BALGUY, John, an eminent English theologian and moral philosopher, was born at Sheffield on August 12, 1686. He received his early education partly under his father, and partly under Mr Daubuz, his father’s successor, in the grammar-school of that town. He entered St John’s College, Cambridge, in 1702, graduated Bachelor of Arts in 1706, was ordained to the ministry in 1710, and soon after obtained the small living of Lamesly and Tanfield in the county of Durham. He married in 1715. It was the year in w hich Bishop Hoadley preached that famous sermon on The Kingdom of Christ, which gave rise to the long, wearisome, and confused theological war known as the “Bangorian controversy;” and Balguy, under the nom de plume of Silvius, began his career of authorship by taking the side of Hoadley in this controversy against some of his High Church opponents. In 1726 he published A Letter to a Deist concerning the Beauty and Excellency of Moral Virtue, and the support and improvement which it receives from the Christian Religion, chiefly designed to show that, while a love of virtue for its own sake is the highest principle of morality, religious rewards and punishments are most valuable, and in some cases absolutely indispensable, as sanctions of conduct. He supposed that a contrary opinion had been maintained by Lord Shaftesbury in his Inquiry concerning Virtue; but an examination of that essay will prove him to have in this respect done Shaftesbury injustice. In 1728 he was made a prebend of Salisbury by his friend, Bishop Hoadley. He published in the same year the first part of a tractate entitled The Foundation of Moral Goodness, and in the following year a second part, “illustrating and enforcing the principles contained in the former.” The aim of the work is ...twofold— to refute the theory of Hutcheson regarding the basis of rectitude, and to establish the theory of Clarke. His objections to Hutcheson’s theory are,—(1.) That it represents virtue as arbitrary and insecure by making it depend on two instincts, benevolent affection and the moral sense; (2.) That if true, brutes, since they have kind instincts or affections, must have some degree of virtue; (3.) That if such affections constitute virtue, the virtue must be the greater in proportion as the affections are stronger, contrary to the notion of virtue, which is the control of the affections; and (4.) That virtue is degraded by being made a result of instincts instead of being represented as the highest part of our nature. Clarke’s fundamental ethical principle, that virtue is conformity to reason,—the acting according to fitnesses which arise out of the eternal and immutable relations of agents to objects,— is the central and guiding thought in Balguy ’ s moral speculations, and even the source of what is most distinctive in his theology. His exposition of it is characterised by insight into its significance, and by ingenuity in disposing of the objections which had been urged against it. In 1729 he became vicar of Northallerton, in the county of York. His next work was an essay on Divine Rectitude; or, a Brief Inquiry concerning the Moral Perfections of the Deity, particularly in respect of Creation and Providence. It is an attempt to show that the same moral principle which ought to direct human life may be perceived to underlie the works and ways of God: goodness in the Deity not being a mere disposition to benevolence, but a regard to an order, beauty, and harmony, which are not merely relative to our faculties and capacities, but real and absolute; claiming for their own sakes the reverence of all intelligent beings, and alone answering to the perfection of the divine ideas. It is only, Balguy thinks, when the divine rectitude is thus viewed as aiming at order no less than at happiness, as acting according to the true reasons of things no less than from the affection of benevolence, that such facts as the gift of freedom to man, the introduction and infliction of natural evil, the inequalities of human fortune, the sufferings of the righteous, and the prosperity of the wicked, can be satisfactorily explained. There followed A Second Letter to a Deist, concerning a late book entitled lt Christianity as old as the Creation," more particularly that chapter which relates to Dr Clarke. Here Balguy argues that Tindal had falsely inferred revelation to be superfluous from the perfection of the law of nature and the ability of reason to discover that law. He grants that the law of nature is perfect and unchangeable, and that men can know whatever it is their duty to do, but maintains that the light of reason may have, and has had, added to it by revelation knowledge of great interest and value. This, he holds, is all that Clarke had maintained, and Tindal had failed to show that he had fallen into any self-contradictions. The same leading thoughts which we find in the tracts just mentioned meet us again in The Law of Truth, or the Obligations of Reason essential to all Religion. In this essay it is contended,— (1.) That reason binds or obliges, in the strictest sense of the word, all moral agents; (2.) That, considering men in their intellectual and moral capacity, the obligations of religion are entirely founded on the obligations of reason; and (3.) That on this ground, religion, whether natural or revealed, stands very firm and secure. Balguy collected these tracts and published them in a single volume in 1734, the Letter to a Deist and the Foundation of Moral Goodness having previously passed through three editions. In 1741 he published an Essay on Redemption, containing somewhat peculiar views. Redemption as taught in Scripture means, according to him, “the deliverance or release of mankind from the power and punishment of sin, by the meritorious sufferings of Jesus Christ,” but involves no translation of guilt, substitution of persons, or vicarious punishment. Freed from these ideas, which have arisen from interpreting literally expressions which are properly figurative, the doctrine, he argues, satisfies deep and urgent human wants, and is in perfect consistence and agreement with reason and rectitude. His last publication was a volume of sermons, pervaded by good sense and good feeling, and clear, natural, and direct in style, but bearing few traces of the influence of the most distinctive and potent Christian motives. He died at Harrowgate, September 21, 1748. A second volume of sermons appeared shortly afterwards. The edition of his sermons most commonly met with is the 3d, in 2 vols., published in 1760. The notice of his life in the Biographia Britannica was written by his son. See also Hunt’s Religious Thought in England, vol. ii. 362-4, 454-6, iii. 87-9. Mr Hunt erroneously represents Shaftesbury and not Hutcheson as the philosopher assailed in the Foundation of Moral Goodness. (r. f.)
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