APPEAL, in its usual modern sense, is the act by which a decision is brought for review from an inferior to a superior court In Roman jurisprudence it was used in this and in other significations; it was sometimes equivalent to prosecution, or the calling up of an accused person before a tribunal where the accuser appealed to the protection of the magistrate against injustice or oppression. The derivation from the word appello, naturally shows its earliest meaning to have been an urgent outcry or prayer against injustice. Hence it inferred a superior power capable of protecting against petty tyranny. In its meaning of seeking a higher tribunal for recourse against a lower, it does not seem to have been a characteristic of the Republic, where the magistrate was generally supreme within his sphere, and those who felt themselves outraged by injustice threw themselves on popular protection by provocatio, instead of looking to redress from a higher official authority. The Empire, however, introduced grades of jurdisdiction, and the ultimate remedy was an appeal to the emperor; thus Paul, when brought before Festus, appealed unto Caesar. It must be understood that the appeal was actually dealt with by a supreme judge representing the emperor, not by the emperor in person. In the Corpus Juris, the appeal to the emperor is called indiscriminately appellatio and provocatio. A considerable portion of the 49th book of the Pandects is devoted to appeals; but little of the practical operation of the system is to be deduced from the propositions there brought together....
The ecclesiastical hierarchy, and the gradations of the feudal system, naturally afforded scope in the Middle Ages for appeals from the lower to the higher authority. In matters ecclesiastical, including these matrimonial, testamentary, and other departments which the church ever tried to bring within the operation of the canon law, there were various grades of appeal, ending with the Pope. The European princes in general struggled against this assumption of authority by the court of Rome, and it was the source of many contests between the ecclesiastical and the regal power.
It became customary for ambitious sovereigns to encourage appeals from the courts of the crown vassals to themselves as represented by the supreme judges, and Charlemagne usually enjoys the credit of having set the example of this system of centralisation, by establishing missi dominici. The great vassals, however, sought recourse against the decisions of the royal courts in their own order, embodied as the great council or parhament of the nation, and hence arose the appeal to the House of Lords as the court of last resort.
When the progress of civilisation and the art of self-government render judges no longer amenable to the charge of tyranny or fraud, an appellate system changes its character and objects. It in some measure certainly tends to preserve that judicial integrity which renders it unnecessary as the immediate refuge of the persecuted suitor. But its ostensible object is the preservation of uniformity in the law. The attainment of this object renders it unfortunately necessary, in such a country as ours, that no tribunal shall give, in the first instance, in any important question, a decision which is not open to appeal. The process has the double advantage, that it has a tendency to bring every legal difficulty ultimately to one tribunal, where a uniformity of principle may be expected in the application of the law, and, at the same time, stimulates the exertions of the subordinate judge, who knowing that his proceedings will be revised, is careful to bring them as close as he can to those uniform principles of law, which he knows that the court of appeal
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