HERMENEUTICS, Biblical, is that branch of theological science which treats of the principles of Scripture interpretation. Variously described as the theory of the discovery and communication of the thoughts of Holy Scripture (Lange), the science of attaining clearness both in comprehending and in explaining the sense of the Biblical authors (Ernesti), the methodological preparation for the interpreter and for exegesis (Doedes), the science of the removal of differences between us and the sacred writers (Immer), it has for its task to determine the laws of valid exegetical practice. Schleiermacher and Klàusen have limited it to the doctrine of what the interpreter has to observe in order to put himself in possession of the mind of Scripture. The former defines it as a discipline which looks simply to the reader’s own apprehension, not to the conveyance of the meaning ascertained to others; which latter is to be regarded, he thinks, as but a particular division of the art of speaking and writing. It has been generally taken, however, to have respect to the communication as well as the acquisition of the thoughts of the Biblical writers. This larger definition, which is as ancient at least as Augustine’s statement of the two things “quibus nititur omnis tractatio Scripturae, modus inveniendi quae intelligenda sunt et modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt” (De Doctr. Christ., i. 1), has been formally accepted or practically acted on by most modern authorities. It is consonant with the currency of the terms ερμηνεύω, ερμηνεύω, ερμηνευτής (connected it may be with Hermes, but not derived from that, such use of a deity’s name being probably unexampled). These in the classics express both expounding (Pindar, O., 2, 153) and interpreting or ...translating a foreign language to others (Xen., Anab., i. 2, 17; Herod., ii. 125); while in the New Testament ερμηνεύει* means to translate (John i. 39, 43) and διερμηνεύει* to expound, interpret, or translate (Luke xxiv. 27, 1 Cor. xii. 30, Acts ix. 36). The definition is in harmony too with the Protestant idea of exegesis as an art which brings the contents of Scripture to the general understanding, and the Protestant conception of the direct approach of God’s word to man’s heart by Scripture. As the theory of the interpretative art hermeneutics is usually taken to be an historical science, forming a subdivision of historical theology. Where, however, a fourfold, instead of a threefold, distribution of theological science is adopted, it is assigned to literary theology. It presupposes such disciplines as textual criticism and Biblical introduction, while it may exercise a reflex influence on some of the discussions with which these are conversant. Although practice precedes theory, and only through the use of the art of interpretation can the principles of interpretation be reached, as it is out of Scripture itself that the laws of Scriptural exposition must be drawn, theoretically this science precedes exegesis and forms an indispensable preparation for Biblical theology. Much which it has been the custom to embrace -within it belongs really to general hermeneutics. The limits properly assignable to it are comparatively narrow, its immediate object being to decide how the laws of general hermeneutics are related to the particular records known as Scripture. The propriety of a special Biblical hermeneutic is established so far as Scripture is proved to be more than an ordinary literature. The Christian who comes to the Bible with the conviction that it is the record of divine communications, and with the experience that it is the medium through which God has spoken to him and led him into new relations to Himself, has to ask whether the principles of ordinary hermeneutics have to be modified or supplemented when applied to these books. Neither the Christian recognition of the spiritual character of Scripture nor the Protestant assertion of the right of private judgment, the perspicuity of Scripture, and the laity’s direct interest in the Bible, warrants the extreme position assumed among some sects, that a scholarly interpretation and, therefore, a science of hermeneutics are superfluous. Being a literary record composed in languages which demand the exegetical praxis of translation, and produced under circumstances, by writers, and for readers widely removed in date and character from our present acquaintance, Scripture requires a scientific process for its exposition, and the laws of that process must be verified. The peculiar value which attaches to it as a holy literature makes this the more needful, the exceptional position assigned it rendering its interpretation opener to the invasion of prepossession and private religious ideas. The exclusive authority ascribed to these books by the Protestant, who accepts them as the only rule of faith and life, gives him a special interest in hermeneutics. The concrete and historical form in which their spiritual teaching appears, the figurative, typical, and symbolical terms so largely used in them, the numerous presuppositions on which their statements of religious truth and fact proceed, suggest the necessity of such a discipline. The qualities of Scripture which render its appeal to the common understanding distinct and immediate are arguments for scientific intelligence in educing from its declarations nothing more and nothing less than their exact intention. The interpreter’s function being, not to develop some meaning which the words might bear to present students or which the first readers may have seen in them, but simply to ascertain with precision and completeness the ideas which the writers themselves meant to convey, it may be said with Schleiermacher that in a certain sense the interpreter has to educe more than the author introduced. The former has to bring out into clearness much that influenced the latter half-unconsciously in his composition, and to give objective expression to much that underlies his definite statements. Hence the special need for a scientific hermeneutic in the case of a book like the Bible, in which there is so much that is implicit. The vast variety of results reached in crucial passages, and the wide diversities of method which have been pursued among individual exegetes and in exegetical schools, make the propriety and utility of such a science the more apparent.
Since Christopher Wolle (Hermeneutica Novi Foedems acroamaticodoymatica certissimis defecatoe philosophice principiis corroborata eximiisque omnium Theologice Christianae partium usibus inserviens, Leipsic, 1736) the hermeneutics of the New Testament, for the sake of convenience or on grounds of scientific distinction, has often been separated from the hermeneutics of the Old Testament. The scientific union or disjunction of these disciplines depends on the view entertained of the mutual relations of the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian. Where the Bible is seen to constitute an organic whole, the hermeneutical principles applicable to the two Testaments are treated in connexion. It then becomes one great object of the science to grasp the differences which are discovered within the unity of Scripture, and exhibit what account has to be taken of these in the art of interpretation. A distinct position, however, naturally belongs to Jewish hermeneutics, which dealt with the Hebrew Scriptures as at once the entire written revelation of God, and the repertory of the highest wisdom on all subjects of human inquiry. The results of the scientific study of the Old Testament, which was carried on with vast activity from Ezra’s time by numerous scribes and in great schools and colleges (Jerusalem, Tiberias, Sura, Pumbeditha, Nahardea, <fcc.), are seen in the Talmudical writings, the Mishna giving authoritative enlargements and explanations of the law, and the Gemara, in its twofold form of Jerusalem Talmud edited at Tiberias, and Babylonian Talmud proceeding from Sura, containing further commentaries, fantastic definitions, and explanations of prior explanations (see Talmud). The most ancient Jewish interpretation of Scripture, the Hidrash (“study,” “investigation”), which assumed a fixed character during the period of the second temple and gradually formed a literature, ran out into two great branches, logical or legal exposition, and practical or homiletical exposition. The former, designated “Halacha” (“rule by which to walk,” “binding precept ”), brought the law to bear upon points of religious or general interest on which there was no explicit declaration. It confined itself chiefly to the Pentateuch, extracting from it by numerous exegetical expedients a body of “Halachoth” or sopheric precepts (cf. Matt. xv. 2, Mark vii. 3), which were held authoritative. These, after a long period of oral transmission, gradually assumed written form, and passed finally through a process of compilation, classification, and redaction which extended perhaps from about two centuries before to two centuries after Christ. The latter, styled “Hagada” (“opinion,” “free exposition ”), was meant for edification, traversed the entire Old Testament, and occupied itself with the application of Scripture to the purposes of practical instruction in all manner of subjects, ethical, political, metaphysical, theosophic, as well as religious. Its expositions were conveyed in forms, symbolical, poetic, parabolic, such as were most likely to arrest attention, and, though of no binding authority, it made itself so attractive to the people that it was often known as “the Midrash” distinctively. The hermeneutical laws followed in these two lines of exposition are sufficiently well known. Eliezer ben Jose, the Galilaean, a distinguished rabbi of the 2d century of our era, has embodied the results of a final redaction of the principles of the Hagadic exegesis in a series of thirty-two rules. Some of these are sound, dealing, e.g. , with the use of brachylogy, repetition, parable, the reconciliation of two discrepant texts by a third, &c. Many of them are wholly fantastic, prescribing how explanations are to be sought by reducing the letters of a word to their numerical value, by the transposition of letters, by the substitution of another word of the same numerical value for one which yields no worthy sense, by studying the introduction of superfluous particles, &c. Such principles held a much smaller place in the Halachic exegesis, which, as it aimed at something higher than applications of Scripture, could indulge in fewer freedoms in certain directions, so far as it was true to its idea. In the fixing of the Halachic hermeneutics Hillel I. (died 8 or 10 a.d.) occupies a conspicuous place. He reduced the traditional legal erudition of the Jews, with its bewildering multiplicity of laws, from the 600 or 700 sections over which it is said previously to have spread, to six capital “Sedarim”or orders, forming a manageable basis on which his successors Αkiba, Simon HL, and Jehudah I. could work on to the final codification of the Mishna. He was also the first to formulate definite rules by which the rabbinical development of the law should proceed. These canons of interpretation were seven in number, afterwards increased by Rabbi Ismael to thirteen by the addition of seven new rules and the omission of the sixth, and looked to the construction of Biblical warrant for precepts which it was wished to prove implicit in the law. These “Middoth” were instructions to reason (1) a minori ad majus, (T) ex analogia, (3) by derivation of a principal proposition from a single passage, (4) by derivation of a principal proposition from two passages, (5) by limitation of the general through the particular, (6) by explanation of one passage through another, (7) by the use of the context. The idea that the Old Testament, preeminently the law, held hidden in it the highest wisdom on all subjects, was naturally inimical to the rights of the literal sense. The rabbinical hermeneutics drew inevitable distinctions between the proper or innate sense (P□^∣P), which again was described as either verbal (BE⅛j or figurative (-∏d), and the derivative or studied sense (^ζ∙"!P, f ψ7ι ’)> which was to be sought either by inference (tΛT) or by artificial conjunction (ÎÇ'J). The natural sense, however, though practically robbed of its dues, was not professedly ignored. This regard for it, which was never wholly disowned, ultimately took shape in the improved rabbinical hermeneutics of the Middle Ages. In the writings of such rabbis as Saadias Gaon, Jarchi, Rashi, Kimchi, Maimonides, Abarbanel (a line of expositors extending from the 10th to the 16th century), we find, alongside the traditional rules and explanations, a scientific recognition of the interpreter’s duty to give the literal sense as well as a practical application of the principles of grammatical and historical exegesis to the Old Testament.
The hermeneutics developed among the Hellenistic Jews had marked characteristics of its own. These interpreters, departing from the exclusiveness of rabbinical devotion to the Old Testament revelation, and from the pure Hebraism of native Jews, brought to the study of the sacred books a range of ideas derived from Hellenic culture. They had to devise a hermeneutical procedure which would harmonize their new ethnic learning with the traditional estimate of the Jewish Scriptures. To the theosophic Hellenist, and specially to the Alexandrian Jew, acceptance of the plain sense was often an impossibility. A reconciliation was sought by the use of allegorical interpretation. This method was also pursued by the Rabbinical exegetes. It is embraced in the Halachic hermeneutics, and is seen in the distinctions drawn by Palestinian Jews between the body and the soul of texts. But while the allegorical interpretation of native Jews, in consonance with their purer estimate of the Hebrew revelation, moved in the direction of the typical, that of the Hellenists became rather mystical. The coryphaeus in this hermeneutical practice was Philo (born perhaps about 20 B.C.), although he .had predecessors in Aristobulus, pseudo-Josephus, and others. He devoted himself mainly to the exposition to the Pentateuch, with the view of explaining the realism and anthropomorphism of the Old Testament in a way to suit the philosophy of the time. Wishful to retain the Alexandrian Jew’s regard for Moses as the supremely inspired prophet of God and the oracle of all mysteries along with adherence to the current Platonism and theosophy, he supposed that the Mosaic writings contained a twofold mode of teaching, a popular representation of God and divine things and a spiritual. It was the task of wisdom to penetrate through the envelope of the literal history to the secret sense which it shielded. The verbal sense was acknowledged, but held to be for the illiterate. The outstanding facts in the records of the creation, the deluge, the careers of the patriarchs and Moses, were accepted in an historic sense, but the details of all these narratives were spiritualized. Sometimes the figurative meaning was made the only meaning, but in other cases the objective meaning was allowed to be the intended meaning. The hermeneutical rule, however, was to rise by allegory from the superficial anthropomorphic sense (to ∣∕rυχικ⅛) to the higher or spiritual sense (to πvevpατu<0v). The simple histories were symbols of abstract truths. To the enlightened they were so many modes of soul (τρόποι ψvχηf)— Adam the figure of the sensuous nature, Rebecca of patience, Leah of despised virtue, Egypt an emblem of the body, and Canaan of piety.
Two later chapters in the history of Jewish hermeneutics deserve notice. On the one band the rabbinical procedure was decisively departed from by the Karaites, among whom Japhet ben Heli, of Bussorah, belonging to the close of the 10th century, and Aaron ben Joseph, of the 13th century, are notable. In their case interpretation again sought the via media between bald literalism and arbitrary spiritualizing. It was prosecuted on the principles of renouncing the quest after a variety of senses, abiding by the natural sense, accepting metaphor where the figurative was intended, and conserving the religious interest. On the other hand an extraordinary development was given to the rabbinical hermeneutics by the Kabbalists of the Middle Ages, who used the devices of artificial interpretation in order to find an Old Testament basis for their mixed Neo-Platonist, Gnostic, and Sabaean culture. The Kabbala (“what has been received,” “tradition,” see Kabbala) had its roots in the ancient doctrine of numbers, for which the Jews were probably indebted to the Chaldaeans. The use of the numerical power of letters as a key to mysteries, which the Palestinian Jews had early favoured and which formed a not inconsiderable element in the Hagadic exposition, expanded into a vast system of fantastic Hebrew Gnosticism in the 8th century of the Christian era. The written Word was regarded as a depository of secret doctrine and absolute truth which could be entered only by the initiated. The mysteries hidden in its letters required for their discovery processes of exchange, more or less intricate, between literal and numerical values. By the combinations and permutations of letters, the interchange of words of equal numerical value, and similar artifices, new meanings were extracted where the proper sense seemed poor, and acceptable meanings found where offence was felt. Where the text, e.g., states (Numbers xii. 1) that Moses married an Ethiopian woman, the veiled sense was shown to be that he married a woman of beautiful countenanced and the offence against the law was thus removed. For the letters of ΓP⅛*∙13 added together make the sum 736; the letters in the expression n 5', “beautiful of countenance,” yield the same sum; and the enlightened are able to read the latter idea in the former appellative. Distinct titles came to be applied to different branches of the art. The process of reaching hidden truths by the numerical equivalence of letters (as when from the circumstance that χ occurs six times in the first and last verses of the Old Testament it is inferred that the world is to last 6000 years) was styled “Gematria.” The process of forming new words out of the several letters of some solemn term, or one new word by combining the first letters of several words (as when the answer ∙ 1 7' t P, “circumcision,” is discovered in the question in Deut. xxx. 12, “Who shall go up for us to heaven i” by bringing together the letters with which the several words in the query commence), was called “Notarikon.” The use of the anagram or permutation (as when by transposition of '2ξPP into ⅛C'P it is ascertained that “mine angel” of Exod. xxiii. 23 was the angel Michael) was known as “Temurah.” The hermeneutical practice of the Kabbalists increased in subtlety as the theosophic system itself grew. Rules were elaborated for exchanging the powers of letters, reading them in. a variety of orders, and otherwise conjuring with the literal sense.
The course which Biblical hermeneutics has run outside the purely Jewish pale has been not less changeful or remarkable. The New Testament writings show at large how the apostles and first followers of Christ viewed, interpreted, and quoted the Old Testament. They give little in the shape of formal hermeneutical principles, but allow much to be inferred from usage and example. Conclusions as to authoritative canons of interpretation, so far as these are drawn from New Testament employments of Old Testament Scripture, are weighted with the question whether or how far currency is followed. It is affirmed on the one hand that Paul, e.g., in his hermeneutics, was a pure rabbinist, while on the other the equally extreme position is held that his training is in no way reflected in his use of the Hebrew Scriptures. The citation of the Old Testament in the New, which forms a question by itself and one of great intricacy, takes a variety of modes. Passages are reproduced as direct prophecies of the Messiah and His kingdom (Acts ii. 34, Heb. i. 13), as mediate references to the same through partial realizations of their idea (Heb. ii. 6-9, 12, 13), as illustrations or applications of principles common to both economies (Rom. x. 6-8, 1 Tim. v. 18), as apt expressions, without the character of explicit quotation, in which New Testament statements naturally embody themselves (1 Pet. i. 24). The proper and immediate sense is adhered to. The application of typology and symbolism (Heb. viii. 5, ix. 9) is at the same time exemplified, and the existence of secondary or higher meanings in allegorical or other forms (Gal. iv. 24, Eph. v. 32) is to a certain extent recognized. The typical relation of the Old Testament to the New is everywhere presented. It is exhibited both in the histories and in the institutions, and is developed alike in ethical, didactic, and prophetic significance (1 Cor. x. 6, 11, Rom. vi. 17, v. 14). The Hebrew revelation is interpreted as a divine preparation for the Christian and as a continuous prophecy bearing onwards towards Christ (Acts. ii. 25). Its official personages and its saints, its ordinances and its events, are real though imperfect exhibitions of Messiah arid the Messianic kingdom. Even its minor occurrences and incidental utterances are anticipations or expressions of the purposes of Jehovah realized in the Christian dispensation (Matt. ii. 15, Heb. iv. 7, Eph. iv. 8-12). How far Biblical hermeneutics within the Christian Church has gathered its principles from Scripture itself, and what use it has made of the New Testament praxis will appear from its history. It will be enough here to deal with the capital ideas to which the various conflicting methods seem capable of...
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