1. Definition and general account of the subject. —It is not easy to define in a single phrase the subject commonly called Ethics in such a manner as to meet with general acceptance; as its boundaries and relations to cognate subjects are variously conceived by writers of different schools, and rather indefinitely by mankind in general. Nor does the derivation of the term help us much. Ethics (ηθLκa) originally meant that which relates to ^0oς (“character ”); the treatise of Aristotle’s, however, to which the term was first applied, is not concerned with character considered simply as character, but with its good and bad qualities. Indeed, the antithesis of “good” and “bad,”in some form, is involved in all ethical affirmation; and its presence constitutes a fundamental distinction between the science or study of ethics and any department of physical inquiry. Physics is concerned with what is, has been, or will be; ethics with what is “good.” or what “ought to be,” and its opposite. We must add, however, that the good that ethics investigates is “good for man,” to distinguish it from universal or absolute good, which is the subject-matter of theology or ontology; and again, if we are to separate ethics from politics, we must introduce a further qualification, and define the former as the study of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered as individuals. Neither of these distinctions, however, should be taken to imply a complete division of subjects; and neither, it may be added, was reached at once and without effort in the development of ethical reflection. In Platonism we find Ethics and Ontology indissolubly blended; and, indeed, in almost every philosophical system in which the universe is contemplated as having an ultimate end or Good, the good of human beings is conceived as somehow closely related to this Universal Good. So again the connexion between Ethics and Politics is naturally very intimate. We only know the individual man as a member of some society; what we call his virtues are chiefly exhibited in his dealings with his fellows, and his most prominent pleasures are derived from intercourse with them; thus it is a paradox to maintain that man’s highest good is independent of his social relations, or of the constitution and condition of the community of which he forms a part. So, again, it w ould be generally admitted that a statesman ought to aim at promoting the wellbeing of his follow citizens considered as individuals; and if so, the investigation of the particulars of such wellbeing must be an integral part of politics. Still it is manifest that the good of an individual man can be separated as an object of study from the good of his community; so that the ethical point of view has to be distinguished from the political, however large a field the two studies may have in common,

When, however, we thus isolate in thought the individual man from his polity, the close connexion of Ethics with Psychology becomes manifest. It is plain that the chief good of man cannot consist in anything external and material, such as wealth; nor even in mere bodily health and wellbeing, which experience shows to be compatible with extreme badness and wretchedness. And though it is . perhaps true that goodness is commonly attributed to men from a consideration of the external effects of their conduct; still it is generally held that a certain state of the agent s mind, a certain quality of disposition, motive, intention, or purpose, is essential to the perfect moral goodness of an action. Thus all (or almost all) ethical schools would agree that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life; whether they hold that ultimate good is to be found in psychical existence regarded as merely sentient and emotional, identifying it with some species of desirable feeling or pleasure, or the genus or sum of such feelings, or whether they rather maintain that wellbeing of the mind must lie solely or chiefly in the quality of its activity. And when we attempt to work out either view into a clear and complete system, we are led inevitably to further psychological study, in order to examine different kinds and degrees of pleasure and pain, determine the nature and mutual relations of the different virtues or good qualities of character, and their opposites. So again, in discussing the fundamental question as to what is ultimately good or desirable, moralists are led to observe carefully what men actually do desire and aim at, and thus to analyse fully the process of voluntary action, as well as the emotional states that precede and prompt to it. In fact it will appear that all important ethical notions are also psychological; except the fundamental antithesis of “good” and “bad,” or “right” and “wrong,” with which psychology is not primarily concerned, any more than physics.

The two antitheses just mentioned are frequently regarded as identical. And in fact it does not matter for ordinary purposes whether we speak of “right” or “good” conduct, “wrong” or “bad” motives. The common notion of what is Good for a human being—even if we restrict it to what is“ultimately” good, or “good in itself” and not merely as a means to some further end—includes more than the common notion of what is Right for him, or his Duty. No doubt it is commonly believed that it will be ultimately best for a man to do his duty, and that this will promote his real Interest or Happiness; but it does not follow that the notions of duty and interest are to be identified, or even that the connexion between the tλvo may be scientifically demonstrated. The connexion is often regarded rather as a matter of faith; indeed many would hold that it is not undesirable that it should be somewhat obscure, in order that duty may be done as duty, and not from a mere calculation of self-love. Thus we arrive at another conception of ethics, in which it is viewed as concerned primarily with the principles of duty or the moral code, and only secondarily—or perhaps not at all—with the relation of duty to the agent’s private happiness. On this view the study connects itself with theology, if the rules of duty are regarded as a code of divine legislation; and apart from this reference it has a close affinity to rational or abstract jurisprudence. We might distinguish this as the modern view of ethics in contrast with the former, which was that of ancient Greek philosophy generally,—the transition between the two being due chiefly to the influence of Christianity, but partly also to that of Roman jurisprudence It is true that the thought of “the gods’ unwritten and unfaltering law” was not by any means absent from the moral reflection of Greece: still, the idea of Law was not taken as the ultimate and fundamental notion in any of the ancient ethical systems. These all proceed on the assumption that man, as a reasonable being, must seek his own highest good in this earthly life, and «therefore that any laws he has to obey must be demonstrated to be means to the attainment of this good, or particulars in which it is realized. On this point the change produced by Christianity is even more striking, if we consider its more general effects rather than its influence on the minds that were most completely penetrated by its religious spirit.

The true Christian saint lived even on earth, no less than the pagan philosopher, a life which he regarded as intrinsically preferable to all other modes of earthly existence; and, like the Platonic philosopher, a life of which practical virtue was not so much the essence as the outward expression. Still even for the saint this earthly life afforded but an imperfect foretaste of the bliss for which he hoped; and in the view of more ordinary Christians, the ultimate good of man vanished from the scrutiny of mere ethical speculation into the indefinite brightness of a future life of happiness, supernaturally bestowed by God as a reward for obedience to his laws. Or rather, perhaps, by the mass of Christians, the moral code was more commonly regarded, in still closer analogy to human legislation, as supported by penal sanctions; since in all ages of Christianity the fear of the pains of hell has probably been a more powerful motive to draw men from vice than the hope of the pleasures of heaven. On either view the ultimate weal or ill of human beings became something that might be imagined and rhetorically described, but not definitely known or scientifically investigated; and thus the subject-matter of ethics defined itself afresh as Moral Law, a body of rules absolutely prescribed, and supplying a complete guidance for human conduct, though not claiming to contain an exhaustive statement of human good.

Within the Christian church, through the early and middle ages of its history, it naturally fell to theologians to expound, and to priests to administer this code of divine legislation. But when a more philosophical treatment of ethics was introduced by the schoolmen, the combination in the code of two elements, one distinctively Christian, and the other cognizable by natural reason and binding on all men apart from revelation, began to be clearly seen; and an adequate theory of this second element seemed to be supplied by the development of theoretical jurisprudence that followed on the revival, in the 12th century, of the study of Roman law. In the later treatment of legal principles in Rome, the notion of a law of nature had become prominent; and this notion was naturally aud easily adapted to represent the element in morality that was independent of revelation. It is true that the natural law of the philosophical jurists did not concern itself primarily with duties, but rather with rights, and so with the relative and negative duties that are involved in the notion of rights; hence it could not properly be identified with more than a portion of the moral code. This portion, however, is of such fundamental importance that the difference we have noticed has been frequently overlooked, and Morality not distinguished from Natural Law, except by the further control that the former claims over the inner springs of voluntary action.

It is chiefly in connexion with this jural view of morality that the inquiry into the origin of the moral faculty has occupied a prominent place in the modern treatment of Ethics. So long as the “moral facιdty” is regarded merely as the faculty of knowing our true good, together with its main causes or conditions, it hardly seems important to inquire how this faculty originated, any more than it is for a geometer to investigate the origin of the spatial faculty. But when conscience is conceived as a legislator and governor within the breast, claiming absolute authority over all other impulses, it is natural that the legitimacy of its claim should be investigated; and it is not hard to understand how this legitimacy is thought to depend on the “originality” of the faculty—that is, on its being a part of the plan or type according to which human nature was originally constructed. Hence investigations into the moral condition of children and savages and even animals, and more or less conjectural theories of the soul’s growth aud development, have been commonly regarded as necessary appendages or introductions to modern ethical discussion.

So again, it is through the jural conception of ethics that the controversy on free will chiefly becomes important. Λ man does not naturally inquire whether he is “free” or not to seek his own good, provided only he knows what it is, and that it is attainable by voluntary action. But when his conduct is compared with a code to the violation of which punishments are attached, the question whether he really could obey the rule by which he is judged is obvious and inevitable, since if he could not, it seems contrary to our sense of justice to punish him.

To sum up, the subject of Ethics, most comprehensively understood, includes (1) an investigation of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature and particular species of (a) Virtue or (b) Pleasure, and the chief means of realizing these ends; (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or the Moral. Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue); (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will. It is connected with Ontology or Theology, in so far as a Universal Good is recognized, inclusive of Human Good, or analogous to it; with Theology again, so far as morality is regarded as a Code of Divine appointment. It is connected with Politics, so far as the wellbeing of any individual man is bound up with the wellbeing of his society; and again with Jurisprudence (or Politics), so far as morality is identified with Natural Law. Finally, almost every branch of Ethical discussiou belongs at least in part to Psychology; and the inquiries into the origin of the moral faculty and the freedom of the Will are purely psychological.

We will now proceed to trace briefly the course of ethical speculation from its origin in Europe to the present day; confining our attention, during the latter part of this period, to such modes of thought as have been developed in England, or have exercised an important influence there.

II. Greek and Greco-Roman Ethics. —The ethical speculation of Greece, and therefore of Europe, has not, any more than other elements of European civilization, an abrupt and absolute commencement. The naïve and fragmentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct, in which nascent moral reflection everywhere first manifests itself, supply a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the “gnomic” poetry of the 7th and 6th centuries before Christ; their importance in the development of Greek civilization is strikingly characterized by the traditional enumeration of the “seven sages” of the 6th century; and their influence on ethical thought is sufficiently shown in the references that Plato and even Aristotle make to the definitions and maxims of poets and sages. But from such utterances as these to moral philosophy there was still a long step; for though Thales (circ. 640-560 B.C.), one of the seven, was also the first physical philosopher of Greece, we have no ground for supposing that his practical wisdom had anything of a philosophical character. There seems to have been more connexion between moral teaching and metaphysical speculation in the case of Pythagoras (cire. 580-500 b.c.), who is conspicuous among pre-Socratic philosophers as the _ founder not merely of a school, but rather of a sect or order, bound by a common rule of life. Certainly the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, that the essence of justice (conceived as equal retribution) was a square number, indicates a serious attempt to extend to the region of conduct that mathematical view of the universe which was the fundamental characteristic of Pythagoreanism; and the same may be said of their classification of good with unity, limit, straightness, light, &c., and of evil with the opposite qualities. Still, on the whole, the moral precepts of Pythagoras appear to have been announced much more in a dogmatic, or even prophetic, than in a philosophic manner; and, whether sound or arbitrary, to have been accepted by his disciples with a decidedly unphilosophic reverence for the “ipse dixit ’ ' of the master. Hence, whatever influence the Pythagorean blending of ethical and mathematical notions may have had on Plato, and, through him, on later thought, we cannot regard the school as having really forestalled the Socratic inquiry after a completely reasoned theory of conduct. The ethical element in the “dark” philosophizing of Heraclitus (circ. 530-470 b.c.) shows more profundity of view but still less approximation to a system; in spite of the partial anticipation of Stoicism which we find in his conceptions of a law of the universe, to which the wise man will carefully conform, and a divine harmony, in the recognition of which he will find his truest satisfaction. It is only when we come to Democritus, a contemporary of Socrates, the last of the series of original thinkers whom we distinguish as pre-Socratic, that we find anything which we can call an ethical system. The fragments that remain of the moral treatises of Democritus are sufficient, perhaps, to convince us that the turn of Greek philosophy in the direction of conduct, which was actually due to Socrates, would have taken place without him, though in a less decided manner; but when we compare the Democritean ethics with the post-Socratic system to which it has most affinity, Epicureanism, we find that it exhibits a very rudimentary apprehension of the formal conditions which moral teaching must fulfil before it can lay claim to be treated as scientific.

The fact is that a moral system could not satisfactorily be constructed until attention had been strongly directed to the vagueness and inconsistency of the common moral opinions of mankind; until this was done, the moral counsels of the philosopher, however supreme his contempt for the common herd, inevitably shared these defects. For this purpose was needed the concentration of a philosophic intellect of the first order on the problems of practice. In Socrates, for the first time, we find the required combination of a genuine ardour for knowledge, and a paramount interest in conduct. The pre-Socratic thinkers, from Thales downwards, were all primarily devoted to ontological research; but by the middle of the 5th century b.c. the clash and conflict of their dogmatic systems had led some of the keenest minds to doubt the possibility of penetrating the secret of the universe. This doubt found expression in the reasoned scepticism of Gorgias, and produced the famous doctrine of Protagoras, that the human apprehension is the only standard of what is and what is not. A similar view of the natural limits of the human intellect repelled the philosophic ardour of Socrates from physico-metapbysi-cal inquiries. In his case, moreover, such a view found support in a naive piety that indisposed him to search into things of which the gods seemed to have reserved the knowledge to themselves. The regulation of human action, on the other hand (except on occasions of special difficulty, for which omens and oracles might be vouchsafed), they had left to human reason; on this accordingly Socrates concentrated his efforts.

The demand for an art of conduct was not, however, original in Socrates, though his conception of the requisite knowledge was so in the highest degree. The thought of the most independent thinker is conditioned by that of his age; and we cannot disconnect the work of Socrates from the professional instruction in conduct which is so striking a phenomenon of this period of Greek civilization. The origination of this kind of teaching seems to have been due to the genius of Protagoras; whom we may suppose to have been turned, like Socrates, to the study of human affairs in consequence of his negative attitude towards current ontological speculation. This instruction, conveyed in well-thronged lectures, does not seem to have been based on any philosophical system, and was in fact of too popular a quality to be of much philosophical importance. It seems to have combined somewhat loosely the art of getting on in the world with the art of managing public affairs, and to have mingled encomiastic expositions of different virtues with prudential justifications of virtue, as a means of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain. But however commonplace the teaching of the “sophists” may have been, the general fact of the appearance of this new profession to meet a new social need is sufficiently remarkable. How came it that after so many centuries, in which Greeks had used their moral notions with the confidence of perfect knowledge, and attributed to any cause rather thau ignorance the extensive failure of men to realize virtue, they should suddenly become persuaded that good conduct was something that could be learnt from lectures'? It must be borne in mind that in the Greek conception of virtue the moral view of life was not separated from the prudential; the aptτη which the sophists professed to communicate was not strictly virtue, as distinguished from other skills and gifts that sustain and enrich life. Thus while in this age, as in more modern times, most men would suppose that they had sufficient knowledge of justice and temperance, they would not be equally confident that they possessed the art of making the best of life generally. We must remember, too, the importance of the civic or public side of life, to a free-born leisured Greek in...