Two different practices have obtained from time immemorial as to the position of this book in the Bible. According to one, which is preserved in the MSS. and editions of the Septuagint, and is followed by the MSS. and editions of the Vulgate, Ecclesiastes is the second in the order of the five books which, according to the Alexandrian Jews and the Greek and Latin churches, was written by Solomon. The order of these five books in the Alexandrian and Sinai tic Codices and in the MS. Bible of Charles the Bold, circa 850 (British Museum) is Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus. According to the other practice the book in question is separated from those which are supposed to belong to the same author, and is joined for liturgical purposes to the other four Megilloth. Thus in the oldest dated MS. of the entire Hebrew Bible yet known (1009), now in the imperial library of St Petersburg, it is the third of the five Megilloth, viz., Ruth, Canticles, Ecclesiastes, Lamentations, and Esther. Though this order is also to be found in the Spanish and Italian MSS., it is by no means universal. Additional MS. 15,250 of the British Museum not only puts Ecclesiastes before Canticles, but places Ruth before the Psalms. In the fourteen pre-Reformation German translations of the Bible (1462-1518), and in Wycliffe’s English version, where the five Solomonic books are still kept together, the order of the Septuagint and Vulgate is followed, as is also the case in the English Catholic version (Douai, 1610). Luther, who was the first to remove Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus from this group, and place them with the other so-called Apocryphal books at the end of the Old Testament, has left Ecclesiastes as second in the order of the Solomonic writings. In our first English translation of the entire Bible (1535) Coverdale followed the example of the great Continental Reformer. Hence this narrower group and this position of Ecclesiastes in the succeeding English Bibles, and in the present Authorized Version.

There is hardly another book in the Bible which has called forth so many commentaries and suffered as much at the hands of expositors as Ecclesiastes. Nearly 350 years ago Luther remarked,—“Difficult as this book is, it is almost more difficult to clear the author of the visionary fancies palmed upon him by his numerous commentators than to develop his meaning.” What w ould this sagacious Reformer have said if he could have seen the countless speculations of which it has been the subject since his days 7 We are positively assured that the book contains the holy lamentations of Solomon, together with a prophetic vision of the splitting up of the royal house of David, the destruction of the Temple, and the Captivity; and we are equally assured that it is a discussion between a refined sensualist and a sober sage. Solomon publishes in it his repentance, to glorify God and to strengthen his brethren; he wrote it “when he was irreligious and sceptical during his amours and idolatry.” “The Messiah, the true Solomon, who was known by the title of son of David, addresses this book to the saints;” a profligate who wanted to disseminate his infamous sentiments palmed it upon Solomon. It teaches us to despise the world with all its pleasures, and flee to monasteries; it shows that sensual gratifications are men’s greatest blessing upon earth. It is a philosophic lecture delivered to a literary society upon topics of the greatest moment; it is a medley of heterogeneous fragments belonging to various authors and different ages. It describes the beautiful order of God’s moral government, showing that all things work together for good to them that love the Lord; it proves that all is disorder and confusion, and that the world is the sport of chance. It is a treatise on the summum bonum; it is “a chronicle of the lives of the kings of the house of David from Solomon down to Zedekiah.” Its object is to prove the immortality of the soul; its design is to deny a future existence. Its aim is to comfort the unhappy Jews in their misfortunes; and its sole purport is to pour forth the gloomy imaginations of a melancholy misanthrope. It is intended “to open Nathan’s speech (1 Chron. xvii.) touching the eternal throne of David;” and it propounds by anticipation the modern discoveries of anatomy and the Harveian theory of the circulation of the blood. “It foretells what will become of man or angels to eternity;” and, according to one of the latest and greatest authorities, it is a keen satire on Herod, written 8 b.c., when the king cast his son Alexander into prison.

One of the causes which have contributed to obscure the design of this book is the name Ecclesiastes. This title Preacher, which ascribes to Solomon an office foreign to the Old Testament, has been given to it by the Septuagint and Vulgate in accordance with a Jewish tradition, and has been adopted alike by the pre-and post-Reformation authorized versions of the Scriptures. The Jewish tradition in question is to be found in the Midrash Pabba on Eccl. i. 1, where we are told that “Solomon was called Coheleth = Ecclesiastes, because hi3 discourses were delivered in the Cαhαl = Ecclesia.” Hence the title in the Alexandrian version, which was followed by the Latin Authorized Version, and is reproduced in Wycliffe’s Bible “the boc of Ecclesiastes, that is to sey, boc of talker to the people.” Hence, too, Luther’s title Prediger, which is followed in our first printed English Bible “the boke of the Preacher, otherwyse called Ecclesiastes” (Coverdale, 1535), and which is perpetuated in our Authorized Version. This title, however, is contrary to the grammatical form of the word Coheleth, as well as to the usage of the root from which it is derived. It has arisen from a desire on the part of the Jewish synagogue to exhibit Solomon in the garb of a penitent confessing his sins, and, by detailing his bitter experience, warning the people publicly to avoid the thorny path he has pursued and walk in the ways of righteousness. Laudable as this desire is, it perverts the historico-exegetical import of the book, and is contradicted by the signification of the name.

Coheleth is the participle feminine Kai of kdhal, which primarily means to call, to call together, to collect, to assemble. The verb 0ccur3 about forty times in the Hebrew Bible, and is invariably used for assembling or gathering people together, especially for religious worship. Hence the name means α collectress, or an assembleress of people into the presence of God, a female gatherer of an assembly to God, This meaning of the name is fully confirmed by another Jewish tradition, which 13 embodied in the Midrash Yalkut (Eccl. i. 1), and is exhibited in the ancient Greek versi0n3 of Aquila and Symmachus. Chapter i. 12 tells us that Solomon is meant by this designation, since he was the only son of David who was king over Israel in Jerusalem. The feminine and symbolic appellation arises from the fact that in chapter vii. 27 of this very book Solomon is depicted as personified Wisdom, who appears herself in Prov. i. 10, viii. 1, &c., as Coheleth, or the female gatherer of the people. This symbolic name is, moreover, intended to indicate the design of the book itself, and to connect Solomon’s endeavours here with his work recorded in 1 Kings viii. Solomon, who in 1 Kings viii. is described as gathering (^∏p') the people to hold communion with the Most High in the place which he erected for this purpose, is here again represented as the gatherer (∏S∏p) θf the far-off people of God. As he retains his individuality, he sometimes describes his own experience, and sometimes utters the words of Wisdom, whose organ he is.

The design of this book, as indicated in the symbolic title of its hero, is to gather God’s people, who were led astray by the inexplicable difficulties in the moral government of the world, iuto the community of God. Coheleth shows them the utter insufficiency of all human efforts to obtain real happiness—that it cannot be secured by wisdom, pleasure, industry, wealth, and prudence, but that it consists in the calm enjoyment of our lot, in resignation to the dealings of Providence, in the service of the Most High, and in looking forward to a future state of retribution, when all the present mysteries shall be solved, and when the Righteous Judge shall render to every man according to his deeds, whether they be good or evil.

Instead of writing an elaborate metaphysical disquisition to refute the various systems of happiness which the different orders of mind and the different temperaments had constructed for themselves, Solomon is introduced as narrating his painful experience in all his attempts. He shows how he had vainly striven to divert the longings of his soul by various experiments, and the only solution which can pacify the perplexed mind when contemplating the unfathomable dealings in the moral government of the world.

The theme or problem of the book is given in chapter i. 2-11. On the assumption that there is no hereafter, and that the longing soul is to be satisfied with the things here, Coheleth declares all human efforts to satisfy the longings of the soul to be utterly vain (chap. i. 1, 2), since conscious man is more deplorable than unconscious nature, for he must speedily quit this life, whilst the earth abides for ever (4): the objects of nature depart and retrace their course again, but man disappears and is for ever gone (5-11).

In corroboration of the allegation in the prologue, and to show the utter failure to satisfy the cravings of the soul with mere temporal pleasures, Coheleth tells us that, with all the resources of a great monarch at his command (chap, i. 12), he applied himself assiduously to discover by the aid of wisdom the nature of earthly pursuits, and found that they were fruitless (13-14), since they could not alter destinies. Hence, when he reflected upon the large amount of wisdom which he had acquired, he came to the conclusion that it is utterly useless (16-17), for the accumulation of it only increased his sorrow and pain (18). Wisdom having failed, Coheleth resolved to try pleasure, to see whether it would yield the desired happiness, but he soon found that this too w as vain (chap. ii. 1), and hence denounced it (2). After procuring every imaginable pleasure (3-10) he found that it was utterly insufficient to impart lasting good (11). He then compared wisdom with pleasure, the two experiments he had made (12); and though he saw that the former had a decided advantage over the latter (13, 14α), still he also saw that it does not except its possessor from death and oblivion, but that the wise man and the fool must both die alike and be forgotten (146—16). This melancholy thought made him hate both life and the wealth which he had acquired by wisdom and industry, and which, to aggravate matters, he perchance might leave to a reckless fool (17-21). It convinced him that man has nothing from his toil but w earisome days and sleepless nights (22, 23), and that there is therefore nothing better for man than to enjoy himself (24α). Soon, however, he found that this too is not in the power of man (245, 25). God gives this power to the righteous and withholds it from the wicked, and it is after all only transitory (2).

Having shown the failure of wisdom, knowledge, and enjoyment to calm the distracted mind which broods over the problem that, whilst the objects of nature depart and retrace their steps, again man vanishes and is for ever forgotten, Coheleth now shows the vain efforts of industry to satisfy the restless longings of the soul. All the events of life are immutably fixed (chap. iii. 1-8); labour is therefore fruitless (9). Even the regulations to human labour which God has prescribed in harmony with this fixed order of things man in his ignorance often mistakes (10, 11). Nothing is therefore left but the enjoyments as one finds them. But this, too, as has already been shown, is a gift of God (12, 13), who has fixed everything to make man feel his utter dependence on and fear the Lord (14, 15). The success of the wicked does not militate against this conclusion, for there is a day fixed for righteous retribution (16, 17). But even if all terminates here, and man and beast have the same destiny (17-21), this only shows all the more that the enjoyment of life is our only portion (22). Such a desperate conclusion, however, makes death preferable to a toilsome life (iv. 1-3),—a life spent in exertions to battle with the pre-ordained order of things, a life expended in labours which either arise from jealousies and fail in their end (4-6), or are prompted by avarice and defeat themselves (9-16). But as God has thus ordained the order of things, we ought to serve him (17-v. 6), trust to his protection under oppression (7, 8), and remember that the rich oppressor has not even the comfort of the poor labourer (9-11), and often bι'.ngs misery upon his children and himself (12-16). This again brings Coheleth to the mournful conclusion that nothing is left but to enjoy the few fleeting years of life, which is a gift of God (17-19).

Coheleth now shows that neither the much-coveted wealth nor the highly-praised prudence suffices to secure the desired happiness and solve the melancholy problem of life that the same failure attends wealth (vi. 1—9), for the rich man cannot over-rule the order of Providence, nor forecast what will be for his happiness (10-12). The same is the case with the prudential or common sense view of life. Coheleth thought to secure happiness by acquiring and leaving a good name (vi. 1-4), by listening to merited rebuke (5-9), not indulging in a repining spirit. He would also submit to Divine Providence (10-14), be moderate in his religious practices (15-20), not meddle with the opinions of others (21, 22), seeing that higher wisdom is unattainable (23, 24), and submit to the oppressive powers that be, convinced that the mightiest tyrant will ultimately be punished (viii. 1-9), for, though righteous retribution is momentarily suspended which causes wickedness to triumph, God will eventually administer justice (10-13). But as he found that the fortunes of the righteous and the wicked are often reversed all their lifetime, he had to relinquish this common-sense view of life as utterly insufficient to calm the longings of the soul, and recurred to his repeated conclusion that there is nothing left for man but to enjoy the fleeting things of this life (14, 15).

Before propounding his final conclusion, Coheleth gives a resume of his investigations. Since it is impossible to fathom the work of God by wisdom, seeing that even the righteous and wise are subject to this inscrutable Providence just as are the wicked (viii. 16-ix. 2);—for all must die alike and be forgotten, and have no more participation in what takes place here (3-6), and we are therefore to indulge in pleasures here, since there is no hereafter (7-10); success does not always attend the strong and the skilful (11, 12); wisdom, though advantageous in many respects, is often despised and defeated by folly (13-x. 3); we are to be patient under sufferings from rulers who by virtue of their power often pervert the order of things (4-7), since opposition may only increase our sufferings (8-11); the exercise of prudence will in the long run be more advantageous than folly (12-20); we are to be charitable, though the recipients of our charity often appear ungrateful, since some of them may after all requite us (xi. 1, 2); we are always to be at work, not allowing ourselves to be deterred by imaginary failures, since we know not which of our efforts may prove successful (3-6), and thus make life as agreeable as we can, since this is the only scene of enjoyment, and the future is all vanity (7, 8);—yet, seeing that even all this does not satisfy the higher craving of the soul, and still leaves conscious man in a more deplorable state than unconscious nature, for the objects of nature depart, retrace their course again, while man disappears and is for ever forgotten—Coheleth at last comes to the conclusion that the enjoyment of this life, combined with a belief in a future judgment, does secure real happiness for man (9, 10). We are therefore to live from our early years in the fear of God and of a final judgment, when the Righteous Judge will rectify all present inequalities (xii. 1-7).

The wisest and most painstaking Coheleth found by experience that all human efforts to obtain real happiness are vanity of vanities (xii. 8-10), that the sacred writings alone contain the clue to it (11, 12), that there is a Righteous Judge who takes cognizance αf all we do, that He will in the great Day of Judgment try the conduct of us all, and that we are therefore to fear Him and keep His commandments (13, 14).

From this analysis of its contents it will be seen that the book consists of four parts, with a prologue and epilogue. The prologue and epilogue are distinguished by respectively beginning with the same phrase (i. 1, xii. 8) and ending with two marked sentences (i. 11, xii. 14). The prologue, which consists of chapter i. 1-11, propounds the grand problem of the book; whilst the epilogue, which consists of chapter xii. 8-12, gives the solution proposed by Coheleth. The four sections, which are respectively indicated by the recurrence of the same formula or refrain, viz., ii. 26, V. 19, and viii. 15, give the result of each experiment or group of efforts to satisfy the cravings of the longing soul, apart from the conclusion at which Coheleth arrived.

Coheleth fills up a gap in the Old Testament lessons. Throughout the Hebrew Scriptures virtue and vice are spoken of as being visibly rewarded on earth. God declares at the very giving of the law that He will show mercy to thousands of those who love Him and keep His commandments, and visit the iniquity of those who hate Him to the third and fourth generation (Exod. xx. 5, 6). The whole of Lev. xxvi. and of Deut, xxviii. are replete with promises of earthly blessings to those who will walk i n the way of the Lord, and threatenings of temporal afflictions upon those who shall transgress His law. The faithful fulfilment of these promises and threatenings in the early stages of the J ewish history convinced every Israelite that “God judgeth the righteous, and God is angry with the wicked every dayf and afforded a source of consolation to which the righteous resorted when the power of the wicked threatened destruction (1 Sam. xxiv. 13-16, xxvi. 23; Pss. vii., ix., lii.). Like a net of fine threads is this doctrine spread over the entire Old Testament (comp. Pss. xvii. 1, 2; xxvi. 1, 2; xxviii. 1-3; xxxv.; liv. 7-9; Iv. 20-24; xc.; cxii.; cxxv. 3; cxxvii.; cxl.; cxli. 10; Prov. X. 6; xi. 5-8, 19; xii. 7; Hag. ii. 15-20; Zech. i. 2-6; viii. 9-17; Malachi ii. 17). By limiting the bar of judgment to this side of the grave, the Old Testament yielded no explanation of, or succour under, the distracting sight of the righteous suffering all their life, and then dying for their righteousness, and of the wicked prospering and prolonging their days through their wickedness. It was under such despairing circumstances that Psalms xxxvii., xlix., and lxxiii were written. But these very Psalms endeavour to allay the prevailing scepticism in the moral government of God, by declaring that the righteous shall ultimately prosper and prolong their days upon the earth, and that the wicked shall suddenly be cut off in great misery. Hence the recurrence of this perplexity passing over into despair when these reassurances and consolations were not realized by experience, and when the sufferers, however conscious of their innocence, were looked upon as rejected of God in consequence of some secret sin. The book of Job, which so successfully combats the latter notion by showing that afflictions are not always a proper test of sin committed, only confirms the old opinion that the righteous are visibly rewarded here, inasmuch as it represents their calamities as transitory, and Job himself as restored to double his original wealth and happiness in this life....

In consequence, however, of the exertions of Calvin, what were denominated the reformed churches deemed it expedient wholly to change this form of polity, and to introduce again the equality among pastors which had existed in the primitive times. That celebrated theologian, resting upon the undisputed fact, that in the Apostolic age no distinction subsisted between bishops and presbyters, thought himself at liberty to frame a system of polity upon this principle, persuaded that, by doing so, he would most effectually guard against those abuses that had given rise to the Papal tyranny which Protestants had abjured. He accordingly introduced his scheme where he had influence to do so; and he employed all the vigour of his talents in pressing upon distant churches the propriety of regulating, in conformity with his sentiments, their ecclesiastical government. But, while he was firmly persuaded that an equality among pastors was agreeable to the Apostolic practice, he has shown that he did not conceive this equality to be so absolutely required by Scripture, that there could in no case be a departure from it. He was, in fact, convinced that all the purposes of religion might be accomplished under a form of polity in which it was not recognised: “Wherever,” he says, “the preaching of the Gospel is heard with reverence, and the sacraments are not neglected, there at that time there is a church.” Speaking of faithful pastors, he describes them to be “those who by the doctrine of Christ lead men to true piety, who properly administer the sacred mysteries, and who preserve and exercise right discipline.” In tracing the progress of the hierarchy, he observes, that “those to whom the office of teaching was assigned were denominated presbyters; that to avoid the dissensions often arising among equals, they chose one of their number to preside, to whom the title of bishop was exclusively given; and that the practice, as the ancients admitted, was introduced by human consent, from the necessity of the times.” That this exaltation of the bishop, and, of course, this departure from parity, did not, in his estimation, render the church unchristian, is apparent from what he says of it after the change was introduced: “Such was the severity of these times, that all the ministers were led to discharge their duty as the Lord required of them.” Even after archbishops and patriarchs had arisen, he merely says, in recording their introduction, “This arrangement was calculated to preserve discipline.”

What Calvin thus taught in his “Institutes,” he confirmed in many of the interesting letters which he wrote to various eminent persons. In these letters he speaks with the highest respect of the church of England, where the distinction of clerical orders was preserved. He corresponds with the highest dignitaries of that church in a style which he assuredly would not have adopted, had he considered them as upholding an antichristian polity; and he repeatedly avows the principle, that, in regulating the government of the church, attention must be paid to the circumstances in which its members were placed. Beza, who was warmly attached to presbytery, and who upon every occasion, strenuously defended it, still admits that the human order of episcopacy was useful, as long as the bishops were good; and he professes all reverence for those modern bishops who strive to imitate the primitive ones in the reformation of the church according to the word of God: adding that it was a calumny against him, and those who entertained his sentiments, to affirm, as some had done, that they wished to prescribe their form of government to all other churches. In the excellent letter which he addressed to Grindal, bishop of London, and in which he pleads the cause of those ministers who scrupled to use the ceremonies which their brethren approved, he bears his testimony to the conformity of the church of England in doctrine with his church, expresses himself with the highest respect of the prelate to whom he was writing, and concludes by asking his prayers in his own behalf, and in that of the church of Geneva; all of which is quite inconsistent with the tenet, that presbytery is absolutely prescribed by divine authority.

The same general principle was avowed by the most eminent English divines. Cranmer explicitly declared, that bishops and priests were of the same order at the commencement of Christianity; and this was the opinion of several of his distinguished contemporaries. Holding this maxim, their support of episcopacy must have proceeded from views of expediency, or, in some instances, from a conviction which prevailed very generally at this early period, that it belonged to the supreme civil magistrate to regulate the spiritual no less than the political government; an idea involving in it that no one form of ecclesiastical polity is of divine institution. At a later period, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, we find the same conviction, that it was no violation of Christianity to choose different modes of administering the church. Archbishop Whitgift, who distinguished himself by the zeal with which he supported the English hierarchy, frequently maintains, that the form of discipline is not particularly, and by name, set down in Scripture; and he also plainly asserts, “that no form of church government is, by the Scriptures, prescribed or commanded to the church of God.” This principle is admirably illustrated and confirmed by the venerable Hooker, in the third book of his work on ecclesiastical polity; and another divine of the English church, who lived about the same period, has laid down what he conceives to be an unquestionable position, “that all churches have not the same form of discipline; neither is it necessary that they should, because it cannot be proved that any particular form of church government is enjoined by the word of God.” We have, indeed, a succession of testimonies from the introduction of the reformation down through the reign of Elizabeth,--testimonies given by the primates, and bishops, and theologians, who have been venerated as the luminaries of the church of England, that the divine right or institution of episcopacy constituted no part of their faith; and this is confirmed by their correspondence with reformed divines, who did not live under the episcopal model, but who, notwithstanding, were often consulted as to the ecclesiastical arrangements which the convocation should adopt. The same general sentiment is to be traced in those churches which had reverted to the primitive equality among the ministers of Christ. In the second Helvetic confession, which was approved by many churches, it is taught, that bishops and presbyters in the beginning governed the church with equal power, none exalting himself above another; the inequality which soon was introduced originating from the desire of preserving order. Various passages from Cyprian and Jerom are quoted in confirmation of this; and the article thus concludes: “Wherefore no one can be lawfully hindered from returning to the ancient constitution of the church of God, and to adopt it in preference to what custom has introduced.” Had the compilers believed that this ancient constitution was of divine obligation, they would have expressed themselves much more strongly with respect to it; and instead of representing the return to it as what ought not to be hindered, they would have enjoined it, as what it was a violation of the law of God to neglect.

The reformation in Scotland, conducted by Knox, who had spent a considerable part of his life at Geneva, and who had imbibed the opinions of Calvin, proceeded upon those views of polity which that reformer had adopted. Still, however, he authorized a modification of these opinions, accommodated to the state of his native country; for although the title of bishop was not used, superintendents, with powers little inferior to those committed to prelates in England, were sanctioned by the first Book of Discipline; and these superintendents were classed, in the acts of different general assemblies, among the necessary ministers of the church. The necessity must have arisen out of the circumstances of the period when the book was framed; for the polity which it prescribed was said to be only for a time; and the office of superintendent, as has been strenuously urged by some of the most zealous defenders of presbytery, was not intended to be permanent. The Lutheran church, with the exception of those branches of it established in Denmark and Sweden, has adopted a kind of intermediate constitution between episcopacy and presbytery. While it holds that there is no divine law creating a distinction among ministers, it yet contends that such a distinction is on many accounts expedient; and accordingly a diversity in point of rank and privileges has been universally introduced, approaching in different places, more or less, to the hierarchy which subsisted before the reformation. But, although it has thus regulated its own practice, it unambiguously admits, that as the Gospel is silent as to any particular form of polity, different forms may be chosen, without any breach of Christian union.

It appears from the statement which has now been given, that all Protestants immediately after the reformation, while they abjured the papal supremacy, were united in holding that the mode of administering the church might be varied, some of them being attached to episcopacy, others to presbytery; but all founding this attachment upon the judgment which they had formed as to the tendency or utility of either of these modes of government. An idea soon was avowed by some of the reformers, that the whole regulation of the church pertained to the magistrate; this branch of power being vested in him no less than that of administering the civil government; and to this opinion the name of Erastianism, from Erastus, who first defended it, was given. Cranmer, in an official reply which he made to certain questions that had been submitted for his consideration, declared, “that the civil ministers under the king’s majesty be those that shall please his highness for the time to put in authority under him; as, for example, the lord chancellor, lord great master, &c; the ministers of God’s word under his majesty be the bishops, parsons, vicars, and such other priests as be appointed by his highness to that ministration; as, for example, the bishop of Canterbury, &c. All the said officers and ministers, as well of the one sort as the other, be appointed, assigned, and elected in every place by the laws and orders of kings and princes.” By the great majority of Protestants, however, the tenets of Erastus were condemned; for they maintained that the Lord Jesus had conveyed to his church a spiritual power quite distinct from the temporal; and that it belonged to the ministers of religion to exercise it, for promoting the spiritual welfare of the Christian community. But, while they disputed as to this point, they agreed in admitting there was no model prescribed in the New Testament for a Christian church, as there had been in the Mosaical economy for the Jewish church; and that it was a branch of the liberty of the disciples of Christ, or one of their privileges, to choose the polity which seemed to them best adapted for extending the power and influence of religion.

The recommendations cf the commission recited in 6 and 7 Will. IV. c. 97 are too numerous to be given here. They include an extensive re-arrangement of the dioceses, equalization of episcopal income, providing residences, &c. By 3 and 4 Vict. c. 113 the fourth report of the original commissioners, dealing chiefly with cathedral and collegiate churches, was carried into effect, a large number of canonries being suspended, and sinecure benefices and dignities suppressed.

The emoluments of these suppressed or suspended offices, and the surplus income of the episcopal sees, constitute the fund at the disposal of the commissioners. By 23 and 24 Vict. c. 124, on the avoidance of any bishopric or archbishopric, all the land and emoluments of the see, except the patronage and lands attached to houses of residence, become, by Order in Council, vested in the commissioners, who may, however, reassign to the see so much of the land as may be sufficient to secure the net annual income named for it by statute or order. All the profits and emoluments of the suspended canonries, &c., pass over to the commissioners, as well as the separate estates of those deaneries and canonries which are not suspended. Out of this fund the expenses of the commission are to be paid, and the residue is to be devoted to increasing the efficiency of the church by the augmentation of the smaller bishoprics and of poor livings, the endowment of new churches, and employment of additional ministers.

The substitution of one central corporation for the many local and independent corporations of the church, so far at least as the management of property is concerned, was a constitutional change of great importance, and the effect of it has undoubtedly been to correct the anomalous distribution of ecclesiastical revenues by equalizing incomes and abolishing sinecures. At the same time it is regarded as having made a serious breach in the legal theory of ecclesiastical property. “The important principle,” says Cripps, “on which the inviolability of the church establishment depends, that the church generally possesses no property as a corporation, or which is applicable to general purposes, but that such particular ecclesiastical corporation, whether aggregate or sole, has its property separate, distinct, and inalienable, according to the intention of the original endowment, was given up without an effort to defend it” {Law Relating io the Church and Clergy, p. 46).

The sources of the ecclesiastical law of England are thus described by the leading text-writer on this subject: — “The ecclesiastical law of England is compounded of these four main ingredients—the civil law, the canon law, the common law, and the statute law. And from these, digested in their proper rank and subordination, to draw out one uniform law of the church is the purport of this book. When these laws do interfere and cross each other, the order of preference is this :—‘ The civil law submitteth to the canon law; both of these to the common law; and all three to the statute law. So that from any one or more of these, without all of them together, or from all of them together without attending to their comparative obligation, it is not possible to exhibit any distinct prospect of the English ecclesiastical constitution.’ Under the head of statute law Burn includes ‘ the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, agreed upon in Convocation in the year 1562; and in like manner the Rubric of the Book of Common Prayer, which, being both of them established by Acts of Parliament, are to be esteemed as part of the statute law.’”

The first principle of the ecclesiastical law is the assertion of the supremacy of the crown, -which in the present state of the constitution means the same thing as the supremacy of Parliament. This principle has been maintained ever since the Reformation. Before the Reformation the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Pope was recognized, with certain limitations, in England, and the church itself had some pretensions to ecclesiastical freedom. The freedom of the church is, in fact, one of the standing provisions of those charters on which the English constitution was based. The first provision of Magna Charta is quod ecclesia Anglicana libera sit. By the various enactments of the period of the Reformation the whole constitutional position of the church, not merely with reference to the Pope but with reference to the state, was definitely fixed. The legislative power of Convocation was held to extend to the clergy only, and even to that extent required the sanction and assent of the Crown. The common law courts controlled the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, claiming to have “the exposition of such statutes or Acts of Parliament as concern either the extent of the jurisdiction of these courts or the matters depending before them. And therefore if these courts either refuse to allow these Acts of Parliament, or expound them in any other sense than is truly and properly the exposition of them, the king’s great courts of common law may prohibit and control them.”

The design of constructing a code of ecclesiastical laws was entertained during the period of the Reformation, but never carried into effect. It is alluded to in various statutes of the reign of Henry VIII., who obtained power to appoint a commission to examine the old ecclesiastical laws, with a view of deciding which ought to be kept and which ought to be abolished; and in the meantime it was enacted that “such canons, institutions, ordinances, synodal or provincial or other ecclesiastical laws or jurisdictions spiritual as be yet accustomed and used here in the Church of England, which necessarily and conveniently are requisite to be put in ure and execution for the time, not being repugnant, contrarient, or derogatory to the laws or statutes of the realm, nor to the prerogatives of the royal crown of the same, or any of them, shall be occupied, exercised, and put in ure for the time within this realm” (35 Henry VIII. c. 16, 25 c. 19, 27 c. 8).

The work was actually undertaken and finished iiι the reign of Edward VI. by a sub-committee of eight persons, under the name of the Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum, which, however, never obtained the royal assent. Although the powers of the 25 Henry VIII. c. 1, were revived by the 1 Elizabeth c. 1, the scheme was never executed, and the ecclesiastical laws remained on the footing assigned to them in that statute,—so much of the old ecclesiastical laws might be used as had been actually in use and was not repugnant to the laws of the realm.

The statement is, indeed, made by Sir R. Phillimore that the “Church of England has at all times, before and since the Reformation, claimed the right of an independent church in an independent kingdom, to be governed by the Jaws which she has deemed it expedient to adopt.” This position can only be accepted if it is confined, as the authorities cited for it are confined, to the resistance of interference from abroad. If it mean that the church, as distinguished from the kingdom, has claimed to be governed by laws of her own making, all that can be said is that the claim has been singularly unsuccessful. From the time of the Reformation no change has been made in the law of the church which has not been made by the king and parliament, sometimes indirectly, as by confirming the resolutions of Convocation, but for the most part by statute. The list of statutes cited in Sir R. Phillimore’s Ecclesiastical Law fills eleven pages. It is only by a kind of legal fiction that the church can be said to have deemed it expedient to adopt these laws.

The terms on which the Church Establishment of Ireland was abolished by 32 and 33 Vict. c. 42 may be mentioned. By sect. 20 the present ecclesiastical law is made binding on the members for the time being of the church, “as if they had mutually contracted and agreed to abide by and observe the same;” and by section 21 it is enacted that the ecclesiastical courts shall cease after 1st January 1871, and that the ecclesiastical laws of Ireland, except so far as relates to matrimonial causes and matters, shall cease to exist as law. (e. r.)