The port of Libau, Lyra portus, is mentioned as early as 1263; it then belonged to the Livonian order. In 1418 it was burnt by Lithuanians, and in 1560 it was mortgaged by the grandmaster of the order to the Prussian duke Albert. It was annexed to Russia in 1795.

The earlier history of the English law of defamation is somewhat obscure. Civil actions for damages seem to have been tolerably frequent so far back as the reign of Edward I. There was no distinction drawn between words written and spoken. When no pecuniary penalty was involved such cases fell within the old jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which was only finally abolished during the present reign. It seems, to say the least, uncertain whether any generally applicable criminal process - was in use. The crime of scandalum magnatum, spreading false reports about the magnates of the realm, was established by statutes, but the first fully reported case in which libel is affirmed generally to be punishable at common law is one tried in the Star Chamber in the reign of James I. In that case no English authorities are cited except a previous case of the same nature before the same tribunal; the law and terminology appear to be taken directly from Roman sources, with the insertion that libels tended to a breach of the peace; and it seems probable that that not very scrupulous tribunal had simply found it convenient to adopt the very stringent Roman provisions regarding the libelli famosi without paying any regard to the Roman limitations. From that time we find both the criminal and civil remedies in full operation, and will now consider how the law stands with regard to each at the present time.

Civil Law.— The first important distinction we encounter is that between slander and libel, between the oral and written promulgation of defamatory statements. In the former case the remedy is limited. The law will not take notice of every kind of abusive or defamatory language. It must be shown either that the plaintiff has suffered actual damage as a direct consequence of the slander, or that the imputation is of such a nature that we are entitled to infer damage as a necessary consequence. The special damage on which an action is founded for slanderous words must be of the nature of pecuniary loss. Loss of reputation or of position in society, or even illness, however clearly it may be traced to the slander, is insufficient. When we cannot prove special damage, the action for slander is only allowed upon certain strictly defined grounds. These are the imputation of a crime or misdemeanour which is punishable corporeally, e.g., by imprisonment; the imputation of a contagious or infectious disease; statements which tend to the disherison of an apparent heir (other cases of slander of title when the party is in possession requiring the allegation of special damage); and lastly, slanders directed against a man’s professional or business character, which tend directly to prejudice him in his trade, profession, or means of livelihood. In the latter case the words must either be directly aimed at a man in his business or official character, or they must be such as necessarily to imply unfitness for his particular office or occupation. Thus words which merely reflect generally upon the moral character of a tradesman or professional man are not actionable, but they are actionable if directed against his dealings in the course of his trade or profession. But, in the case of a merchant or trader, an allegation which affects his credit generally is enough, and in the same way it has been held that statements are actionable which affect the ability or moral characters of persons who hold offices, or exercise occupation which require a high degree of ability, or infer peculiar confidence. In every case the plaintiff must have been at the time of the slander in the actual exercise of the occupation or enjoyment of the office with reference to which the slander is supposed to have affected him.

The action for libel is not restricted in the same way as that for slander. Originally, as we have seen, there appears to have been no essential distinction between them, but the establishment of libel as a criminal offence had probably considerable influence, and it soon became settled that written defamatory statements, or pictures and other signs which bore a defamatory meaning, implied greater malice and deliberation, and were generally fraught with greater injury than those which were merely made by word of mouth. The result has been that the action for libel is not limited to special grounds, or by the necessity of proving special damage. It may be founded on any statement which disparages a man’s private or professional character, or which tends to hold him up to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Tn one of the leading cases, for example, the plaintiff obtained damages because it was said of him that he was a hypocrite, and had used the cloak of religion for unworthy purposes. In another case a charge of ingratitude was held sufficient. In civil cases the libel must be published by being brought by the defendant under the notice of a third party, and it has even been held that it is sufficient if this has been done by gross carelessness, without deliberate intention to publish. Every person is liable to an action who is concerned in the publication of a libel, whether he be the author, printer, or publisher; and the extent and manner of the publication, although not affecting the ground of the action, is a material element in estimating the damages.

It is not necessary that the defamatory character of the words or writing complained of should be apparent on their face. They may be couched in the form of an insinuation, or may derive their sting from a reference to circumstances understood by the persons to whom they are addressed. In such a case the plaintiff must make the injurious sense clear by an averment called an innuendo, and it is for the jury to say whether the words bore the meaning thus ascribed to them.

In all civil actions for slander and libel the falsity of the injurious statements is an essential element, so that the defendant is always entitled to justify his statements by their truth; but when the statements are in themselves defamatory, their falsity is presumed, and the burden of proving their truth is laid upon the defendant. There are however, a large class of false defamatory statements, commonly called privileged, which are not actionable on account of the particular circumstances in which they are made. The general theory of law with regard to these cases is this. It is assumed that in every case of defamation intention is a necessary element; but in the ordinary case, when a statement is false and defamatory, the law presumes that it has been made or published with an evil intent, and will not allow this presumption to be rebutted by evidence or submitted as matter of fact to a jury. But there are certain circumstances in which the natural presumption is quite the other way. There are certain natural and proper occasions on which statements may be made which are in themselves defamatory, and which may be false, but which naturally suggest that the statements may have been made from a perfectly proper motive and with entire belief in their truth. In the cases of this kind which are recognized by law, the presumption is reversed. It lies with the plaintiff to show that the defendant was actuated by what is called express malice, by an intention to do harm, and in this case the question is not one of legal inference for the court, but a matter of fact to be decided by the jury. Although, however, the theory of the law seems to rest entirely upon natural presumption of intention, it is pretty clear that in determining the limits of privilege the courts have been almost wholly guided by considerations of public or general expediency.

In some cases the privilege is absolute, so that we cannot have an action for defamation even although we prove express malice. Thus no action of this kind can be maintained for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings if they are in any sense relevant to the matter in hand. In the same way no statements or publications are actionable which are made in the ordinary course of parliamentary proceedings. Papers published under the authority of parliament are protected by a special Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9, which was passed after a decree of the law courts adverse to the privilege claimed. The reports of judicial and parliamentary proceedings stand in a somewhat different position, which has only been attained after a long and interesting conflict. The general rule now is that all reports of parliamentary or judicial proceedings are privileged in so far as they are honest and impartial. Even ex parte proceedings, in so far as they take place in public, now fall within the same rule. But if the report is garbled, or if part of it only is published, the party who is injured in consequence is entitled to maintain an action, and to have the question of malice submitted to a jury. Comments on subjects of public interest, on the proceedings of courts or public bodies, on publications, exhibitions, and on persons who have in any way chosen to invite the public attention, fall within a similar rule. The public interest demands that on all these subjects a fair latitude for discussion should be permitted; the critic is entitled to the utmost liberty so long as he expresses nothing more than his honest opinion of the subject before him, but if it can be proved that he has used false and defamatory language out of malice, and especially if he has travelled beyond the facts which are properly before the public, he is no longer protected by his privilege. In private life a large number of statements are privileged so long as they remain matters of strictly private communication. It is difficult to define the limits of private privilege without extensive reference to concrete cases; but generally it may be said that it includes all communications which are made in performance of a duty not merely legal but moral or social, answers to l>ona fide inquiries, communications made by persons in confidential relations regarding matters in which one or both are interested, and even statements made within proper limits by persons in the l>ona fide prosecution of their own interest. Common examples of this kind of privilege are to be found in answer to inquiries as to the character of servants or the solvency of a trader, warnings to a friend, communications between persons who are jointly interested in some matters of business. But in every case we must be careful not to exceed the limits of publication required by the occasion, or otherwise the privilege is lost. Thus defamatory statements may be privileged when made to a meeting of shareholders, but not when published to others who have no immediate concern in the business.

In a few instances in which an action cannot be maintained even by the averment of malice, the plaintiff may maintain an action by averring not only malice but also want of reasonable and probable cause. The most common instances of this kind are malicious charges made in the ordinary course of justice and malicious prosecutions. In such cases it would be contrary to public policy to punish or prevent every charge which was made from a purely malicious motive, but there is no reason for protecting accusations which are not only malicious, but destitute of all reasonable probability.

Criminal Law.— Publications which are blasphemous, immoral, or seditious are frequently termed libels, and are punishable both at common law and by various statutes. The matter, however, which constitutes the offence in these publications lies beyond our present scope. Libels upon individuals may be prosecuted by criminal information or indictment, but there can be no criminal prosecution for slander. So far as concerns the definition of libel, and its limitation by the necessity of proving in certain cases express malice, there is no substantial difference between the rules which apply to criminal prosecutions and to civil actions, with the one important exception (now considerably modified) that the falsity of a libel is not in criminal law an essential element of the offence. If the matter alleged were in itself defamatory, the court would not permit inquiry into its truth. The sweeping application of this rule seems chiefly due to the indiscriminate use, in earlier cases, of a rule in Roman law which was only applicable to certain modes of publication, but has been supported by various reasons of general policy, and especially by the view that one main reason for punishing a libel was its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. The same view has occasioned a difference in the publication required in civil and criminal actions. It is enough in criminal law that the libel has been published to the party against whom it is directed, if it is averred that it is intended or calculated to produce a breach of the peace. Important alterations, however, have been introduced into this branch of the law by 6 à 7 Vict. c. 96. By that Act any person who maliciously publishes a defamatory libel may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both, the imprisonment not to exceed one year. Any person maliciously publishing a defamatory libel, knowing the same to be false, is liable to fine and imprisonment for two years. In every case the truth of the matters charged may be inquired into if it be pleaded, but the truth does not amount to a defence unless it is also proved that the publication was for the public benefit; and if, after such plea, the defendant is convicted, it is competent to the court to consider whether the guilt of the defendant is mitigated or aggravated by the plea, and the evidence given in relation to it. By the same Act a defendant is protected from publication of libels without his knowledge, authority, or consent, if the publication did not arise from the want of due care and caution on his part. The court are further authorized to award costs to the defendant in any information or indictment at the instance of a private prosecutor.

An important dispute about the powers of the jury in cases of libel arose during last century in connexion with some well known trials for seditious libels. The point is familiar to readers of Macaulay in connexion with the trial of the seven bishops, but the cases in which it was brought most prominently forward, and which led to its final settlement, were those against Woodfall (the printer of Lunins), Wilkes, and others, and especially the case against Shipley, the dean of St Asaph (21 St. Tr. 925), in which the question was fought by Mr Erskine with extraordinary energy and ability. The controversy turned upon the question whether the jury were to be strictly confined to matters of fact which required to be proved by evidence, or whether in every case they were entitled to form their own opinion upon the libellous character of the publication and the intention of the author. There could be no doubt of course that the jury, if they pleased, had it in their power to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, but both in theory and practice they were subject in law to the directions of the court, and had to be informed by it as to what they were to take into consideration in determining upon their verdict (see Jury). There is no difficulty about the general application of this principle in criminal trials. In a case of murder, for example, the judge directs the jury that if they are satisfied the accused did so and so they ought to find him guilty. He directs them, not merely as to the definition of the crime, but as to the particular facts which fall within that definition. If the crime is one which is inferred by law from certain facts, they are only concerned with these facts, and must accept the construction which is put upon them by law. Applying these principles to the case of libel, juries were directed that it was for the court to determine whether the publication fell within the definition of libel, and whether the case was one in which malice was to be inferred by construction of law. If the case were one in which malice was inferred by law, the only facts left to the jury were the fact of publication and the meaning averred by innuendoes; they could not go into the question of intention, unless the case were one of privilege, in which express malice had to be proved. In general principle, therefore, the decisions of the court were in accordance with the ordinary principles of criminal law·. But there were undoubtedly some peculiarities in the case of libel. The sense of words, the inferences to be drawn from them, and the effect which they produce are not so easily defined as gross matters of fact. They seem to belong to those cases in which the impression made upon a jury is more to be trusted than the decision of a judge. And further, owing to the mode of procedure, the defendant was often punished before the question of law was determined. But nevertheless the question would scarcely have been raised had the libels related merely to private matters. The real ground of dispute was the liberty to be accorded to political discussion. Had the judges taken as wide a view of privilege in discussing matters of public interest as they do now, the question could scarcely have arisen; for Erskine’s w4ιole contention really amounted to this, that the jury were entitled to take into consideration the good or bad intent of the authors, which is precisely the question which would now be put before them in any matter which concerned the public. But at that time the notion of a special privilege attaching to political discussion had scarcely arisen,...