The celebrity of Plutarch, or at least his popularity, is mainly founded on his forty-six Parallel Lives. He is thought to have written this work in his later years after his return to his native town Chaeronea. His knowledge of Latin and of Roman history he must have partly derived from some years’ residence in Rome and other parts of Italy, though he says he was too much engaged in lecturing (doubtless in Greek, on philosophy) to turn his attention much to Roman literature during that period. Long observes that “we must expect to find him imperfectly informed on Roman institutions, and we can detect in him some errors. Yet, on the whole, his Roman lives do not often convey erroneous notions; if the detail is incorrect, the general impression is true.”

Plutarch’s design in writing the Parallel Lives— for this is the title which he gives them in dedicating Theseus and Romulus to Sosius Senecio—appears to have been the publication, in successive books, of authentic biographies in pairs, a Greek and a Roman (generally with some approximation to synchronism as well as some well-marked resemblances in political career) being selected as the subject of each. In the introduction to the Theseus he speaks of having already issued his Lycurgus and Numa, viewing them, no doubt, as bearing a resemblance to each other in their legislative character; and so Theseus and Romulus are compared as the legendary founders of states.

In the opening sentence of the life of Alexander he says that “in this book he has written the lives of Alexander and Caesar” (Julius), and in his Demosthenes, where he again (§1) mentions his friend Sosius, 2o'σσιoς, he calls the life of this orator and Cicero the fifth book. It may therefore fairly be inferred that Plutarch’s original idea was simply to set (πapaβ0λλew, Nie., § 1) a Greek warrior, statesman, orator, or legislator side by side with some noted Roman celebrated for the same qualities. In his age, when Rome held the supremacy, but Greece was still looked up to as the centre and source of wisdom and art, such a comparison of the greatest men of both nations had a special propriety and significance, and was more than a mere literary exercise. It was a patriotic theme, to show the superiority of this or that race; and Plutarch, in a sense, belonged to both. Now Alexander and C. Caesar, Demosthenes and Cicero, Solon and Valerius Publicola, have some fairly obvious resemblances, which are not so conspicuous in some other pairs. But the sequel which follows most (not all) of the Lives, entitled σύγκρισι?, viz., a comparison in detail, is by modern critics rejected as spurious. It was manifestly added as an appendix from a misapprehension of Plutarch’s real motive; the effort to bring out exact points of resemblances which are either forced or fanciful far exceeded the design contemplated by him. Moreover, the marked difference in style between the βcoL and the συγκpiσeις is quite decisive of the question.

Nearly all the lives are in pairs; but the series concludes with single biographies of Artaxerxes, Aratus (of Sicyon), Galba, and Otho. In the life of Aratus, not Sosius Senecio, but one Polycrates, is addressed.

It is not to be supposed that Plutarch was content to write merely amusing or popular biographies. On the contrary, the Lives are works of great learning and research, and they must for this very reason, as well as from their considerable length, have taken many years in their compilation. For example, in the life of Theseus the following long list of authorities appears :—the Megarian historians, Hellanicus, Simonides, Philochorus, Pherecydes, Demo,'Paeon of Amathus, Dicaearchus, Herodorus, Bio, Menecrates, Clidemus, Hereas, Ister, 1 Diodorus. For the life of Romulus he refers to “one Promathio who composed a history of Italy” (§ 2 fin.), Diodes of Peparethus, Fabius Pictor, Herodorus, Varro, Valerius, Juba (Ίο'βας), Zenodotus of Troezen, Simulus the poet (from whom he quotes eight elegiac verses), Antigonus, “one Butas,” 2 and Caius Acilius, and (as a viva voce informant) Sexfrius Sulla of Carthage. In the life of Lycurgus he cites Aristotle, Eratosthenes, Apollodorus, Timaeus, Xenophon, Simonides, Aristocrates the Spartan, Sphaerus, Critias, Theophrastus, Dioscorides, Hippias the sophist, Philostephanus, Demetrius Phalereus, Hermippus, Sosibius, Thucydides, Apollothemis, Aristoxenus, Aristocrates. In the life of Alexander, which is a long and elaborate essay, mention is made of Onesicritus, Aristobulus, Duris, Chares, Callisthenes, Eratosthenes, Clitarchus, Polyclitus, Antigenes, Ister, Ptolemaeus, Anticlides, Philo of Thebes, Philippus of Theangele, Philippus of Eretria, Hecataeus, Hermippus, Sotion.

It is true that many of the lives, especially of Romans, do not show such an extent of research or such a wealth of authorities. But Plutarch must have possessed or had access to a great store of books, and his diligence as an historian cannot be questioned, if his accuracy is in some points impeached.

His sympathy with Doric characters and institutions is very evident; he delights to record the exploits, the maxims, and the virtues of Spartan kings and generals. This feeling is the key to his apparently unfair and virulent attack on Herodotus, who, as an Ionian, seemed to him to have exaggerated the prowess and the foresight of the Athenian leaders.

The voluminous and varied writings of Plutarch exclusive of the Lives are known under the common term Opera Moralia. These consist of above sixty essays, some of them long and many of them rather difficult, some too of very doubtful genuineness. Their literary value is greatly enhanced by the large number of citations from lost Greek poems, especially verses of the dramatists, among whom Euripides holds by far the first place. They evince a mind of vast and varied resources, historical as well as philosophical—the mind of an inquirer and a seeker after knowledge, rather than that of an exponent or an opponent of any particular philosophical system.

But Plutarch’s Greek is not, like Lucian’s, fluent and easy, nor even clear. He uses many words not in the ordinary Greek vocabulary, and he too often constructs long sentences, the thread of which separately, as well as the connexion, cannot be traced without close attention. Hence he is unattractive as a writer, so far as style is concerned, and he is often diffuse and carries his discussions to an unnecessary length.

It is certain that to most persons in Britain, even to those who call themselves scholars, the Opera Moralia of Plutarch are practically almost unknown. No English translation of them, we believe, has been printed since the bulky folio of Philemon Holland, published at the end of the 17th century, with the exception of a single volume in Bohn’s Classical Library, lately added to that series by Mr C. W. King, M.A. It is therefore the more desirable to devote the remainder of this article to a brief notice of the principal treatises.

On the Education of Children recommends (1) good birth, and sobriety in the father; (2) good disposition and good training are alike necessary for virtue; (3) a mother ought to nurse her own offspring, on the analogy of all animals; (4) the paedagogus must be honest and trustworthy; (5) all the advantages of life and fortune must be held secondary to education; (6) mere mob-oratory is no part of a good education; (7) philosophy should form the principal study, but not to the exclusion of the other sciences; (8) gymnastics are to be practised; (9) kindness and advice are better than blows; (10) oyer-pressure in learning is to be avoided, and plenty of relaxation is to be allowed; (11) self-control, and not least over the tongue, is to be learned; (12) the grown-up youth should be under the eye and advice of his father, aιjd all bad company avoided, flatterers included; (13) fathers should not be too harsh and exacting, but remember that they were themselves once young; (14) marriage is recommended, and without disparity of rank; (15) above all, a father should be an example of virtue to a son.

How a Young Man ought to Hear Poetry is largely made up of quotations from Homer and the tragic poets. The points of the essay are the moral effects of poetry as combining the true with the false, the praises of virtue and heroism with a mythology depraved and unworthy of gods, eι θeoi τι δpωσι φaυλov, oυκ 0σlv θtoi (§ 21). “So long as the young man,” says Plutarch, “admires what is rightly said and done in the poets, but feels annoyed at the contrary, no harm is done; but if he learns to admire everything which is presented to him under the name of a hero, he will unconsciously become morally deteriorated” (§ 26).

On the Right Way of Hearing (τrtpl τoυ aκoυtιv) advocates the listening in silence to what is being said, and not giving a precipitate reply to statements which may yet receive some addition or modification from the speaker (§ 4). The hearer is warned not to give too much weight to the style, manner, or tone of the speaker (§ 7), not to be either too apathetic or too prone to praise, not to be impatient if he finds his faults reproved by the lecturer (§ 16). He concludes with the maxim, “to hear rightly is the beginning of living rightly,” and perhaps he has in view throughout his own profession as a lecturer.

How a Flatterer may be Distingτιished from a Friend is a rather long and uninteresting treatise. The ancient writers are full of warnings against flatterers, who do not seem to exercise much influence in modem society. The really dangerous flatterer (§ 4) is not the parasite, but the pretender to a disinterested friendship, —one who affects similar tastes, and so insinuates himself into your confidence. Your accomplished flatterer does not always praise, but flatters by act, as when he occupies a good seat at a public meeting for the express purpose of resigning it to his patron (§15). A true friend, on the contrary, speaks freely on proper occasions. A good part of the essay turns on παρρησία, the honest expression of opinion. The citations, which are fairly numerous, are mostly from Homer.

How one may be Conscious of Progress in Goodness is addressed to Sosius Senecio, who was consul in the last years of Nerva, and more than once (99, 102, 107) under Trajan. If, says Plutarch, a man could become suddenly wise instead of foolish, he could not be ignorant of the change; but it is otherwise with moral or mental processes. Gradual advance in virtue is like steady sailing over a wide sea, and can only be measured by the time taken and the forces applied (§ 3). Zeno tested advance by dreams (§ 12); if no excess or immorality presented itself to the imagination of the sleeper, his mind had been purged by reason and philosophy. When we love the truly good, and adapt ourselves to their looks and manners, and this even with the loss of worldly prosperity, then we are really getting on in goodness ourselves (§ 15). Lastly, the avoidance of little sins is an evidence of a scrupulous conscience (§ 17).

How to get Benefit oτιt of Enemies argues that, as primitive man had savage animals to fight against, but learnt to make use of their skins for clothing and their flesh for food, so we are bound to turn even our enemies to some good purpose. One service they do to us is to make us live warily against plots; another is, they induce us to live honestly, so as to vex our rivals not by scolding them but by making them secretly jealous of us (§ 4). Again, finding fault leads us to consider if we are ourselves faultless, and to be found fault with by a foe is likely to be plain truth speaking, o,κoυστeov eo∙τi παρά των ίχθρων τ⅛v aληθtιav (§ 6). Jealousies and strifes, so natural to man, are diverted from our friends by being legitimately expended on our enemies (§ 10).

On Having Many Friends, On Chance, On Virtue and Vice, are three short essays, the first advocating the concentration of one’s affections on a few who are worthy (τo5s α∣iovs φιλ,tas δι<iκeιv, § 4), rather than diluting them, as it were, on the many; the second pleads that intelligence, φρovησιs, not mere luck, is the ruling principle of all success; the third shows that virtue and vice are but other names for happiness and misery. All these are interspersed with citations from ’ the poets, several of them unknown from other sources.

A longer treatise, well and clearly written, and not less valuable for its many quotations, is the Consolation addressed to Apollonius, on the early death of his “generally beloved and religious and dutiful son.” Equality of mind both in prosperity and in adversity is recommended (§ 4), since there are “ups and downs” (Sψoς κal τaπeιv6της) in life, as there are storms and calms on the sea, and good and bad seasons on the earth. That man is born to reverses 1 'θ ,, lστpos iv τrj τρισκaιδcκaτr) τωv 'A,ττικωv, § 34.

2 Βούτας τιs αιτίας uυθΦδeις év ^λeγeiojs irepï των 'Pωμaικωv άναγραφων, § 21.

he illustrates by citing fifteen fine verses from Menander (§ 5). The uselessness of indulging in grief is pointed out, death being a debt to all and not to be regarded as an evil ( §§ 10-12). Plato’s doctrine is cited (§ 13) that the body is a burden and an impediment to the soul. Death may be annihilation, and therefore the dead are in the same category as the unborn (§ 15). The lamenting a death because it is untimely or premature has something of selfishness in it (§ 19), besides that it only means that one has arrived sooner than another at the end of a common journey. If a death is more grievous because it is untimely, a new born infant’s death would be the most grievous of all (§ 23). One who has died early may have been spared many woes rather than have been deprived of many blessings; and, after all, to die is but to pay a debt due to the gods when they ask for it (§ 28). Examples are given of fortitude and resignation under such affliction (§ 33). If, says the author in conclusion, there is a heaven for the good hereafter, be sure that such a son will have a place in it.

Precepts about Health commences as a dialogue, and extends to some length as a lecture. It is technical and difficult throughout, and contains but little that falls in with modern ideas. Milk, he says, should be taken for food rather than for drink, and wine should not be indulged in after hard work or mental effort, for it does but tend to increase the bodily disturbance (§ 17). Better than purges or emetics is a temperate diet, which induces the bodily functions to act of themselves (§ 20). Another wise saying is that idleness does not conduce to health (ούδ’ a,Kηθis eστι τδ μάλλον υyιaiveιv robs ησυχίαν ⅛γovταs, § 21), and yet another that a man should learn by experience his bodily capabilities without always consulting a physician (§ 26).

Advice to the Married is addressed to his newly wedded friends Pollianus and Eurydice. It is simply and plainly written, and consists chiefly of short maxims and anecdotes, with but few citations from the poets.

The Banquet of the Seven Wise Men is a longer treatise, one of the several “Symposia” or imaginary conversations that have come down to us. It is supposed to be given by Periander in the public banqueting-room (fστιaτipιov) near the harbour of Corinth (Lechaeum) on the occasion of a sacrifice to Aphrodite. The whole party consisted of “more than twice seven,” the friends of the principal guests being also present. Like Plato’s Symposizιm this treatise takes the form of a narrative of what was said and done, the narrator being one Diocles, a friend of Periander⅛, who professes to give Nicarchus a correct account as having been present. The dinner was simple, and in contrast with the usual splendour of “tyrants” (§ 4). The conversation turns on various topics; Solon is credited with the remarkable opinion that “a king or tyrant is most likely to become celebrated if he makes a democracy out of a monarchy” (§ 7). There is much playful banter throughout, but neither the wit nor the wisdom seems of a very high standard. Solon delivers a speech on food being a necessity rather than a pleasure of life (§ 16), and one Gorgus, a brother of the host, comes in to relate how he has just shaken hands with Arion brought across the sea on the back of a dolphin (§ 18), which brings on a discussion about the habits of that creature. Among the speakers are Aesop, Anaeharsis, Thales, Chilo, Cleobulus, and one Chersias, a poet.

A short essay On Superstition contains a good many quotations from the poets. It opens with the wise remark that ignorance about the gods, which makes the obstinate man an atheist, also begets credulity in weak and pliant minds. The atheist fears nothing because he believes nothing; the superstitious man believes there are gods, but that they are unfriendly to him (§ 2). A man who fears the gods is never free from fear, whatever he may do or whatever may befall him. He extends his fears beyond his death, and believes in the “gates of hell,” and its fires, in the darkness, the ghosts, the infernal judges, and what not (§ 4). The atheist does not believe in the gods; the superstitious man wishes he did not, but fears to disbelieve (§ 11). On the whole, this is a most interesting treatise. Mr King has given a translation of it, and of the next five essays.

On Isis and Osiris is a rather long treatise on Egyptian symbolism, interesting chiefly to students of Egyptology. It gives an exposition of the strange myths and superstitions of this ancient solar cult, including a full account of the great antagonist of Osiris, Typhon, or the Egyptian Satan. Plutarch thus lays down the Zoroastrian theory of good and bad agencies (§ 45): “if nothing can happen without cause, and good cannot furnish cause for evil, it follows that the nature of evil, as of good, must have an origin and principle of its own.”

On the Cessation of Oracles is a dialogue, discussing the reasons why divine inspiration seemed to be withdrawn from the old seats of prophetic lore. The real reason of their decline in popularity is probably very simple; when the Greek cities became Roman provinces the fashion of consulting oracles fell off, as unsuited to the more practical influences of Roman thought and Roman politics. The question is discussed whether there are such intermediate beings as daemons, who according to Plato communicate the will of the gods to men, and the prayers and vows of men to the gods.

The possibility of a plurality of worlds is entertained, and of the planets being more or less composed of the essence of the five elements, fire, ether, earth, air, and water (§ 37). The whole treatise is metaphysical, but it concludes with remarks on the exhalations at Delphi having different effects on different people and at different times. The ancient notion doubtless was that the vapour was the breath of some mysterious being sent up from the under-world.

On the Pythian Responses, why no longer given in Verse, is also a dialogue, the first part of which is occupied mainly with conversation and anecdotes about the statues and other offerings at Delphi. It is rather an amusing essay, and...