners, or about 17 men each.
The earlier and middle parts of the reign of Edward III. were particularly famous for the power of the English fleet, and for the dread which it inspired. After a splendid victory over the Spanish fleet in 1350, the title of “king of the sea” was bestowed on the sovereign. Towards the end of that reign, however, naval as well as other affairs were neglected, the seas were left unguarded, the coasts were insulted, and acts of piracy were committed in English waters which a few years before had been impossible. Complaints were loud and frequent. The duke of Lancaster, Edward’s brother, was charged with having misspent a sum of money granted to him for the guardianship of the seas, and the anger of the Commons, unable to vent itself upon him, expended itself in a successful impeachment of some of the king’s ministers. In the next reign attempts were made to improve matters; but, notwithstanding the levies from the Cinque Ports and other towns, the naval force in 1378 was insufficient to keep even English waters free from pirates, and it was due to the private exertions of John Philpot, a London merchant, who fitted out a squadron at his own expense, that John Mercer, a celebrated Scottish pirate, was captured and his career ended. Plymouth and Hastings were burned, Winchelsea was attacked, and two descents were made, with much damage, upon the Isle of Wight. In one of these descents the French possessed themselves of most of the island, but were finally driven to their ships by Sir Hugh Tyrrel, governor of Carisbrooke, and “a spur of incredible sharpness.” Return expeditions were made to French and Spanish towns by the English, who, however, acted rather in the privateer capacity of men who had to take the law into their own hands than as authorized warriors of the English king.
Naval affairs improved under Henry IV., and the reign of Henry V. was most glorious in maintaining the naval superiority over the fleets of France. From a letter of this sovereign to his lord chancellor, dated 12 th August 1417, discovered by Samuel Lysons among the records in the Tower, and of which the following is a copy, it would appear that there was something like an established royal navy in his reign, independently of the shipping furnished by the Cinque Ports and the merchants, for the king’s own use, on occasion of any particular expedition. The letter appears to have been written nine days after the surrender of the castle of Touque, near Honfleur, in Normandy, whence it is dated.
“ Au révérend pere en Dieu Γ Evesquc de Duresme nre Chancelier d'Angleterre.
“By the Kyng—
“Worshipful fader yn God We sende you closed within this letter a cedule conteyning the names of certein Maistres for owr owne grete Shippes Carrakes Barges and Balyngers to the whiche Maistres We have granted annuitees such as is appointed upon eche of hem in the same Cedule to take yerely of owre grante while that us lust at owr Exchequer of Westm r . at the termes of Michelmasse and Ester by even porcions. Wherefore We wol and charge yow that unto eche of the said Maistres ye do make under owr grete seel beyng in yowre warde owr letters patentes severales in forme after th’ effect and pourport of owr said grante. Yeven under owr signet atte owr Castle of Touque the xij. day of August.” [table]
The remainder, to the masters of which pensions were thus granted, consist of 17 “niefs, barges, and bally tigers,” some with three, and others two mariners only. But history informs us that about this time Henry embarked an army of 25,000 men at Dover on board of 1500 sail of ships, two of which carried purple sails, embroidered with the arms of England and France,—one styled the “King’s Chamber,” the other his “Saloon,” as typical of his keeping his court at sea, which he considered as a part of his dominions.
The general orders for the admit ιl of a fleet, contained in the Black Book of the Admiralty, lay it down that “the admirall ought by his office to elect and order for the king’s person, if he be present, otherwise for his lieutenant, the best and most able shipp of the kingdome, which shall be called the chamber of the king or of his lieutenant; and if the king be present then the Comptroller of his household is to make choice of some of the best shipps of the whole ffleete (that is to say) one shipp for the Hall, another for the Wardrobe, the third for the Larder, and the fourth for the Kitchen.” Froissart, writing of the battle of L’Espagnols sur Mer, in 1350, speaks of a ship called “la Salle du Roi, où tous ses hotels étoient.” It would appear from a very curious poem, written in the early part of the reign of Henry VI. (between 1426 and 1438), that the navy of his predecessor was considerable, but that, by neglect, it was then reduced to the same state in which it had been during the preceding reigns.
Shortly after the time when this poem must have been written, it appears from the parliament roll (20th Henry VI., 1442) that an armed naval force, consisting only of eight large ships, with smaller vessels to attend them, was to be collected from the ports of London, Bristol, Dartmouth, Hull, Newcastle, Winchelsea, Plymouth, Falmouth, Ac.; and, of course, the royal ships of 1417, the names of which are. contained in the foregoing schedule, were then either gone to decay or dispersed. We are not to judge of the size of the ships from the few mariners appointed to each. These were merely the ship-keepers, or harbourduty men, placed on permanent pay, to keep the ships in a condition fit for sea when wanted.
The classes of ships and vessels mentioned in the records of what may be called the first period of the British navy are very numerous, varying with the use for which they were designed. Thus there were “cogs,” or large, swift vessels, sometimes of 250 tons, carrying 130 seamen besides archers and soldiers; “barges,” or small cogs, which carried 60 to 80 men; “balingers,” or boats resembling modern barges; “caraks,” large vessels, chiefly used in Continental navies; “crayers,” transport vessels, seldom over 60 tons; “doggers and lodeships,” fishing and pilot boats, with 30 men, which were occasionally impressed into the king’s service; “fluves,” two-masted vessels, used for conveyance of troops (Edward III. commanded the burgesses of Kingston-upon-Hull to build him a “fluve”); “galleys” and “galiots”; “hoc-boats,” cargo or store ships. There were also “lynes,” “persouers,” and “pikards,” or large boats. “Pinnaces,” with 35 men, figured at Sluys, and at the battle of L’Espagnols sur Mer in 1350; and in 1339 two “espinaces” were given to Sir Richard Talbot for the defence of Southampton.
It is very probable that, until English merchants engaged in the Mediterranean trade, and the attention of the Government was turned, in the reign of Henry VII. (about 1496), to imitate Portugal in making foreign discovery, under the skilful seaman Sebastian Cabot, very little was added to the capacity or the power of British ships of war. In his reign was built a ship called the “Great Harry,” the first on record that deserved the name of a ship of war, if it was not the first exclusively appropriated to the service of the state. This is the ship which Camden called the “Henry Grace de Dieu,” but erroneously,—the vessel so named not having been built till the reign of Henry VIII. The “Great Harry” is stated to have cost £14,000; there is reason to suppose that she was renamed the “Regent” on the accession of Henry VIII.
We now come to that period in which England might be truly said to possess a military marine. Some curious details have been preserved in the Pepysian collection at Magdalene College, Cambridge, from which papers it appears that in the thirteenth year of Henry VIII. the following constituted the royal navy :— [table]
There were besides two row-barges of 60 tons each, making in all 16 ships and vessels, measuring 7260 tons.
The “Henry Grace de Dieu” is stated in all other accounts, and with more probability, to have been only 1000 tons. This ship, the better-known “Great Harry,” appears to have been begun at Erith, in August or September 1512, to replace the “Regent,” which was burned in the former month in action with the French fleet, when carrying the flag of the lord high admiral. There is a drawing of the ship in the Pepysian papers. From these papers it appears that she carried fourteen guns on the lower deck, twelve on the main deck, eighteen on the quarter-deck and poop, eighteen on the lofty forecastle, and ten in her stern-ports, making altogether seventy-two guns. Her regular establishment of men is said to have consisted of 349 soldiers, 301 mariners, and 50 gunners, making altogether 700 men. The war ships of this period were awkward to manoeuvre: on the appearance of the French fleet at St Helens, the ti Great Harry,” the first ship built with two decks, had nearly been sunk; and the “Mary Rose,” of 600 tons, with 500 or 600 men on board, was actually sunk at Spithead, as Raleigh informs us, in consequence of “a little sway in casting the ship about, her ports being within 16 inches of the water.” On this occasion the fleets cannonaded each other for two hours; and it is remarked as something extraordinary that not less than three hundred cannon-shot were fired on both sides in the course of this action. From the drawings still extant it is quite surprising how the vessels could be trusted on the sea at all, their enormous poops and forecastles making them appear loftier and more awkward than the large Chinese junks, to which, indeed, they bear a strong resemblance.
Henry VIII. may justly be said to have laid the foundation of the British navy as a permanent or standing force, He established the dockyards at Deptford, Woolwich, and Portsmouth; he appointed certain commissioners to superintend the civil affairs of the navy, and settled the rank and pay of admirals, vice-admirals, and inferior officers, thus creating a national navy, and raising the officers to a separate and distinct profession. The principal officers of the navy then were—the vice-admiral of England, master of the ordnance, surveyor of the marine causes, treasurer, comptroller, general surveyor of the victualling, clerk of the ships, and clerk of the stores. Each of these officers had his particular duties, but they met at their office on Tower Hill once a week, to consult, and make their reports to the lord high admiral. Henry also established the fraternities or guilds of the Trinity House at Deptford, Hull, and Newcastle for the improvement of navigation and the encouragement of commerce, and built thé castles of Deal, Walmer, Sandgate, Hurst Castle, <fcc., for the protection of his fleet and of the coast.
At the death of Henry VIII. in 1547, the royal navy consisted of about 50 ships and vessels of different sizes, the former from 1000 to 150 tons, and the latter down to 20 tons, making in the whole about 12,000 tons, and manned by about 8000 mariners, soldiers, gunners, &c. Thus, as has been well said, “everything was leading up to a time when the perils of the seas should claim all that was most heroic in England’s most heroic age.” In the short reign of his son Edward little alteration seems to have taken place in the state and condition of the royal navy. But the regulations which had been made in the reign of his father for the civil government of naval affairs were revised, arranged, and turned into ordinances, which form the basis of all the subsequent instructions given to the commissioners for the management of the civil affairs of the navy. In the reign of Mary the tonnage of the navy was reduced to about 7000 tons; but her lord high admiral nobly maintained the title assumed by England of Sovereign of the Seas, by compelling Philip of Spain to strike his flag that was flying at the main-top-mast head, though on his way to England to marry Queen Mary, by firing a shot at the Spanish admiral. He also demanded that the whole fleet, consisting of 160 sail, should strike their colours and lower their top-sails, as a homage to the English flag, before he would permit his own squadron to salute the Spanish monarch.
Elizabeth not only increased the numerical force of the regular navy, but established many wise regulations for its preservation, and for securing adequate supplies of timber and other naval stores. She placed her naval officers on a more respectable footing, and encouraged foreign trade and geographical discovery, so that she acquired justly the title of the Restorer of Naval Power, and Sovereign of the Northern Seas. The greatest naval force that had till then been called together was that which was assembled to oppose the Invincible Armada, and which, according to the notes of Pepys, consisted of 176 ships, with 14,992 men; but these were not all “Shippes Royall,” but consisted largely of the contributions of the Cinque Ports and private persons. The number actually belonging to the navy is stated by the commissioners of 1618 in their report (several manuscript copies of which exist) to have been 34 ships of 12,190 tons, carrying 6225 men. Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst. 50) “thinks it matter of boast that the royal navy of England then consisted of 33 ships” (Blackstone). At the end of Elizabeth’s reign, however, the navy had greatly increased, the list in 1603 consisting of 42 ships of various descriptions, amounting to 17,000 tons, and manned with 8346 men. Of these, two were of the burden of 1000 tons each, three of 900 tons, and ten of from 600 to 800 tons.
James I. was not inattentive to his navy. He warmly patronized Phineas Pett, to whom we undoubtedly owe the first essential improvements in the form and construction of ships. The cumbrous top-works were first got rid of under his superintendence. “In my owne time,” says Raleigh, “the shape of our English ships hath been greatly bettered; in extremity we carry our ordnance better than we were wont; we have added crosse pillars in our royal! shippes, to strengthen them; we have given longer floors to our shippes than in older times,” &c. In 1610 Pett laid down a ship named the “Prince Royal”; her burden was 1400 tons, her keel 114 feet, and she was armed with sixty-four pieces of great ordnance, “beingin all respects,” says Stowe, “the greatest and goodliest ship that was ever built in England.”
The state of the navy at the king’s death is variously given by different writers; but on this subject the memoranda left by Pepys are most likely to be correct. From them we learn that in 1618 certain commissioners were appointed to examine into the state of the navy, and by their report it appears there were then only 39 ships and vessels, whose tonnage amounted to 14,700 tons: while in 1624, on the same authority, the number had decreased to 32 or 33, but the tonnage increased to about 19,400 tons. The commissioners had, in fact, recommended many of the small craft to be broken up or sold, and more ships of the higher rates to be kept up.
Charles I. added upwards of 20 sail to the navy, generally of the smaller kind; but one of them, built by Pett, was of a description, both as to form and dimensions, far superior to any that had yet been launched. This ship was the celebrated “Sovereign of the Seas,” launched at Woolwich in 1637. The length of her keel was 128 feet, the main breadth 48 feet, and the length from stem to stern 232 feet. In the description of this ship by Thomas Heywood it is said that she “bore five lanthorns, the biggest of which would hold ten persons upright; had three flush-decks, a forecastle, half-deck, quarter-deck, and round-house. Her lower tier had thirty ports for cannon and demi-cannon; middle tier, thirty for culverins and demi-culverins; third tier, twenty-six for other ordnance; forecastle, twelve; and two half-decks, thirteen or fourteen ports more within board, for murthering pieces; besides ten pieces of chace ordnance forward, and ten right aft, and many loopholes in the cabins for musquet-shot. She had eleven anchors, one of 4400 lb weight. She was of the burden of 1637 tons.” It appears, however, that she was found, on trial, to be too high for a good serviceable ship in all weathers, and was therefore cut down to a deck less. After this she became an excellent ship, and was in almost all the great actions with the Dutch; she was rebuilt in 1684, when the name was changed to that of “Royal Sovereign,” and was about to be rebuilt a second time at Chatham in 1696 when she was totally destroyed by fire. In this reign the ships of the navy were first classed, or divided into six rates, the first being from 100 to 60 guns, the second from 54 to 36, &c.
In 1642 the management of the navy was taken out of the king’s hands, and in 1648 Prince Rupert carried away twenty-five ships, none of which ever returned; and such, indeed, was the reduced state of the establishment that at the beginning of Cromwell’s government he had only fourteen ships of war of two decks, and some of these carried only 40 guns; but, under the careful management of very able men in different commissions which he appointed, such vigorous measures were pursued that, in five years, though engaged within that time in war with the greatest naval power in Europe, the fleet was increased to 150 sail (of which more than a third part had two decks, and many had been captured from the Dutch), while upwards of 20,000 seamen were employed in the navy. The military marine was, indeed, raised by Cromwell to a height which it had never before reached.
Though Cromwell found the navy divided into six rates or classes, it was under his government that these ratings were defined and established in the manner nearly in which they were till the middle of the present century; and it may also be remarked, that under his government were constructed a large number of frigates, or vessels designed specially for speed and having a peculiar sharpness of form. The first built in England was the “Constant Warwick.” “She was built,” says Pepys, “in 1640, by Mr Peter Pett (son of Phineas), for a privateer for the earl of Warwick, and was sold by him to the state. Mr Pett took his model of this ship from a French frigate which he had seen in the Thames.”
We know comparatively little about ships’ armaments up to this period. It appears, however, that they were furnished about the year 1337 with espringalds, haubergeons, bacinets, bows, arrows, jacks, doublets, targets, pavises (or large shields placed at the side, and serving the double purpose of protection against the sea and the enemy), lances, and “firing barrels.” It also appears that as early as 1338 cannon formed part of the armament of ships, and that about 1372 guns and gunpowder were commonly used. Among the stores belonging to the “Christopher of the Tower” in June 1338 were three iron cannon with five chambers, a hand gun, and three old stone bags, probably for shot. The “Mary of the Tower” had an iron cannon with two chambers, and one of brass with one chamber. The precise character and description of the earlier guns are difficult to be found, but among the “crakys of war” mentioned as most used on board ship are “cannon-paviors,” or stone-shot throwers, and “murtherers,” which were smaller and threw any kind of shot. There were also in the first period of naval history basilisks, port pieces, stock-fowlers, sakers, and bombards. The last-named were large instruments of hammered iron, made of bars welded and bound together with iron bands. They threw stone shot of 140 lb, and even of 195 lb weight. A battery of these erected on a slip of land at the naval battle of Chioggia (1380), between the Venetians and the Genoese, did great damage. They were loaded over night and fired in the morning—one discharge per diem being considered enough for the gun, if not for the enemy. Froissart mentions a bombard at the siege of Oudenarde by Philip van Artevelde, that “might be heard five leagues off in the daytime, and ten at night. The report of it was so loud that it seemed as if all the devils in hell had broken loose.” According to Lord Herbert, brass ordnance were first cast in England in the year 1535. They had various names, such as cannon, demi-cannon, culverins, demi-culverins, sakers, mynions, falcons, falconets, &c. What the calibre of each of these was is not accurately known, but the cannon are supposed to have been about 60-pounders, the demi-cannon 32, culverins 18, falcons 2, mynions 4, sakers 5, &c. Many of these pieces of different calibres were mounted on the same deck, which must have occasioned great confusion in action in finding for each its proper shot.
On the restoration of Charles II. the duke of York was immediately appointed lord high admiral, and by his advice a committee was named to consider a plan, proposed by himself, for the future regulation of the affairs of the navy, at which the duke presided. By the advice and able assistance of Pepys as a principal officer of the navy, great progress was speedily made in the reparation and increase of the fleet. The duke remained lord high admiral till 1673, when, in consequence of the test required by parliament, to which he could not submit, he resigned, and that office was in part put in commission, and the rest retained by the king. Prince Rupert was put at the head of this commission, and Pepys appointed secretary of the Admiralty. By his able and judicious management there were in sea-pay, in the year 1679, and in excellent condition, 7 6 ships of the line, all furnished with stores for six months, 8 fire-ships besides a numerous train of ketches, smacks, yachts, &c., with more than 12,000 seamen; and also 30 new ships building, and a good supply of stores in the dockyards. But this flourishing condition of the navy did not last long. In consequence of the dissipation of the king, and his pecuniary difficulties, he neglected the navy on account of the expenses; the duke was sent abroad, and Pepys to the Tower. A new set of commissioners was appointed, without experience, ability, or industry; and the consequence was, as stated by the commissioners of revision, that “all the wise regulations formed during the administration of the duke of York were neglected; and such supineness and waste appear to have prevailed that, at the end of not more than five years, when he was recalled to the office of lord high admiral, only 22 ships, none larger than a fourth rate, with two fire-ships, were at sea; those in harbour were quite unfit for service ; even the 30 new ships which he had left building had been suffered to fall into a state of great decay, and hardly any stores were found to remain in the dockyards.”
The first act on the duke’s return was the reappointment of Pepys as secretary of the Admiralty. In 1686, finding the principal officers unequal to the duties required of them, he appointed a special commission to restore the navy to its former strength and condition. Sir Anthony Deane, the most experienced of the shipbuilders then in England, was joined with the commissioners. He is said to have introduced important improvements in ships of the line, his model being the “Superbe,” a French ship of 74 guns, from which he built the “Harwich” in 1664. Others, however, are of opinion that no advance was made on the model of the “Sovereign of the Seas” after she was cut down. The commissioners undertook, in three years, to complete the repair of the fleet, and furnish the dockyards with a proper supply of stores, on an estimate of £400,000 a year, to be issued in weekly payments; and in two years and a half they finished their task to the satisfaction of the king and the whole nation, 108 sail of the line being repaired and under repair, besides smaller vessels. At the time of the king’s abdication, the list of the navy amounted to 173 sail, of 101,892 tons, carrying 6930 guns and 42,000 seamen.
The naval regulations were wisely left unaltered at the Revolution, and the business of the Admiralty continued to be carried on for a short time, under the immediate direction of King William, by Pepys, till the arrival of Admiral Herbert and Captain Russell from the fleet, into whose hands, he says, “he silently let it fall.” Upon the general principles of that system, thus established with his aid by the duke of York, the civil government of the British navy has been carried on ever since.
In the second year of William III. (1690), no less than 27 ships were ordered to be built, of 60 and 80 guns each; and in 1697 the king, in his speech to parliament, stated that the naval force of the kingdom was increased to nearly double what he found it at his accession. It was now partly composed of various classes of French ships which had been captured in the course of the war, amounting in number to more than 60, and in guns to 2300,—the losses by storms and captures being about half the tonnage and half the guns acquired. At the commencement of William’s reign, the navy, as already stated, consisted of 173 ships, measuring 101,892 tons; at his death it had been extended to 272 ships, measuring 159,020 tons, being an increase of more than one-half both in number and in tonnage. The ships of the line numbered then 130, and this continued to be the average number till the middle of the 18th century.
The accession of Queen Anne was immediately followed by a war with France and Spain, and in the second year of her reign she had the misfortune to lose no less than 13 of her ships by one of the most tremendous storms that was ever known; but every energy was used to repair this national calamity. In the course of this war there were taken or destroyed about 50 ships of war, mounting 3000 cannon; and about half that number were lost. At the death of the queen, in 1714, the list of the navy was reduced in number to 247 ships, measuring 167,219 tons, being an increase in tonnage of 8199 tons.
George I. left the navy pretty nearly in the state in which he found it. At his death, in 1727, the list consisted of 233 ships, measuring 170,862 tons, being a decrease in number of 14, but an increase in tonnage of 3643 tons.
George II. was engaged in a war with Spain in 1739, in consequence of which the size of ships of the line ordered to be built was considerably enlarged. On the restoration of peace in 1748 it was found that England’s naval strength had prodigiously increased. The loss had been little or nothing, while the English had taken and destroyed 20 French and 15 Spanish sail of the line, besides smaller vessels. The war with France of 1756 added considerably to the list, so that at the king’s decease in 1760 it consisted of 412 ships, measuring 321,104 tons.
In the short war of 1762, George III. added no less than 20 sail of the line to the navy. At the conclusion of the American war in 1782, the list of the navy was increased to 600 sail; and at the signing of the preliminaries in 1783 it amounted to 617 sail, measuring upwards of 500,000 tons, being an increase of 185 ships and 157,000 tons and upwards since the year 1762. At the peace of Amiens the list of the fleet amounted to upwards of 700 sail, of which 144 were of the line. The number taken from the enemy, or destroyed, amounted nearly to 600, of which 90 were of the line, including 50-gun ships, and upwards of 200 were frigates; the English loss amounted to about 60, of which 6 were of the line and 12 frigates.
The recommencement and long continuance of the revolutionary war, the glorious successes of England in naval actions, and the protection required for the extended commerce, of which, in fact, Britain might be said to enjoy a monopoly, and for the security of the numerous colonies, contributed to raise the British navy to a magnitude to which the accumulated navies of the whole world bore but a small proportion. From 1808 to 1813 there were seldom less than from 100 to 106 sail of the line in commission, and from 130 to 160 frigates, and upwards of 200 sloops, besides bombs, gun-brigs, cutters, schooners, &c., amounting in the whole to about 500 sail of effective ships and vessels, to which may be added 500 more in the ordinary, and as prison, hospital, and receiving ships,— making at least 1000 pennants, and measuring from 800,000 to 900,000 tons. The commissioners appointed to inquire into the state and condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues of the crown state, in their report to parliament, in the year 1792, that, “at the accession of his majesty (George III.) to the throne, the tonnage of the royal navy was 321,104 tons, and at the end of the year 1788 it had risen to no less than 413,467 tons.” In 1808 it had amounted to the enormous total of 800,000 tons, having nearly doubled itself in twenty years. It must not, however, be supposed that the effective navy consisted of more than half this amount of tonnage.
Since the conclusion of the war with France, it would appear that at least one-half of the ships had been sold or broken up as unfit for service; and as, by the list of the navy at the beginning of the year 1821, the number of ships and vessels of every description, in commission, in ordinary, building, repairing, and ordered to be built, had been reduced to 609 sail, we may take the greatest extent of the tonnage at 500,000 tons; but the greater part, if not the whole, of this tonnage was efficient, and in a state of progressive efficiency.
According to the printed list of the 1st January 1821, the 609 sail of ships and vessels appear to be as under:— [table]
making a total of 432; to which have to be added 177 gun-brigs, cutters, schooners, tenders, bombs, troop-ships, store-ships, yachts, <fcc.
In the year 1836 the total number of ships of war, including every description mentioned in the above list, amounted to about 560 sail; of which 95 were ships of the line in a state of efficiency for any service, or capable of being speedily put into a fit state for sea; and many of them were of a very superior class to any employed in the war. In 1846 there were 671 ships, including every description; and in 1857 there were on the list of the royal navy 735 ships, exclusive of those appropriated to harbour service, and of the coastguard cruisers, making a grand total of 888 ships and vessels of all classes.
Soon after the commencement of Queen Victoria’s reign steam began to assert its superiority over sail-power for the propulsion of ships of war. It has now to a great extent usurped the place of manual labour also in ships, and it has been the main cause of the revolution which has been effected in their type.
The paddle-wheel was first adopted as the means of utilizing the power of steam for propulsion. The first ship of war of any importance fitted with the paddle was the 46-gun frigate “Penelope.” In 1843 she was cut in two, lengthened, and furnished with engines of 650 horse-power. A number of ships were also built expressly for the paddle, of which class the “Terrible,” a powerful, frigate-built ship of 21 guns and 800 horse-power, may be taken as a type. The “Valorous” is almost the only remaining example of it in 1883, and she has been relegated to dockyard service.
The success of the screw, however, as a means of propulsion soon made it evident that this must be the system of the future for warships. By its use the whole motive power could be protected by being placed below the water-line. It interfered much less than the paddle with the efficiency and handiness of the vessel under sail alone, and it enabled ships to be kept generally under sail. Great importance was attached to this, as the handling of a ship under sail was justly thought an invaluable means of training both officers and men in ready resource, prompt action, and self-reliance. For this reason masts and sails have been retained long after they were admitted to be detrimental to the fighting qualities of battle ships.
The screw was therefore eagerly adopted, and rapid progress was made in the conversion of ships into screw steamers,—some being cut in two and lengthened, others being razeed or having decks removed, while new ships were building, so that the Russian war, which broke out in 1854, found Great Britain in possession of a powerful steam fleet. Of this fleet the three-decker “Duke of Wellington,” of 700 horse-power (nominal) and 131 guns, the two-decker “Agamemnon,” of 600 horse-power (nominal) and 91 guns, and the frigate “Shannon,” of 600 horse-power (nominal) and 51 guns, may be taken as the finest examples; a powerful flotilla of steam gunboats was built for the occasion. Henceforth ships propelled only by sail were obsolete for war purposes.
In this war mechanical mines or torpedoes were used by the Russians for the defence of their harbours, but with not much effect.
The advance of gunnery, and the disastrous effect of explosive shells, which were new weapons since the great naval wars of forty years before, operated to the disadvantage of ships with wooden walls. The fleets were unable to do much more than blockade, and it became necessary to furnish means by which they might also attack.
The French were the first to apply in a practical shape the idea (which appears to have originated in the United States) of reviving the use of armour, and placing it on the sides of ships. They constructed five floating batteries clad with 4∣ inches of iron, on an oak backing 8 inches thick. Of these the first was the “Tonnante,” mounting 16 guns. She was launched at Brest in March 1855, and was quickly followed by the others. Three of them took part in the bombardment of Kinburn in the Black Sea on the 17th October following.
The British Admiralty at once put in hand similar vessels, and with such diligence that the “Erebus” and “Terror” arrived at Kinburn on the 24th October. They were hastily constructed for work in shallow water, and were difficult to manage; but the results were sufficiently satisfactory to induce the French to convert a wooden line-of-battle ship on the stocks into a frigate armoured all over with 4f inches of iron. She was launched at Toulon under the name of “La Gloire” in November 1859, andλvas of 5600 tons displacement and 800 horse-power (nominal).
In December 1858 a committee was appointed under the administration of Lord Derby, because the attention of the cabinet had been drawn to the very serious increase which had taken place of late years in the navy estimates, while, at the same time, it was represented that the naval force of the country was far inferior to what it ought to be with reference to that of other powers, and especially of France, and that increased efforts and increased expenditure were imperatively called for to place it on a proper footing. One of the main causes assigned for a prospective increase was the comparative state of preparation of France, in respect of powerful screw steamers, and the expenditure which had taken place and was still going on in her dockyards.
The committee, in its report, January 6, 1859, directed its remarks principally to the increase in the estimates of 1858 as compared with those of 1852, and omitted the disturbed period between those dates. They say that in 1852 the navy estimates were revised and increased, and measures taken to supply what were supposed to be deficiencies in former years, and to adapt the navy to the altered state of things occasioned by the application of the screw to ships of war. They remark that no one probably in the year 1852 could have anticipated the wonderful progress which a few years had exhibited, superseding practically the use of sailing vessels in the navy, and introducing the use of screw steamers of immense size and power, and involving a more than commensurate additional expense. The total amounts voted were—in 1852, £5,835,588, and in 1858, £8,851,371. They say, at the outbreak of the French revolutionary war England possessed 145 sail of the line, France 77. These comparative numbers were reduced in 1850 to—England 86, and France 45. “At this latter period the effective strength of the two navies in line-of-battle ships exclusively, and almost exclusively in frigates, consisted of sailing vessels; but, the French having subsequently decided on, and nearly carried out, the conversion of all their sailing ships that were fit for it into steamships, as sailing vessels could not be opposed to steamships with any chance of success, the latter must now be considered as the only ships really effective for the purposes of war, and the following is at present the relative strength of the two navies in steam line-of-battle ships and frigates, including ships building and converting”:— [table]
It is curious to observe what happened as a consequence of this report and the circumstances of the time. The committee did not recommend building an iron-plated line-of-battle ship or frigate, although the “Warrior” was commenced a few months later. They recommended converting 19 sailing ships of the line into steamships of the line and steam frigates. Two years later there were 67 tvooden steamships of war building and converting for the royal navy, and navy estimates had gone up to twelve millions and a half; unhappily all these wooden line-of-battle ships and frigates were soon found to be no real addition to the force of the navy, and many of them were not completed. The four iron-plated ships appearing so ominously at the foot of the French list had completely changed the situation.
At this date iron had been gradually encroaching on wood as a material for the hulls of British merchant ships. It was thought at one time to be unsuitable for war-ships on account of the irregular holes made by shot passing through it, and the difficulty of plugging them, but the use of armour tended to prevent shot, or at least shell, from passing through. Iron presented also the advantage of permitting the use of water-tight bulkheads. (The system of subdivision lias been largely developed within the last few years by the use of double bottoms and of longitudinal as well as transverse bulkheads, and has added much to, the security of ships against perils of the sea or acts of the queen’s enemies.) By the use of iron the country was, moreover, relieved from all anxiety on the score of the supply of timber of suitable dimensions and quality.
The Admiralty therefore determined to build their first sea-going ironclad ship, the “Warrior,” of iron, and the decision has been amply justified by the event. Her displacement was 9200 tons, and the indicated horse-power 5470. The central part of the ship was protected by 4⅛-inch armour from the upper deck to 5 feet below the water-line,—the main deck battery being enclosed at its foremost and after ends by armoured transverse bulkheads. She cost, including engines, £357,000, and was able to withstand the fire, at 200 yards, of the heaviest gun of the day, the 68- ρounder of 95 cwts. Her own armament consisted of thirty-six of these guns. She was similar in appearance to the frigates of her day, on a large scale. She was launched in December 1860.
Much discussion ensued as to the relative merits of the rival ships ‘ ‘ La Gloire” and ‘ ‘ Warrior.” The latter was the faster ship, but her great length (380 feet between perpendiculars) had made it desirable to leave 85 feet at each end entirely unprotected, and, as she had only a single propeller, the steering gear was necessarily by this arrangement exposed to shot. Her length also limited her power of manoeuvring.
In the meantime the “Black Prince,” a sister ship, had been built; the “Defence” and “Resistance” soon followed on a smaller scale. In 1861 eleven ironclads were ordered; five of them were converted from λvooden ships on the stocks, and these no longer appear in the Navy List. The “Hector’’and “Valiant” followed the “Warrior,” but the armour on the main deck extended further. In the “Achilles” the battery remained as in the “Warrior,” but the armour was extended as a belt, at the suggestion of Mr Reed, all round the water-line. The “Minotaur,” “Agincourt,” and “Northumberland” were armoured from end to end, the thickness being increased to 5⅛ inches. This additional armour, with the desired fineness of form, involved a length of 400 feet, ami a displacement of 10,690 tons. They had five masts. Like the “Warrior” they were unhandy, and were thought liable to fall a prey to smaller and nimbler antagonists. The belt type of the “Achilles” has survived except where it has been replaced by submerged armoured decks, as in the “Shannon,” “Nelson,” “Inflexible,” and following ships.
During this time the comparative impotence of artillery had suggested recourse to a weapon of the galleys of the Middle Ages. The ram was revived, the French again setting the example. England followed, without however at first making it so prominent a feature as the French. The weapon has since become general, or at least the bows are strengthened to stand the shock of ramming.
After the Russian war torpedoes and submarine mines and counter-mines, mechanical and electrical, attracted much attention. Schools were established for the instruction of officers and men in their use. For the British navy, the “Vernon” was set apart for this purpose. In 1871 the secret of the celebrated Whitehead fish torpedo was purchased by the Admiralty. It has since been acquired by nearly all foreign nations. It was designed to attack ships below water, since their batteries were deemed practically invulnerable. At first it was only arranged to project the torpedoes from a submerged tube in the line of keel ahead, but it was found that they could be effectively projected from the broadside above water, and this plan has been extensively adopted. The Whitehead torpedo is projected by means of an impulse of compressed air or steam, and is propelled through the water by means of a screw and pair of engines actuated by compressed air, carried within it. The head carries the explosive, which is fired on contact, and a secret chamber contains the mechanism regulating the depth below the surface at which it is to travel. It now forms part of the armament of most war-ships. A torpedo invented by Captain Harvey, R.N., was in use for some years till superseded by the λVhitehead. It was towed on the broadside or quarter.
Fast screw torpedo boats to use the Whitehead or the spar torpedo were introduced by Mr Thornycroft of Chiswick, and they were at once acquired or copied by all foreign powers.
The superiority of the defence due to armour was short-lived. Apart from the introduction of new weapons for attack, the artillery continued to advance in power and weight.
With the rivalry between guns and armour sprang up designs for the best mode of defence combined with the most powerful means of attack. Captain Coles advocated for masted ships the turret system, and Mr Reed (now Sir Edward Reed) the broadside system, each striving to give the utmost protection armouf could afford to the battery and other vital parts, whilst enabling the largest guns to be worked safely under these defences. The broadside system armoured the battery and the water-line, whilst the sides and upper portions of the ships remained much as in the older frigates. The turret aimed at lower sides as offering less target to the enemy, whilst a deadly fighting power had all-round sway from behind armoured cover. In 1862 the “Enterprise,” “Favourite,” and “Research” were adapted to Mr Reed’s principle,—the belt and battery,—upon which also, with the addition of indented ports at the corners of the battery to give a wider range of fire, were built the “Pallas,” “Penelope,” “Bellérophon,” and “Hercules.” In the “Sultan” an upper deck battery was added with four guns. On the “Sultan” pattern the “Audacious” and several other vessels were built. As the guns increased in size, the batteries decreased and the guns became fewer, but the belt remained.
In 1862 also the first turret ship was produced in the shape of the “Royal Sovereign,” a three-decker cut down and converted; the “Prince Albert,” built of iron, followed. Both these ships were without sail-power, and calculated for coast defence only.
The “Monarch,” ordered in 1865, was designed as a sea-going rigged turret ship, having 7-inch armour, a free-board of 14 feet, and an armament of four 25-ton guns in two turrets plated with 10- and 8-inch armour. Then came the “Captain ”—a ship designed by Captain Coles and Messrs Laird in rivalry of the “Monarch,” and built by Messrs Laird at Birkenhead in 1869. She was intended to combine the low freeboard of the “Royal Sovereign” with the qualities of a sailing frigate; and for a time she was thought to give promise of such a combination. The calamity of her capsizing, on the night of the 6th of September 1870, with 500 men, of whom only 18 were saved, will not be forgotten while the annals of the navy are preserved.
At this date (1870) a sea-going mastless turret ship type had been devised under the administration of Mr Childers, and there were three such ships building, the “Devastation,” “Thunderer,” and “Fury,” designed by Mr Reed for service as battle ships at sea. They were, after the loss of the “Captain,” strongly condemned by anticipation by most eminent naval men. But their design has since been fully approved by experience.
The important questions arising out of these changes in types of ships, and especially as to the “Devastation” class, were discussed in 1871 by a very distinguished committee, knou τ n as the Committee on Designs. They said in their report :—
“A perfect ship of war is a desideratum which lias never yet been attained, and is now further than ever removed from our reach. Any near approach to perfection in one direction inevitably brings with it disadvantages in another. From the time when ships of war first carried artillery, and were thus converted from mere vehicles for the transport of armed men into engines of war, naval architects have been compelled, in designing them, to content themselves with a more or less satisfactory compromise. The difficulty, always great, of bringing into harmony the conflicting features which are desirable in a ship of war was much increased by the adoption of steam-power throughout the navy; the form of hull which was thought to be requisite for obtaining the best results under steam alone being very different from that most suitable for sailing. When to this was added the still more serious embarrassment arising from the introduction of armour-plating, the problem presented to naval architects became one of extreme difficulty and complexity.
“For some time, indeed, after the necessity of using armour-plating had been recognized, but before the penetrative power of artillery had reached its present stage of development, the question how to unite in one ship the power of sailing, steaming, and carrying both heavy guns and armour, although difficult, did not appear to be insoluble, and was met with remarkable ability, and a very large measure of success, by the constructive department of the navy. In the meantime, however, a rapid progressive increase in the power of artillery led to a corresponding augmentation in the thickness and weight of the armour borne by ships, until the point had been reached at which it became impossible to combine in one vessel all the qualities which it is desirable a ship of war should possess, consistently with the attainment of a very high degree of efficiency in any of the more important of them.
“The necessity, in some cases at least, of altogether sacrificing some one desirable feature, in order that another may be secured in a higher degree than would otherwise be possible, was recognized by their lordships when they adopted the design of the ‘ Devastation ’ class, in which the power of sailing was entirely given up in favour of that of carrying thick armour and very powerful guns, of moving under steam at a fair although not very high speed, and, finally, of carrying a sufficient quantity of coal to admit of voyages across the Atlantic being made without the aid of sails. In the ‘ Inconstant ’ class a compromise of a similar character, but in a different direction, had previously been sanctioned, the protection of armour being altogether abandoned in order to secure very high speed under steam, combined with as efficient sail-power as could be attained without interference with the essential feature of great speed under steam alone. Each of these types possesses valuable features which are totally wanting in the other. Each in our opinion meets a part of the requirements of modern warfare, and must (subject to modification and improvement) continue to be represented in the British navy.” ....
“After making every allowance for the disadvantages that attend the use of an enormous dead weight of very costly armour, which after all is not absolutely impenetrable to certain special guns, we cannot lose sight of the indisputable fact that in an action between an armour-clad and an unarmoured ship (assuming that they carry guns of equal power) the former has, and must have, an immense advantage in being able to penetrate the sides of her adversary at a distance at which she is herself impenetrable, and, further, in being able to use with effect those most destructive projectiles 1 common ’ shells, which would fall harmless from her own armoured sides. Even assuming that absolute impenetrability to shot proves to be unattainable, it is still our opinion that the time has not come to throw off armour altogether, but that it is necessary that the first ranks of our ships of war should continue to carry armour of as great resisting power as possible.
“Before quitting this part of our subject, we desire to remark that, although, as before pointed out, there are serious difficulties in the way of increasing to any very material extent the thickness of armour applied in the usual manner to sea-going ships, viz., in the form of a complete belt round the ship, from stem to stern, at the water-line, besides local protection for guns, men, Ac., it is not by any means certain that some method may not be devised of securing the requisite reserve of buoyancy by other means than armour-plating. Were this accomplished, the area of the armour might be diminished, and its thickness increased in a corresponding degree. The ship would then comprise a very strongly plated central citadel, surrounded and supported by an unaπnoured raft constructed on a cellular system, or containing some buoyant substance such as cork, which, without offering any material resistance to the passage of projectiles, would not be deprived of its buoyancy by penetration.” ....
“At present we find ourselves compelled to regard the attainment of a very high degree of offensive and defensive power united with real efficiency under sail as an insoluble problem; and we believe that our transmarine possessions, and other important interests in distant parts of the world, will be more efficiently protected by the establishment, where requisite, of centres of naval power, from which vessels of the ’ Devastation ’ class may operate, than by relying upon cruising ships of such limited fighting power as the ‘Monarch.’ We think, however, that a class of vessel in many respects resembling the ‘ Monarch,’ although much smaller and less costly, ought to form part of the British navy."
In 1873 Italy was contemplating the construction of the “Duilio” and “Dandolo,” large turret ships of the “Devastation” type, but intended to mount four very heavy guns which were being constructed by Sir William Armstrong & Co., to be protected by armour 22 inches in thickness. It was necessary that England should not be behind, and the “Inflexible” was laid down. She was to carry four 60-ton guns in two revolving turrets, similar to the “Devastation,” except that, in order to obtain right-ahead fire of all four guns, and to meet the objections raised by naval officers and in parliament against the lowness of the upper deck of the “Devastation” class, the turrets were placed “en échelon,” the foremost turret on the port side and the after one on the starboard side, and a superstructure was erected between them along the centre of the ship. The belt also beyond the citadel was omitted, and a submerged armour deck, of 3 inches in thickness, replaced it at the ends. This deck descended forward and helped to strengthen the ram. The armour on the sides was to be 24 inches; before the ship was completed, however, compound armour had been introduced, which allowed the thickness on the turrets to be reduced to 16 inches. The total weight of armour was 3155 tons. To enable this great weight to be carried, to provide stability when injured, and to allow all the guns to fire in line of keel, the breadth, which had not before exceeded 60 feet in sea-going ships of war, was increased to 75 feet, the utmost which existing docks allowed. The length was 320 feet, and the displacement reached 11,880 tons. The horse-power was 8000, and this gave her, after she was launched in 1876, a speed of 14∣ knots, and when fully equipped at Malta 13’87 knots. She is rigged as a brig. This is, however, only an arrangement for peace time. In consequence of an important question having been raised in the press and in parliament as to her stability in the event of the unarmoured ends being badly damaged in action, a committee was appointed, who reported that ‘ ‘ it cannot be said that the armoured citadel is invulnerable, or that the unarmoured ends are indestructible, although the character of the risk they run is different. But in our opinion the unprotected ends are as well able as tlιe armoured citadel to bear the part assigned to them in encountering the various risks of naval warfare, and therefore we consider that a just balance has been maintained in the design, so that out of a given set of conditions a good result has been obtained.”
It was subsequently laid down in parliament, by the responsible minister, as a guiding principle in such questions, that in a ship of war there should be the greatest possible offensive power, and the defensive arrangements should be such as to ensure her as far as possible, and in equal degrees, against all the various modes in which she may be disabled or destroyed. From this it would follow that it should not be in the power of the enemy to disable the ship by one single blow delivered by any means at his command, if this could have been prevented by causing other defences, where he has not this power, to surrender a portion of their strength to succour the weak part.
Amplifying this principle, it may be said that there should be defence for the propelling power, for the steering power, and for the floating power against the gun, the ram, and the torpedo. To a very large extent the defence against the two last named must rest with the officer in command; but to resist them he must retain command of speed and steering gear. He therefore requires that these and his floating power should be equally defended against the gun, which he cannot avoid. The avoidable weapons, the ram and the torpedo, are provided against in all ships, even in the “Inflexible,” far less than is the unavoidable weapon, the gun. The equality of defensive power in view of all three weapons is obtained by reckoning as part of the defence against the ram and the torpedo the skill and vigilance of the seaman.
The “Ajax” and “Agamemnon” were laid down in the year the “Inflexible” was launched (1876). They are of the same type but smaller, carrying only 38-ton guns. Of this type also are the “Colossus” and “Edinburgh,” commenced in 1879, and now (1883) approaching completion. They are the same length as the “Inflexible,” but 7 feet narrower. As they are of later date than the “Iris” (the first war-vessel built entirely of steel), steel is employed almost entirely in their construction, and they have steel-faced armour. They are to be armed with 43-ton breechloading guns in the turrets, and four 6-inch 4-ton guns on the superstructure. The “Conqueror” is another steel ship, designed especially as a ram, having one turret for two 43-ton guns, and four 6-inch guns unprotected by armour.
The “Collingwood,” commenced in 1880, has a different arrangement. In the endeavour to increase the protection of the vital parts, and at the same time to increase the offensive power without going into extravagant dimensions, it was inevitable that the space to be covered should be reduced, and the armour concentrated. The guns being large, it was thought they would not suffer by being mounted “en barbette,” the loading being still done under cover. By these means the revolving turrets were got rid of, and the citadel was no longer required to protect the loading apparatus. By placing the barbette towers some distance apart it became possible to mount several broadside guns, not indeed protected from the front, but sheltered from raking fire by an armoured screen extending from the barbette towers to the ship’s sides. This then is the design of the “Collingwood” class. The central belt, which rises but little above the water, has 18-inch compound armour, the barbette towers 12-inch, and the screen 6-inch. Communication is maintained by means of armoured vertical hollow cylinders between the towers and the protected part of the ship below, whence the supply of ammunition is derived. She will mount four 43-ton guns in the towers, six 4-ton guns in the broadside, and numerous lighter guns. The ‘ ‘ Rodney,” “Howe,” “Camperdown,” “Anson,” and “Benbow” are similar to the “Collingwood,” but they will carry 63-ton guns instead of 43-ton. Possibly the “Benbow” may have two exceeding 100 tons instead of the four 63-ton guns.
The cruising ironclads have also continued to advance. In 1873 the “Alexandra” was commenced, of the “Sultan” type. In this vessel four poλverful guns in the central batteries fire in line of keel ahead, and two astern. She has thicker armour than the “Sultan,” and a bulkhead was placed across the main battery, cutting off the two foremost guns from the rest. In the same year the ‘ ‘ Temeraire” was commenced. She differed from the “Alexandra” in having barbette towers forward and aft, instead of the upper deck battery, the 25-ton guns mounted in them being made to descend, on being fired within the tower, for loading. The towers communicated with the protected part below by means of hollow armoured cylinders. She fires three heavy guns from her armoured batteries in line of keel ahead. Then came the “Shannon,” a much smaller vessel, in which the water-line is protected by an armour belt to within 60 feet of the stem, whence a submerged armour deck extends forward; a bulkhead rises from the same point, which covers two guns firing ahead. The remainder of the guns are unprotected, except from right-ahead fire. She was designed for an armoured cruiser, capable of engaging a second-class ironclad. The “Nelson” and “Northampton” followed, but they have central belts and armoured decks at each end, and armour-covered guns for stern as well as bow fire, with eight broadside guns between.
In 1878, when Russia was threatening Constantinople, three ships then building in England were bought from the Ottoman Government,—the “Belleisle” and “Orion,” belted ships with a central battery and a gun at each of the corners, and the “Superb,” broadside ironclad. At the same time the “Neptune,” a masted turret ship like the “Monarch,” building for Brazil, was bought.
The “Impérieuse” and “Warspite,” now building, of steel, are the latest type of ironclad cruisers. They are like the “Nelson,” but with barbette towers of the French type forward and aft and amidships instead of the partial battery.
Recent ships are furnished with every appliance that modern science can devise to augment their efficiency and power. The turrets and the turn-tables of the barbette ships are moved by hydraulic power; the guns are loaded and worked by the same power, and are fired by electricity if desired. Electricity is used to light the batteries and the ship generally, the old fighting lanthorn, or indeed any other, being extinguished by the shock of discharge of modern artillery. The capstan, the steerage of the ship, the gun, the ram and torpedo, the pumps and ventilation, and electric light all require machinery in every direction, so that the ship has become a factory. A large proportion of the crew are relegated to the stokeholds, and but little is left that recalls the war-ship of our fathers.
The “Polyphemus” is the only other vessel to be here mentioned. She is hardly an ironclad; she comes under the head of special ships, and is described in the Navy List as a double screw torpedo-ram of 2640 tons and 5500 horse-power. Her shape is cylindro-conical, of steel—the part above water being covered with 3 inches of steel. She is intended for ramming and to use the Whitehead torpedo. Her only other armament is the machine gun. These guns are mounted in revolving towers.
In this ship the first attempt was made in a sea-going vessel to use the locomotive boiler (working with fresh water) with closed stokeholes and forced draught. Mr Thornycroft and other torpedo-boat builders had used one such boiler in boats with great success. As its weight was very considerably less than the ordinary type of boiler, the experiment seemed to be justified. Great difficulties were, however, found to attend the use of such boilers in numbers sufficient for a sea-going vessel, and while the experiments were in progress it was ascertained that, by using closed stokeholes and forced draught, the ordinary cylindrical marine boiler using salt water could be made as economical of weight as the locomotive type. The ordinary practice up to this date had required a total weight of machinery of about 4 cwt. for each indicated horse-power in a sea-going ship. The employment of forced draught, and concurrent improvements in machinery, made it possible to get a horse-power in such ships with not more than from 2 to 2∣ cwt. total weight of engines and boilers, including the water in boilers and condensers. The locomotive boilers have therefore been given up in this ship.
The following extract (with slight variations and additions) from the Statesman’s Year-Book, 1883, gives a fair idea of the present position and strength of the British ironclad fleet :—
“The most important division of the navy, the ironclad fleet of war, consisted at the end of 1882 of 74 ships afloat and building, of which number 55 were afloat and described as efficient for sea or for coast defence, while 3 were not strictly British, being built solely for the defence of the colonies, 6 were on the stocks, and 10 had become inefficient for naval warfare. The following is a tabulated list of the ‘ so-called ’ efficient ironclads, and of the ironclads still on the stocks, divided into five classes according to the strength of armour and armament and mode of construction. ]! The ironclads marked with an asterisk were not completed at the end of 1882."
There are three other 18-ton turret ships of the fourth class, viz., the “Cerberus,” belonging to the Victorian Government, and stationed at Melbourne, and the “Abyssinia” and “Magdala,” belonging to the Indian Government, and stationed at Bombay.
From the experience of the American civil war and the cruise of the “Alabama” was born the modern type of cruiser, the object of these being to overtake and capture the cruisers of the enemy and to destroy his commerce. It is not supposed that they would be charged with a convoy.
The “Inconstant,” commenced in 1866, was the first of this class. With a view to retain the advantages of copper sheathing in combination with the iron construction which was necessary in so long a ship, she was built of iron, of 5782 tons displacement, cased with λvood in two thicknesses, and coppered. She was heavily armed, and attained a speed of 16 knots at full power. Her coal supply would last two and a quarter days at this speed, but it sufficed without the use of sail for forty-one days at 5 knots an hour. The “Active” and “Volage” were laid down at the same time on a reduced scale, and their speed was 15 knots. The “Shah” and “Raleigh,” commenced in 1870, were of the same type as the ‘ ‘ Inconstant,” while the ‘ ‘ Boadicea,” ‘ ‘ Bacchante,” and ‘ ‘Euryalus” were of intermediate type, 4140 tons displacement. They were all built of iron and cased with wood and sheathed.
The “Iris” was commenced in 1875. She is remarkable as the first war vessel constructed entirely of steel. She was intended for an armed despatch vessel, and in order to obtain the highest speed it was imperative to use the lightest, or, in other words, the strongest, material in her construction. There was at this time, moreover, a great difficulty in getting uniformly good iron even at extravagant prices. On these grounds a mild steel was employed, which enabled her designers to put 7700 horse-power into a hull with a load displacement of only 3730 tons, and to attain the speed of 18'572 knots, with a length of only 300 feet. The sister ship, the “Mercury,” did even more, realizing 18'876 knots, or nearly 22 miles an hour.
The “Comus” was the first of nine vessels built in 1879, and called the C. class from the initial letter of their names. They have iron or steel bottoms, cased with wood, and iron or steel frames and internal fittings. The engines and boilers are protected by a 1⅜- inch steel deck over them, as well as by the coal as much as possible. They are smaller than the “Active” class, and are intended for foreign service. They are variously armed; the “Canada” carries ten 6-inch guns on the broadside. The two foremost ones are mounted on central pivot carriages on sponsons or projections from the side. By this method they each cover half the horizon. The “Calliope” and “Calypso ” are building on a somewhat larger scale. They will mount four 6-inch guns on sponsons, two forward and two aft, with ten 5- or 6-inch guns between them on the broadside. All are coppered.
There are six of a class called the “Gems,” of which the “Ruby” is the type. They are composite vessels, with iron frames and wood planking, and sheathed with copper.
The next is a new class, built entirely of steel on the lines of the “Iris,” and described as second-class cruisers. All this class have twin screws, and their armaments are arranged in a similar manner to that of the “Calliope,” and in an open battery. The “Leander” of this class is of 3750 tons, 5000 horse-power, carries 700 tons of coal, and will have a speed of 16 knots.
The “Mersey” is rather smaller, being of 3550 tons, but she has 500 horse-power more, and is expected to steam 17 knots. She will mount fourteen 6-inch guns, and has a covered battery.
All the above-named vessels are protected by a steel turtle-back deck. In the “Mersey” class this deck will be carried throughout the length. They will have the Whitehead torpedo and tλvo second class torpedo boats.
There are, besides, numerous sloops and gun vessels, chiefly composite. The floating gun-carriages of the “Staunch” type, designed by Mr Rendel in 1867 to carry an 18-ton gun, are small, low, mastless boats, with a speed of about 8 knots. The gunboats forming the “Mosquito ” fleet in 1854 have mostly disappeared.
The accompanying table gives a list of English unarmoured ships. The vessels named in italics have a protecting deck—the “Mersey,” “Severn,” and “Thames” throughout, the others over machinery and magazines.
Materials of Construction.— Henceforward we have a new departure as regards the material for ships of war. As the iron displaced the wooden walls, so now steel is displacing iron. All the new ships, whether armoured or not, are of steel.
A remarkable economy in cost has been effected by these means. The steel is so uniform in quality, and the manufacture is so precise, that there is fair competition, and therefore a nearly uniform rate all over the country, and this rate is only one-half of what was given for iron for the royal dockyards when the “Iris” and “Mercury” were commenced. At that date (1875) the contract price of Admiralty plates of a standard size was over £20 per ton. Iron plates supplied to the same specification, but not subject to tests, were supplied by different makers at prices differing from each [table]
other by more than 100 per cent., according as the makers and the particular brand were supposed to have credit in the market. The steel now in use is absolutely faultless as to surface, stronger and more ductile than iron, and very uniform in quality. That actually employed in the “Iris” and “Mercury,” being a new material (Siemens-Martin of special quality), was no cheaper than the highest quality of tested iron. Since then the extension of its use in all directions has brought it down to half the price given at first. Siemens-Martin and Bessemer steel are now employed almost indifferently. Between 1866 and 1876 only three small vessels were built of steel in the United Kingdom. It is now employed in all the shipbuilding establishments in the country. In this case the royal navy gave the start, and private shipbuilders followed, in a most important change in the use of materials of construction.
The use of steel in the navy has not been confined to shipbuilding. The guns took it up first for internal tubes, and now the whole gun is built of it. The armour has also adopted it, wholly or in part. In England a steel face is cast upon an iron back, the steel being about one-third of the thickness of the plate. The hard face has been found very efficacious in breaking up the attacking projectiles. It has been found by experiment, for example, that flat plates of compound armour 12 inches thick are more effective against iron and steel projectiles, fired normally, at high velocity, from a 9-inch gun, than plates of iron 14 inches thick. But the most important point gained is that it has become impossible for iron shell to perforate armour as shell. The hard face of the armour breaks the shell to pieces.
Mercantile Marine. — There has never been a time in British naval history when the merchant service has failed to supply ships and men for the national defence. For some years prior to 1853 it was the practice to insert in mail contracts clauses providing for the armament of the steamships employed in mail service.
Towards the end of 1852 a report was presented to the Board of Admiralty by a committee of four officers on the question of arming the mail contract steam-packets belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental and Royal West India Mail Packet Companies. Their recapitulation of their report is as follows :—
“That the two companies have 53 vessels (23 of iron); that 16 ply between Southampton and foreign ports; that 5 on an average are always at home and fit for sea; that 8 may be rendered available for war purposes on an emergency, if they can be spared from the mail packet service within different periods extending altogether over sixty-six days; that they would not make efficient substitutes for regular men-of-war; that they might be fitted for armed packets and armed troop-ships; that it would be prudent in future that the fittings be executed beforehand; that the fittings necessary to the nature of proposed armaments (including magazines and shell-rooms) would cost from £600 to £800 for first and second class vessels, if attended to while a vessel is in progress of building or undergoing a large repair, and proportionally less for smaller vessels; that guns of such calibre be used as are common in the royal navy (viz., 8-inch guns of 65 cwt., and 32-pounders of 42 cwt. ),' to facilitate the supplies and render fittings and ordnance stores transferable from ship to ship; that a store of guns be kept at the port of Southampton (or Portsmouth), with a proper proportion of ordnance and gunners’ stores laid apart ready for an immediate call; that it would be advisable to introduce a clause in the contracts giving the Admiralty a right of pre-emption, and possibly to prevent their sale (but with permission) to a foreign power.”
In a second report from the same committee, dated March 1853, upon the British and North American, the Pacific, the General Screw, the Australian, the South Western, and the African Companies, the report is summed up in the statement that out of 91 vessels—belonging to eight distinct companies—employed in mail contracts, there were only 16 which could be made available on an emergency for auxiliary war purposes. Iron vessels were excluded from those which might be considered available ‘ ‘ on account of the material used in their construction,” but the committee does not state why the material was considered unsuitable.
To go into the reasons influencing their decision would make it necessary to refer to the experiments and the scientific and political controversies which had then been going on for ten years. During this time it had been decided to create a war navy of iron ships; the ships were commenced; then it was attempted to stop the building of them, but without success; they were then transformed into troop-and store-ships. Of two great parties, one contended that iron had been proved to be unfit for fighting ships, and the other that there had been no such proof, and that in the end wood must be given up.
The officers composing this committee appear to have agreed with the former party; and they do not seem to have thought it necessary to·give any reason for their rejection of all the large and fine ships employed in the mail service which, at some small expenditure of money, were suitable for receiving an armament in every particular, except that they were built of iron.
In March 1853 a Treasury minute was issued calling attention to the enormous cost of the mail packet service, and appointing a committee to consider the whole question. Among other things it is said in these instructions :—
“In reviewing the purposes and stipulations of the contracts, the committee will have to consider and report whether they can learn either that the prospect of a reserve of ships of war, which was at one time confidently entertained, has been realized in any sensible degree under these costly arrangements, or whether there is any probability that it can be realized hereafter compatibly with the paramount purpose for which the packets have been constructed, viz., that of postal vessels. On this point the committee will consult a report which has been presented to the Board of Admiralty by a committee of naval and artillery officers.
“It will also be their duty to observe what provisions have been inserted in the contracts to secure the sufficiency of the ships for the purpose of naval warfare; to ascertain whether the stipulations have been carefully fulfilled; whether, in any cases where they have not been so fulfilled, permission to waive them has been regularly sought and obtained from the proper department of the Government; and whether, in consideration of such non-fulfilment, there has been any adequate remission, or any remission, of the price which the state engaged to pay, not for postal service merely, but for the double purpose of postal service, together with a reserve force in aid of the royal navy.”
In July 1853 the committee reported :—
“The question which appears to us first in the order of consideration is, whether it is desirable to simplify such contracts as may in future be made, by omitting from them all provisions which do not directly bear upon the efficiency of the postal service. In arranging the terms of these contracts, the Government seized the opportunity of requiring that the vessels should be constructed in a manner that would render them as serviceable for national defence in war as steam packets belonging to the crown would have been if employed in their stead. A provision to this effect was first inserted in the contract with the Royal Mail Company in 1840, and in most of the existing contracts stipulations are to be found, requiring that the vessels should be of a construction and strength fit to carry such an armament as the Admiralty may think proper. In several cases they must be built of wood, and not of iron; and there are some contracts which confer on the Admiralty the right of taking the ships at a valuation when it may be thought desirable to do so.
“The surveyor’s report upon most of these vessels, as regards their fitness for war purposes, is in the following terms :—‘ Not fitted for armament, but capable of carrying guns when so fitted.’ This report accords with the opinion expressed by the committee of naval and artillery officers upon the vessels which have come under their notice. It appears, however, from the statements of that committee that, although the packets they have examined are for the most part of sufficient strength to carry and fire a certain number of guns, the expense of the alterations which would be necessary before they could be got ready for service would be very considerable, and that, even when such alterations had been made, the efficiency of the vessels would be very small in proportion to their size, and that they could not encounter hostile vessels of equal tonnage without endangering the honour of the British flag.
“With reference to future contracts, we are decidedly of opinion that no expense should be incurred for the sake of imposing conditions for giving a military character to the postal vessels. We believe the imposition of such conditions to be a measure of false economy. Should a war suddenly break out, the immediate demand for mail steamers would probably be greater than ever, and it might be exceedingly inconvenient to withdraw them at such a time from their legitimate use for the purpose of arming them for battle. Moreover, the high charge for the packet service has been borne with the greater readiness, because it has been supposed by some to include a provision, of large but unknown amount, for the defence of the country; while, on the other hand, the naval estimates have sometimes been complained of as excessive, on the ground that the force provided for was in addition to the large reserve of postal war steamers.
“We accordingly recommend that for the future the contracts for the conveyance of the mails should be wholly free from stipulations of the nature we have been describing, though it may be desirable in some cases to retain the power in the Government to take possession of the vessels in the event of national emergency.”
They add :—“An erroneous impression appears to have prevailed among the public as to the efficiency of our postal steamers for direct purposes of warfare. We do not believe that those who are charged with the direction of the military affairs of the country have ever regarded them as likely to be of any great service in an engagement, but their advantage as an auxiliary force will be very considerable. They will be available, in the event of the breaking out of hostilities, for the rapid conveyance of despatches, of specie, and, to a certain extent, of troops and stores. Their speed will be such as probably to secure them from the risk of capture, and will render them highly valuable for procuring intelligence of hostile movements. They may also be expected to furnish queen’s ships with men trained to steam navigation, and possessing an amount of local knowledge which cannot fail to be valuable in several ways.
“Again, it is not only in a military sense that rapidity of communication between all parts of the Bιitish empire tends to increase its security. While the mother country continues to exercise any control over the proceedings of the colonies, the inconveniences attending the delay of correspondence are severely felt, and speedy communication is of the highest consequence to the preservation of satisfactory relations between them.”
Within the last few years all references to armament or fitness for warlike services have disappeared from the mail contracts, but there has been in some of them a clause providing that the Admiralty may in cases of great public emergency charter vessels of the company at rates to be agreed on, but in case of difference as to such rates, or damages consequent upon such purchase or hiring, the same is to be settled by arbitration.
Since 1852, when the committee refused to accept vessels built of iron, many changes have taken place. There are no wooden mail steamers left: iron or steel has completely displaced wood as a material of construction for such purposes. The great development of incendiary projectiles in war, such as percussion shell, red-hot shot, and hollow shot filled with molten iron, not only led to the adoption of iron armour, and thus incidentally to iron frames and skin as well, but showed also that wooden ships would be rapidly set on fire in an action. In the ironclad ship the objection raised to iron for the structure of war ships, viz., that the plating and riveting could be driven out in numerous and dangerous fragments by projectiles, does not hold. The experiments on the “Simoom” targets (1849-51) were doubtless in the minds of the officers who made the reports referred to above, and they must not be forgotten.
There are now many ships for fighting purposes built with iron frames and iron skin, and without armour; but in most of these cases there is stout wooden planking wrought over this iron skin, with the express object of obliging projectiles passing right through the ship to punch a hole in the side by which they pass out, instead of driving off masses of plating by the breaking of the rivets. There can be no doubt also that plates are better, and riveting is sounder now, than they were apt to be twenty years ago. The iron ships in the merchant navy have not this protection. It is difficult to estimate the precise gravity of the defect, but there is no doubt that it is sufficiently important to make proper division into compartments imperative, so as to give time to cover a damage in the side under water. But, unfortunately, a proper subdivision into compartments, of which the divisional bulkheads rise a sufficient height above the water, is very rare in merchant ships, even in mail steamers. If the compartments are so large and the tops of the bulkhead so low that, by filling a compartment, the top of the bulkhead is brought below the level of the water outside the ship, the loss of the ship is inevitable. Moreover, these ships are, as a rule, very narrow in proportion to their displacement, and their risk of foundering, by the filling of a compartment, is thereby greatly increased, because a narrow ship loses its stability rapidly under these circumstances, and will turn over.
Another disadvantage is the height of the engines and boilers. In ships of war of the size of the mail steamers, and indeed in nearly all, of whatever size, the engines and boilers are kept below the water, and fairly out of the reach of shot. But in modern mail steamers the engines are worked with their cylinders standing some feet above the load water-line. The advantage of this arrangement, in point of economy of working, is very great, but it involves serious risk in a fighting ship.
In 1856 a most important event occurred seriously affecting this question, viz., the signing of what is known as the Declaration of Paris, a sort of rider to the treaty of Paris of March 1856, by which declaration it was laid down that, “whereas it was formerly legal to grant royal commissions to private owners to equip, arm, and man private cruisers, to capture the commerce of the enemy for their own profit, this shall no longer be legal; that, while the cruisers of the state may capture and destroy private ships belonging to subjects of the hostile state, they may not, as of old, search neutral ships in the open seas to discover and confiscate hostile property contained in them, but only to verify their right to fly the neutral flag, and to discover and confiscate property held to be contraband of war, destined for ports of the enemy.”
This was in fact a ratification in perpetuity of an order in council of the 25th of March 1854, by which, on the outbreak of war with Russia, Great Britain consented to “waive her maritime rights” and allow enemies’ goods to be carried in neutral bottoms without liability to seizure.
All the parties to the treaty of Paris agreed to this declaration, and the rights it confers on neutrals are rights now common to all the European powers. Under its operation neutrals would doubtless insist on exercising for their own profit the right of carriage into and out of those ports of a belligerent which were not effectively blockaded by the enemy. Privateering being abolished, so far as the European powers are concerned, each maritime nation would seek, on the outbreak of war, to incorporate into the state navy the fastest and most powerful merchant ships it could obtain. Each war navy would become strengthened by the addition of merchant ships capable, at whatever risk to themselves, of mounting guns, of ramming, and of employing the torpedo. By this means the naval power would depend, not only on the strength of the war navy, but also upon the strength and excellence of the national mercantile marine. For this purpose only the fastest ships would be useful, and all the rest would fall a prey, in any encounter, to the fast ships in the hands of an enemy.
The great importance attached to the possession of such fast ships may be seen from the figures given below.
British registered merchant ships, sailing and steam (38,939)—esti-Tons.
mated gross tonnage in 1880 10,200,000
Of this the proportion of steamers (6903) was 4,400,000
At the same date the whole number of British ships built and building having an average ocean speed of 12 knots and upwards did not exceed 400; and ships of this speed built and building for all other maritime powers taken together did not reach 100. The onlypow’ers possessing such ships were France, Germany, Holland, Spain, United States, Italy, and Belgium.
Between 1875 and 1882 the number of English merchant steamers of 13 knots ocean speed and upwards increased from 25 to 65, of 14 knots and upwards from 10 to 35, and the maximum speed rose from 15 to 17 knots.
Since 1875 the Admiralty have been engaged in forming a list of all ocean-going British ships which, being reasonably divided into compartments, might be armed in the event of war. The number on this list having an average ocean speed of 12 knots and upwards is, in 1883, 112, with a total gross register tonnage of 451,470 tons.
The number of men and boys actually employed in 1880 in registered British sea-going vessels was nearly 200,000, of which nearly 12 per cent, were foreign and the rest British.
Sir Thomas Brassey estimates that there are in the British mercantile marine 407,000 seamen, exclusive of men in British ships in the colonies and abroad. The total number includes— [table]
Naval Guns.— From time immemorial smooth-bore guns in cast iron, or bronze for the smaller calibres, had been used for throwing spherical shot with charges not exceeding one-third the weight of the shot.
The first use of rifled guns in the navy was in 1859-60, when Mr (now Sir William) Armstrong’s breech-loading 40-pounder and 100- pounder guns were issued to the service. The elongated shot or shell and cartridge were entered from the rear, through a hollow screw. A breech piece in which the vent was formed was dropped through a slot in the breech of the gun, and, being tightened up by the hollow screw, closed the bore. The projectile was coated with lead to take the polygroove rifling. It fired much more accurately than the smooth-bore; but in 1863, the method of closing the breech having proved inefficient on service in Japan, the manufacture was discontinued.
In 1865 muzzle-loading guns were adopted, built on Armstrong’s principle of welded wrought-iron coils round a steel tube, rifled on the “shunt” principle, in which a studded projectile was rammed down grooves in the bore, rather deeper than those by which it was afterwards driven out. The guns gradually increased in weight up to the 12-inch 38-ton gun and 16-inch 80-ton gun. In 1876 the 80-ton gun was fired with a projectile of 1700 lb and a charge of 425 lb at a target composed of four 8-inch iron plates with 5-inch intervals filled with teak, and perforated it. The charge of this gun was afterwards increased to 450 lb of prismatic powder.
In 1873 the advantage of an increased diameter of the powder chamber was recognized and adopted in the 38-ton gun, but in order to utilize this chamber in a muzzle-loading gun the cartridge had to be made small enough to pass through the bore and afterwards expand in the chamber. This involved an awkward cartridge. Breech-loading obviated this difficulty. The use of slow-burning powder required a considerably increased length of bore, and made muzzle-loading exceedingly difficult. Breech-loading also offered greater facility for closing the windage of the shot. These causes have led to a return to breech-loading. The system adopted is the French intercepted screw. The plan of reinforcing the steel tube by wrought iron coils has been abandoned, and the approved system of construction is a steel tube, supported by a steel breech, which takes the breech screw and extends to the trunnions, reinforced by one or more layers of steel hoops shrunk on. These guns throw an elongated projectile of about three and a half calibres of the bore in length, with a charge nearly half the weight of the shot, which gives a velocity approaching 2000 feet per second. The powder pressure (17 or 18 tons on the square inch) is no higher than it used to be, but is longer sustained. A few only of these guns are yet afloat.
Boats’ guns are similar in type, but of solid steel. The projectiles are the Palliser chilled shell, or cored shot; the common shell, which contains about one-tenth of its weight of powder; the shrapnel shell, which contains bullets and a small charge to liberate the bullets; and the case shot, which is a thin case containing small shot for short ranges.
These guns will be made of all calibres and weights. Those already tried are the 12-inch 43-ton, 10 ’ 4-inch 26-ton, 9 ’ 2-i∙nch 18- ton, 8-inch ll-ton, 6-inch 4-ton, 5-inch 36-cwt., 4-inch 22-cwt.
The Gatling gun is ten-barrelled revolving. It throws bullets of the same size as the rifle. An improved feed has just been tried, and with it the gun is capable of discharging 1000 rounds a minute. To guard against the attack of torpedo boats a rapid-firing gun of sufficient power to penetrate their sides was necessary, and for this purpose a four-barrel gun, invented by Mr Nordenfelt, was adopted, and is now supplied to all ships. Quick-firing 6-pounder guns are now under trial capable of firing shot or shell.
Cost of the Navy.— Sir Thomas Brassey says, “In considering the general question of our naval expenditure, it is necessary, in justice to those to whom its administration has been entrusted, to look back over a series of years, and to compare the fluctuations in that expenditure with the growth in the value of the trade for the protection of which our navy is maintained. In the year 1858-59 the effective expenditure for the navy was £7,106,100, and non-effective £1,334,000. In 1870-71 the effective expenditure was £7,308,000, while the non-effective had increased to £1,705,000. The estimates for the ensuing year (1881-82) provide for an effective expenditure of £8,434,000, while the non-efiective expenditure amounts to £2,063,000. If we compare the expenditure of the army in the same interval, we find that the effective expenditure has grown from £9,337,000 to £12,797,000, with an increase of half a million in the non-effective expenditure.
“The increase in the foreign trade and tonnage of our merchant navy has been out of all proportion with the increase in our naval expenditure. The total tonnage of British merchant ships was 5,711,000 tons in 1860, 7,149,000 tons in 1870, and 8,462,000 tons according to our last returns. Reckoning the carrying power of steamships as fourfold that of sailing ships, we have half the mercantile tonnage of the globe.
“Germany, with a mercantile tonnage of 1,129,000, spends £890,000 on the maintenance and construction of her fleet. France, with 976,000 tons of merchant shipping, expends £2,893,000 on building and repairs, and employs 26,000 workmen in her dockyards. England, with an excess of tonnage over the French mercantile marine of 7 million tons, employs only 16,000 men in her dockyards, at an expenditure, under votes 6 and 10, of £3,323,000. With these figures before us, it cannot be said that England is leading the way in an aggressive policy, or in the direction of extravagance.”
Comparative View of Navies.— A comparison of the matériel of modern navies would be very misleading if it only took into account the number and power of the regular ships of war, because for some important services there is but little difference between the value of the ship built for war purposes and of that only adapted to such purposes at need. The increasing vulnerability of the ship of war, however carefully built, to weapons which the adapted merchant ship can employ is one of the most notable features in the modern aspect of maritime warfare. The statesman who desires to estimate the naval resources of empires or states will need to consider the quality and extent of their mercantile marine in fast steamships and trained men as well as the number and efficiency of their regular ships of Avar, and their actual war personnel. A comparison limited to armoured or ironclad ships is vitiated by the defect that it does not account for the protection afforded to what are called unarmoured ships by other means than that of armouring their sides. This is fast becoming so considerable that a new term has been introduced (protected ships) to distinguish such vessels from ordinary unarmoured fighting ships.
The fairest available approximate measure of the power of the ships is their displacement or total weight. It always represents power of some kind, although in many cases the distribution of the various elements of power in the ship may be badly suited for many phases of war. Taking this as a measure, and reckoning, not only completed or practically completed ships, but also those in various stages of building, .the maritime powers named stand as follows, first as to tonnage of armoured ships, secondly as to unarmoured ships, and thirdly as to both taken together:— [table]
The following facts are noteworthy in connexion with the above figures. (1) Germany, which launched her first ironclad ship in 1864, has not launched one since 1880, and has not one on the slips. (2) The armoured tonnage launched by Italy (1876-83) is greater than that launched by Germany during the same period. (3) The French armoured ships launched before 1873 are, with insignificant exceptions, built of wood. Every armoured ship the French are now building or completing (1883) is of iron or steel. (4) France has in process of construction, i.e., building or completing, an ironclad navy equal in tonnage to the entire ironclad navy of Germany or Italy built and building; and equal also in tonnage to all the completed ships in her own navy launched during the previous ten years. (5) France expended in building and completing ships for sea in 1873—77 only one-half what was spent by England in those years. Since 1877 her expenditure on this service has usually equalled, and generally exceeded, that of England.
A general survey shows that the great cost of maintaining a regular war navy is tending to limit its production and employment in states which either are not wealthy or are obliged to maintain large armies. This must be an increasing tendency for the following reasons. (1) There is a growing necessity for high speed. Commerce increases its speed, and war must at least equal it. High speeds and fair fuel endurance require large coal supplies. The ship with a high speed and large coal supply is already a large ship. To protect such a ship efficiently with armour demands the highest quality of protective material over considerable areas. There is then a further demand for powerful artillery for the purpose of dealing with such armour in an adversary. The attack is constantly developing new methods, and demanding not only the adoption of its weapons but also the creation and adoption of corresponding defences against them. So it comes about that nothing but a large and costly ship can take first rank in a regular war navy. (2) The ships so produced need high training in officers and men, and the costly matériel must be accompanied by a correspondingly costly personnel. (3) The warlike usefulness of such ships is narrowed perpetually by the rapidly increasing power of fortresses, aided by torpedoes and torpedo boats, to protect harbours and towns against both attack and blockade. It is narrowed also by their inability to compete in speed and coal endurance with ships not protected or armed. (4) Lastly, and more generally, the occupation of the seas by shipping tends to increase, for economical reasons, in proportion as human labour is divided and specialized, and commodities interchanged. This growth in shipping and in the seafaring population will reduce the significance and importance of the single ship of war which it has cost so much to produce.
Personnel of the Navy.
The personnel of the British navy is composed of two different bodies of men, the seamen and the marines, each of which has its appropriate officers. The latter body is the subject of a separate article (see Marines). Officers.— The officers of the navy, exclusive of the marines, are divided into two distinct branches—the military and the civil.
1. The military, or executive, branch consists of the undermentioned officers, classed in the order of their rank:—flag-officers, commodores, captains, staff captains, commanders, staff commanders, lieutenants, navigating lieutenants, sub-lieutenants, chief gunners, chief boatswains, chief carpenters, gunners, boatswains, carpenters, midshipmen, naval cadets.
Flag-officers are divided into three ranks, viz., rear-admiral, vice-admiral, admiral. Formerly there were three subdivisions of each grade, according as the officer belonged to the white, blue, or red squadrons, but this distinction has been abolished (see Admiral). There is also the rank of admiral of the fleet: such an officer, if in command, would carry the union flag at the main.
The civil powers and duties of the lord high admiral, or lords commissioners of the Admiralty, are treated of in the article Admiral. Their military powers are more extensive and important. By their orders all ships are built, repaired, fitted for sea, or laid up in reserve, broken up, or sold, put in commission or out of commission, armed, stored, and provisioned, and employed on the home or foreign stations, or on voyages of discovery. All promotion in the several ranks emanates from them; all honours bestowed for brilliant services, and all pensions, gratuities, and superannuations for wounds, infirmities, and long services are granted by them or on their recommendation. All returns from the fleet are sent to the Board of Admiralty, and everything that relates to the discipline and good order of every ship. All orders for the payment of naval moneys are issued to the accountant-general of the navy by the lords commissioners of the Admiralty; and the annual estimate of the expenses of the navy is prepared by them, and laid before parliament for its sanction. All new inventions and experiments are tried by their orders before being introduced into the service; all designs of ships must be approved by them; all repairs, alterations, and improvements in the dockyards, and all new buildings of every description, must be submitted for their decision before they are undertaken.
All flag-officers, commanders-in-chief, are considered as responsible for the conduct of the fleet or squadron under their command. They are bound to keep them in perfect condition for service ; to exercise them frequently in forming orders of sailing and lines of battle, and in performing all such evolutions as may occur in the presence of an enemy; to direct the commanders of squadrons and divisions to inspect the state of each ship under their command; to see that the established rules for good order, discipline, and cleanliness are observed; and occasionally to inquire into these and other matters themselves. They are required to correspond with the secretary of the Admiralty, and report to him all their proceedings.
Every flag-officer serving in a fleet, but not commanding it, is required to superintend all the ships of the squadron or division placed under his orders,—to see that their crews are properly disciplined, that all orders are punctually attended to, that the stores, provisions, and water are kept as complete as circumstances will admit, that the seamen and marines are frequently exercised, and that every precaution is taken for preserving the health of their crews. When at sea, he is to take care that every ship in his division preserves her station, in whatever line or order of sailing the fleet may be formed; and in battle he is to observe attentively the conduct of every ship near him, whether of the squadron or division under his immediate command or not; and at the end of the battle he is to report it to the commander-in-chief, in order that commendation or censure may be passed, as the case may appear to merit; and he is empowered to send an officer to supersede any captain who may misbehave in battle, or whose ship is evidently avoiding the engagement. If any flag-officer be killed in battle his flag is to be kept flying, and signals to be repeated, in the same manner as if he were still alive, until the battle shall be ended; but the death of a flag-officer, or his being rendered incapable of attending to his duty, is to be conveyed as expeditiously as possible to the commander-in-chief.
The captain of the fleet is a temporary rank, where a commander-in-chief has ten or more ships of the line under his command; it may be compared with that of adjutantgeneral in the army. He may either be a flag-officer or one of the senior captains; in the former case, he takes his rank with the flag-officers of the fleet; in the latter, he ranks next to the junior rear-admiral, and is entitled to the pay and allowance of a rear-admiral. All orders of the commander-in-chief are issued through him, all returns of the fleet are made through him to the commander-inchief, and he keeps ajournai of the proceedings of the fleet, which he transmits every three months to the Admiralty. He is appointed and can be removed from this situation only by the lords commissioners of the Admiralty.
A commodore is a temporary rank, and of two kinds,— the one having a captain under him in the same ship, and the other without a captain. The former has the rank, pay, and allowances of a rear-admiral, the latter the pay and allowances of a captain and special allowance as the lords of the Admiralty may direct. They both carry distinguishing pennants.
When a captain is appointed to command a ship of war he commissions the ship by hoisting his pennant; and if fresh out of the dock, and from the hands of the dockyard officers, he proceeds immediately to prepare her for sea, by demanding her stores, provisions, guns, and ammunition from the respective departments, according to her establishment. He enters such petty officers, leading seamen, able seamen, ordinary seamen, artificers, stokers, firemen, and boys as may be sent to him from the flag or receiving ship. If he be appointed to succeed the captain of a ship already in commission, he passes a receipt to the said captain for the ship’s books, papers, and stores, and becomes responsible for the whole of the remaining stores and provisions; and, to enable him to keep a proper check upon the ship’s accounts, he is allowed a clerk or assistant-clerk.
The duty of the captain of a ship, with regard to the several books and accounts, pay-books, entry, musters, discharges, &c., is regulated by various Acts of Parliament; but the state of the internal discipline, the order, regularity, cleanliness, and the health of the crews will depend mainly on himself and his officers. In all these respects the general printed orders for his guidance contained in the Queen’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions are particularly precise and minute. And, for the information of the ship’s company, he is directed to cause the articles of war, and abstracts of all Acts of Parliament for the encouragement of seamen, and all such orders and regulations for discipline as may be established, to be hung up in some public part of the ship, to which the men may at all times have access. He is also to direct that they be read to the ship’s company, all the officers being present, once at least in every month. He is desired to be particularly careful that the chaplain have shown to him the attention and respect due to his sacred office by all the officers and men, and that divine service be performed every Sunday. He is not authorized to inflict summary punishment on any commissioned or warrant-officer, but he may place them under arrest, and suspend any officer who shall misbehave, until an opportunity shall offer of trying such officer by a court-martial. He is enjoined to be very careful not to suffer the inferior officers or men to be treated with cruelty and oppression by their superiors. He is the authority who can order punishment to be inflicted, which he is never to do without sufficient cause, nor ever with greater severity than the offence may really deserve, nor until twenty-four hours after the crime has been committed, which must be specified in the warrant ordering the punishment. He may delegate this authority to a limited extent to certain officers. All the officers and the whole ship’s company are to be present at every punishment, which must be inserted in the log-book, and an abstract sent to the Admiralty every quarter.
The commander has the chief command in small vessels, such as sloops and gun-vessels. In larger vessels he is chief of the staff to the captain, and assists him in maintaining discipline, and in sailing and fighting the ship.
The lieutenants take the watch by turns, and are at such times entrusted, in the absence of the captain, with the command of the ship. The one on duty is to inform the captain of all occurrences which take place during his watch,—as strange sails that may be in sight, signals from other ships in company, change of wind, &c. He is to see that the ship be properly steered, the log hove, and the course and distance entered on the log-board; and, in short, he is to see that the whole of the duties of the ship are carried on with the same punctuality as if the captain himself were present. In the absence of the captain, the commander or senior executive officer is responsible for everything done on board.
The navigating officer receives his orders from the captain or the senior executive officer. His more immediate duties are those of stowing the ship’s hold and attending to her sailing qualities, of receiving and placing the provisions in the ship, so as most conveniently to come at those which may be wanted. He is to take care that the cables are properly coiled in the tiers. The keys of the spirit-room are in his custody, and he is directed to entrust them only to the officer authorized to use them. He has the charge of the store-rooms of the warrantofficers, which he is ordered frequently to visit; and he is also entrusted, under the command of the captain, with the charge of navigating the ship, bringing her to anchor, ascertaining the latitude and longitude of her place at sea, surveying harbours, and making such nautical remarks and observations as may be useful to navigation in general. He. keeps the ship’s log-book and remark-book.
The warrant-officers of the navy may be compared with the non-commissioned officers of the army. They take rank as follows, viz., gunner, boatswain, carpenter; and, compared with other officers, they take rank after sub-lieutenants and before midshipmen. They are charged with the duty of receiving on board from the dockyards, and examining, the stores of their respective departments, and keeping an account of the expenditure of them.
The gunner has the charge of the ship’s artillery, and of the powder magazine. He is to see that the locks and carriages are kept in good order, and that the powder is preserved from damp; he is frequently to examine the musketry and small arms, and to see that they are kept clean and fit for service; and, in preparing for battle, it is his duty to take care that all the quarters are supplied with everything necessary for the service of the guns, and, during the action, that there be no want of ammunition served out. He is frequently to exercise the men at the guns, and to see that they perform this part of their duty with correctness. The armourer and his mates are under the immediate orders of the gunner in everything that relates to the great guns and small arms.
The boatswain is charged with all the stores belonging to his department, consisting chiefly of the ropes and rigging, the latter of which he is ordered to inspect daily, in order that any part of it chafed or likely to give way may be repaired without loss of time. He is always required to be on deck at such times as all hands are employed; he is bound to see that the men, when called, move quickly upon deck, and when there that they perform their duty with alacrity, and without noise or confusion. The sailmaker and the ropemaker are under his immediate orders.
The carpenter, when appointed to a ship, is carefully to inspect the state of the masts and the yards, whether in the dockyard or on board of the ship, to see that they are perfectly sound and in good order. He is to examine every part of the ship’s hull, magazine, store-rooms, and cabins. He is every day when at sea carefully to examine into the state of the masts and yards, and to report to the officer of the watch if any appear to be sprung, or in any way defective. He is to see that the ports are secure and properly lined, and that the pumps are kept in good order, as also the boats, ladders, and gratings. The caulker, carpenter’s mates, and carpenter’s crew are placed under his immediate orders.
The midshipmen are considered as the principal subordinate officers, but have no specific duties assigned to them. In the smaller vessels some of the senior ones are entrusted with the watch; they attend parties of men sent on shore, pass the word of command on board, and see that the orders of their superiors are carried into effect; in short, they are exercised in all the duties of their profession, so as, after five years’ service as cadets and midshipmen, to qualify them to become lieutenants, and are then rated sub-lieutenants provided they have passed the requisite examination, and are nineteen years of age.
2. The civil branch comprises the following officers, whose relative rank is stated against their names :— [table]
Chaplains shall not hold any naval rank, but shall retain, when afloat, the position to which theil’ office would entitle them on shore; and the chaplain of Greenwich Hospital shall be considered ths head of the chaplains, with the title of chaplain of the fleet.
The engineer, when first appointed to a steam-vessel, carefully examines the engines, screw (or paddles), and the boilers, and reports to the commanding officer any defects he discovers. He takes charge of all the engineer’s stores and tools, and keeps account of receipts and expenditure. He is never to quit the engine-room during his watch, and visits it frequently at all times day and night. The engineroom artificers, leading stoker, and stokers are under his immediate control.
The paymaster (formerly purser) has the charge of all moneys belonging to the crown, the conduct of all cash transactions, and the charge of all the ship’s provisions, and of the serving them out for the use of the crew. The regulations and instructions for his guidance are minutely detailed in the general printed instructions, with all the various forms established for the keeping of his accounts with the accountant-general of the navy, to whom he is immediately responsible. To assist him in the performance of his duties there are assistant paymasters and clerks. The captain, who is responsible for the strict performance of the duties of all the officers under his orders, acts as a check on the paymaster in many parts of his duty regarding the slop-books, muster-books, &c. He has also to count at uncertain times the cash in charge of the paymaster, and to see that it corresponds with the balance per account. For store duties the paymaster has also a steward under his immediate orders.
The duties of the medical inspectors of hospitals and fleets, the medical officer of a ship and his assistants, the secretary to the commander-in-chief, the chaplain, the naval instructor, and inspectors of machinery afloat are too obvious to require specification.
The petty officers are very numerous; they are classified as chief petty officers and first and second class working petty officers.
The regulations under which candidates for the several branches of officer are received into the navy will be found in the Navy List, which is published quarterly under the authority of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty. The limits of age vary with the line chosen. Cadets are entered between the ages of twelve and thirteen and a half, and. they must pass after entry two years in study on board the “Britannia” before final examination and transmission to a sea-going training ship. Since the foundation and opening of Greenwich Naval College, on 1st February 1873, very great facilities have been given for the higher education of naval officers of all ranks from sub-lieutenants to captains. Engineer officer students are also received.
By an order in council, the following regulations are established for the promotion of commissioned officers of the navy. Midshipmen are required to serve five years as midshipmen or cadet on board some of Her Majesty’s ships to render them eligible to the rank and situation of lieutenant; and they must be nineteen years of age. To qualify an officer for sub-lieutenant, he must have served the time, and passed the examination, required to qualify for a lieutenancy. No lieutenant can be promoted to the rank of commander except for gallantry in action until he has served four years as lieutenant, three of them at sea; and no commander to the rank of captain except for gallantry in action until he has served two years as commander, one of them at sea. Captains become admirals in succession according to their seniority on the list, provided they shall have commanded four years in a rated ship during war, or six years during peace, or five years in war and peace combined. Appointments as navigating lieutenant (formerly master) are no longer made. The old list of masters, now subdivided into staff captains, staff commanders, and navigating lieutenants, will gradually die out, and the duties will be performed by lieutenants and commanders. No person can be appointed gunner unless he shall have served seven years, one of them as gunner’s mate or other petty officer, or seaman gunner, on board one or more of Her Majesty’s ships; and he must produce a first class certificate in gunnery, and certificates of his good conduct, and undergo the necessary examination. No person can be appointed boatswain unless he shall have served seven years,,—one complete year with the rating, and actually doing the duty, of a petty officer in Her Majesty’s navy; and he must produce certificates of good conduct, and undergo the necessary examination. No person can be appointed carpenter unless he has been six months a carpenter’s mate or caulker, or twelve months with the rating of shipwright or carpenter’s crew, on board one or more of Her Majesty’s ships. No person can be appointed chaplain to one of Her Majesty’s ships until he has received priest’s orders. No person can be appointed paymaster or assistant-paymaster unless he shall have been rated and have discharged the duties of a clerk for three complete years, and shall produce good certificates. Admission to this class is by limited competition for assistantclerkships. Admission to the medical class is by open competition. Promotion from surgeon to staff surgeon is conferred on qualified officers twelve years from date of entry.
The long-continued wars towards the close of last century necessarily created a prodigious increase of the commissioned officers of the navy. Their numbers in the following five peace years were— [table]
In the year 1857 there were on the active list of the navy 371 captains, 530 commanders, 1122 lieutenants, and on the retired and reserved list 129 captains, 243 commanders with rank of captain (besides 113 commanders on reserved half-pay), 254 lieutenants with rank of retired commanders (besides 618 on reserved half-pay). The total number of captains was therefore 743, commanders 897, lieutenants 1740. The warrant-officers increased from the average of about 400 in 1793 and 700 in 1821 to upwards of 1000 in 1857. The total number of officers of the royal navy and royal marines in 1857 was upwards of 7300, excluding mates and midshipmen, clerks, warrant-officers, and engineers, who may be computed at 3000,— making a grand total of 10,300 officers of all ranks.
The chronic disproportion between the number of officers on the active list and the number for whom it was possible to find employment led to many difficulties. Promotion stagnated, and officers in the higher ranks remained in the service long after the time when in the ordinary course of things they should have been retired for age or infirmity. Several schemes of naval retirement were proposed to remedy the evil. Mr Childers, when first lord of the Admiralty in 1870, framed a scheme much of which remains in force, although amendments in it have be.en found necessary. Full details are given in the Navy List, and a large body of interesting matter connected with the subject may be found in a parliamentary paper dated 11th July 1872. The active list has been reduced to the number in each rank which is deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of the navy, and provision is made for a regular flow of promotion by requiring the retirement of officers at certain specified ages, or after non-service afloat, irrespective of age, for a given number of years. Improved retired pay has been accorded.
As the regulations stand at present admirals and vice-admirals are compulsorily retired at the age of sixty-five; rear-admirals at sixty, or if their flag has not been hoisted for ten years; captains are retired at the age of fifty-five, “or at any age if seven years have elapsed since they last served”; commanders at the age of fifty; lieutenants at forty-five, “or at any age if five years have elapsed since they last served”; sub-lieutenants (by order in council 5th February 1872) are compulsorily retired at the age of forty. Permission has been given to flag-officers, captains, commanders, and lieutenants to retire some years sooner than the age of compulsory retirement, and arrangements have been made by which they may commute their retired pay, or a part of it, for a lump sum. Staff captains are retired at the age of sixty, “or at any age if they have not served seven years”; staff commanders at fifty-five; and navigating lieutenants at forty-five, or after five years’ nonservice. Chief engineers are retired at fifty-five, or after five years’ non-service. Chaplains and naval instructors are retired at the age of sixty, or in case of non-service by the former after five years, by the latter after three years. Of medical officers, inspectors and deputy-inspectors of hospitals are retired at sixty, or after five years’ non-service; fleet surgeons, staff surgeons, and surgeons at fifty-five, or in each case after five years’ non-service. Paymasters are retired at sixty. Permission is accorded to these officers also to retire five years sooner than the maximum age.
A maximum establishment of warrant-officers has been fixed, and ages specified at which retirement is compulsory. The object has been to favour promotion, the employment of none but vigorous men, and to reduce the list to the maximum number it is considered desirable to employ.
At present (1883) the total number of the officers of the royal navy and royal marines is about 7900. Of these upwards of 2100 are in the ranks of engineer officers, sublieutenants, midshipmen, naval cadets, clerks, <fcc., and warrant-officers.
All officers of the navy wear a uniform, which is established in pursuance of the pleasure of the sovereign. It consists of blue cloth, with white collars and cuffs to the coats, and various embroidery and epaulets. The epaulets of the officers of the civil branch of the service are embroidered in gold and silver. The full dress, with cocked hats, is worn on state occasions and at courts-martial by all naval officers. The first naval uniform (blue and white) was established in 1748. The identical patterns then issued may now be seen in the United Service Institution. In the reign of William IV. the facings were for a short time changed to red. The last alteration of the uniform was in 1856. The existing regulations may at any time be ascertained by reference to the current number of the Navy List. Men.— The crew of a ship of war consists of leading seamen, able seamen, ordinary seamen, engine-room artificers, other artificers, leading stokers, stokers, coal-trim mers, boys, and marines. The artificers and stokers and the marines are always entered voluntarily, the latter in the same manner as soldiers, by enlisting into the corps, the former at some rendezvous or on board particular ships. The supply of boys for the navy, from whom the seamen class of men and petty officers is recruited, is also obtained by voluntary entry.
The conditions under which boys are entered in Her Majesty’s navy are as follows:—All entrants must understand that they are bound to serve continuously for ten years from the time of their attaining the age of eighteen; and they will be required to sign an engagement to that effect; but no.boy will be entered without the written consent of his parents, guardians, or nearest relations. The age for entry is from fifteen to sixteen and a half, and the following are the present standards as to height, &c., which, however, are liable to alteration :— [table]
They must produce a certificate of birth, or a declaration made by their parents or guardians before a magistrate, to show they are of the proper age. They must also be of sound constitution, not subject to fits, free from any physical defects or malformation, and able to read and write. No boys will be received from reformatories or prisons, or if they have been committed by a magistrate; but boys may be admitted from industrial school ships.
Able and ordinary seamen are seldom admitted direct into the navy, as the system of training boys proves very satisfactory. Volunteers are occasionally entered, especially from thç naval reserve, and no doubt a large supply of men could be obtained if sought for. The wages given in the merchant service may be higher, but in all other respects the treatment is far superior in the navy: the men have better provisions, continuous employment, and leave on full pay, are subject to much less fatigue and exposure to the weather, are well taken care of in sickness, and are entitled to pensions after twenty years’ service or when disabled.
Merchant seamen are admitted into the royal naval reserve, receive an annual payment by way of retainer, perform drill on board Her Majesty’s ships, and are engaged to serve in the navy in case of war or emergency. Including the fishermen and boys, who form the second and third classes of this reserve, it is to consist of about 20,000 men.
The speedy manning of the fleet, on the first breaking out of a war, is one of the most important duties that can fall on the naval administration. A variety of schemes have been brought forward for attaining this end, but all of them have heretofore failed of success, except the compulsory mode of raising men, under the authority of press warrants, issued by the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, by virtue of an order in council, renewed from year to year. On the occasion of the war with Russia in 1855, however, the fleet was manned, for the first time, without recourse to impressment. There likewise issues, on the breaking out of a war, a proclamation from the sovereign, recalling all British seamen out of the service of foreign princes or states; and commanders of all ships of war are directed to search foreign vessels for such seamen.
The impressment of seafaring men, however anomalous under a free constitution like that of Great Britain, is defensible on state necessity, until it can be shown that the fleet, on an emergency, is capable of being manned without resorting to that measure. In consequence of some doubts being raised on the legality of impressment in the year 1676, when the affairs of the Admiralty were managed immediately under the direction of the king and the great officers of state, a discussion was held on this point, when it was decided by the judges and crown lawyers, that the king had an indefeasible right to the services of his subjects when the state required them, and that the power of impressing seamen was inherent in the crown, seeing that without it the trade and safety of the nation could not be secured. In the Black Book of the Admiralty is an order by Sir Thomas Beaufort, high admiral to Henry IV., commanding the impressment of mariners for service, in the barge “E. de S.,” and punishments were provided for those who failed in service. The statute 2 Rie. II. c. 4 speaks of mariners being arrested and retained for the king’s service as of a thing well known and practised without dispute, and provides a remedy against their running away. By statute 2 & 3 Phil, and Μ. c. 16 any Thames waterman hiding during the execution of a commission of pressing for the royal service is liable to heavy penalties. By 5 Eliz. c. 5 fishermen are exempted from impressment. The subject of impressment is dealt with in many statutes down to the time of George III., and the power to impress in case of necessity is still conferred by the sovereign in the Admiralty patent. At the present stage of the world’s history, however, this power would not be enforced, except upon application of the maxim “salus populi suprema lex.”
The first instance of impressing men in Ireland seems to have been in the year 1678, when the lord-lieutenant received directions from the privy council to raise 1000 seamen for the fleet. In 1690 the lords-justices of Ireland were directed to assist the officers of the navy in impressing men in that kingdom. In 1697 a register was taken of all the seafaring men in Ireland, which amounted to 4424 men, of whom it is noted 2654 were Catholics. On several occasions, during Queen Anne’s reign, the lords-justices of Ireland received directions to raise men to serve in the fleet.
In Scotland the mode of raising men by impressment was unknown before the Union; but in various instances the council of Scotland was directed to raise volunteers for the fleet, each man to have 40s. as bounty.
In 1706 an experiment was tried for the speedy manning of the fleet, by virtue of an Act of Parliament, which required the civil magistrates of all the counties to make diligent search for all seafaring men, and 20s. were allowed to the constables for each man taken up,—the seamen to have pay from the day of delivery to the naval officers stationed to receive them; if they deserted after that, they were .to be considered as guilty of felony. By the same Act, insolvent debtors, fit for the service, and willing to enter it, were released, provided the debt did not exceed £30; and no seaman in the fleet was to be arrested for any debt not exceeding £20. The whole proceeding under this Act incurred a very heavy expense, and totally failed.
In the same year the queen referred to the prince of Denmark, then lord high admiral, an address from the House of Lords, relating to the three following points :— (1) the most effectual means for manning the fleet; (2) the encouragement and increase of the number of seamen; (3) the restoring and preserving the discipline of the navy. His royal highness submitted these points to such of the flag-officers and other commanders as could be assembled, who made a report, recommending (1) that a general register should be kept of all seafaring men in England and Ireland, and that all marines qualified to act as seamen should be discharged from the army; and (2) that not fewer than 20,000 seamen should be kept in employ in time of peace. With regard to the discipline of the navy, they observed that, no particular defect being specified, they could pronounce no opinion on that head.
Reserve. — In addition to the seamen and marines borne on the strength of the navy, there are four lines of reserves at the disposal of the Admiralty :—the coastguard, the seaman pensioner reserve, the royal naval reserve, and the royal naval artillery volunteers.
To qualify a seaman for admission to the coastguard he must be under thirty-seven years of age, have completed eight years’ continuous service in man’s rating, or such period as the lords commissioners of the Admiralty may from time to time direct, be either a seaman gunner or trained man, be in possession of at least one good conduct badge, and be recommended by his captain.
Petty officers and seamen of Her Majesty’s navy, on being pensioned for length of service, are eligible for enrolment in the seaman pensioner reserve provided they are either seamen gunners or trained men, and are under forty-five years of age. Men in the seaman pensioner reserve are required to undergo fourteen days’ training annually, and on attaining the age of fifty they are granted the Greenwich Hospital age pension and exempted from further drill, provided they have attended drill every year, and not less than six periods of such drill.
The royal naval reserve comprises those officers and men of the mercantile marine and fishermen who are willing, in consideration of a small retaining salary, to undergo each year a certain number of days’ training on board a ship of war or at a naval reserve battery. The regulations in force for the appointment of officers to the royal naval reserve are published in each issue of the Navy List. The men are divided into three classes. (1) For enrolment in the first class a man must be under thirty years of age, and show proof of at least eight years’ sea service in foreign-going or regular coasting vessels within the ten years immediately preceding his application, and must have obtained and held the rating of A. B. three years prior to the expiration of such service, or have completed his indentures as an apprentice for a term of not less than four years, one year of which has been served in foreign-going or regular coasting vessels. Men who have been discharged from the royal navy as able seamen with good characters may be enrolled in the reserve if they are physically fit, provided they do not exceed thirty-five years of age. (2) Candidates for enrolment in the second class reserve must not be under nineteen nor above thirty years of age, and must have followed a seafaring life either in foreign-going, coasting, fishing, or other vessels for three years, of which six months at least must have been as ordinary seaman; they must know the compass, and be able to steer and to pull a good oar. (3) Boys who have been eighteen months under training in a mercantile training ship are eligible for enrolment in the third class reserve at the age of sixteen, provided they are under engagement to join a merchant ship for sea service, are physically and mentally fit, and can show satisfactory proficiency in gunnery drills, as well as in certain elementary subjects connected with navigation and seamanship. They are eligible for promotion to the second class at the age of nineteen provided they have served six months at sea, and afterwards to the first-class reserve when in all respects qualified as above. Every enrolment in the royal naval reserve is for a period of five years, and on promotion from a lower to a higher class the man is required to re-enrol. The force was originated in 1859, and the officers and men are liable to be called out for general service in the fleet in the event of war.
The royal naval artillery volunteers are enrolled under conditions somewhat akin to those attaching to enrolment in volunteer regiments. Brigades of this force have been formed -at London, Liverpool, and Bristol, with batteries at Brighton, Hastings, Southport, Birkenhead, Carnarvon, Bangor, and Swansea.
The discipline of the navy, or the government of Her Majesty’s ships, vessels, and forces by sea, is regulated by the Naval Discipline Act 29 & 30 Vict. c. 109. The Consolidation Act 22 Geo. II. c. 33 replaced the first parliamentary enactment for the government oι the fleet (13 Car. II. § 1, c. 9), and was passed after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, “to remedy some defects which were of fatal consequence in conducting the preceding war.” Previously to the statute of Charles II. the government and discipline as well as the pay of the navy had depended, like the government and pay of the army, upon the quasi-household orders of the sovereign.
Under the Naval Discipline Act, the lords commissioners of the Admiralty are empowered to order courts-martial for all offences mentioned therein, and committed by any person in and belonging to the fleet and on full pay; and also to delegate the same power to officers in command of fleets and squadrons on foreign stations, which power also may devolve on their successors in case of death or recall. By this Act no court-martial can consist of more than nine or of less than five persons, to be composed of such flag-officers, captains, commanders, and lieutenants, then and there present, as are next in seniority to the officer who presides at the court-martial. Commanders and lieutenants are not required to sit when four officers of higher rank, and junior to the president, can be assembled.
The former penalty of death for cowardice, or other neglect of duty, in time of action, and for not pursuing the enemy, was, by the 19th George III., so far mitigated as to authorize the court-martial “to pronounce sentence of death or to inflict such other punishment as the nature and degree of the offence shall be found to deserve.” Under these articles thus mitigated, Admiral Byng would probably not have been condemned to death. The provisions of the present Act (29 & 30 Vict. c. 109) confine sentence of death, without alternative, to cases of traitorous misconduct in the presence of the enemy, and murder. All other offences which were formerly capital may now be dealt with either by sentence of death or by such other punishment as the court may think fit to award under the provisions of the Act; and penal servitude or imprisonment, with dismissal from the service, are now the severest sentences awarded, flogging having been practically abolished.
The discipline of the navy is also maintained by a system of summary punishments, including short terms of imprisonment, which can be awarded by the captains of ships, under the regulations issued from time to time by the lords of the Admiralty.
The first regular code of printed instructions would appear to be that known as the Duke of York’s Sailing and Fighting Instructions, bearing date about 1660, which formed the basis of all the subsequent ones. Much, however, of the internal discipline of a ship of war depends upon the captain; that officer being empowered to punish the men for minor offences, according to the usage of the service, courts-martial on seamen are rarely found necessary in well-regulated ships. In 1853 a more uniform system, defining the nature and duration of minor punishments, was promulgated by the Board of Admiralty.
By the general printed instructions, the captains of Her Majesty’s ships are required to accustom the men to assemble at their proper quarters, to exercise them at the great guns, to teach them to point, fire, &c., under all circumstances of sea and weather. Practice in these respects is obviously much more necessary on board ships than on shore.
At Portsmouth and Devonport regular instruction is given in the theory and practice of gunnery, in the principles which regulate projectiles, in the theory and manipulation of torpedoes, in the use of small arms, and in all the scientific departments of the art of war. Cheinistry and electricity as applied to war and warlike stores are also taught practically, and every inducement is given to officers to study and to qualify for the post of gunnery officers in the fleet. Extra rates of pay are given to gunnery lieutenants according to their proficiency. For the training of the men, who up to 1852 were almost devoid of special skill, there was created a class of “seamen gunners” who act as instructors on board ship, under the orders of the gunnery officer. Examinations are held at stated times for the purpose of testing the progress made by officers under training. In the higher education of naval men at Greenwich College gunnery forms one of the principal features.
The necessity for this special training, and for special efforts to induce men to undergo it, will be evident upon comparison between the guns of thirty years ago and those of the present day. The cannon with which the greatest victories of the British navy were won were 12-, 16-, and 24-pounders. Out of 104 guns carried by Nelson’s “Victory,” 44 were 12-pounders, 30 were 24-pounders, and only 30 were 32 ’ s. In the Russian War, 56 ’ s and a few 68’s constituted the armament of the large war-ships. Now ships go about with 2000-pounder guns—of most scientific make and character. For the proper handling and management of these refined engines of destruction it is clear that very special knowledge and very careful training are required. The issues involved in miss or hit are too momentous to be left to careless or ignorant hands.
The state of health on board of a ship of war is, generally speaking, not exceeded in the most favoured spot on shore; and the sea-scurvy may now be considered as unknown in the British navy, since the universal introduction of lemon juice, or citric acid, without an ample supply of which no ship is permitted to sail on a foreign voyage. From the official returns collected by Sir Gilbert Blane, Μ. Dupin, a French author well versed in naval subjects, drew out the following table, which exhibits at one view the progressive diminution of sickness, death, and desertion in the British navy, calculated on 100,000 men :— [table]
Hence it would appear that the diminution of sickness and of deaths was in the proportion of 4 to 1 nearly between the years 1799 and 1813. The diminution of desertions from the hospital in the same period is not less remarkable.
The following returns, of more recent date, show the advance of medical science in this department :— [table]
Annexed is a memorandum showing the invaliding and death-rates in the navy afloat, including the deaths in hospital, from 1856 to 1881. Comparison with the dead lists of former years, even those cited above, will show the wonderful decrease caused by greater medical knowledge and better sanitary arrangements on board ship. This will be the more apparent when it is borne in mind that the old statistics show only the deaths in hospital, not those which occurred on board ship, through disease or the enemy. The high death-rate of 1870 is accounted for by the sad loss of the “Captain”; and those of 1878, 1880, and 1881 by the sinking of the “Eurydice” and “Atalanta” and the blowing up of the “Doterel.” [table]
The encouragement given to the navy from its first regular establishment has marked it as a favourite service. The sea-pay, the half-pay, and other emoluments have generally been superior to those enjoyed by the army, but subject to great fluctuations in every reign, and to frequent changes in the same reign. From the Black Book of the Admiralty it appears that the pay of the navy was fixed as follows in the time of Richard II.:—“If the admirall bee knight batchellor hee shall have every day at sea four shillings for himselfe, and for each chevalier gooing in his company two shillings, and for every escuier arme twelvepence a day; and shall have in consideration of thirty hommes d’armes, at the end of each quarter of a yeare, one hundred markes, and so hee shall have for every one. And shall also have for each archer sixpence a day. And soo everyone of his captains shall have theire wages of him. And if the admirall is a baron he shall have six shillings and eightpence a day; and if hee is an earle hee shall have thirteen shillings and fourpence a day.” The admiral had also fourpence in the pound for all wages paid for his fleet; but out of this he had “in the night tyme, all the while that the fleet is at sea, to carry at the topp of his mast two lanthornes, to the end that all the masters of the ffleet my know and perceive by the light and the admirall’s course, what course they shall steer.” “As to the marriners wages upon the voyages of the king or the admirall, each master of a shipp shall have sixpence a day, and every constable (or gunner) of the ffleet shall have the same wages by the day. Each marriner shall have threepence halfpenny per diem, and each marriner shall have sixpence per week for consideration” (or bounty), “and each sea boy shall have twopence halfpenny per diem.”
The establishment of half-pay was of slow growth. Though the navy, as we have seen, was put upon a regular establishment under the reign of Henry VI11., neither officers nor seamen received any pay or emolument in time of peace until the reign of Charles II., when in 1668 certain allowances were made to flagofficers and their captains out of the £200,000 a year voted for the whole naval service; and in 1674 certain other allowances were granted, by order in council, to captains who had commanded ships of the first and second rates, and to the second captains to flagofficers, on the ground, as assigned in the preamble, that they had undergone the brunt of the war, without sharing in the incident advantages of it, as prizes, convoys, and such like, which the commanders of the small classes of ships had enjoyed. But the first regular establishment of half-pay for all flag-officers, captains, first-lieutenants, and masters was by King William, in the year 1693, provided they had served a year in their respective qualities, or had been in a general engagement with the enemy. A regularly established half-pay was further sanctioned by an order in council of Queen Anne in 1700, the conditions of which were, that no officer should enjoy the benefit thereof who had absented himself without permission of the lord high admiral or lords commissioners of the Admiralty, or who had been dismissed for any misdemeanour or by court-martial, or who had not behaved himself to the satisfaction of the lord high admiral, or who should have leisure to go out of His Majesty’s dominions, if employed in the merchant service or otherwise, or who enjoyed the benefit of any public employment. Since the above period the rate of half-pay to the several officers of the navy has undergone various modifications. It has included within its area of benefit a larger number of classes of officers. It has also increased enormously in bulk as a non-effective service charge. So great was the increase in this respect, notwithstanding the subdivision of the half-pay list into “retired” and “reserved” sections in addition to the “active” half-pay list, that in the interest of the officers themselves, as well as of the country, it became necessary in 1869 to make a scheme of retirement, in accordance with which officers on the half-pay list, from whatever cause, for more than a prescribed number of years, were permanently retired, and allowed to draw a retired pay, or to commute for a capital sum the value of their pay. Half-pay is not given to officers below the rank of sub-lieutenant in the military branch, or of paymaster in the civil. For further details see the Navy List. Prize-Money.— This additional incentive to exertion on the part of officers and seamen on board ships of war dates from the earliest time. At an early date rules and regulations were made for the due apportionment of prize of war, a large portion going to the king and his admiral. In 1793 precise regulations, in the present sense of the word, were first issued. By them the proceeds arising from captures from the enemy were divided into eight equal parts, and were distributed by order of ranks. These have been amended from time to time, and were the subject of special orders in March 1854. The existing orders are contained in a royal proclamation dated May 1871, and direct, subject to the under-mentioned provisos, that one-thirtieth part of the value of prizes shall go to the admiral in command of the capturing vessels (if two admirals they are to divide the thirtieth, the senior taking two-thirds, the junior one-third), and of the remainder, or of the whole if no flag share is payable, the captain is entitled to a tenth of the entire proceeds. After these deductions the remainder of the net proceeds is to be distributed in ten classes, so that each officer, man, and boy assisting in the capture of the prize shall receive shares, or a share, according to his class. Officers in the first class, including inspectors-general of hospitals afloat, inspectors of steam machinery, secretary to commander-in-chief, are to receive forty-five shares each; in the second class, including senior lieutenant, staff surgeon, and certain paymasters, thirty-five shares each; in the third class, lieutenants, surgeons, captain of marines, and some others, thirty shares each; in the fourth class, including lieutenants of marines, sub-lieutenants, and warrant-officers, twenty shares each. To the fifth class twelve shares each are assigned; to the sixth, ten shares each; to the seventh, seven shares; to the eighth, including able seamen, four shares; to the ninth, including “idlers,” two shares; and to the tenth, boys, one share. Another source of emolument is the percentage charged upon treasure, which, for security’s sake, may be conveyed in ships of war on merchants’ account.
Another great encouragement for young men to enter the naval service arises from the honours bestowed by the sovereign for any brilliant exploit. Exclusive of peerages and baronetcies, the honours bestowed for gallant conduct in the naval service at present (1883) are the titles of knights grand-crosses of the military order of the Bath, and knights commanders and companions of the Bath, in addition to which there are the civil order of the Bath, and, for colonial services, the order of St Michael and St George, l<oyal medals have also been granted of late years for various naval services, and distributed alike to the officers, seamen, and marines; and a number of officers, seamen, and marines have received the Victoria Cross. Good-sörvice pensions are also awarded to a certain number of flag-officers, captains, and general and field-officers of marines. These are selected according to their standing, and length and nature of services, a statement of which is given, in each case, in the annual naval estimates presented to parliament. The amount of the good-service pension ranges from £100 to £300, according to rank and service. There are also naval and Greenwich Hospital pensions established for the relief of retired officers of long service, who are old, infirm, wounded, or disabled. Some of these pensions are allotted to each class of officers.
The cost of the British navy has necessarily varied with the times, with the materials used in the construction of ships, and with the number of men borne on the strength of the fleet. The highest number of men borne in the navy was in 1813—when 147,047 seamen and marines were borne, and when the total charge was £21,212,012, and the year ended with a navy debt of £8,562,291. This was the largest charge ever made for the navy, except in 1855 (the year of war with Russia), when the charge was £21,394,216.
Below is a statement showing the number of men voted, the number actually borne, and the charge, for typical years between 1690 and 1881 :— [table]
* Including marines, who first appear in 1702 to 1712, and disappear between 1713 and 1738.
f Including marines on shore.
j After excluding ordnance and conveyance of troops.
In reviewing her resources generally for manning the navy, England may, as Sir Thomas Brassey says, fairly look to the reserves, no less than to the number of men actually borne for fleet service. The coastguard on shore has been maintained for many years at an average strength of 4000 men. The naval reserves have averaged, between 1868 and 1881, 15,785 men. The same authority gave the following figures in 1882 :—pensioner reserve, 1560; first class royal naval reserve, 11,800; second class, 5600; third class, 150; and naval artillery volunteers, 1400. The total reserve for manning a war navy was considered by him to be not less than 40,000 men.
Personnel of Modern Navies Compared.
In any comparison of the personnel of modern navies, the question of the strength of the mercantile marine is more important than it is in relation to the matériel. Sir T. Brassey reminds us that, of the 140 English ships which were assembled to oppose the Spanish Armada, only 28 belonged to the royal navy, and that Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, who commanded the fleet under Lord Howard, were masters in the merchant navy; also that Howe’s victory of 1st June 1794 was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. It is estimated by the same authority that, if the system of naval conscription existing in France were applied to England so as to include, as it does in France, the crews of coasters, fishermen, boatmen, and the workmen in the private shipbuilding yards and the dockyards, there would be a roll of from 700,000 to 800,000 men.
France. — The system here was established under Louis XIV., and it comprises a term of compulsory service, by means of which France inscribes on her rolls some 170,000 men, of whom the great majority are fishermen.
The personnel of the navy below the rank of officer is recruited, (1) by the men of the maritime inscription, (2) by voluntary engagements, and (3) in the case of an insufficiency of men of the first two categories, by a contingent from the general recruiting of the country told off for the navy.
1. Every individual, having completed eighteen years of age, who has made two long voyages (au long cours} either on Government or on merchant ships, or who can count eighteen months of navigation or two years of coast fishing, and who declares his intention of continuing a seafaring life, is inscribed as a sailor, and can be levied for the service of the fleet. Every sailor who is inscribed is called into active service on completing twenty years of age. During the month in which he accomplishes his twentieth year, or during the month which follows his return to France, he is bound to present himself before a commissary of the maritime inscription. He is then enrolled, sent to a port which is the chief town of an arrondissement, and incorporated in a division of sailors of the fleet. If he be considered fit for service, he can, from the age of eighteen years, forestall his call to active service. The young sailor who joins at eighteen years of age performs his service in two periods. During the first, which lasts for five years, he may, when in France, be given renewable furlough without pay, and can then devote himself to navigation of any description. After this first period he remains for two years longer in the same conditions, on renewable furlough. The time passed in this position of renewable furlough is counted as service to the state for every sailor who engages to navigate only in coasting voyages or in home fishing. After this latter period the sailor cannot again be called out except by decree in case of emergency. After serving for three years, the sailor who has not been sent on furlough is entitled to an increase of 2d. to his daily pay. The levies of sailors for duty with the fleet are first made amongst those who have not hitherto rendered any service to the state, then, in case of insufficiency, amongst those who have the least service, or, in case of equal service, those are taken who have been longest on furlough. Inscribed sailors have alone the right of carrying on maritime navigation or coast fishing, and enjoy various other privileges and immunities. The minimum age for the engagement of naval apprentices is eighteen years, the privilege of making an engagement at sixteen years being reserved to young men leaving the school for ship boys, and to those specially selected by the minister. The maximum age for young men who have not rendered any service to the state is fixed at twenty-four years. This is increased to thirty for musicians, stokers, carpenters, sailmakers, and caulkers who can count at least five years’ previous service since the age of sixteen. For pupils and quartermaster mechanicians {quartiers-maîtres mécaniciens) and working mechanicians {ouvriers mécaniciens) the minimum limit of age is eighteen and the maximum twenty-five, if they have not previously served the state, or thirty if they belong to either of the callings above mentioned and have rendered previous service to the state.
2. Voluntary engagements are only allowed according to the requirements of the service. They cannot be made in the colonies. The conditions are the same as for the army. The engagement is made for five years. Re-engagements can be made by sailors of the fleet for three, four, or five years. They are without conditions of age or service, provided only that their length would not retain warrant officers {officiers mariniers) in the service beyond the age of fifty-five, and quartermasters and sailors beyond fifty, if they can unite with this age a service of twenty-five years.
3. For men of the navy who do not belong to the maritime inscription, the time of service is five years and in the reserve four years. They then pass immediately into the reserve of the territorial army, in which they remain until they attain forty years of age. The contingent is furnished in proper proportion from each canton, and is composed of the young men comprised in the first part of the cantonal recruiting list, to whom the lowest numbers have fallen when drawing lots.
The number of men obtained by the general recruiting was 6056 in 1873, 7040 in 1874, 6406 in 1875, and 4326 in 1876.
The sailors on shore are divided into five divisions, of which two (those at Brest and Toulon) are of the first class and three are of the second class. In each division there is a council of administration, entrusted with clothing and pay duties, and, in fact, with all administrative questions. Each first class division consists of a staff and of depot companies, as follows:—one company of seamen gunners {matelots canonniers), one company of seamen fusiliers {matelots fusiliers), one company of mechanicians and stokers, three companies of sailors of the maritime inscription, one company of sailors from the general recruiting. The divisions of the second class are each composed of a staff and depot companies as follows:—one company of special branches, two companies of sailors of the maritime inscription and from the general recruiting. Each of these companies is divided into two sections. The division at Lorient comprises, in addition, an instruction battalion of fusilier apprentices. In each division there is an elementary school, a school for teaching bookkeeping to quartermaster-serjeants, a gymnasium, a fencing school, and a swimming school. In the two first divisions there are also music schools. The first masters and second masters belonging to the different special branches and professions form the cadre of the warrant officers of the fleet. When of equal grade, they are classed in the following order:—navigation, gunnery, musketry, steering, mechanicians, carpenters, sailmakers, and caulkers. When not serving afloat or in the divisions, these masters are placed in disponibilité at their homes, with reduced pay, and are recalled to active service according to roster. The budget for 1878 shows that eighty-nine officiers de vaisseau are to be employed with the shore divisions of crews and with the establishment for pupils. The number of men provided for is as below (bandmasters, officers, quartermasters, sailors, boys, and supernumeraries):—onshore, 8438; afloat, 25,063; reserve, 1607; total, 35,108.
The marine infantry is not employed in service on board men-of-war in the same manner as the marines of the British navy. Its duties are to garrison the five military ports and the colonies, and to take part in maritime and other wars. When necessary, it furnishes detachments on board ships belonging to the state.
Germany. x — The whole of the maritime population, inclusive of the technical personnel, are absolved from land duties, but are liable to serve in the fleet. The distribution of the annual levy is dependent upon the seafaring population, the quota contributed by each state being deducted from its whole liability for the land and sea forces. It used to be the practice to draw exclusively from the seafaring population of the provinces of Prussia, Pomerania, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and other federal states, but it has been found necessary to draw upon the land population of the above provinces in order to make up the required quota.
The personnel of the navy includes the following officers, noncommissioned officers, and men :—1 chief of the admiralty, 4 rear-admirals, 17 (23) captains, 36 (63) captains of corvette, 65 (165) captain lieutenants, 104 (118) lieutenants, 86 (140) sub-lieutenants, and 100 (229) naval cadets, 83 (147) deck officers, 580 (1546) noncommissioned officers of seamen, 4290 (10,267) seamen, 330 (499) non-commissioned officers. Besides these there are 12 engineers, 90 (304) deck officers (engineers and masters), 110 (189) engineers’ mates, 28 engineers’ apprentices, 580 (2131) firemen, 154 (570) masters’ mates, 450 (698) mechanics, 84 (154) staff sergeants for police purposes.
Every German (except in a few well-defined cases) is liable to service in the army or navy, and is not allowed to provide a substitute nor to purchase exemption. Liability to service commences with the completion of the seventeenth year, and lasts until the close of the forty-second year of age. Of this time, twelve years must be passed in the standing army and landwehr in the case of a soldier, in the fleet and seewehr in the case of a seaman. All men liable to service, who may not be called into the standing army, fleet, landwehr, or seewehr, are liable to be called out in the landsturm in time of war. The estimated seafaring population of North Germany is about 80,000, including fishermen and dock labourers.
Italy. — The annual classification of all individuals fitted for sea service takes place according to fixed instructions. The men who are passed as fit and suited for the navy are divided into two categories by lot. Those of the first category are drawn into the service, and have to serve four years either on board or on shore (they pass the remaining six years on unlimited furlough). The men of the second category, however, are allowed to go at once on unlimited furlough, and are only called up in case of war or similar emergency. They are also liable for service for ten years. Volunteers and boys trained at the various naval training establishments are obliged to serve eight years continuously. The number of men per annum who reach the age rendering them liable for service is about 5050 on an average, of whom 2600 are fit or suited for the service. Of these, from 1500 to 1800 are placed in the first category (200 volunteers). Naval officers are chiefly obtained from the naval schools. Under-officers seldom obtain the rank of officer, and only then after a searching examination. The law on promotion of the year 1871 fixes the rules of promotion for all ranks.
The “corpo reale equipaggi” is divided into three divisions, each of which is under the command of a post-captain, and belongs to a “dipartimento.” The total establishment was as follows in 1875 :—741 able seamen, 5526 (including 200 boys) seamen and gunners, 704 artificers, 360 employed in “administration,” 1187 engineers and stokers, 168 “guardiani,” 29 invalids; total 8715 men. A body of men has been lately formed for torpedo defence. The estimated seafaring population of Italy is 225,000, chiefly fishermen.
Russia — The entire male population, without distinction of class, is liable to military service. The number of men required to complete the strength of the army and navy is fixed by the legislature every year on the recommendation of the minister of war, and promulgated to the senate by an imperial ukase. Admission to the service is determined by lot drawing, in which one class only of the population is annually called upon to take part, namely, that which includes all the males who have reached the age of twenty years on the 1st January of the year in question. Persons who have fulfilled certain educational conditions may relieve themselves from lot drawing by enlisting as volunteers. In the naval forces the ordinary term of service is ten years, namely, seven with the fleet and three in the reserve. The total number of young men who had attained the age of twenty years in 1880 was 794,000. The contingent to join on the 1st (13th) January 1881 was fixed at 235,000, and of this number 231,961 were enrolled. According to the statutes the number of sailors in the navy should be about 50,000. Of these in time of peace there are serving afloat 28,000, and employed ashore 12,000,—the remaining 10,000 being on unlimited furlough. In 1879 the appropriation of the conscripts actually enrolled in the navy was 4504 for the Baltic fleet, 446 for the Black Sea fleet, 72 for the Caspian flotilla, and 418 for the Siberian flotilla. The effective was on January 1, 1880, 2303 below the establishment.
Austria-Hungary. — The duty of military service is general, and must be fulfilled personally by every citizen capable of bearing arms. The term lasts for twelve years, of which three are spent in the standing army, seven in the reserve, and two in the landwehr; men who are incorporated in the landwehr at once serve in it for twelve years. In the navy the period of service is for ten years, of which three years are active and seven years reserve service. The conscription is confined to Dalmatia and the coast districts. One-third of the whole complement of officers and men required to man the fleet in time of war is kept continuously afloat in peace; the war complement is 8079 of all ranks, of whom 2700 are actively employed; the war complement comprises (besides rear-admiral and. staff of the squadron)—officers, &c., 571; sailors and gunners, 5428; navigating personnel, 362; naval police, 158; engine-room artificers, stokers, &c., 781; sanitary personnel, 53; tradesmen, 202; stewards, cooks, officers’ servants, &c., 524,—total, 8079. The peace effective of the corps of seamen is 6152, inclusive of the 400 boys in the training-ship “Schwartzenberg.” The total force on the war establishment is 11,532.
To show briefly the general result of all this organization of matériel and personnel, it is perhaps sufficient to state the number of ships in commission at a given date in the present year (1883), and the numbers of their crews.
Including stationary and harbour ships, tenders, training and drill ships, troop and surveying ships, there are from 230 to 240 ships and vessels in commission in the British navy, mounting about 1400 guns, and having a personnel, all told, of about 34,000 officers, men, and boys. Excluding the vessels specially referred to above, and taking only those which may be regarded as fighting vessels, the number in commission falls to about 100, with about 800 guns, and 22,000 officers, men, and boys in the crews. Comparing this with foreign navies, the proportions may be fairly stated as follows :— [table]
Of works on British naval history, the following, among others, may be consulted :—Nicolas, History of the Navy from the Earliest Times to 1422, 2 vols., 1847; Campbell, Lives of the Admirals to 1727, 4 vols., 1750, and afterwards continued by Berkenhout and Yorke down to 1816 in 8 vols., the last edition being that of 1870; Southey, Lives of the British Admirals, 5 vols., 1833 (from the Restoration); Lediard, Naval History of England to 1734, 1735; Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783, 1st edition, 3 vols., 1790; Brenton, Naval History from 1783 to 1836, 2 vols., 1837; James, Naval History from 1793 to 1827, 6 vols., many editions; Schomberg, Naval Chronology to 1802, 5 vols., 1802; Naval Chronicle from 1799 to 1818, 40 vols.; Allen, Battles of the British Navy from 1190 to 1840, 2 vols., 1852; Yonge, History of British Navy from 700 to 1862, 2 vols., 1863. The following deal almost exclusively with the matériel of the navy:—Charnock, History of Naval Architecture, 3 vols., 1801; Derrick, Memoirs of the Navy, 1806; Perigal, Chart of Naval History from the Earliest Period to 1859, 1860. (N. B.)
Navy of the United States.
The American navy came into existence shortly after the Declaration of Independence. As early as October 1775 Congress authorized the construction of two national cruisers, and, at the same time, appointed a marine committee to administer naval affairs. The first force, consisting of purchased vessels, badly fitted and built, and insufficiently equipped and manned, embraced two ships of 24 guns each, six brigs carrying from 10 to 12 guns, two schooners each with 8 guns, and four sloops, three of 10 guns and one of 4 guns. On December 22d a personnel of officers was selected, one of the lieutenants being the well-known Paul Jones. Ezekiel Hopkins was made commander-in-chief, but, having incuιτed the censure of Congress, he was dismissed early in 1777, and since then the title has never been revived except in the person of the president. In November 1776 the grades of admiral, vice-admiral, rear-admiral, and commodore were assimilated in rank and precedence to relative army titles, but they were never created by law until 1862. During the war a number of spirited engagements occurred, but there was a great lack of efficient material at home, and agents abroad were not able to enlist the active sympathies of nations or rulers. Benjamin Franklin did manage to equip one good squadron, but this was rendered almost useless by internal dissensions, and it required the victory of Paul Jones in the “Bon Homme Richard” over the “Serapis” to bring about any tangible result for the risk taken. During the war 800 vessels of all classes were made prizes, but the navy lost by capture 11 vessels of war and a little squadron of gunboats on the lakes; and, with 13 ships destroyed to avoid capture by the British, 5 condemned, and 3 wrecked at sea, the country was practically without a naval force between 1780 and 1785.
Owing to the depredations upon commerce of the Barbary powers, Congress in 1794 ordered the construction of six frigates, prescribing that four of them should be armed with 44 guns and two with 36 guns; but, the Berbers having made peace, the number of vessels was reduced one half, and no additions were made until 1797, when the “Constitution,” “United States,” and “Constellation” were built. Trouble with France from 1798 to 1801 resulted in the formation of four squadrons operating in the West Indies; these numbered 21 vessels in all, and, besides capturing nearly one hundred prizes, they gained experience and prestige by many short and decisive single actions. No further increase was made until 1802, when the war with Tripoli was declared; up to this time the navy had cost the country, including sites for navy yards, only £2,000,000. In 1803 the “gunboat policy” was revived, but, though 188 vessels of this class were built, their service was unimportant and their usefulness questionable.
At the breaking out of hostilities with Great Britain in June 1812, the naval force of the United States consisted of a number of gunboats fitted for the protection of rivers and inlets, and of 17 sea-going ships, 9 of which were below the frigate class. From the close of the war in 1815 until the beginning of hostilities with Mexico in 1846, the American navy was engaged in the suppression of the slave-trade and of piracy, and in voyages of exploration and discovery. In 1846 California, after being once relinquished, was seized, and during the war the United States vessels were employed in blockading or capturing the ports upon both seaboards of Mexico, and in co-operating with the army,—all hostilities ceasing in 1847 with the occupation of the city of Mexico. In 1848 Lieutenant Lynch commanded an expedition engaged on the exploration of the Dead Sea and the river Jordan; in 1856 the ‘ ‘ Advance” and “Rescue” searched for Sir John Franklin, followed later by the expeditions of Kane and of Hartstene; in 1854 Strain made a partial survey of the Isthmus of Panama; and in 1855 Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, in the “Vincennes,” went farther into the Arctic Ocean through Behring’s Strait than any previous navigator. In 1858 the Paraguay expedition successfully finished its work; and for many years, earnestly aided by Great Britain, a squadron was employed on the coast of Africa and in the West Indies for the suppression of the slave-trade.
The civil war broke out in April 1861, and its naval character was marked by two leading features: the first was that, while one side had a small force of naval vessels, which were generally good of their kind, the other entered the contest with absolutely nothing that could be called a man-of-war; the second was that, though certain developments in the character and construction of ships and weapons had been foreshadowed before the war, and had even been partially realized, it was during the progress of the struggle that those changes took place in marine warfare which amounted to a revolution. The effect of rifle and shell-fire, the employment of the ram, the destructive energy of torpedoes, the application of armour to the sides of vessels, and the superiority of iron-armoured ships—all taught in practice what theory had in vain asserted. At the commencement of hostilities the number of vessels of all kinds in commission was 76; 136 were purchasedin 1861, making the total 264, while the roll of enlisted men increased from 7500 to 22,000. At the close of the war there were 51,500 seamen and 7000 officers of all grades, and over 600 vessels; at the navy yards 6880 artisans were employed; 208 steamers were built, and 313 out of a total of 481 were purchased, all at a cost of over £3,000,000; 340 were afterwards sold for £1,500,000. On the 1st of January 1865 there were 5278 volunteer officers in service, but in 1870 this number had been reduced to 111, excluding 64 out of 305 applicants who had been admitted to the regular service. The Confederate navy was modelled precisely upon that of the Federal States. In the autumn of 1864, when at a maximum, it consisted of 16 ironclads, 3 of which were rated as floating batteries, of 50 wooden vessels, and of the rover “Shenandoah.” Abroad cruisers were of great assistance to the Confederacy, the most notable of these being the “Sumter,” “Alabama,” “Georgia,” “Florida,” “Rappahannock,” and “Shenandoah.”
Since the close of the war the United States navy has been doing excellent service in the peaceful pathways of science and humanity, the only warlike demonstrations having been that against Formosa in 1867 and that against Corea in 1870. Expeditions have been sent to the Arctic Ocean; ships have been employed in the survey of every sea; deep-sea soundings have been made both in the Atlantic and the Pacific; and five expeditions have tried to solve the problem of the best route for a trans-isthmian and inter-oceanic canal; scientific observers have occupied stations, and with important results, in the transit observations, and to-day the chain of telegraphic measurements of longitude around the whole world is the work of American naval officers.
Administration and Condition.— During the revolutionary war Congress through its committees and agents managed naval affairs. In 1789 these duties were entrusted to the secretary of war, and it was not until 1798 that the “department of the navy” was established. In 1815 a “board of commissioners for the navy” was constituted, but the Act provided that nothing in it should be construed to take from the secretary his control of marine affairs. In 1842 this law was repealed, and the bureau system, under which all the duties were divided specifically among five offices, was established; in 1862 there was a new division of responsibilities, and the eight bureaus now existing were created. Each of these is under the control of a naval officer, nominated by the executive and confirmed by the senate, all chiefs of bureaus having assigned them the temporary rank of commodore, actual or relative, when their own grades are below this. The bureaus are—(1) navigation, which controls all matters relating to pilotage and. navigation, with a direct superintendence of the naval observatory and of the hydrographic, signal, naval intelligence, Nautical Almanac, war record, compass, and detail offices,—this last having charge of the personnel of the service; (2) ordnance, which administers all artillery, ordnance, and torpedo matters; (3) equipment and recruiting, which is in charge of outfits, equipments, stores, recruiting, and apprenticeships; (4) yards and docks, which superintends the construction of docks, naval grounds, buildings, and all civil-engineering work; (5) medicine and surgery; (6) provisions and clothing, which is responsible for the supplies of food, water, and clothing, and manages the accounts, thus performing under one direction these duties relegated in the army to the quartermaster, commissary, and paymaster; (7) steam engineering, which designs and has the care of engines and boilers; and (8) construction and repair, which performs the same duties for ships. The first four bureaus are under the direction of line-officers of the navy.
There are no maritime districts in the United States, naval authority being limited strictly to the navy-yard government. At present there are seven navy yards and three naval stations, in which the general administration is entrusted to specific departments, all under the direct command of a line-officer of high rank, and each corresponding to a bureau of the central control. It is the intention of the Government to close all but three of the yards, maintaining those at New York, Norfolk, and San Francisco (Mare Island), together with a repair arsenal at Washington.
The judge advocate’s office and the Naval Academy are under the special supervision of the secretary. The Naval Academy ranks among the best institutions of the kind in the world. It is situated at Annapolis, Maryland, and is governed by a line-officer superintendent, assisted by an academic board made up of the heads of the departments of discipline and of studies, and with a corps of instructors drawn mainly from the line of the navy, with a few engineer and civilian assistants. All appointments of naval cadets are made by the president upon the nominations of members of Congress; each of the congressional districts, about three hundred in all, is entitled to one representative at the institution, admission after nomination being based upon a rigorous examination. The curriculum is for four years, supplemented by a two years’ cruise before final graduation.
Corresponding to Greenwich Hospital in its days of old pensioners is the Naval Asylum, situated at Philadelphia; and at New’port, Rhode Island, are the headquarters of the torpedo station and of the training system for apprentices. The naval experimental battery is at Annapolis, though not a part of the Naval Academy; and in all the large seaboard towns are rendezvous for the shipping of men, and branches of the hydrographic office for the dissemination of maritime information.
The personnel of the active list includes 1410 commissioned officers (602 of whom are at sea and 808 on shore), 7500 men, and 700 apprentices; there is also a corps of marine infantry, with 1887 enlisted men and 75 officers. All enlistments of sailors are voluntary, and for a period of three years, with special inducements for re-enlistment within a fixed period, and with the certainty of a pension or of a billet at the Naval Asylum after twenty-one years* service. There is no reserve, the active list representing the available force. For officers who have attained sixty-two years of age, or who have seen service for a term varying from forty to forty-five years, there is a retired list which entitles them without delay to 75 per cent, of their highest sea pay. Upon this list also there are officers, and in the Naval Asylum there are men, who are incapacitated for active service by reason of physical or other causes. Apprentices are enlisted between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, with obligatory service until the age of twenty-one is attained.
There are five foreign stations, divided geographically,—the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, European, Pacific, and Asiatic. In January 1883 there were 140 vessels of all kinds on the register, 23 of which were in commission for general cruising, and 5 were employed on special service. Three modern steel steamers are being built at a private yard, and Congress has under consideration a new construction plan; by an annual expenditure of $4,283,000 this will give in ten years a modern steel navy of 70 ships, in every λvay adequate to the demands of the country. The estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1885, require for the ordinary purposes of the navy $16,319,307'62, and for the increase of the navy, including the completion of four double-turreted monitors of the armoured fleet, $7,449,581'76, or a total of $23,768,889'38. The present effective cruising force is composed of 1 first rate, 14 second rates, and 21 third rates, or 36 in all; the available armoured vessels are 13 monitors of the old single-turreted type and 6 double-turreted monitors, lately rebuilt.
The coast survey and lighthouse establishment, both mainly in charge of naval officers, the revenue marine, life-saving, steamboat inspection, and marine hospital services, are all a part of the treasury department; the transfer of their control to the navy department is asked of Congress by the secretary of the navy, who also recommends the establishment, under his administration, of a bureau of mercantile marine, the duties of which -will be analogous to those of the mercantile marine department of the Board of Trade. (J D. J K. )
