INSURANCEINSURANCE is the system or machinery by which it is sought to guard against the pecuniary consequences of certain accidents to which men are liable, such as the loss of property by fire or shipwreck, or the loss of future earnings through disablement or premature death. Insurance does not attempt to prevent these accidents, nor even to protect men against all the consequences of them. It deals only with the main pecuniary loss which such accidents are fitted to occasion, provides for it beforehand, practically distributes it among the persons who are more or less exposed to the same risk; and so, when the accident does light on any one of them, its pecuniary effects are neutralized or greatly mitigated.
The three chief developments of this system—Fire, Life, and Marine Insurance—are separately treated in the following articles. A very important application of the principle has been treated under the heading Friendly Societies....
Besides the above branches of insurance, which have attained immense proportions in almost all civilized, countries, there are many other applications of the principle which have been tried with greater or less success. The conditions which seem necessary to success (in addition to good administration) are chiefly these :—there must be a risk of real loss which it ought to be beyond the power of either the insurer or the insured to avert or to hasten; a large number of persons must be liable to the like risk; the accident contemplated must be likely to fall on a comparatively small number of the persons exposed to the risk of it; the probabilities of its occurrence must be capable of being estimated beforehand with some approximation to certainty; the loss apprehended must be so considerable when it does occur as to be worth providing against; and the cost of that provision must be comparatively so small as not to be prohibitive.
Accident Insurance.— Ordinary life assurance protects against the pecuniary loss arising to a man’s family or creditors or others by his death, whether that arise from accident or disease; but it has been found that a separate insurance against the consequences of accident meets the requirements of a large class of persons. A company was established in London in 1849 for insuring against the consequences of railway accidents,—the Railway Passengers Assurance Company. In return for a payment of 3d., 2d,, or Id. made by first, second, or third class passengers respectively, for insurance during a single journey, it undertook to pay £1000, <£500, or £200 in case of death by such an accident, or a certain weekly allowance in respect of personal injury not resulting in death. In 1856 the business was extended to embrace accidents of all kinds, and there came into use a system of yearly payments proportioned to the degree of risk supposed to attach to various occupations or other conditions of life. Many other similar companies have since been established, and at the present time (1881) there appear to be about eleven such offices in the United Kingdom. The amount insured by them is estimated at nearly £100,000,000 sterling, and their yearly income is between £400,000 and £500,000. The claims absorb about 50 per cent, of the premiums, the remainder, after paying expenses necessarily large, being the profit. Various schemes are at present being organized, in consequence of recent legislation, to enable employers to insure against risk from injuries suffered by their work-people.
The business of insuring against accidents has been developed in Canada, Victoria, and New South Wales, as well as in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. In the country last mentioned the premium income of the principal office engaged in this business was in 1879 close on a million of dollars.
Fidelity Guarantee.— The guarantee of employers against the fraud or insolvency of their servants has of late years become a considerable and useful department of insurance business. Private suretyship is attended by many evils, and a bond of indemnity by a joint-stock company, although it has to be purchased by a yearly payment, is now generally preferred. Such a bond is not granted without previous inquiry as to the character of the applicant and the checks which the employer is to use. Seven institutions in the United Kingdom undertake this description of business; some of them insure only against loss arising from embezzlement, while others protect the employer against any failure to make good the sums entrusted-to an employé. The yearly premiums required range from 10s. to 60s. per cent of the sum guaranteed.
Various Minor Forms of Insurance.— In those parts of the British Isles which are exposed to violent hail-storms offices have been established successfully for insurance against the loss which these often occasion. Efforts have been made also, not always with equal success, to protect farmers and other owners of horses and cattle against the loss arising from accident or disease among these animals. It has been attempted also to insure traders against loss from bad debts, and house-owners against loss of rent and against defective titles. No fewer than thirteen offices, mostly local in their operation, insure against loss from the breakage of plate glass, and three against the loss from explosion of boilers. In former times, when men were liable to be drawn to serve in the militia but might purchase a substitute, a system of insurance was established to provide them with the necessary funds. These developments of insurance, however, are of an importance quite insignificant compared with the three great departments now to be dealt with.
I. Fire Insurance.
Fire insurance is a matter of practical interest to a far larger number of persons than either of the other two great departments of insurance—life or marine. There are few persons to whom, in the absence of insurance, the destruction of their dwellings or of their household goods would not be a serious calamity, while to the merchant or manufacturer the burning of his premises or stock or machinery might be ruinous. No age or country has been exempt from such fatalities, and no watchfulness has been able to prevent them. Some protection against the pecuniary consequences seems an essential condition of any extended system of manufactures or commerce.
Fire insurance, however, as an organized system, has had an origin comparatively recent. There are traces, indeed, in earlier times of enforced or voluntary contributions towards the relief of sufferers by fire, but it is only about the beginning of the 17th century that we hear of proposals being made for a more systematic provision, and it was not till after the great fire of London in 1666 that these proposals took practical shape. This seems at first to have been in the form of underwriting by individuals or by clubs, and some attempts were made to engage the corporation of London in a scheme of fire insurance; but in 1681 the first regular office for insuring against loss by fire was opened by a combination of persons “at the back-side of the Royal Exchange,” and it was followed shortly afterwards by another Of the insurance offices that still survive, only one, the Hand-in-Hand, dates from the 17th century (1G96); five date from the first half of the 18th century, the Sun (1710), Union (1714), Westminster (1717), London (1720), and Royal Exchange (1720); while only three date from the second half of that century, the Salop (1780), Phoenix (1782), and Norwich Union (1797). The first fire office in Scotland was established in 1720, the first in Germany in 1750, and the first proprietary company in that country in 1779; the first office in the United States was established at Philadelphia in 1752, one of its early directors having been Benjamin Franklin; the first in France dates from 1816, and the first in Russia from 1827.
The growth of fire insurance business in Britain did not receive much assistance from Government. At a very early period, in 1694 under William & Mary, a stamp duty was imposed on fire policies (now reduced to the nominal rate of one penny), and in 1782, during the administration of Lord North, fire insurances were made liable to an annual duty at the rate of Is. 6d. for each <£100 insured. This tax, which was collected by the offices along with their premiums and accounted for by them to the exchequer, was increased in 1797 to 2s. per cent., in 1805 to 2s. 6d., and in 1816 to 3s., at which rate it continued for about fifty years. It was strongly objected to as a discouragement to prudence, and as disproportionate in rate to the cost of insurance which it was tacked to; but as it was easily collected, and yielded nearly two millions a year (£1,714,622 in 1863), it naturally died hard. In 1864 it was partially remitted, and it expired finally in 1869. The returns of the duty enable us to measure in some degree the progress of fire insurance in the United Kingdom during the eighty-five years of its incidence. Some descriptions of property, such as agricultural produce, were exempt from duty and do not appear in the returns, nor do the sums insured on property situated out of the United Kingdom; but the amount insured by British offices on which duty was paid was [table]
At the present time (1881) there appear to be about sixty offices established in the United Kingdom for insuring against loss by fire either alone or in conjunction with life or marine insurance. A few of these are of very recent origin. The number does not include several foreign companies doing business in Great Britain.
Excepting by the imposition of the duty now repealed, the British legislature has not interfered with the business of fire insurance. Any number of persons may at the present time engage in this business with or without capital, nor is there a necessity even for the publication of their accounts. By the Life Assurance Companies Act of 1870, a deposit of £20,000 is required on the establishment of a life office; certain returns also must be made to the Board of Trade for presentation to parliament, and these regulations apply to offices which conduct fire in conjunction with life insurance, as well as to purely life offices. One consequence is that, while the results of the fire insurance business of these compound offices are published regularly, those of purely fire offices need not be published, and several of the oldest and most important fire companies do in fact keep their accounts strictly private. There is no reason to suppose, however, that their experience differs materially from that of the compound offices whose figures are open to us. From the returns of thirty of these it appears that their aggregate income from fire premiums in the seven years 1870-76 was as follows :— [table]
The increase in six years was therefore nearly two millions and a half of yearly income, the premiums in 1876 being about 63 per cent, more than in 1870. There are no means of ascertaining how far this increase arises from the insurance of property abroad, which is no doubt a considerable item, or from an increase in the quantity of insurable property within the United Kingdom, or in the proportion of it which is insured, or in the average rates charged for insurance, but no doubt all of these causes were at work. It may be mentioned here that the thirty offices to which the above returns relate have a subscribed capital of about 40 millions, and cash assets available for fire losses, not including their life assurance funds, amounting to 20 millions. They have therefore funds in hand equal to more than three years’ income from premiums. Another return gives the premium income of forty-five’JBritish offices in the year 1879 as £8,271,000, their losses as £4,349,000, their expenses as £2,426,000, and their net profits irrespective of interest as about £1,500,000, or 18 per cent, of the premiums. The whole premium income of British fire offices is probably nearly 10 millions sterling, and the amount insured may be taken at from four to five thousand millions.
The returns of the London Fire Brigade enable us to approximate to the amount of insurances effected on property within the metropolitan area. In 1866 the sum insured was about 316 millions; in 1871, 440 millions; in 1878, 605 millions; and in 1879, 624 millions.
The essential principle of fire insurance is the distribution of loss. It does not aim, directly at least, at the prevention and only in a secondary way even at the minimizing of loss; but what it seeks to accomplish is that such losses as do occur shall not fall exclusively, and possibly with overwhelming effect, on the owner of the property destroyed, but shall be borne in easy proportions by a large number of persons, who are all alike exposed to the risk of a similar catastrophe. This work of distribution is capable of being effected in more ways than one. It might be undertaken by the state or by a municipality, and this plan has been tried in several countries, notably in the canton of Zurich. There it applies to buildings only, not to their contents. The Government insures, and raises the necessary funds for meeting losses by a ratable tax on the owners. Where, as in this case, the exact sum needed is raised and no more, the system is practically one of mutual insurance administered by the cantonal authorities. Such a system yields this collateral benefit that the authorities, and indeed all house owners, become interested in the prevention and extinction of fires, and in Zurich accordingly the construction of buildings is carefully watched and regulated; but the results do not indicate any remarkable measure of success. The rate of assessment in 1870 was nearly equal to 2s. 6d. sterling per cent. The difficulties of carrying out such a system with equity, especially in a great community, seem almost insuperable. To assess the cost fairly it would be necessary, not merely to value each individual building, but to measure the degree of risk it was exposed to from its construction, its surroundings, its uses, and its contents. To place in the hands of public functionaries the power to do this, as well as to adjust the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of a fire, would be a course attended with manifest evils. Still greater would be the difficulty of applying the same principle to household goods, merchandise, and machinery; and, if these must be insured on some other plan, there seems little to be gained by setting up a different system for the insurance of buildings alone.
There is, however, a natural temptation presented to particular classes or communities to speculate in the insurance of their own property, in the hope of making a profit, or at all events of saving for themselves what would go as profits to the companies which would otherwise insure them. Sometimes this temptation seizes the inhabitants of a particular town, sometimes the persons interested in some particular trade, sometimes an ecclesiastical body. A community which has taken out of the hands of joint-stock companies the supply of its own gas or water, and finds itself as well served as before, perhaps better served and more cheaply, is apt to think that it may insure itself against fire as well. But, besides the complications in the problem which have been already alluded to, and which require technical skill and extended experience for their equitable solution, there are few bodies or communities which possess a sufficiently wide area to make insurance profitable or even safe. If there had been such a system at Boston or Chicago or St John’s when these considerable cities were ravaged by fire, the effects would have been still more disastrous to them than they were. Certain classes of property again seem liable almost to epidemic fires, from causes which are often not far to seek; and if, for example, the owners of any particular class of mills were to combine in a scheme of mutual insurance, they might find that, besides the great difficulty of agreeing on how each mil], was to be rated, or on the compensation to be awarded on the occurrence of a fire, they were exposed to exceptionally numerous claims just when their own trade was most depressed, or when their relations with their work-people already loaded them with sufficient anxiety. Schemes of so-called mutual insurance are tried from time to time, but scarcely ever without being based on a subscribed or paid-up capital (the contributors to which have to be remunerated), or without looking for outside business to give breadth and ballast to the enterprise.
Accordingly the system of fire insurance which has virtually superseded all others, and has contributed most to the public benefit, is that which is conducted by joint-stock companies, offering to the insured the guarantee of their capital and other funds, and looking to make a profit by the business. It is a department of commercial activity eminently suited for joint-stock enterprise, requiring for its success, and indeed almost for its safety, that its transactions should be various in character and spread over wide areas of space and time, and be invested with a certain amount of publicity, and enjoy that prolonged existence which attaches more to corporate than to individual effort.
Fire insurance as a business consists in undertaking a certain risk more or less considerable in amount, in return for a comparatively small sum, received beforehand, called the premium. While the amount of risk undertaken is strictly limited to the sum insured, the degree of risk is an element extremely difficult to measure, and liable to much fluctuation. Whether of ten thousand houses or shops, or stores, or factories, ten will be more or less injured every year by fire or a hundred is a matter partly of experience, but partly also of conjecture and, as we say, of chance. Assuming that the proportion would always be the same under precisely the same circumstances, not perhaps every year but ou an average of years, the questions remain whether the circumstances will always be the same, and whether if they be the one thousand cases on which we have made our own calculations are a sufficient basis for dealing with ten thousand cases. The slightest observation reveals an endless diversity in the risks undertaken, and, even if an absolute law could be reckoned on, the risks would require careful and accurate classification before the law could be deduced. But, in point of fact, the risks are always changing. If we take what from an insurance point of view is the simplest and safest “risk,” a private dwelling house in a large town, the question suggests itself, How has this risk been affected by the age of the building, the character of the occupants, the introduction of gas or paraffin or lucifer matches, by the proximity of more dangerous property, and by the improvement or deterioration in the public supply of water and the public arrangements for extinguishing fires 2 Infinitely greater changes take place in the degree of risk attending warehouses and manufactories, and many of these developments are of an unexpected character. The great fire in Tooley Street, London, in 1861, was aggravated by a prodigious escape of burning tallow, which literally set the Thames on fire, and long defied all efforts to extinguish it. More lately at Leith a highly inflammable spirit recently introduced into trade exhibited similar characteristics. At Newcastle a fusion of nitrates of soda or potash mixed with burning timbers caused a prodigious aggravation of a fire; and at Glasgow and elsewhere the fine flour dust of a corn mill, when mixed with a certain quantity of atmospheric air, was unexpectedly found to be as explosive as gunpowder.
But the speculative hazard of fire insurance as a commercial enterprise is limited by a very important circumstance. The contracts, in the United Kingdom at least, are seldom made for a longer period than one year, and often for less, and need not be renewed on either side unless their safety and reasonableness are confirmed by experience, so that from day to day the insurance company is able in a measure to revise its terms, and to correct the errors arising from imperfect data or a too sanguine generalization. The business on the whole has been a profitable one. There have been comparatively few absolute failures of fire insurance offices in Great Britain, and none of any magnitude ; nor do British companies regard it as any distinction that “they have always paid their losses in full.” The returns of those companies whose accounts are published indicate general prosperity, and the quotations of the share market and other circumstances show that the companies whose accounts are not made public have had at least equal success. The thirty companies whose experience has...
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INSURANCE CONTDx + n respectively, and a' x+η is the hypothetical annuityvalue at the latter age. Mr Sprague has shown (Ass. Mag., xi. 90) that the policy-values obtained by this method will be greater or less than, or equal to, those of the net-premium method according as the “loading” is a constant percentage of the net premium or an equal addition to it at all ages, or of an intermediate character, its elements being so adjusted as to balance each other....
When the net-premium method is employed, it is important that the office premiums be not altogether left out of view, otherwise an imperfect idea will be formed as to the results of the valuation. Suppose two offices, in circumstances as nearly as possible similar, estimate their liabilities by the net-premium method upon the same data, but office A charges premiums which contain a margin of 20 per cent, above the net premiums, and office B charges premiums with a margin of 30 per cent. Then, in so far as regards their net liabilities (always supposing the sum set aside in each case to be that required by the valuation), the reserves of those offices will be of equal strength, and if nothing further were taken into account they might be supposed to stand in the same financial position. But it is obvious, that office B, which has a margin of income 50' per cent, greater than that of office A, is so much better able to bear any unusual strain in addition to the ordinary expenditure, and is likely to realize a larger surplus on its transactions. Hence it appears that in order to obtain an adequate view of the financial position of any office it is necessary to consider, not only the basis upon which its reserves are calculated, but also the proportion of “loading” or “margin” contained in its premiums, and set aside for future expenses and profits.
Valuations may be made on different data as to mortality and interest, and the resulting net liability will be greater or less according to the nature of these. Under any given table of mortality a valuation at a low rate of interest will produce a larger net liability—will require, that is to say, a higher reserve to be made by the office against its future engagements to the assured—than a valuation at a higher rate. The effect of different assumptions in regard to the rates of mortality cannot be expressed in similar terms. A table of mortality showing a high death-rate, and requiring, consequently, large assurance premiums, does not necessarily produce large reserve values. The contrary indeed may be the case, as with the Northampton Table, which requires larger premiums than the more modern tables, but gives on the whole smaller reserve values. The amount of the net liability depends, not on the absolute magnitude of the rates of mortality indicated by the table, but on the ratio in which these increase from age to age.
If the values deduced by the net-premium method from any two tables be compared, it will be seen that
Vi >, =, or < n Vχ according as j _ 1 ÷<⅛+⅝ > _ or < 1 — 1 αχ ^^ n
1 + a ’ x ’ 1 + ax i, e ., as ⅛⅛ >, =, or < ⅛ . . . (1),
1 + a x 1 + a x or as J±⅛ >, =, or < }⅛ . . (2);
1 + aχ 1 + aχ+n where the accented symbols throughout refer to one table and the unaccented symbols to the other.
We have thus the means of ascertaining whether the policy-values of any table will be greater or less than, or equal to, those of another, either (1) by calculating for each table separately the ratios of the annuity-values at successive ages, and comparing the results, or (2) by calculating at successive ages the ratios of the annuity-values of one table to those of another, and observing whether these ratios decrease or increase with advancing age, or remain stationary throughout. The above relations will subsist whatever maybe the differences in the data employed, and whether or not the annuity-values by the different tables are calculated at the same rate of interest. When the same rate of interest is employed, any divergence in the ratios of the annuity-values will of necessity be due to differences in the rates of mortality. This interesting subject is investigated by Mr Meikle in a paper on Policy Life-Lines, one of the Actuarial Society’s publications, and by Mr Sprague in the Assurance Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 77.
The following table gives examples of the reserve values of policies for £100, calculated on the net-premium method by three different mortality tables, at a uniform rate of interest, 3 per cent [table]
Something may be said here as to the data on which assurance companies make their valuations. The rates of interest assumed by different offices may be said to range between 3 and 4 per cent., being in most cases lower than 4. It is, however, in regard to the tables of mortality that the greatest diversity exists. The Northampton Table has, for valuation purposes, been all but discarded. The Carlisle Table has so far lost its ground, since the introduction of the more recent Experience Tables, as to be now used by only a, minority of the offices as the chief basis of their calculations. The different tables based on the experience of the Equitable Society, the Seventeen Offices’ Experience, and the English Life Tables have still some adherents, and (besides those offices which value by the “hypothetical method”) a few companies employ tables constructed specially for their own use. But there is an evident tendency towards the general adoption of the Institute of Actuaries (twenty offices) Tables, which have been used by a large proportion of the companies in their latest valuations. Of these, the tables chiefly employed are H m and H M(5) , the latter being used by some offices in combination with the H m pure premiums, in order to eliminate as far as possible the effects of selection. Mr King (Ass. Mag., xix. 381 and xx. 233) and Mr Sprague (Ass. Mag., xxi. 229 and xxii. 391) have shown the construction of tables which would give in a more, direct and scientific way the result that is aimed at by using the combined H m and H M(5) tables. Mr King, to illustrate the results of his method, constructs a “model office,” assuming a uniform annual influx of new business and a rate of discontinuance of policies based on the experience of the twenty offices which contributed their statistics to the formation of the Institute of Actuaries Tables, and he shows the comparative reserves required by such an office at the end of successive quinquennial periods, according to various mortality tables and at different rates of interest. As these illustrative tables afford an admirable means of comparing the results of valuing by different mortality tables, we give the following extracts. It must be borne in mind, however, in seeking to apply the figures in these tables to estimate the strength of the reserves maintained by particular offices, that the soundness of the estimate may be a good deal affected by circumstances. In particular the rates at which new business has come in and policies have been discontinued must be taken into account, and, as before stated, the amount of “margin” contained in the premiums must not be lost sight of. Moreover, the supposed liabilities do not include bonus additions, and the presence of these will of course modify any conclusions drawn from the tables. [table]
Division of Surplus.— There are various sources from which a surplus of funds may arise in an assurance company :—(1) from the rate of interest actually earned being higher than that anticipated in the calculations; (2) from the death-rate among the assured being lower than that provided for by the mortality tables; (3) from the expenses and contingent outlay being less than the “loading” provided to meet them; and (4) from miscellaneous sources, such as profitable investments, the cancelment of policies, &c.
»Supposing a valuation to have been made on sound data and by a proper method, and to have resulted in showing that the funds in hand exceed the liabilities, the surplus thus ascertained may be regarded as profit, and either its amount may be withdrawn from the assets of the office or the liabilities may be increased in a corresponding degree.
Various methods are employed by assurance companies in distributing their surplus funds among the assured. In some offices the share or “bonus” falling to each policyholder is paid to him in cash; in others it is applied in providing a reversionary sum which is added to the amount assured by the policy; in others it goes to reduce tho annual contributions payable by the policyholder. A method of more recent introduction is to apply the earlier bonuses on a policy to limit the term for which premiums may be payable, thus relieving the policyholder of his annual payments after a certain period. Another method is to apply the bonuses towards making the sum assured payable in the lifetime of the policyholder. The plan of reversionary bonus additions is most common, and when it is followed the option is usually given of exchanging the bonuses for their value in cash or of having them applied in the reduction of premiums.
Not only are there different modes of applying surplus, but the basis on which it is divided among the assured also varies in different offices. In some the reversionary bonus is calculated as an equal percentage per annum of the sum assured, reckoning back either to the commencement of the policy in every case, or (more commonly) to the preceding division of profits. In others the rate is calculated, not only on the original sums assured, but also on previous bonus additions. In others the ratio of distribution is applied to the cash surplus, and the share allotted to each policy is dealt with in one or other of the ways above indicated. The following are some of tho ratios employed by different offices in the allocation of profits:—(1) in proportion to the amount of premiums paid (with or without accumulated interest) since the last preceding valuation; (2) in proportion to the accumulated “loading” of the premiums so paid; (3) in proportion to the reserve values of the policies; (4) in proportion to the difference between the accumulated premiums and the reserve value of the policy in each case.
Some offices have a special system of dealing with surplus, reserving it for those policyholders who survive the ordinary “expectation of life,” or whose premiums paid, with accumulated interest, amount to the sums assured by their policies. This system is usually connected with specially low rates of premium.
The various bonus systems which have been mentioned yield different results to policy holders of different ages, and whose assurances have been in force for longer or shorter periods. A person seeking to effect an assurance may exercise a wise discretion in selecting that office whose bonus system appears most advantageous, considering his own age and circumstances.
From a paper by Mr A. ∏ewat in the Assurance Magazine (xxii. 286) it appears that , the average amount of surplus annually divided among the assured by seventyseven offices which have rendered valuation accounts to the Board of Trade since the passing of the “Life Assurance Companies Act, 1870,” has been £2,285,000, cr 23 per cent, of the annual premium income of the offices. The following average specimens of reversionary bonuses are taken from the returns of forty-one of those offices, whose average rate of annual premium is shown in the second column. [table]
Surrender Values.— In those branches of insurance where the contract is one of indemnity against loss, the risk remaining the same from year to year—and where the consent of both parties, insurer and insured, is required at each periodical renewal—no question of allowance in respect of past payments can anse when one party or the other determines to drop the contract. It is quite recognized that the premiums are simply an equivalent for the risk undertaken during the period to which they apply, with a certain margin for expenses and for profit to the insurer, and that therefore a favourable issue of the particular contract supplies no argument for a return of any part of the sums paid. In life assurance, however, we have shown that the premiums contain a third element, namely, the portion that is set aside and accumulated to meet the risk of the assurance when the premium payable is no longer sufficient of itself for that purpose.
When a policyholder withdraws from his contract with a life assurance office, the provision made for the future in respect of his particular assurance is no longer required, and out of it a surrender value may b. allowed him for giving up his right to the policy. If there were no reasons to the contrary, the office might hand over the whole of this provision, which, as we have seen, is in fact the reserve value of the policy. No more could be given without encroaching upon the provision necessary for the remaining policies. But the policyholder in withdrawing is exercising a power which circumstances give to him only and not to the other party in the contract. The office is bound by the policy so long as the premiums are duly paid and the other conditions of assurance are not infringed. It has no opportunity of reviewing its position and withdrawing from the bargain should that appear likely to be a losing one. The policyholder, on the other hand, is free to continue or to drop the assurance as he pleases, and it may fairly be presumed that he will take whichever course will best serve his own interest. If he is in failing health he is the more likely to make an effort to keep the assurance on foot; if he has also fallen into adverse circumstances, his friends may aid him to maintain his policy for the benefit of those dependent on him, or he may dispose of it to some one who, knowing the circumstances, may be willing to give a high price for it, speculating on the chance of its becoming an early claim. All these things do happen, and the tendency obviously is that policies on deteriorated and unhealthy lives are kept in force, while those on lives having good prospects of longevity are more readily given up. Again, the retiring policyholder, by withdrawing his annual contribution, not only diminishes the fund from which expenses are met, but lessens the area over which these are spread, and so increases the burden for those who remain. Considerations like these point to the conclusion that, in fairness to the remaining constituents of the office, the surrender value to be allowed for a policy which is to be given up should be less than the reserve value. The common practice is to allow a proportion only of the reserve value. Some offices have adopted the plan of allowing a specified proportion of the amount of premiums paid. This plan is not defended on any ground of principle, but is followed for its simplicity and as a concession to a popular demand for fixed surrender values.
Another mode of securing to retiring policyholders the benefit of the reserve values of their assurances is that known as the nonforfeiture system. This system was first introduced in America, whence it found its way to the United Kingdom, where it was gradually adopted by a large proportion of the assurance companies. In its original form it was known as the “ten years non-forfeiture plan.” The policies were effected by premiums payable during ten years only, the rates being of course correspondingly high. If during those ten years the policyholder wished to discontinue his payments, he was entitled to a free “paid-up policy” for as many tenth parts of the original sum assured as he had paid premiums. The system, once introduced was gradually extended first to assurances effected by premiums payable during longer fixed periods, and ultimately, by some offices, to assurances bearing annual premiums during the whole of life. The methods of fixing the amount of paid-up policy in the last-mentioned class of cases vary in different offices, but the principle underlying them all is that of applying the reserve value to the purchase of a new assurance of reduced amount.
Conditions of Assurance.— An office, in entering on a contract of life assurance, does so in the faith that all circumstances material to be known in order to a proper estimate of the risk have been disclosed. These circumstances are beyond its own knowledge, and as the office for the most part (except as regards the result of the medical examination, which may reveal features of the case unknown to the proposer himself) is dependent on the information furnished by the party seeking to effect the assurance, it is proper that the latter be made responsible for the correctness of such information. Accordingly it is made a stipulation, preliminary to the issue of every policy, that all the required information bearing upon the risk shall have been truly and fairly stated, and that in case of any misrepresentation, or any concealment of material facts, the assurance shall be forfeited. In practice, however, this forfeiture is rarely insisted on unless there has been an evident intention to deceive. The other usual conditions of life assurance policies may be shortly noticed.
1. As to Payment of Premiums.— A certain period of grace is allowed, most commonly thirty days, after each premium falls due. If payment is not made within that time, the presumption is that the policyholder intends to drop the contract, and the risk of the office comes to an end. It may, however, be revived on certain conditions, usually the production of evidence of health and payment of a fine in addition to the premium. An impression used to prevail among the public that the offices were interested in encouraging the forfeiture of policies. If any such impression was ever shared by the offices themselves it must have long since passed away, as it will be found that every reasonable effort is now made on their part, not only to secure assurances but to retain them, and to afford all the facilities that can be extended to policyholders with that object.
2. As to Foreign Travel and Residence, and as to Hazardous Occupations.— When Mr Babbage wrote his Comparative View of Assurance Institutions in 1826, voyaging abroad was scarcely permitted under a life policy. The Elbe and the Garonne, Texel and Havre, Texel and Brest, the Elbe and Brest, were the limits prescribed by most of the English offices. Even at a much later period the extra premiums charged for leave to travel or reside abroad were very heavy. But improved means of conveyance—in some places better sanitary appliances, and habits of living more suited to the climatic conditions—and, more than all perhaps, the knowledge that has been gained by experience as to the extent of the extra risks involved and the relative salubrity of foreign climates—have enabled the offices to modify their terms very considerably. The limits of free residence and travel have been greatly widened, and where extra premiums are still required these are, as a rule, much lower than formerly. The assured are now commonly permitted to reside anywhere within such limits as north of 35° N. lat. (except in Asia) or south of 30° S. lat., and to travel to and from any places within those limits, without extra premium.
Military men (when on active service) and seafaring men are of course charged extra rates, as are also persons following specially dangerous or unhealthy occupations at home.
3. As to Suicide.— The policies of most companies contain a proviso that the assurance shall be void in case the person whose life is assured dies by his own hand. This proviso is analogous to that which renders void a fire policy if the insured becomes guilty of arson, or a policy of marine insurance if the vessel is wrecked intentionally by the owner. The event contemplated in the policy being brought about by the voluntary act of the assured, and not in the natural course of events, is a contingency not included in the scheme of insurance. In the case of life policies the general rule of law appears to be (see The Law of Life Assurance, fy C. J. Bunyon) that the contract will be avoided unless the suicide takes place when the assured is insane and not accountable for his acts. Sometimes the proviso “whether insane or not” is inserted in policies. In the case of...
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