Although nothing can be more simple than the fundamental principle of general average, that a loss incurred for the advantage of all the coadventurers should be made good by them all in equitable proportion to their stakes in the adventure, the application of this principle to the varied and complicated cases which occur in the course of maritime commerce has given rise to many diversities of usage at different periods and in different countries. It is «oon discovered that the principle cannot be applied in any settled or consistent manner unless by the aid of rules of a technical and sometimes of a seemingly arbitrary character. The distinctions on which these rules turn are often very τefined indeed. This is the chief reason why no real progress has yet been made towards an international system of general average, notwithstanding repeated conferences and other efforts by most competent representatives from different countries, seeking to arrive at a common understanding as a preliminary basis for such a system. A brief summary only can be given here of the rules which have been established in Great Britain by usage, or by legal decisions, in connection with the subject.

All general average losses may be divided into two principal classes—(1), sacrifices of part of the cargo and freight, or of part of the ship, for the general safety; (2), extraordinary expenditures incurred with the same object. We shall notice these in their order.

When a part of a cargo is thrown overboard (or jettisoned, as it is termed) to save the ship from foundering in a storm, or to float her when stranded, or to facilitate her escape from an enemy, the loss of the goods and of the freight attached to them must be made good by average contribution. But if goods jettisoned have been originally stowed on deck, no contribution can be demanded for them, unless they are so carried according to the common usage and course of trade on the voyage for which they are shipped, or with the consent of all the parties concerned in the ship and cargo.

If, instead of being thrown overboard, the goods are put into boats or lighters, and lost or damaged before reaching the shore, such loss is regarded as a virtual jettison, and gives a claim to average contribution. The same rule applies to damage occasioned by the goods being put ashore on muddy ground, or where they cannot be kept in ordinary safety. But when the goods have been conveyed to a place of ordinary safety, they cease to be at the risk of the general interest; and should they be damaged there by fire or other accidents the loss must be borne by the individual proprietors, or by their insurers.

Damage done to the cargo by discharging it at a port of refuge in the manner and under the circumstances •customary at that port, is not allowed as general average. This rule covers the case of wastage, breakage, leakage, <tc., from handling the goods in the ordinary course of -discharging, warehousing, and reshipping.

If goods are thrown overboard from having become, Through heating or other cause peculiar to their own condition, a source of special danger to the whole interest, the loss is not recoverable in general average. So, too, if a cargo is discharged at a port of refuge from damage resulting from its own vice propre, the costs are chargeable to its owners.

The loss of corn, salt, guano, or similar goods, arising from their being pumped up or baled out with the water in the vessel, is not recoverable by average contribution. The damage done to the cargo by means of water thrown down the hatches, or admitted into the ship by scuttling her, for the purpose of extinguishing an accidental fire, was excluded from general average by the usage of Lloyds up till 1873. In that year the courts of Queen’s Bench and Exchequer Chamber expressed a strong opinion in connection with the case of Stewart v. the West India and Pacific Steamship Company, that such damage ought to be made good by average contribution. The usage has now been altered accordingly.

The amount of compensation to be made for goods sacrificed by general average acts is determined by the net market price they would have produced on arrival at the port of destination had they not been sacrificed; but under deduction of the freight attaching to them (which is made good to the shipowners), and of the charges for duties and landing expenses which are saved.

The general average acts next to be considered are those which involve sacrifices of part of the ship or her materials.

The same principles which regulate the case of goods thrown overboard apply also to the jettison of the ship’s chains, anchors, hawsers, spars, boats, or other stores. But if water-casks are stowed on deck, or if chains and hawsers are carried on deck when the vessel is not near the land so as to render it necessary that they should be so carried, the loss arising from the jettison of these articles falls on the shipowner; and if boats are jettisoned in consequence of their having been broken adrift from their fastenings on deck by the force of the sea, they are excluded from general average, and are charged to particular average on the ship. The damage done to the ship by cutting holes to effect a jettison of the cargo, or to pour down water to a fire, or by scuttling her for that purpose, is allowed as a general average charge. The damage arising from cutting or knocking away a portion of the ship’s bulwarks in order to prevent the deck from being flooded in a storm, is compensated in the same manner.

When sails or masts are cut away in order to right a ship which has been thrown on her beam-ends, or to prevent her from driving on a lee-shore, the loss is made good by average contribution; but if the object in cutting away a sail or spar be merely to save a mast, the loss is not made good in general average.

It frequently happens that masts or yards are sprung and carried away by the force of the wind, and are left entangled in the rigging, or hanging over the ship’s side in what is termed “a state of wreck;” in these circumstances it becomes necessary to cut them away, with the sails and rigging attached, and to throw the whole overboard, otherwise they would impede the navigation, and endanger the ship and cargo. On this ground it is held by some authorities that the loss caused by the act of cutting them away should be made good by average contribution. But this act is the direct consequence of the previous accident, which places these articles in a situation where it is impossible to save them without imperilling the ship, cargo, and lives. It would not be reasonable to imperil these for such a purpose; whence it follows that the displaced articles are already virtually lost by means of the original accident, before the loss is actually consummated by cutting them away. This loss is accordingly excluded, by the usage of this country, from average contribution. On the same principle, no contribution can be demanded for any articles which are sacrificed as having themselves become, through previous accident, the immediate cause of danger to the whole interest.

The loss of sails or spars, in consequence of carrying a press of canvas to avoid a lee-shore, or to escape from an enemy, is not the subject of general average in this country; neither is the damage suffered by the ship from straining, under any such extraordinary press of sail.

When anchors and cables are slipped from in order to work a vessel off a lee-shore, or to avoid collision with another ship, the loss is made good by average contribution; but if the cable is slipped in order* that the vessel may join convoy, or because the anchor has become hooked to some object at the bottom and cannot be raised, the loss is borne by the shipowner.

When sails, ropes, or other materials are cut up and used at sea for the purpose of stopping leaks or to rig jury-masts, or when the common benefit requires that they should be applied to some purpose for which they were not originally intended, the loss is made good in general average. The same rule applies to the case of hawsers, cables, anchors, sails, or boats, lost or damaged in attempting to force off a stranded vessel from the shore.

The damage sustained in defending a ship against a pirate or an enemy is not the subject of general average in this country; it is treated as particular average on the ship.

It has been much debated by writers on maritime law, whether the voluntary stranding of a ship, in order to prevent her from foundering, should be treated as a general •or as a particular average loss. In the United States it has been settled, by judicial decision, that the loss in question constitutes a general average claim; but the opposite doctrine is acted upon in the usage of Great Britain, and the point has never been decided by the courts of law. It appears to us that the argument greatly preponderates against the rule adopted in the United States, and in favour of the usage established in this country. The only reason for regarding this loss as the subject of general average is, that it originates in the intentional act of running the ship aground, for the preservation, as far as possible, of the whole interest concerned. But it tan seldom be known beforehand how the different interests at stake will be specially affected by the act in question;— whether, for instance, the damage to the cargo may not be more serious than the damage to the ship, or vice versa. Thus no particular part of the interest can be said to be intentionally sacrificed for the benefit of the whole; the intention, indeed, is not to sacrifice any one part, but to place the whole interest in a situation of less peril than it would otherwise have been in. What particular damages may thereafter ensue to either ship or cargo will depend, in each case, on a variety of circumstances entirely accidental in their character, and therefore in no proper sense the subject of previous intention. The same rule, therefore, which excludes from general average accidental damages in all other cases, ought to exclude them in this case also. Moreover, when the alternatives are either that the vessel be left to founder, or that she be run ashore with a chance of preservation, there can really be no room for choice, or, at all events, the elements of will and intention are entirely subordinate in the part they must play under the pressure of the existing circumstances; and in this view the stranding is as truly inevitable as if it had been caused by the force of the w inds and waves alone.

But, even were these reasons less weighty than it appears they are, a serious practical objection might be urged against the doctrine that voluntary stranding should be a general average loss, on the ground that it would in most cases be impossible to distinguish between the damages received by the ship and cargo prior to the stranding, and those sustained after or in consequence of it. It is needless to remark, that before a ship can be in such imminent danger of foundering as to render it necessary to run her ashore, she must be presumed to have sustained a very considerable amount of damage; and the probability is, that the cargo also will have suffered to a corresponding extent. Up to this point these damages are confessedly particular average; and were it held that the damages after the stranding were the subject of general average, it would, of course, be necessaιy to distinguish the separate damages that belonged to each. But in every case these different damages would exist in varying proportions, yet always so incorporated together that justice could never have a more perplexing task than that of discriminating between them. No general rule could be applied that would meet the widely different circumstances of each particular case; and the arbitrary method of adjustment that would alone be possible would doubtless give rise to endless dissatisfaction and dispute. On the ground of expediency, therefore, as -well as on that of principle, the usage now established in this country ought to be maintained, notwithstanding the high authorities by whom the opposite practice has been countenanced.

The amount of general average losses on the ship is compensated by allowing to the owners the cost of repairs, or of new materials in place of those sacrificed, subject to the deduction of one-third for the difference of value between old and new; but no deduction is made from the cost of new anchors, and only one-sixth is deducted from the cost of new chain cables. If the ship be on her first voyage (which is held to include the homeward as well as the outward passage), the repairs and new materials are allowed in full.

We now proceed to notice the second principal class of general average losses, consisting of extraordinary expenditures incurred with a view to the common benefit.

When a ship is obliged to put into a port of refuge, in consequence of damage received in the course of the voyage, the usage in this country is to allow as general average all the charges connected with the entrance of the vessel into the port, and with the landing and warehousing of the cargo, when this is necessary to admit of the ship being repaired. Thus the expenses of pilotage or other assistance into the port, the harbour dues, and similar charges, the costs of the protest taken by the master and crew, and of the survey held to ascertain whether the cargo requires to be discharged, together with the charges for landing the cargo and conveying it to a warehouse or other place of safety, are all made good as general average. The costs of repairing the ship are charged to general average only in so far as the repairs may refer to damages which are themselves the proper subject of general contribution. If the damages are of the nature of particular average, as is more usually the case, they are charged accordingly; or if they proceed from “wear and tear,” they are stated against the shipowner.

The warehouse rent for the cargo at a port of refuge, and any expenses connected with its preservation, form special charges against that particular interest, and .are borne by the proprietors of the goods, or by their insurers. When goods are insured “free from particular average, unless the ship be stranded,” it is necessary, if the ship has not been stranded, to distinguish the charges for warehouse rent and fire insurance from those incurred in connection with the preservation of the goods from the effects of damage,—the underwriters being liable for the former, but not for the latter.

The expenses of reshipping the cargo, and the pilotage, or other charges outwards, are borne by the freight. If the entire cargo cannot be taken on board again, from the want, at the port of refuge, of the usual facilities for stowing it, the loss or expenses resulting from the exclusion of part of it are not treated, in this country, as the subject of general contribution.

The wages and provisions of the master and crew during the period of detention at a port of refuge are not admitted as a charge against general average, it being held that the shipowner is bound to keep a competent crew on board the ship from the commencement to the end of the voyage at his own expense.

The charges for agency at a port of refuge are brought against the general average, even though they may have been originally made in the form of separate charges against the ship and cargo respectively. Commissions on money advanced, maritime interest on bottomry and respondentia, and the loss on exchanges, <fcc., are apportioned relatively to the gross sums expended on behalf of the several interests concerned.

The expenses incurred in getting a stranded ship off the ground, the hire of extra hands to pump a ship which has sprung a leak, and the sums awarded for salvage or for other services rendered to the ship and cargo under any extraordinary emergencies, are compensated by average contribution. But this rule applies only to the extraneous assistance that may have been obtained, the crew being bound to do their utmost in the service of the ship on all occasions, with extra remuneration for what they might consider extraordinary exertions on their part.

The costβ of reclaiming the ship and cargo after having been captured are allowed as general average charges; and although ransom, to an enemy is prohibited in this country by legal enactment, it seems that this does not apply to the case of money or goods given up by way of composition to pirates for the liberation of the ship and cargo, and that this would also form a subject of average contribution.

When the ship and cargo arrive at the port of destination it is unnecessary, in ordinary cases, to distinguish, in the adjustment of the general average, between the losses which have arisen from sacrifices and those which have resulted from expenditures for the common benefit. But if the ship and cargo should be lost before reaching their destination, no contribution is due for the goods or ship’s materials which may have been sacrificed at a former stage of the voyage, the owners of these being in no worse position than any of their coadventurers. On the other hand, it is evident that when money has been expended for the common benefit, the subsequent loss of the ship and cargo should not affect the right of the party who has made the advance to recover it in full from all the parties for whose advantage it was originally made. Hence, while sacrifices are made good only in the event of the ship and cargo being ultimately saved, expenditures must be reimbursed whether the ship and cargo be eventually saved or lost; and the contribution for these expenditures must be regulated by the values of the ship, cargo, and freight as they stood at the time when the advances were made.

If, however, the money required for average expenditures has been raised by means of bottomry, and the ship be lost before completing the voyage, there can be no claim for reimbursement,—the risk being assumed by the bottomry lender in consideration of the premium he receives on the sum advanced. When there is no bottomry, it is a usual practice, but not an invariable rule, to insure the average disbursements by a special policy. When this has been done, and when the amount has been recovered on the subsequent loss of the ship, it cannot be again claimed from the individuals who would otherwise have been liable. But if the expenditures are not insured, either by a bottomry contract, or by a special policy, and if the ship and cargo be totally lost in the subsequent course of the voyage, the parties for whose benefit the expenditures were incurred must reimburse them on the principles already explained. These parties, however, have recourse on their original insurers, not only for the total loss of the interests insured, but also for the previous expenditures, although the insurers may thus be called on to pay a larger sum than the amount of the insurance.

The contribution for general average losses is regulated by the values of the respective interests for the benefit of which they were incurred. The practical...

For Aristotle the reverence of Averroes was unbounded, and to expound him was his chosen task. The uncritical receptivity of his age, the defects of the Arabic versions, the emphatic theism of his creed, and the rationalising mysticism of some Oriental thought, may have sometimes led him astray, and given prominence to the less obvious features of Aristotelianism. But in his conception of the relation between philosophy and religion, Averroes had a light which the Latins were without. The science, falsely so called, of the several theological schools, their groundless distinctions and sophistical demonstrations, he regarded as the great source of heresy and scepticism. The allegorical interpretations and metaphysics which had been imported into religion had taken men’s minds away from the plain sense of the Koran, and destroyed the force of those appeals which had been spoken to the hearts and understandings of our common humanity, not to the wisdom of the “people of demonstration.” God had declared a truth meet for all men, which needed no intellectual superiority to understand, in a tongue which each human soul could apprehend according to its powers and feelings. Accordingly, the expositors of religious metaphysics, Algazali included, are the enemies of true religion, because they make it a mere matter of syllogism. Averroes maintains that a return must be made to the words and teaching of the prophet; that science must not expend itself in dogmatising on the metaphysical consequences of fragments of doctrine for popular acceptance, but must proceed to reflect upon and examine the existing things of the world. Averroes, at the same time, condemns the attempts of those who tried to give demonstrative science where the mind was not capable of more than rhetoric: they harm religion by their mere negations, destroying an old sensuous creed, but cannot build up a higher and intellectual faith.

In this spirit Averroes does not allow the fancied needs of theological reasoning to interfere with his study of Aristotle, whom he simply interprets as a truth-seeker. The points by which he told on Europe were all implicit in Aristotle, but Averroes set in relief what the original had left obscure, and emphasised things which the Christian theologian passed by or misconceived. Thus Averroes had a double effect. He was the great interpreter of Aristotle to the later Schoolmen, worthy of a place, according to Dante, beside the glorious sages of the heathen world. On the other hand, he came to represent those aspects of Peripateticism most alien to the spirit of Christendom; and the deeply-religious Moslem gave his name to the anti-sacerdotal party, to the materialists, sceptics, and atheists, who defied or undermined the dominant beliefs of the church.

On three points Averroes, like other Moslem thinkers, came specially into relation, real or supposed, with the religious creed, viz., the creation of the world, the divine knowledge of particular things, and the future of the human soul. But the collision was rather with the laboured ratiocinations by which the Asharite and Motazelite theologians aimed at rationalising dogma than with the doctrine of religion in its simplicity. True philosophy is the foster sister of religion, but is the critic of scholastic subtleties. In regard to the second charge, Averroes himself remarks that philosophy only protests against reducing the divine to the level of the created mind. But the real grandeur of Averroes is seen in his resolute prosecution of the stand-point of science in matters of this world, and in his recognition that religion is not a branch of knowledge to be reduced to propositions and systems of dogma, but a personal and inward power, an individual truth which stands distinct from, but not contradictory to, the universalities of scientific law. In his science he followed the Greeks, and to the Schoolmen he and his compatriote rightly seemed philosophers of the ancient world. He maintained alike the claim of demonstrative science with its generalities for the few who could live in that ethereal world, and the claim of religion for all,—the common life of each soul as an individual and personal consciousness. But theology, or the mixture of the two, he regarded as a source of evil to both—fostering the vain belief in a hostility of philosophers to religion, and meanwhile corrupting religion by a pseudo-science. A stand-point like this was the very antithesis of scholasticism; it was the anticipation of an adequate view which modern speculation has seldom exhibited.

The latent nominalism of Aristotle only came gradually to be emphasised through the prominence which Christianity gave to the individual life, and, apart from passing notices as in Abelard, first found clear enunciation in the school of Duns Scotus. The Arabians, on the contrary, emphasised the idealist aspect which had been adopted and promoted by the Neo-Platonist commentators. Hence, to Averroes the eternity of the world finds its true expression in the eternity of God. The ceaseless movement of growth and change, which presents matter in form after form as a continual search after a finality which in time and movement is not, and cannot be reached, represents only the aspect the world shows to the physicist and to the senses. In the eye of reason the full fruition of this desired finality iβ already and always attained · the actualisation, invisible to the senses, is achieved now and ever, and is thus beyond the element of time. This transcendent or abstract being is that which the world of nature is always seeking. He is thought or intellect, the actuality, of which movement is but the fragmentary attainment in successive instants of time. Such a mind is not in the theological sense a creator, yet the onward movement is not the same as what some modern thinkers seem to mean by development. For the perfect and absolute, the consummation of movement is not generated at any point in the process; it is an ideal end, which guides the operations of nature, and does not wait upon them for its achievement. God is the unchanging essence of the movement, and therefore its eternal cause.

A special application of this relation between the prior perfect, and the imperfect, which it influences, is found in the doctrine of the connection of the abstract (transcendent) intellect with man. This transcendent mind is sometimes connected with the moon, according to the theory of Aristotle, who assigned an imperishable matter to the sphere beyond the sublunary, and in general looked upon the celestial orbs as living and intelligent. Such an intellect, named active or productive, as being the author of the development of reason in man, is the permanent, eternal thought, which is the truth of the cosmic and physical movement. It is in man that the physical or sensible passes most evidently into the metaphysical and rational. Humanity is the chosen vessel in which the light of tho intellect is revealed; and so long as mankind lasts there must always be some individuals destined to receive this light. “There must of necessity always be some philosopher in the race of man.” What seems from the material point of view to be the acquisition of learning, study, and a moral life, is from the higher point of view the manifest tation of the transcendent intellect in the individual. The preparation of the heart and faculties gives rise to a series of grades between the original predisposition and the full acquisition of actual intellect. These grades in the main resemble those given by Avicenna. But beyond these, Averroes claims as the highest bliss of the soul a union in this life with the actual intellect. The intellect, therefore, is one and continuous in all individuals, who differ only in the degree which their illumination has attained. Such was the Averroist doctrine of the unity of intellect—the eternal and universal nature of true intellectual life. By his interpreters it was transformed into a theory of one soul common to all mankind, and when thus corrupted conflicted not unreasonably with the doctrines of a future life, common to Islam and Christendom.

Averroes, rejected by his Moslem countrymen, found a hearing among the Jews, to whom Maimonides had shown the free paths of Greek speculation. In the cities of Languedoc and Provence, to which they had been driven by Spanish fanaticism, the Jews no longer used the learned Arabic, and translations of the works of Averroes became necessary. His writings became the text-book of Levi ben Gerson at Perpignan, and of Moses of Narbonne. Meanwhile, before 1250, Averroes became accessible to the Latin Schoolmen by means of versions, accredited by the names of Michael Scot and others. William of Auvergne is the first Schoolman who criticises the doctrines of Averroes, not, however, by name. Albertus Magnus and St Thomas devote special treatises to an examination of the Averroist theory of the unity of intellect, which they labour to confute in order to establish the orthodoxy of Aristotle. But as early as Aegidius Romanus v 1247-1316), Averroes had been stamped as the patron of indifference to theological dogmas, and credited with the emancipation which was equally due to wider experience and the lessons of the Crusades. There had never been an absence of protest against the hierarchical doctrine. Berengar had struggled in that interest, and with Abelard, in the 12th century, the revolt against authority in belief grew loud. The dialogue betw een a Christian, a Jew,' and a philosopher suggested a comparative estimate of religions, and placed the natural religion of the moral law above all positive revelations. Nihilists and naturalists, who deified logic and science at the expense of faith, were not unknown at Paris in the days of John of Salisbury. In such a critical generation the words of Averroism found willing ears, and pupils who outran their teacher. Paris became the centre of a sceptical society, which the decrees of bishops and councils, and the enthusiasm of the orthodox doctors and knight-errants of Catholicism, were powerless to extinguish. At Oxford Averroes told more as the great commentator. In the dayβ of Roger Bacon he had become an authority. Bacon, placing him beside Aristotle and Avicenna, recommends the study of Arabic as the only way of getting the knowledge which bad versions made almost hopeless; and the student of the present day might echo his remark. In Duns Scotus, Averroes and Aristotle are the unequalled masters of the science of proof; and he pronounces distinctly the separation between Catholic and philosophical truth, which became the watchword of Averroism. By the 14th century zVverroism was the common leaven of philosophy; John Baconthorpe is the chief of Averroists, and Walter Burley has similar tendencies.

Meanwhile Averroism had, in the eye of the great Dominican school, come to be regarded as the arch-enemy of the truth. When Frederick II. consulted a Moslem free-thinker on the mysteries of the faith, when the phrase or legend of the “Three Impostors” presented in its most offensive form the scientific survey of the three laws of Moses, Christ, and Mahomet, and when the characteristic doctrines of Averroes were misunderstood, it soon followed that his name became the badge of the scoffer and the sceptic. What had begun with the subtle disputes of the universities of Paris, went on to the materialist teachers in the medical schools and the sceptical men of the world in the cities of Northern Italy. The patricians of Venice and the lecturers of Padua made Averroism synonymous with doubt and criticism in theology, and with sarcasm against the hierarchy. Petrarch, vexed by the arrogance and overrefinements of their argumentation, and by the barbarism of their words, refuses to believe that any good thing can come out of Arabia, and speaks of Averroes as a mad dog barking against the church. In works of contemporary art Averroes is at one time the comrade of Mahomet and Antichrist; at another he lies with Arius and Sabellius, vanquished by the lance of St Thomas.

It was in the universities of North Italy that Averroism finally settled, and there for three centuries it continued as a stronghold of Scholasticism to resist the efforts of revived antiquity and of advancing science. Padua became the seat of Averroist Aristotelianism; and, when Padua was conquered by Venice in 1405, the printers of the republic spread abroad the teaching of the professors in the university. As early as 1300, at Padua, Petrue Aponensis, a notable expositor of medical theories, had betrayed a heterodoxy in faith; and John of Jandun, one of the pamphleteers on the side of Lewis of Bavaria, was a keen follower of Averroes, whom he styles a “perfect and most glorious physicist.” Urbanus of Bologna, Paul of Venice (d. 1428), and Cajetanus de Thienis (1387-1465), established by their lectures and their discussions the authority of Averroes; and a long list of manuscripts rests in the libraries of Lombardy to witness the diligence of these writers and their successors, Even a lady of Venice, Cassandra Fedele, in 1480, gained her laurels in defence of Averroist theses.

With Pomponatius, in 1495, a brilliant epoch began for the school of Padua. Questions of permanent and present interest took the place of outworn scholastic problems. The disputants ranged themselves under the rival commentators, Alexander and Averroes; and the immortality of the soul became the battle-ground of the two parties. Pomponatius defended the Alexandrist doctrine of the utter mortality of the soul, whilst Augustinus Niphus, the Averroist, was entrusted by Leo X. with the task of defending the Catholic doctrine. The parties seemed to have changed when Averroism thus took the side of the church; but the change w*as probably due to compulsion. Niphus had edited the works of Averroes (1495-7); but his expressions gave offence to the dominant theologians, and he had to save himself by distinguishing his personal faith from his editorial capacity. Achillini, the persistent philosophical adversary of Pomponatius both at Padua and subsequently at Bologna, attempted, along with other moderate but not brilliant Averroists, to accommodate their philosophical theory with the requirements of Catholicism. It was this comparatively mild Averroism, reduced to the merely explanatory activity of a commentator, which continued to be the official dogma at Padua during the 16th century. Its typical representative is Marc-Antonio Zimara (d. 1552), the author of a reconciliation between the tenets of Averroes and those of Aristotle.

Meanwhile, in 1497, Aristotle was for the first time expounded in Greek at Padua. Plato had long been the favourite study at Florence; and Humanists, like Erasmus, Ludovicus "Vives, and Nizolius, enamoured of the popular philosophy of Cicero and Quintilian, poured out the vials of their contempt on scholastic barbarism with its “impious and thrice-accursed Averroes.” The editors of Averroes complain that the popular taste had forsaken them for the Greek. Nevertheless, while Fallopius, Vesalius, and Galileo were claiming attention to their discoveries, the Professors Zabarella, Piccolomini, Pendasio, and Cremonini continued the traditions of Averroism, not without changes and additions. Cremonini, the last of them, died in 1631, after lecturing twelve years at Ferrara, and forty at Padua. The legend which tells that he laid aside his telescope rather than see Jupiter’s moons, which Galileo had discovered, is a parable of the fall of scholastic Averroism. Mediaevalism, with its misconstruction of Averroes, perished because it would not see that the interpretation of the past calls for the ripest knowledge of all discoveries in the present.

The literary works of Averroes include treatises on jurisprudence, grammar, astronomy, medicine, and philosophy. In 1859, a work of Averroes was for the first time published in Arabic by the Bavarian Academy, and a German translation appeared in 1875 by tho editor, J. Müller. It is a treatise entitled Philosophy and Theology, and, with the exception of a German version of the essay on the conjunction of the intellect with man, is the first translation which enables the non-Semitic scholar to form any adequate idea of Averroes. The Latin translations of most of his works are barbarous and obscure. A great part of his writings, particularly on jurisprudence and astronomy, as well as essays on special logical subjects, prolegomena to philosophy, criticisms on Avicenna and Alfarabius, remain in manuscript in the Escorial and other libraries. The Latin editions of his medical works include the Colliget (i.e., Kulliyyat, or summary), a résumé of medical science, and a commentary on· Avicenna’s poem on medicine; but Averroes, in medical renown, always stood far inferior to Avicenna. The Latin editions of his philosophical works comprise the Commentaries on Aristotle, tho Destructio Destructionis (against Algazali), the De Substantia Orbis, and a double treatise De AnimoεBeatitudine. The Commentaries of Averroes fall under three heads:—the larger commentaries, in which a paragraph is quoted at large, and its clauses expounded one by one; the medium commentaries, which cite only the first words of a section; and the paraphrases or analyses, treatises on the subjects of the Aristotelian books. The larger commentary was an innovation of Averroes; for...