Heresy means a grave error in matters of faith, but it is much more than a theological or ecclesiastical term. From the days of the emperor Theodosius at the latest, the Christian religion has been intimately connected with law, and heresy is a legal term, with a definite meaning attaching to it; a heresy was a crime with punishment annexed,and therefore was capable of legal definition. It was an offence in canon law, and it was also for long an offence according to civil law. The theological meaning, and the definitions according to canon law and according to civil law respectively, are all different from each other and must be separately explained.

1. The Theological Sense of the Term.— The early Christian writers say a great deal about heresy, but commonly refrain from telling what it is. They describe heresies, but they only denounce heresy. It is vain to look for a definition of it in Irenaeus’s Against Heresies, in Hippolytus’s Refutation of all Heresies, in Tertullian’s Prescription against Heretics. It is possible, indeed, to collect from these one or two leading tests of heresy, but no definition is to be found. The common features of heresy are too well known to call for specific enumeration. We can gather from Irenaeus that heretics are those who reject Scripture, who refuse to accept the “doctrina tradita,” who deny the authority of the clergy who have come in regular succession from the apostles, who keep aloof from the Catholic Church, the sole depositary of apostolic doctrine (Against Heresies, iii. 2-4). Tertullian, in his usual succinct manner, calls every man a heretic who does not at once accept the “Regula Fidei,” and he refuses to argue with such a man even though the heretic proceeds to adduce arguments from Scripture. “A controversy over Scripture with heretics can clearly produce no other effect than to help to upset either the stomach or the brain” (Prcescr. adv. Hοer., 16). In the Eastern Church, after the period of the oecumenical councils, Tertullian’s test was the touchstone of heresy. The church had her rule of faith expanded into the Nicaeo-Constantinopolitan creed, with the various explanations added in the symbols of the remaining oecumenical councils, and a heretic was one who denied this creed in whole or in part. In the Western Church, on the other hand, theologians were accustomed to define heresy in a vague way. Thus Jerome calls heresy “perversum dogma”; a heretic, with him, is one who interprets Scripture in other fashion than according to the witness of the Spirit of God; and Augustine summarily defines heresy to be the invention or retention of new and false opinions. But whatever the definition, the rough and ready test was always nonconformity to the “formula fidei praescripta ab ecclesia Romana.” Instead of definition the Eastern Church simply points to the creed and the oecumenical councils, the Western Church to the rule of faith enjoined by Rome.

These meagre definitions, extracted from the writings of early theologians, all of them going back in the last resort to the recognized creed of the church for the time being, imply, in spite of their vagueness, that there is a certain essential kernel of doctrine in Christianity, which cannot be denied or challenged without involving the destruction of Christianity itself, and they all point the way to a fuller description of what is meant by heresy in the theological sense of the word. Heresy is a doctrine which, with the appearance of Christian doctrine, is really contradictory to the essential nature of Christianity, and, if persisted in, would in the end make Christianity something very different from what it really is. In order, therefore, to say what heresy is, it is necessary to know what the essential nature of Christianity is, and therefore heresy is generally described by reference to the fundamental nature of Christianity, while the real nature of Christian doctrine is commonly brought out by contrasting it with heresy.

When we look at the matter historically we see that Christianity has always taken the shape of a community thinking and acting for the most part together, and that it has always implied a common life, common work, common ideas. Christianity appears in history as a community whose common work is to confess and to adore God because of what He has done for His people in salvation. This twofold work of confession and worship has manifested itself in a double organization,—an organization of thought and an organization of work,—doctrine and polity. There may be the church without a creed, and the heart-church without the congregatio ; but that is not the way in which Christianity has taken actual historical shape. It is possible to conceive the entrance of a heterogeneous element into this organization on either side. A heterogeneous element, something really foreign to it, may become organized with the church’s doctrine, or may have become incorporated in the church’s polity, and whenever this happens there is a doctrine, apparently Christian, which is really subversive of Christianity, there is a polity which, apparently Christian, is really opposed to the real life of the congregatio. This possibility is the historical root of the origin both of heresy and of schism; for heresy is just a heterogeneous element imbedded in the organized dogmatic of the church, and schism is a foreign element which has found its way into church polity. This description, however, is somewhat misleading, because it may happen that an element which seems heterogeneous is not really so, but is on the contrary a true part of the organization. Heresy is not only apparently but really foreign to the system in which it has become incorporated. Its nature is different, and its source is different. Mere apparent incongruity, therefore, does not prove heresy. A doctrine must be seen to be really contradictory to the fundamental facts of Christianity, and to have come from a different source, before it can be called a heresy. It has frequently happened, accordingly, that doctrines have been judged heretical which a better acquaintance with the nature of Christianity would have pronounced orthodox.

Christianity, under the many forms which it assumes, has always implied the reconciliation of God and man through the person and work of Christ. It implies that Jesus Christ the Saviour has so brought it about that He has established a new kingdom of God which will last, in which men have communion with God through His Spirit. Christianity is complete when the kingdom of God is fully established. “Thy kingdom come” is its aspiration. It therefore implies a moral separation between God and man—a separation which is overcome by the work of Christ the Mediator. The idea of reconciliation is the central thing in Christianity, the essential part in its description. God, man unable to approach God until reconciliation has been made, Christ the Mediator who reconciles, and His people brought again into communion with God,—all Christian doctrine rings the changes on these four fundamental ideas. Whatever contradicts or tends to destroy these, or their relations to each other, is incompatible with Christianity. Whenever any of these four ideas—God, man, Christ, and the kingdom of God —are so misread as to introduce notions incompatible with the relations in which they stand to each other in Christianity, then heresy enters. Theology therefore (and Protestant theology only carries the idea somewhat further) has usually recognized four kinds of heresy, corresponding to the four fundamental ideas on which Christian doctrine rests. The nature and character of God and of His relation to the universe and to man may be so misread as to make reconciliation an impossible thing, and so also may the nature of Christ, the nature of man, and the nature of the results of Christ’s work among men. Hence arise heresies about God, about the person of Christ, about the nature of man, and about the results of Christ’s work— all of them being doctrines which are incompatible with the idea of reconciliation.

I. Reconciliation implies that man has been separated by sin from God, and that God can overcome this separation. All descriptions of God, of His nature, character, and works, which contradict this fact may give rise to heresies. Thus God cannot overcome the separation if it be impossible for Him to project Himself beyond Himself for salvation. The nature of the Godhead may be so described as to contradict the idea of reconciliation, as, e.g., in the Arian heresy. Again, all descriptions of God’s relations to the universe which imply that the universe and all things are not absolutely dependent on Him, which imply that His gracious purpose can be thwarted, contradict the idea of reconciliation, and so may give rise to heresies, e.g., the Gnostic doctrine that matter is independent of God. Misstatements about God’s relation to Himself and about His relation to the universe give rise to two different kinds of heresy.

II. Reconciliation implies a real mediator who can accomplish the reconciliation on both its sides, and so heresies may arise about the nature of Christ The Saviour may be so described that there is no real mediation, and no real reconciliation. These errors may arise in two ways, as one or other side of the mediator is described. The Saviour may be represented so that He has no real relation to God on the one hand or to man on the other. He may be describgd in such a way that there is no solidarity between Him and God, as e.g., in the Ebionite heresy; or He maybe described in such a way that there is no solidarity between Him and man, as in the Docetist heresy. Misstatements about the relation of Christ to God and the relation of Christ to man give rise to two different kinds of heresy.

III. Reconciliation implies that man is so separated from God by sin that there is real need for salvation, and yet not so separated that he cannot be brought into communion with God again; and the nature of man, and especially the presence of sin in man, may be so described as to set aside these requirements. The fact of sin and its presence in man may be so explained away as to leave little ground for the necessity of reconciliation, e.g., in the Pelagian heresy. Again, on the other hand, the fact and presence of sin may be so described that there is no capacity in man for salvation; it may be alleged that sin belongs to the essential nature of man and cannot be removed, e.g. , in the Manichaean heresy. These two misstatements about the connexion between man and sin give rise to two kinds of heresy.

IV. The results of the reconciliation effected by Christ may also be misrepresented in two ways. The separation between man and God, which is the formal occasion of the reconciliation, was caused by sin; and the distance between God and man is a moral one. It is not such a separation as might arise from the difference between the divine and the human nature, or from the inevitable distance between Creator and creature. And so reconciliation has for its effect, not mere absorption into God, but the restoration of moral communion between God and His people. The intercourse was broken by sin, and the result of reconciliation must be moral; it must take effect in a change of will, in the creation of a life of new obedience. False ideas arise when this is misrepresented, and these misrepresentations can arise in two ways :—when it is said that the action of divine grace impregnates the nature in a magical way, instead of taking effect on the will in a moral fashion, e.g., the magical idea of sacramental efficacy; or when it is said that the result of the reconciliation is to raise man above the necessity of living a moral life and of conforming to the laws of morality, e.g., the Antinomian heresy.

Thus theology finds at least eight separate kinds of heresy, arising from the entrance of foreign elements into the four fundamental ideas of Christianity. All heresies may be reduced to one or other of these eight classes. In point of fact, however, most heresies which have actually arisen cannot be said to belong purely to any one of them. The class only denotes the type; for one error is apt to bring others in its train, and so most heresies are mixed, and do not in all respects conform to their type.

Theologians, however, have not rested content with the mere theoretical or genetic description of heresy and heretics, and have commonly borrowed distinctions first laid down by jurists in canon law to distinguish more narrowly the characteristic marks of heresy. Thus a false doctrine to be a heresy must be an intellectual error, it' must be held voluntarily, it must contradict a doctrine already defined by the formula of the church, it must be held pertinaciously, and the heretic must be professedly within the church ; but these distinctions belong properly to the legal aspect of heresy, and must be referred to again.

Many theologians, Schleierrfiacher among others, have attempted to describe the actual origin of heresies, and a common mode of explanation is as follows. Heresies arise in that province of theology called dogmatic, and commonly appear during the definition of some important part of dogmatic theology. Dogmatic theology is the rationale of the spiritual events and forces which have called Christianity into being. In the attempt made by the church to understand these events and forces which have called it into being, its attention has commonly been confined to the more outstanding portions. The history of dogmatic shows us that from time to time the church has endeavoured to master one doctrine, not the whole round of doctrines; it has endeavoured to make distinct single points, instead of working at the various relations of all the doctrines to each other. This very natural mode of work has the one disadvantage that it concentrates attention on isolated portions of doctrine rather than on the whole mass, and between the consecutive portions there are gaps. The mind of man, however, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and summarily fills these vacua up with material usually drawn from the prevailing philosophical or scientific theories of the day. These summary explanations or theories may or may not be in accordance with the spirit of Christianity, and when they are not they become a fruitful source of heresies. One of the best illustrations of this is the introduction into theology of the Aristotelian doctrine of το εκούσιον, which gave the church the Pelagian heresy along with some others.

So much for the general theological conception of heresy, of its nature, divisions, and sources; but before proceeding to describe the use of the term in canon law, it should be observed that the theological does not always correspond with the ecclesiastical meaning of the word. It is generally acknowledged that Holy Scripture is the source of doctrine, and that for the due understanding thereof the enlightening guidance of the Holy Spirit is required; though, of course, the precise meaning of this statement varies in different systems of theology. Holy Scripture and the witness of the Spirit of God are thus the touchstone of heresy. In the Roman Catholic and Greek Churches, however, it is held that the enlightening guidance of the Holy Spirit in this respect is restrained within the limits of certain ecclesiastical machinery (the oecumenical council, the pope ex cathedra, &c.), which are the only channels through which the Spirit comes to the church, and hence the creed of the church rather than Scripture is the real touchstone of heresy. Protestant theologians, on the other hand, do not believe either that the guidance of the Spirit is always present within this ecclesiastical machinery or that it is given in this way only, and so they make a distinction between mere ecclesiastical and real theological heresies. Ecclesiastical heresies arise when a fundamental statement made in the creed or confession is contradicted. But it may happen, since creeds and councils may err, that the error is not in the contradiction but in the creed, and therefore there is always an appeal from the creed to the Scripture. The ecclesiastical idea of heresy has always the theological idea behind it, and may at any time be corrected by it. Roman Catholic and Greek theologians, on the other hand, do not admit any going behind the record; they do not allow any appeal from the creed to Scripture. According to their ideas the creed is the infallible digest of Scripture, and therefore heresy is to be tested by the creed and not by Scripture—that is, the ecclesiastical and theological ideas of heresy are exactly the same.

2. Heresy according to Canon Law.— Canon law was the ecclesiastical law of mediaeval Europe, and is still the law of the Roman Catholic Church, and its description of heresy and of heretics is almost more important than the theological in the investigation of the matter from the historical side. Canon law regards heresy from the practical side of ecclesiastical procedure and legal enactment. Its view is much narrower than the theological, but much more precise. Orthodoxy is the doctrine maintained by the infallible Roman Church and assented to by all its faithful members; heresy is dissent from the articles of faith established by the Roman pontiffs and by the councils of the Roman Church. Canon law also is mιinly concerned with heresy in order to punish it, and therefore is obliged to treat the whole subject with severe legal accuracy of statement. It proceeds from strict definitions. Perhaps the commonest definition is the following :—heresy is “error intellectus voluntarius contra aliquam propositionem catholicam cum pertinacia assertus ab eo qui baptismum accepit.” Jurists are accustomed to expand this general definition in a variety of qualifying statements, (a) All heresy is error, but every error is not a heresy. It is an error according to canon law to take usury; it is heresy to say that to take usury is not a sin, but taking usury is no heresy. Heresy is intellectual error. It is...

It has been suggested that the acceptation of the word αἵρεσις in the epistles is different from what it has been observed to be in the historical books of the New Testament. In order to account for this difference, it may be observed that the word _sect_ has always something relative in it; and therefore, although the general import of the term be the same, it will convey a favourable or an unfavourable idea, according to the particular relation which it bears in the application. When it is used along with the proper name, by way of distinguishing one party from another, it conveys neither praise nor reproach. If any thing reprehensible or commendable be meant, it is suggested, not by the word αἵρεσις itself, but by the words with which it stands connected in construction. Thus we may speak of a strict sect, or a lax sect; or of a good sect, or a bad sect. Again: the term may be applied to a party formed in a community, when considered in reference to the whole. If the community be of such a nature as not to admit of such a subdivision, without impairing or corrupting its constitution, a charge of splitting into sects, or forming parties, is equivalent to a charge of corruption in that which is most essential to the existence and welfare of the society. Hence arises the whole difference in the word, as it is used in the historical part of the New Testament, and in the epistles of St. Peter and St. Paul; for these are the only Apostles who employ it. In the history, the reference is always of the first kind; in the epistles, it is always of the second. In these last, the Apostles address themselves only to Christians, and either reprehend them for, or warn them against, forming sects among themselves, to the prejudice of charity, to the production of much mischief within their community, and of great scandal to the unconverted world without. In both applications, however, the radical import of the word is the same; and even in the latter it has no necessary reference to doctrine, true or false. During the early ages of Christianity, the term _heresy_ gradually lost the innocence of its original meaning, and came to be applied, in a reproachful sense, to any corruption of what was considered as the orthodox creed, or even to any departure from the established rites and ceremonies of the church.

The heresies chiefly alluded to in the apostolical epistles are, first, those of the Judaizers, or rigid adherents to the Mosaic rites, especially that of circumcision; second, those of converted Hellenists, or Grecian Jews, who held the Greek eloquence and philosophy in too high an estimation, and corrupted, by the speculations of the latter, the simplicity of the Gospel; and third, those who endeavoured to blend Christianity with a mixed philosophy of magic, demonology, and Platonism, which was then highly popular in the world. With respect to the latter, the remarks of Hug will tend to illustrate some passages in the writings of St. Paul:--Without being acquainted with the notions of those teachers who caused the Apostle so much anxiety and so much vexation, a considerable part of these treatises must necessarily remain dark and unintelligible. From the criteria by which the Apostle points them out, at one time some deemed that they recognised the Gnostics; others perceived none but the Essenes; and every one found arguments for his assertions from the similarity of the doctrines, opinions, and morals. It would, however, be as difficult to prove that the Gnostic school had at that time indeed perfectly developed itself, as it is unjust to charge the Essenes with that extreme of immorality of which St. Paul accused these seducers, since the contemporaries and acquaintances of this Jewish sect mention them with honour and respect, and extol its members as the most virtuous men of their age. The similarity of the principles and opinions, which will have been observed in both parties compared with St. Paul’s declarations, flows from a common source, from the philosophy of that age, whence both the one and the other have derived their share. We shall therefore go less astray, if we recede a step, and consider the philosophy itself, as the general modeller of these derivative theories. It found its followers among Judaism as well as among the Heathens; it both introduced its speculative preparations into Christianity, and endeavoured to unite them or to adjust them to it, as well as they were able, by which means Christianity would have become deformed and unlike to itself, and would have been merged in the ocean of philosophical reveries, unless the Apostles had on this occasion defended it against the follies of men. An oriental, or, as it is commonly called, a Babylonian or Chaldean, doctrinal system had already long become known to the Greeks, and even to the Romans, before Augustus, and still more so in the Augustan age, and was in the full progress of its extension over Asia and Europe. It set up different deities and intermediate spirits in explanation of certain phenomena of nature, for the office of governing the world, and for the solution of other metaphysical questions, which from time immemorial were reckoned among the difficult propositions of philosophy. The practical part of this system was occupied with the precepts by means of which a person might enter into communication with these spirits or demons. But the result which they promised to themselves from this union with the divine natures, was that of acquiring, by their assistance, superhuman knowledge, that of predicting future events, and of performing supernatural works. These philosophers were celebrated under the name of magi and Chaldeans; who, for the sake of better accommodating themselves to the western nations, modified their system after the Greek forms, and then, as it appears, knew how to unite it with the doctrine of Plato, from whence afterward arose the Neo-Platonic and in Christendom the Gnostical school. These men forced their way even to the throne. Tiberius had received instruction in their philosophy, and was very confident that by means of an intelligence with the demons, it was possible to learn and perform extraordinary things. Nero caused a great number of them to be brought over from Asia, not unfrequently at the expense of the provinces. The supernatural spirits would not always appear, yet he did not discard his belief of them. The magi and Chaldeans were the persons who were consulted on great undertakings, who, when conspiracies arose, predicted the issue; who invoked spirits, prepared offerings, and in love affairs were obliged to afford aid from their art. Even the force of the laws, to which recourse was frequently necessary to be had at Rome, tended to nothing but the augmentation of their authority. As they found access and favour with people of all classes in the capital, so did they also in the provinces. Paul found a magus at the court of the proconsul at Paphos, Acts xiii, 6. Such was that Simon in Samaria, Acts viii, 10, who was there considered as a higher being of the spiritual class. The expression is remarkable, as it is a part of the technical language of the Theurgists; they called him Δύναμις τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγάλη, “The great power of God.” So also Pliny calls some of the demons and intermediate spirits, by whose coöperation particular results were effected, _potestates_. [Powers.] Justin Martyr, the fellow countryman of Simon, has preserved to us some technical expressions of his followers. He says that they ascribed to him the high title ὑπεράνω ϖάσης ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἐξουσίας, καὶ δυνάμεως. [Far above all principality, and power, and might.] Of these classes of spirits, which appear under such different appellations, the superior were those who ruled; but the inferior, who had more of a material substance, and who, on that account, were able to connect themselves immediately with matter, were those who executed the commands of the superior. By an intelligence with the superior spirits a person might have the subaltern at his service and assistance; for the more powerful demons thus commanded the inferior to execute certain commissions in the material world: Ἐν τῶ ἄρχοντι τῶν δαιμονίων, “By the prince of the devils,” Matt. xii, 24.

The Syrian philosopher, Jamblichus, of Chalcis, has furnished us with a circumstantial representation of this system and its several varieties, in his book on the mysteries of the Chaldeans and Egyptians:--The nature of the gods is a pure, spiritual, and perfect unity. With this highest and perfect immateriality no influence on matter is conceivable, consequently, no creation and dominion of the world. Certain subordinate deities must therefore be admitted, which are more compounded in their nature, and can act upon gross matter. These are the “creators of the world,” δημίουργοι, and the “rulers of the world,” κοσμοκράτορες. The superior deities are, however, the real cause of all that exists; and from their fulness, from their ϖλήρωμα, it derives its existence. The succession from the highest deities down to the lowest is not by a sudden descent, but by a continually graduating decrease from the highest, pure, and spiritual natures, down to those which are more substantial and material, which are the nearest related to the gross matter of the creation, and which consequently possess the property of acting upon it. In proportion to their purer quality, or coarser composition, they occupy different places as their residence, either in a denser atmosphere, or in higher regions. The highest among these classes of spirits are called ἄρχαι, or, ἀρχικὸν ἀιτιόν. Others among the “divine natures,” θείαι οὐσίαι, are “intermediate beings,” μέσαι. Those which occupy themselves with the laws of the world are also called ἄρχοντες, and “the ministering spirits” are δύναμεις and ἄγγελοι. The archangels are not generally recognised in this theory; this class is said to have been of a later origin, and to have been first introduced by Porphyry. (See _Archangel_.) If we take here also into consideration the ἐξουσίαι, of which Justin has before spoken, we shall have enumerated the greater part of the technical appellations of this demonology. But to arrive at a union with the higher orders of the spiritual world, in which alone the highest bliss of man consists, it is necessary, before all things, to become disengaged from the servitude of the body, which detains the soul from soaring up to the purely spiritual. Matrimony, therefore, and every inclination to sexual concupiscence, must be renounced before the attainment of this perfection. Hence, the offerings and initiations of the magi cannot, without great injury, be even communicated to those who have not as yet emancipated themselves from the _libido procreandi_, and the propensities to corporeal attachments. To eat meat, or to partake in general of any slain animal, nay, to even touch it, contaminates. Bodily exercises and purifications, though not productive of the gifts of prophecy, are nevertheless conducive to them. Though the gods only attend to the pure, they nevertheless sometimes mislead men to impure, actions. This may perhaps proceed from the totally different ideas of that which is good and righteous, which subsist between them and mankind.

This philosophy of which the elements had already existed a long time in the east, formed itself, in its progress to the west, into a doctrinal system, which found there far more approbation and celebrity than it ever had deserved. It was principally welcome in those countries, to which the epistles of the Apostle are directed. When St. Paul had preached at Ephesus, a quantity of magical and theurgical books were brought forward by their possessors and burned before his eyes, Acts xix, 19. This city had long since been celebrated for them, and the Ἐφέσια ἀλεξιφάρμακα, and Ἐφέσια γράμματα, were spells highly extolled by the ancients for the purpose of procuring an authority over the demons. As late even as the fourth century, the synod at Laodicea was obliged to institute severe laws against the worship of angels, against magic, and against incantations. These opinions had taken such a deep root in the mind, that some centuries did not suffice for the extinction of the recollection of them. Now, there are passages in the Apostle which strikingly characterize this theory. He calls the doctrinal system of his opponents φιλοσοφία οὐ κατὰ Χριϛὸν, “a philosophy incompatible with Christianity,” Col. ii, 8; θρησκειά τῶν ἀγγέλων, “a worship of angels,” Col. ii, 18; διδασκαλίαι δαιμονίων, “a demonology,” 1 Tim. iv, 1. He calls it still farther γοητεία, 2 Tim. iii, 13. This is the peculiar expression by which the ancients denoted magical arts and necromantic experiments; γόης is, according to Hesychius, μάγος, κόλαξ, ϖερίεργος, and γοητεύει, ἀπατᾶ μαγεύει, φαρμακεύει, ἐξάιδει. λ. St. Paul compares these teachers to Jannes and Jambres, 2 Timothy iii, 8. These two persons are, according to the ancient tradition, the magicians who withstood Moses by their arts. They were from time immemorial names so notorious in the magical science, that they did not remain unknown even to the Neo-Platonics. When the Apostle enjoins the Ephesians to array themselves in the arms of faith, and courageously to endure the combat, Ephes. vi, 12, he says that it is the more necessary, because their combat is not against human force, οὐ ϖρὸς [not against] ἄιμα καὶ σάρκα, “flesh and blood,” but against superhuman natures. Where he mentions these, he enumerates in order the names of this magico-spiritual world, ἀρχὰς, ἐξουσίας, particularly the κοσμοκράτορας, “principalities,” “powers,” “rulers;” and likewise fixes their abode in the upper aërial regions, εἰς τὸν ἀέρα ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. In like manner, in the Epistle to the Colossians, for the sake of representing to them Christianity in an exalted and important light, and of praising the divine nature of Jesus, he says, that all that exists is his creation, and is subjected to him, not even the spiritual world excepted. He then selects the philosophic appellations to demonstrate that this supposititious demonocracy is wholly subservient to him; whether they be θρόνοι, or κυριότητες, ἀρχαὶ ἐξουσίαι, [thrones, dominions, principalities, powers,] Col. i, 16. Finally, to destroy completely and decisively the whole doctrinal system, he demonstrates, that Christ, through the work of redemption, has obtained the victory over the entire spiritual creation, that he drags in triumph the ἀρχὰς [principalities] and ἐξουσίας [powers] as vanquished, and that henceforth their dominion and exercise of power have ceased, Col. ii, 15. But what he says respecting the seared consciences of these heretics, respecting their deceptions, their avarice, &c, is certainly more applicable to this class of men, than to any other. None throughout all antiquity are more accused of these immoralities, than those pretended confidents of the occult powers. If he speaks warmly against any distinction of meats, against abstinence from matrimony, this also applies to them; and if he rejects bodily exercises, it was because they recommended them, because they imposed baths, lustrations, continence, and long preparations, as the conditions by which alone the connection with the spirits became possible. These, then, are the persons who passed before the Apostle’s mind, and who, when they adopted Christianity, established that sect among the professors of Jesus, which gave to it the name of Gnostics, and which, together with the different varieties of this system, is accused by history of magical arts. Other adherents of this system among the Heathens, to which the Syrian philosophers, as well as some Egyptian, such as Plotinus and his scholars, belonged, formed the sect of Neo-Platonism.

But in the above remarks of this learned German, some considerations are wanting, necessary to the right understanding of several of the above passages quoted from St. Paul. The philosophic system above mentioned was built on the Scripture doctrine of good and evil angels, and so had a basis of truth, although abused to a gross superstition, and even idolatry. It was grounded, too, upon the notion of different orders among both good and evil spirits, with subordination and government; which also is a truth of which some intimation is given in Scripture. The Apostle then could use all these terms without giving any sanction to the errors of the day. He knew that the spiritual powers they had converted into subordinate deities, were either good or evil angels in their various ranks, and he uproots the whole superstition, by showing that the “thrones and dominions” of heaven are submissive created servants of Christ; and that the evil spirits, the rulers of “the darkness of this world,” are put under his feet.