Settling at Leipsic, Fichte still found himself without any fixed means of livelihood, and was again reduced to literary drudgery, writing tales, plays, and reviews for the popular magazines. In the midst of this distracting work occurred the most important event of his life, his introduction to the philosophy of Kant. That Fichte had been already interested in philosophico-theological questions we know, but up to this period his speculations had been but desultory. At Schulpforta he had read with delight Lessing’s Atdi-Goeze, and during his Jena student days had occupied himself with the difficult problem of the relation between philosophy and religion. The outcome of his speculations, as exhibited in the fragmentary Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus (unpublished, date 1790; Werke 9 i. 1-8), was a species of Spinozistic determinism, regarded, however, as lying altogether outside the boundary of religion. It is remarkable that even for a time should fatalism have been predominant in Fichte’s reasoning, for in character he was throughout opposed to such a view, and, as he has said, “according to the man, so is the system of philosophy he adopts.” With such half-formed opinions, Kant’s philosophy was a new revelation. In particular, he seized upon the practical side, in which Kant works out his view of the absolute moral law as the essence of free intelligence. This doctrine lies at the root of all Fichte’s after speculations; in fact, his system is merely the rigidly consistent evolution of the true relation between reason as practical and reason as cognitive.

Fichte’s Letters of this period sufficiently attest the influence exercised on him by the study of Kant. It effected a revolution in his whole mode of thinking; and so completely did the Kantian doctrine of the inherent moral worth of man harmonize with his own character, that from this time forward his life becomes one effort to realize and perfect a true philosophy, and to make its principles no mere theoretic axioms, but practical maxims. At first he seems to have thought that the best method for accomplishing his object would be to expound Kantianism in a popular, intelligible form. He felt, and rightly, that the reception of Kant’s doctrines was impeded by the clumsy and scholastic phraseology in which they were stated. An abridgment of the Kritik der Urtheilskraft was begun, but was left unfinished.

The circumstances of Fichte’s life had not improved. No opening had presented itself, and it had been arranged in the beginning of 1791 that he should return to Zurich and be married to Johanna Rahn. This plan was overthrown by a commercial disaster which severely affected the fortunes of the Rahn family. Fichte accepted a post as private tutor to the family of a nobleman in Warsaw, and proceeded slowly on foot to that town. The situation proved unsuitable; the lady, as Kuno Fischer says, “required greater submission and better French” than Fichte could yield, and after little more than a fortnight’s stay, Fichte set out for Königsberg, drawn thither by the desire to see Kant. His first interview with Kant was disappointing; the coldness and formality of the aged philosopher checked the enthusiasm of the young disciple, though it did not diminish his admiration and reverence. He resolved to bring himself before Kant’s notice in a more effective manner by submitting to him some paper in which the principles of the Kantian philosophy should be applied. Such was the origin of the work, written in four weeks, the Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Essay towards a Critique of all Revelation). The problem which Fichte dealt with in this essay was one not yet handled by Kant himself, and the relations of which to the critical philosophy furnished matter for considerable surmise. Indirectly, indeed, Kant had indicated a very definite opinion on theology: from the Critique of Pure Reason it was clear that for him speculative theology must be purely negative, while the Critique of Practical Reason as clearly indicated the view that the moral law is the absolute content or substance of any religion. A critical investigation of the notion of revealed religion, an examination of the conditions under which religious belief was possible, was still, therefore, an open problem. Fichte’s essay was forwarded by him to Kant, who approved it highly, extended to the author a most warm reception, and exerted his influence to procure a publisher for the work. After some delay, consequent on the scruples of the theological censor of Halle, who did not like to see miracles rejected, the book appeared at Easter, 1792. By an oversight of the publisher, Fichte’s name did not appear on the title page, nor was the preface given, in which the author spoke of himself as a beginner in philosophy. Considering then the principles applied and the results reached, it was not unnatural that outsiders should ascribe the work to Kant himself. The Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung went so far as to say that no one who had read a line of Kant’s immortal writings could fail to recognize the eminent author of this new work. The mistake was soon rectified by Kaut himself, who publicly announced the true author, at the same time highly commending the work. By this fortunate error Fichte’s reputation was secured at a stroke, and he soon reaped the benefits of fame.

The Critiqτιe of Revelation is deserving of particular notice, since it marks the culminating point of Fichte’s Kantian period. The exposition of the conditions under which revealed religion is possible turns upon the absolute requirements of the moral law in human nature. Religion itself is the belief in this moral law as divine, and such belief is a practical postulate, necessary in order to add force to the law. It follows that no revealed religion, so far as matter or substance is concerned, can contain anything beyond this law; nor can any fact in the world of experience be recognized by us as supernatural The supernatural element in religion can only be the divine character of the moral law. Now, the revelation of this divine character of morality is possible only to a being in whom the lower impulses have been or are successful in overcoming reverence for the law. In such a case it is conceivable that a revelation might be given in order to add strength to the moral law. Religion ultimately then rests upon the practical reason, and expresses some demand or want of the pure ego or human will. In this conclusion we can trace the prominence assigned by Fichte to the practical element, and the tendency to make the requirements of the ego the ground for all judgment on reality. It was not possible that having reached this point he should not press forward and leave the Kantian position.

Fichte’s literary success was coincident with an improvement in the fortunes of the Rahn family. There seemed now no reason for delaying his marriage, which accordingly took place at Zurich in October 1793. The remainder of the year he spent in retirement at Zurich, slowly perfecting his thoughts on the fundamental problems left for solution in the Kantian philosophy. During this period also he published anonymously two remarkable political works, Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit von den Fürsten Europa's, and Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die französische Revolution. Of these the latter is much the more important. The French Revolution seemed to many earnest thinkers the one great outcry of modern times for the liberty of thought and action which is the eternal heritage of every human being. Unfortunately the political condition of Germany was unfavourable to the formation of an unbiassed opinion on the great movement. The principles involved in it were lost sight of under the mass of spurious maxims on social order which had slowly grown up and stiffened into system. To direct attention to the true nature of revolution, to demonstrate how inextricably the right of liberty is interwoven with the very existence of man as an intelligent agent, to point out the inherent progressiveness of state arrangements, and the consequent necessity of reform or amendment, such are the main objects of the Beitrage ; and although, as is often the case with Fichte, the arguments are too formal and the distinctions too wire-drawn, yet the general idea is nobly conceived and carried out. As in the Critique of Revelation so here the rational nature of man and the conditions necessary for its manifestation or realization become the standard for critical judgment.

Towards the close of 1793 Fichte received an invitation to fill the post of extraordinary professor of philosophy at Jena, vacant by the transference of Reinhold to Kiel. This chair, though not in the ordinary faculty, had become, through Reinhold, the most important in the university, and great deliberation was exercised in selecting his successor. It was desired to secure an able exponent of Kantianism, and none seemed so highly qualified as the author of the Critique of Revelation. Fichte, while accepting the call, at first desired to delay entry on his duties for a year, in order to be more thoroughly prepared; but as this was deemed inexpedient, he rapidly drew out an introductory outline of his system for the use of his students, and began his lectures in May 1794. His success was instantaneous and complete. The fame of his predecessor was altogether eclipsed; as Forberg writes, “Fichte is believed in as Reinhold never was. The students understand him even less than they did his predecessor, but they believe all the more earnestly on that account.” Much of this success was undoubtedly due to Fichte’s rare power as a lecturer. In oral exposition the vigour of thought and moral intensity of the man were most of all apparent, while his practical earnestness completely captivated his hearers. He lectured not only on philosophy to his own class, but on general moral subjects to all students of the university. These general addresses, published under the title Vocation of the Scholar (Bestimmung des Gelehrten), were on a subject very dear to Fichte’s heart, the supreme importance of the highest intellectual culture and the duties incumbent on those who had received it Their tone is stimulating and lofty.

The years spent at Jena were unusually productive; indeed, the completed Fichtean philosophy is contained in the writings of this period. A general introduction to the system is given in the tractate On the Notion of the Theory of Science (Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, 1794), and the theoretical portion is worked out in the Foundation of the whole Theory of Science (Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794), and Outline of what is peculiar inthe Theory of Science (Grundriss des Eigenthüm-lichen d. Wissenschaftslehre, 1794). To these were added in 1797 a First and a Second Introduction to the Theory of Science, and an Essay towards α new Exposition of the Theory of Science. The Introductions are masterly expositions. The practical philosophy, which was with Fichte the fundamental, was given in the Grundlage des Naturrechts, 1796, and System der Sittenlehre, 1798. The last is, we think, the most important of all Fichte’s works; apart from it, his theoretical philosophy is unintelligible and absurd.

During this period of literary activity Fichte’s academic career bad been troubled by various storms, the last so violent as to put a close to his professoriate at Jena. The first of them, a complaint against the delivery of his general addresses on Sundays, was easily got over. The second, arising from Fichte’s strong desire to suppress the Landsmannschaften, or student’s orders, which were productive of much harm, was more serious. Some misunderstanding caused an outburst of ignorant ill-feeling on the part of the students, who proceeded to such lengths that Fichte was compelled to obtain leave to reside out of Jena. The third storm, however, was the most violent. In 1798 Fichte, who, with Niethammer, had edited the Philosophical Journal s'uicq 1795, received from his friend Forberg an essay on the “Development of the Idea of Religion.” With much of the essay he entirely agreed, but he thought the exposition in so many ways defective and calculated to create an erroneous impression, that he prefaced it with a short paper On the Grounds of our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe, in which God 13 defined as the moral order of the universe, the eternal law of right which is the foundation of all our being. Any other mode of existence must be denied to him. Against these papers the cry of atheism was raised, and the electoral Government of Saxony suppressed the Journal and confiscated the copies found in their universities, acts imitated by all the German states except Prussia. The duke of Saxe-Weimar, patron of Jena university, was almost ordered to reprove and dismiss the offenders. Fichte’s defences (Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, and Gerichtliche Verantwortung der Herausgeber der phil. Zeitschrift (1799), though masterly, did not make the matter easier for the court of Saxe-Weimar, who strongly wished to let the affair pass quietly, and an unfortunate letter, in which he threatened to resign in case of reprimand, turned the scale altogether against him. The court arbitrarily accepted his threat as a request to resign, passed censure, and extended to him permission to withdraw from his chair at Jena; nor would they alter their decision, even though Fichte himself endeavoured to explain away the unfortunate letter.

Berlin was now the only town in Germany open to him. His residence there from 1799 to 1806 was only broken by the delivery of lectures during the summer of 1805 at Erlangen, where he had been named professor. Surrounded by friends, including such men as Schlegel and Schleiermacher, he continued his literary work, perfecting and amending the Wissenschaftslehre. The most remarkable of the works from this period are—(1) the Bestimmung des Menschen (Vocation of Man, 1800), a book which, for beauty of style, richness of content, and elevation of thought, may be ranked with the Meditations of Descartes; (2) Der geschlossene Handelsstaat, 1800 (The Exclusive or Isolated Commercial State), a very remarkable treatise, intensely socialist in tone, and bitterly opposed to free-trade and competition, inculcating in fact organized protection; (3) Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grossere Publicum über die neueste Philosophie, 1801. In 1801 was also written the Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, which was not published till after his death. In 1804 a set of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre was given at Berlin, the notes of which were published in the Nachgelassene Werke, vol. ii. In 1804 were also delivered the noble lectures on the Characteristics of the Present Aye (Grundzüge der gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, 1804), containing a most admirable analysis of the Aufklärung, tracing the position such a movement of thought holds in the natural evolution of the general human consciousness, pointing out its inherent defects, and indicating as the ultimate goal of progress the life of reason in its highest aspect as a belief in the divine order of the universe. The philosophy of history sketched in this work has something of value with much that is fantastic and absurd. In 1805 and 1806 appeared the Nature of the Scholar (Weeen des Gelehrten) and the Way to a Blessed Life (Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre), the latter the most important work of this Berlin period. In it the union between the finite selfconsciousness and the infinite ego or God is handled in an almost mystical manner. The knowledge and love of God is the end of life; by this means only can we attain blessedness (Seligkeit), for in God alone have we a permanent, enduring object of desire. The infinite God is the all; the world of independent objects is the result of reflection or self-consciousness, by which the infinite unity is broken up. God is thus over and above the distinction of subject and object; our knowledge is but a reflex or picture of the infinite essence. Being is not thought.

The disasters of Prussia in 1806 drove Fichte from Berlin. He retired first to Stargard, then to Königsberg (where he lectured for a time), then to Copenhagen, whence he returned to the capital in August 1807. From this time till his death his only published writings are practical in character; not till after the appearance of the Nachgelassene Werke was it known in what shape his final speculations had been thrown out. We may here note the order of these posthumous writings as being of importance for tracing the development of Fichte’s thought. From the year 1806 we have the remarkable Bericht über die Wissenschaftslehre ( Werke, vol. viii.) with its sharp critique of Schelling; from 1810 we have the Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns, published in 1817, of which another treatment is given in lectures of 1813 (Nachgeh Werke, vol i.). Of the Wissenschaftslehre we have, in 1812-13, four separate treatments contained in the Nachgel. Werke. As these consist mainly of notes for lectures, couched in uncouth phraseology, they cannot be held to throw much light on Fichte’s views. Perhaps the most interesting are the lectures of 1812 on Transcendental Logic (Nach. Werke, i. 106-400).

From 1812 we have notes of two courses on practical philosophy, Rechtslehre (Nach. Werke, vol ii.) and Sittenlehre (Ib., vol. iiL), A finished work in the same department is the Staatslehre, published in 1820. This gives the Fichtean utopia or state organized on principles of pure reason; in too many cases the proposals are identical with principles of pure despotism.

During these later years, however, Fichte’s energies were mainly occupied with public affairs. In 1807 he drew up an elaborate and minute plan for the proposed new university of Berlin. In 1807-1808 he delivered at Berlin, amidst danger and discouragement, his noble addresses to the German people (Reden an die Deutsche Nation'). Even if we think that in these pure reason is sometimes overshadowed by patriotism, we cannot but recognize the immense practical value of what he recommended as the only true foundation for national prosperity.

In 1810 he was elected rector of the new university founded in the previous year. This post he resigned in 1812, mainly on account of the difficulties he experienced in his endeavour to alter and amend the student life of the university.

In 1813 began the great effort of Germany for national independence. Debarred from taking an active part, Fichte made his contribution by way of lectures. The addresses on the idea of a true war (Ueber den Begriff einer wahrhaften Kriegs, forming part of the Staatslehre) contain a very subtle and admirable contrast between the positions of France and Germany in the war.

In the autumn of 1813 the hospitals of Berlin were filled with sick and wounded from the campaign. Among the most devoted in her exertions was Fichte’s wife, who, in January 1814, was attacked with a virulent hospital fever. On the day after she was pronounced out of danger Fichte was struck...