MIRABEAU, HonoréGabriel Riqueti, Comte de, (1749-1791), one of the greatest statesmen and orators France has ever produced, was born at Bignon, near Nemours, on March 9, 1749. Μ. de Loménie has shown that the family of Biquet or Riqueti came originally from the little town of Digne, that they won wealth and municipal honours as merchants at Marseilles, and that in 1570 Jean Riqueti bought the chateau and estate of Mirabeau, which had up to that time belonged to the great Provençal family of Barras, and took the title of esquire a few years later. In 1685 Honoré Riqueti obtained the title of Marquis de Mirabeau, and his son Jean Antoine brought honour to it. He served with distinction through all the later campaigns of the reign of Louis XIV., and especially distinguished himself in 1705 at the battle of Cassano, where he was so severely wounded in the neck that he had ever after to wear a silver stock; yet he never rose above the rank of colonel, owing to his eccentric habit of speaking unpleasant truths to his superiors. On retiring from the service he married Françoise de Castellane, a remarkable woman, who long survived him, and he left at his death, in 1737, three sons —Victor, Marquis de Mirabeau (see next article), Jean Antoine, Bailli de Mirabeau, and Comte Louis Alexandre de Mirabeau. The great Mirabeau was the elder surviving son of the marquis. When but three years old he had a virulent attack of confluent small-pox which left his face for ever disfigured, and contributed not a little to nourish his father’s dislike to him. His early education was conducted by Lachabeaussière, father of the better known man of letters, after which, being like his father and grandfather destined for the army, then the only profession open to young men of family, he ...was entered at a pension militaire at Paris, kept by an Abbé Choquart. Of this school, which had Lagrange for its professor of mathematics, we have an amusing account in the life of Gilbert Elliot, first earl of Minto, who with his brother Hugh, afterwards British minister at Berlin, there made the acquaintance of Mirabeau, an acquaintance which soon ripened into friendship, and to which Mirabeau in later life owed his introduction into good English society. On leaving this school in 1767 he received a commission in the cavalry regiment of the Marquis de Lambert, which his grandfather had commanded years before. He at once began love making, and in spite of his ugliness succeeded in winning the heart of the lady to whom his colonel was attached, which led to such scandal that his father obtained a lettre de cachet, and the young scapegrace was imprisoned in the isle of Rhé. The love affairs of Mirabeau form quite a history by themselves, and a well-known history, owing to the celebrity of the letters to Sophie; and the behaviour of the marquis in perpetually imprisoning his son is equally well known, and as widely blamed. Yet it may be asserted that until the more durable and more reputable connexion with Madame de Nehra these love episodes were the most disgraceful blemishes in a life otherwise of a far higher moral character than has been commonly supposed. As to the marquis, his use of lettres de cachet is perfectly defensible on the theory of the existence of lettres de cachet at all. They were meant to be used (see Lettres de Cachet) by heads of families for the correction of their families, and Mirabeau, if any son, surely deserved such correction. Further, they did have the effect of sobering the culprit, and the more creditable part of his life did not begin till he left Vincennes. Mirabeau, it may be remarked at once, was not a statesman of the Alcibiades type, and he did not develop his great qualities of mind and character until his youthful excesses were over. These will be passed over as rapidly as possible, for it was not till 1781 that the qualities which made him great began to appear.
On being released frqm his first imprisonment, the young count, who had always intended to continue his military career, obtained leave to accompany as a volunteer the French expedition which was to effect the reduction of Corsica. The conquest was one of sheer numerical strength, for the whole population was on the side of Paoli, and Mirabeau, perceiving the value of public opinion, is said to have written a treatise on the oppression the Genoese had formerly exercised over the island, which the Government was ready to publish had not the Marquis de Mirabeau thought fit to destroy it because of its divergence from his own philosophical and economical views. For his services in Corsica Mirabeau was made a captain of dragoons, though not in any particular regiment, and on his return his father endeavoured to make use of the literary ability he had shown for the advancement of his own economical theories. He tried to keep on good terms with his father, though he could not advocate all his ideas, and even went so far in 1772 as to marry a rich heiress, a daughter of the Marquis de Marignane, whose alliance his father had procured for him. He did not live happily with her, and in 1774 was ordered into semi-exile in the country, at his father’s request, where he wrote his earliest extant work, the Essai sur le Despotisme. His violent disposition now led him to quarrel with a country gentleman who had insulted his sister, and his semi-exile was changed by lettre de cachet into imprisonment in the Chateau d’lf. In 1775 he was removed to the castle of Joux, to which, however, he was not very closely confined, having full leave to visit in the town of Pontarlier. Here he met Marie Thérèse de Monnier, his Sophie as he called her, a married woman, for whom he conceived a violent passion. Of his behaviour nothing too strong can be said: he was introduced into the house as a friend, and betrayed his trust by inducing Madame de Monnier to fall in love with him, and all his excuses about overwhelming passion only make his conduct more despicable. The affair ended by his escaping to Switzerland, where Sophie joined him; they then went to Holland, where he lived by hack-work for the booksellers; meanwhile Mirabeau had been condemned to death at Pontarlier for rapt et vol, of which he was certainly not guilty, as Sophie had followed him of her own accord, and in May 1777 he was seized by the French police, and imprisoned by a lettre de cachet in the castle of Vincennes. There he remained three years and a half, and with his release ends the first and most disgraceful period of his life. During his imprisonment he seems to have learnt to control his passions from their very exhaustion, for the early part of his confinement is marked by the indecent letters to Sophie (first published in 1793), and the obscene Erotica Biblion and Ma Conversion, while to the later months belongs his first political work of any value, the Lettres de Cachet. The Essai sur le Despotisme was an ordinary but at times eloquent declamation, showing in its illustrations a wide miscellaneous knowledge of history, but the Lettres de Cachet exhibits a more accurate knowledge of French constitutional history skilfully applied to an attempt to show that an existing actual grievance was not only philosophically unjust but constitutionally illegal. It shows, though still in rather a diffuse and declamatory form, that application of wide historical knowledge, keen philosophical perception, and genuine eloquence to a practical purpose which was the great characteristic of Mirabeau, both as a political thinker and as a statesman.
With his release from Vincennes begins the second period of Mirabeau’s life. He found that his Sophie was an idealized version of a rather common and ill-educated woman, and she speedily consoled herself with the affection of a young officer, after whose death she committed suicide. Mirabeau first set to work to get the sentence of death still hanging over him reversed, and by his eloquence not only succeeded but got Μ. de Monnier condemned in the costs of the whole law proceedings. From Pontarlier he went to Aix, where he claimed the court’s order that his wife should return to him. She naturally objected, but his eloquence would have won his case, even against Portalis, the leader of the Aix bar, had he not in his excitement accused his wife of infidelity, on which the court pronounced a decree of separation. He then with his usual impetuosity intervened in the suit pending between his father and mother before the parlement of Paris, and so violently attacked the ruling powers that he had to leave France and again go to Holland, and try to live by literary work. About this time began his connexion with Madame de Nehra, which sweetened the ensuing years of toil and brought out the better points of his character. She was the daughter of Zwier van Haren, a Dutch statesman and political writer, and was a woman of a far higher type than Sophie, more educated, more refined, and more capable of appreciating Mirabeau’s good points and helping him to control his passions. With her the lion became a lamb, and his life was strengthened by the love of his petite horde, Madame de Nehra, her baby son, afterwards Lucas de Montigny, and his little dog Chico. After a period of work in Holland he betook himself to England, where his treatise on Lettres de Cachet had been much admired, and where he was soon admitted into the best Whig literary and political society of London, through his old schoolfellow Gilbert Elliot, who had now inherited his father’s baronetcy and estates, and become a leading Whig member of parliament. Sir Gilbert introduced him freely, but of all his English friends none seem to have been so intimate with him as Lord Lansdowne, and Mr (afterwards Sir Samuel) Romilly. The latter became particularly attached to him, and really understood his character; and it is strange that his remarks upon Mirabeau in the fragment of autobiography which he left, and Mirabeau’s letters to him, should have been neglected by French writers. Romilly was introduced to Mirabeau by D’lvernois, and readily undertook to translate the Considerations on the Order of Cincinnatus. Romilly writes thus of him in his autobiography :—
“The count was difficult enough to please; he was sufficiently impressed with the beauties of the original. He went over every part of the translation with me, observed on every passage in which justice was not done to the thought or the force of the expression lost, and made many useful criticisms. During this occupation we had occasion to see one another often, and became very intimate; and, as he had read much, had seen a great deal of the world, was acquainted with all the most distinguished persons who at that time adorned either the royal court or the republic of letters in France, had a great knowledge of French and Italian literature, and possessed very good taste, his conversation was extremely interesting and not a little instructive. I had such frequent opportunities of seeing him at this time, and afterwards at a much more important period of his life, that I think his character was well known to me. I doubt whether it has been so well known to the world, and I am convinced that great injustice has been done him. This, indeed, is not surprising, when one considers that, from the first moment of his entering upon the career of an author, he had been altogether indifferent how numerous or how powerful might be the enemies he should provoke. His vanity was certainly excessive; but I have no doubt that, in his public conduct as well as in his writings, he was desirous of doing good, that his ambition was of the noblest kind, and that he proposed to himself the noblest ends. He was, however, like many of his countrymen, who were active in the calamitous Revolution which afterwards took place, not sufficiently scrupulous about the means by which those ends were to be accomplished. He indeed to some degree professed this; and more than once I have heard him say that there were occasions upon which ‘ la petite morale était ennemie de la grande. ’ It is not surprising that with such maxims as these in his mouth, unguarded in his expressions, and careless of his reputation, he should have afforded room for the circulation of many stories to his disadvantage. Violent, impetuous, conscious of the superiority of his talents, and the declared enemy and denouncer of every species of tyranny and oppression, he could not fail to shock the prejudices, to oppose the interests, to excite the jealousy, and to wound the pride of many descriptions of persons. A mode of refuting his works, open to the basest and vilest of mankind, was to represent him as a monster of vice and profligacy. A scandal once set on foot is strengthened and propagated by many, who have no malice against the object of it. They delight to talk of what is extraordinary; and what more extraordinary than a person so admirable for his talents and so contemptible for his conduct, professing in his writings principles so excellent and in all the offices of public and private life putting in practice those which are so detestable? I indeed possessed demonstrative evidence of the falsehood of some of the anecdotes which by men of high character were related to his prejudice.”— Life of Sir S. Romilly, vol. i. p. 58.
This luminous judgment, the best that is extant on the character of Mirabeau, deserved to be quoted at length; it must be noted that it was written by a man of acknowledged purity of life, who admired Mirabeau in early life, not when he was a statesman, but when he was only a struggling literary man. This close association with Romilly, and his friends Baynes, Trail, and Wilson, does credit to Mirabeau, and must have helped that moral revolution against his passions which was passing within him. He was a warm friend, and first made Romilly acquainted with Lord Lansdowne, and tried to get him a seat in parliament. Lord Lansdowne was himself an extraordinary man, and the first of the new Whigs might well feel sympathy with the statesman of the French Revolution. The Considérations sur Vordre de Cincinnatus which Romilly translated was the only important work Mirabeau wrote in the year 1785, and it is a good specimen of his method. He had read a pamphlet published in America attacking the proposed order, which was to form a bond of association between the officers who had fought in the American War of Independence against England; the arguments struck him as true and valuable, so he rearranged them in his own fashion, and rewrote them in his own oratorical style. He soon found such work not sufficiently remunerative to keep his “petite horde” in comfort, and then turned his thoughts to employment from the French foreign office either in writing or in diplomacy. He first sent Madame de Nehra to Paris to make his peace with the authorities, in which she was completely successful, and then returned himself, hoping to get employment through an old literary collaborateur of his, Durival, who was at this time director of the finances of the department of foreign affairs. One of the functions of this official was to subsidize political pamphleteers, and Mirabeau had hoped to be so employed, but he ruined his chances by a series of financial works. On his return to Paris he had bècome acquainted with Clavières, a Genevese exile, who was minister of finance during the Revolution, and who now introduced him to a banker named Panchaud. From them he heard plenty of abuse of stock-jobbing, and seizing their ideas he began to regard stock-jobbing, or agiotage, as the source of all evil, and to attack in his usual vehement style the Banque de St Charles and the Compagnie des Eaux. This was at least disinterested on his part, for, while his supporters were poor, the bankers he attacked were rich, and would gladly have bought his silence; but Mirabeau, though ever ready to take money for what he wrote, never sold his opinions, or wrote what he did not really believe. The very eloquence of his style rests upon the enthusiastic conviction that he himself was right, and those who differed from him were stupidly and wilfully wrong. This last pamphlet brought him into a controversy with Beaumarchais, who certainly did not get the best of it, but it lost him any chance of literary employment from Government. However, his ability was too great to be neglected by a great minister such as Μ. do Vergennes undoubtedly was, and after a preliminary tour in the early spring of 1786 he was despatched in Juno 1786 on a secret mission to the court of Prussia, from which he returned in January 1787, and of which he gavo a full account in his Histoire Secrète de la Cour de Berlin.
The months he spent at Berlin were important ones in the history of Prussia, for in them Frederick the Great died. The letters just mentioned show clearly what Mirabeau did and what he saw, and equally clearly how unfit he was to be a diplomatist; for, with all his knowledge of men and his influence over them, he thought (and showed he thought) too much of himself ever to be able to surprise their secret thoughts and intentions. He certainly failed to conciliate the new king Frederick William; and thus ended Mirabeau’s one attempt at diplomacy. During his journey he had made the acquaintance of a Major Mauvillon, whom he found possessed of a great number of facts and statistics with regard to Prussia; these he made use of in a great work on Prussia published in 1788, as Romilly says, to show that he could write more than a fugitive pamphlet. But, though his Monarchie Prussienne gave him a general reputation for historical learning, he had in this same year lost a chance of political employment. He had offered himself as a candidate for the office of secretary to the Assembly of Notables which the king had just convened, and to bring his name before the public published another financial work, the Dénonciation de ΓAgiotage, dedicated to the king and notables, which abounded in such violent diatribes that he not only lost his election, but was obliged to retire to Tongres; and he further injured his prospects by publishing the reports he had sent in during his secret mission at Berlin. But 1789 was at hand; the states-general was summoned; Mirabeau’s period of probation was over, and he was at last to have that opportunity of showing his great qualities both as statesman and orator on a worthy arena.
On hearing of the king’s determination to summon the states-general, Mirabeau started for Provence, and offered to assist at the preliminary conference of the noblesse of his district. They rejected him; he appealed to the tiers état, and was returned both for Aix and for Marseilles. He elected to sit for the former city, and was present at the opening of the states-general on May 4, 1789. From this time the record of Mirabeau’s life forms the best history of the first two years of the Constituent Assembly, for at every important crisis his voice is to be heard, though his advice was not always followed. It is impossible here to detail minutely the history of these two eventful years; it will be rather advisable to try and analyse the manner in which Mirabeau regarded passing events, and then show how his policy justifies our analysis.
Mirabeau possessed at the same time great logical acuteness and most passionate enthusiasm; he was therefore both a statesman and an orator, and the interest of the last two years of his life lies mainly in the gradual but decided victory of the statesmanlike and practical over the impulsive and oratorical qualities. From the beginning Mirabeau recognized that government exists in order that the bulk of the population may pursue their daily work in peace and quiet, and that for a Government to be successful it must be strong. In this practical view of the need of a strong executive lies one of Mirabeau’s greatest titles to the name of statesman. At the same time he thoroughly comprehended that for a Government to be strong it must be in harmony with the wishes of the majority of the people, and that the political system of Louis XIV. was now falling for lack of this. He had carefully studied the English constitution in England under...
[7,568 words — estimated reading time: 45 minutes]
A miracle, in the popular sense, is a prodigy, or an extraordinary event, which surprises us by its novelty. In a more accurate and philosophic sense, a miracle is an effect which does not follow from any of the regular laws of nature, or which is inconsistent with some known law of it, or contrary to the settled constitution and course of things. Accordingly, all miracles presuppose an established system of nature, within the limits of which they operate, and with the order of which they disagree. Of a miracle in the theological sense many definitions have been given. That of Dr. Samuel Clarke is: A miracle is a work effected in a manner unusual, or different from the common and regular method of providence, by the interposition of God himself, or of some intelligent agent superior to man, for the proof or evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation of the authority of some particular person.” Mr. Hume has insidiously or erroneously maintained that a miracle is contrary to experience; but in reality it is only different from experience. Experience informs us that one event has happened often; testimony informs us that another event has happened once or more. That diseases should be generally cured by the application of external causes, and sometimes at the mere word of a prophet, and without the visible application of causes, are facts not inconsistent with each other in the nature of things themselves, nor irreconcilable according to our ideas. Each fact may arise from its own proper cause; each may exist independently of the other; and each is known by its own proper proof, whether of sense or testimony. As secret causes often produce events contrary to those we do expect from experience, it is equally conceivable that events should sometimes be ...produced which we do not expect. To pronounce, therefore, a miracle to be false, because it is different from experience is only to conclude against its general existence from the very circumstance which constitutes its particular nature; for if it were not different from experience, where would be its singularity? or what particular proof could be drawn from it, if it happened according to the ordinary train of human events, or was included in the operation of the general laws of nature? We grant that it does differ from experience; but we do not presume to make our experience the standard of the divine conduct. He that acknowledges a God must, at least, admit the possibility of a miracle. The atheist, that makes him inseparable from what is called nature, and binds him to its laws by an insurmountable necessity; that deprives him of will, and wisdom, and power, as a distinct and independent Being; may deny even the very possibility of a miraculous interposition, which can in any instance suspend or counteract those general laws by which the world is governed. But he who allows of a First Cause in itself perfect and intelligent, abstractedly from those effects which his wisdom and power have produced, must at the same time allow that this cause can be under no such restraints as to be debarred the liberty of controlling its laws as often as it sees fit. Surely, the Being that made the world can govern it, or any part of it, in such a manner as he pleases; and he that constituted the very laws by which it is in general conducted, may suspend the operation of those laws in any given instance, or impress new powers on matter, in order to produce new and extraordinary effects. In judging of miracles there are certain criteria, peculiar to the subject, sufficient to conduct our inquiries, and warrant our determination. Assuredly they do not appeal to our ignorance, for they presuppose not only the existence of a general order of things, but our actual knowledge of the appearance which that order exhibits, and of the secondary material causes from which it, in most cases, proceeds. If a miraculous event were effected by the immediate hand of God, and yet bore no mark of distinction from the ordinary effects of his agency, it would impress no conviction, and probably awaken no attention. Our knowledge of the ordinary course of things, though limited, is real; and therefore it is essential to a miracle, both that it differ from that course, and be accompanied with peculiar and unequivocal signs of such difference. We have been told that the course of nature is fixed and unalterable, and therefore it is not consistent with the immutability of God to perform miracles. But, surely, they who reason in this manner beg the point in question. We have no right to assume that the Deity has ordained such general laws as will exclude his interposition; and we cannot suppose that he would forbear to interfere where any important end could be answered. This interposition, though it controls, in particular cases, the energy, does not diminish the utility, of those laws. It leaves them to fulfil their own proper purposes, and effects only a distinct purpose, for which they were not calculated. If the course of nature implies the general laws of matter and motion, into which the most opposite phenomena may be resolved, it is certain that we do not yet know them in their full extent; and, therefore, that events, which are related by judicious and disinterested persons, and at the same time imply no gross contradiction, are possible in themselves, and capable of a certain degree of proof. If the course of nature implies the whole order of events which God has ordained for the government of the world, it includes both his ordinary and extraordinary dispensations, and among them miracles may have their place, as a part of the universal plan. It is, indeed, consistent with sound philosophy, and not inconsistent with pure religion, to acknowledge that they might be disposed by the supreme Being at the same time with the more ordinary effects of his power; that their causes and occasions might be arranged with the same regularity; and that, in reference chiefly to their concomitant circumstances of persons and times, to the specific ends for which they were employed, and to our idea of the immediate necessity there is for a divine agent, miracles would differ from common events, in which the hand of God acts as efficaciously, though less visibly. On this consideration of the subject, miracles, instead of contradicting nature, might form a part of it. But what our limited reason and scanty experience may comprehend should never be represented as a full and exact view of the possible or actual varieties which exist in the works of God.
If we be asked whether miracles are credible, we reply, that, abstractedly considered, they are not incredible; that they are capable of indirect proof from analogy, and of direct, from testimony; that in the common and daily course of worldly affairs, events, the improbability of which, antecedently to all testimony, was very great, are proved to have happened, by the authority of competent and honest witnesses; that the Christian miracles were objects of real and proper experience to those who saw them; and that whatsoever the senses of mankind can perceive, their report may substantiate. Should it be asked whether miracles were necessary, and whether the end proposed to be effected by them could warrant so immediate and extraordinary an interference of the Almighty, as such extraordinary operations suppose; to this we might answer, that, if the fact be established, all reasonings _à priori_ concerning their necessity must be frivolous, and may be false. We are not capable of deciding on a question which, however simple in appearance, is yet too complex in its parts, and too extensive in its object, to be fully comprehended by the human understanding. Whether God could or could not have effected all the ends designed to be promoted by the Gospel, without deviating from the common course of his providence, and interfering with its general laws, is a speculation that a modest inquirer would carefully avoid; for it carries on the very face of it a degree of presumption totally unbecoming the state of a mortal being. Infinitely safer is it for us to acquiesce in what the Almighty has done, than to embarrass our minds with speculations about what he might have done. Inquiries of this kind are generally inconclusive, and always useless. They rest on no solid principles, are conducted by no fixed rules, and lead to no clear conviction. They begin from curiosity or vanity, they are prosecuted amidst ignorance and error, and they frequently terminate in impious presumption or universal skepticism. God is the best and indeed the only judge how far miracles are proper to promote any particular design of his providence, and how far that design would have been left unaccomplished, if common and ordinary methods only had been pursued. So, from the absence of miracles, we may conclude, in any supposed case, that they were not necessary; from their existence, supported by fair testimony, in any given case, we may infer with confidence that they are proper. A view of the state of the world in general, and of the Jewish nation in particular, and an examination of the nature and tendency of the Christian religion, will point out very clearly the great expediency of a miraculous interposition; and when we reflect on the gracious and important ends that were to be effected by it, we shall be convinced that it was not an idle and useless display of divine power; but that while the means effected and confirmed the end, the end fully justified and illustrated the means. If we reflect on the almost irresistible force of prejudice, and the strong opposition it universally made to the establishment of a new religion on the demolition of rites and ceremonies, which authority had made sacred, and custom had familiarized; if we reflect on the extent and importance, as well as the singularity, of the Christian plan; what was its avowed purpose to effect, and what difficulties it was necessarily called to struggle with before that purpose could be effected; how much it was opposed by the opinions and the practice of the generality of mankind, by philosophy, by superstition, by corrupt passions and inveterate habits, by pride and sensuality, in short, by every engine of human influence, whether formed by craft, or aided by power;--if we seriously reflect on these things, and give them their due force, (and experience shows us that we can scarcely give them too much,) we shall be induced to admit even the necessity of a miraculous interposition, at a time when common means must inevitably, in our apprehensions, have failed of success. The revelation of the divine will by inspired persons is, as such, miraculous; and therefore, before the adversaries of the Gospel can employ with propriety their objections to the particular miracles on which its credibility is based, they should show the impossibility of any revelation. In whatever age the revelation is given, succeeding ages can know it only from testimony; and, if they admit, on the report of their fellow creatures, that God had inspired any being with the preternatural knowledge of his will, why should they deny that he had enabled the same being to heal the sick, or to cleanse the leprous? How, may it be asked, should the divine Teacher give a more direct and consistent proof of his preternatural commission, than by displaying those signs and wonders which mark the finger of God? That the Apostles could not be deceived, and that they had no temptation to deceive, has been repeatedly demonstrated. So powerful, indeed, is the proof adduced in support of their testimony, that the infidels of these later days have been obliged to abandon the ground on which their predecessors stood; to disclaim all moral evidences arising from the character and relation of eye-witnesses; and to maintain, upon metaphysical, rather than historical, principles, that miracles are utterly incapable, in their own nature, of existing in any circumstances, or of being supported by any evidence. Miracles may be classed under two heads: those which consist in a train or combination of events, which distinguish themselves from the ordinary arrangements of Providence; and those particular operations which are performed by instruments and agents incompetent to effect them without a preternatural power. In the conduct of Providence respecting the Jewish people, from the earliest periods of their existence, as a distinct class of society, to the present time, we behold a singularity of circumstance and procedure which we cannot account for on common principles. Comparing their condition and situation with that of other nations, we can meet with nothing similar to it in the history of mankind. So remarkable a difference, conspicuous in every revolution of their history, could not have subsisted through mere accident. There must have been a cause adequate to so extraordinary an effect. Now, what should this cause be, but an interposition of Providence in a manner different from the course of its general government? For the phenomenon cannot be explained by an application of those general causes and effects that operate in other cases. The original propagation of Christianity was likewise an event which clearly discovered a miraculous interposition. The circumstances which attended it were such as cannot rationally be accounted for on any other postulatum. (See the article _Christianity_.) It may now be observed, that the institutions of the law and the Gospel may not only appeal for their confirmation to a train of events which, taken in a general and combined view, point out an extraordinary designation, and vindicate their claim to a divine authority; but also to a number of particular operations which, considered distinctly, or in a separate and detached light, evidently display a supernatural power, immediately exerted on the occasion. Since Christ himself constantly appealed to these works as the evidences of his divine mission and character, we may briefly examine how far they justified and confirmed his pretensions. That our Lord laid the greatest stress on the evidence they afforded; nay, that he considered that evidence as sufficient to authenticate his claims to the office of the Messiah with all reasonable and well disposed inquirers, is manifest not only from his own words, John x, 25, but also from a great variety of other passages in the evangelists. Thus, when the disciples of John were sent to Christ, to receive from his own lips the most satisfactory proofs of his divine mission, he referred them to his miracles. Go,” said he, and show to John again those things which ye hear and see: the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up,” Matt. xi, 4, 5. Again: If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not: but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works,” John x, 37. This appeal to miracles was founded on the following just and obvious grounds:-- First: That they are visible proofs of divine approbation, as well as of divine power: for it would have been quite inconclusive to rest an appeal on the testimony of the latter, if it had not at the same time included an evidence of the former; and it was, indeed a natural inference, that working of miracles, in defence of a particular cause, was the seal of Heaven to the truth of that cause. To suppose the contrary, would be to suppose that God not only permitted his creatures to be deceived, but that he deviated from the ordinary course of his providence, purposely with a view to deceive them. The conclusion which the man whom our Saviour restored to sight drew from this miracle was exceedingly just, and founded on the common sentiments and impressions of the human heart. We know,” says he, that God heareth not sinners: but if any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he heareth. Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing,” John ix, 31–33. If the cause which our Saviour was engaged in had not been approved of by God, it would not have been honoured with the seal of miracles: for the divine power can never be supposed to counteract the divine will. This would be to set his nature at variance with itself; and, by destroying his simplicity, would destroy his happiness, and terminate in confusion and misery. Hence we may justly reject, as incredible, those miracles which have been ascribed to the interposition of wicked spirits. The possibility of their interference is a mere hypothesis, depending upon gratuitous assumption, and leading to very dangerous consequences; and the particular instances in which credulous superstition, or perverted philosophy, has supposed them to interfere, are, as facts, destitute of any clear and solid evidence; or, as effects, often resolvable into natural causes. Secondly: When our Lord appealed to his miracles, as proofs of his divine mission, it presupposed that those miracles were of such a nature as would bear the strictest examination; that they had all those criteria which could possibly distinguish them from the delusions of enthusiasm, and the artifices of imposture; else the appeal would have been fallacious and equivocal. He appealed to them with all the confidence of an upright mind, totally possessed with a consciousness of their truth and reality. This appeal was not drawn out into any laboured argument, nor adorned by any of the embellishments of language. It was short, simple, and decisive. He neither reasoned nor declaimed on their nature or their design: he barely pointed to them as plain and indubitable facts, such as spoke their own meaning, and carried with them their own authority. The miracles which our Lord performed were too public to be suspected of imposture; and, being objects of sense, they were secured against the charge of enthusiasm. An impostor would not have acted so absurdly as to have risked his credit on the performance of what, he must have known, it was not in his power to effect; and though an enthusiast, from the warmth of imagination, might have flattered himself with a full persuasion of his being able to perform some miraculous work; yet, when the trial was referred to an object of sense, the event must soon have exposed the delusion. The impostor would not have dared to say to the blind, Receive thy sight; to the deaf, Hear; to the dumb, Speak; to the dead, Arise; to the raging of the sea, Be still; lest he should injure the credit of his cause, by undertaking more than he could perform; and though the enthusiast, under the delusion of his passions, might have confidently commanded disease to fly, and the powers of nature to be subject to his control; yet their obedience would not have followed his command. The miracles of Christ then were such as an impostor would not have attempted, and such as an enthusiast could not have effected. They had no disguise; and were in a variety of instances of such a nature as to preclude the very possibility of collusion. They were performed in the midst of his bitterest enemies; and were so palpable and certain, as to extort the following acknowledgment even from persons who were most eager to oppose his doctrines, and to discredit his pretensions: This man doeth many miracles. If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him,” John xi, 47, 48. The miracles Christ performed were indeed sufficient to alarm the fears of those whose downfall was involved in his success. And it was impossible for them to deny the facts, which so many thousands were ready to attest on evidence too certain to admit even the possibility of mistake, delusion, or imposture. But his enemies, who admitted their reality and yet resisted their design, by not acknowledging the person who wrought them to be the Messiah, had recourse to the most impious and most absurd suppositions, in order to evade their evidence. The Heathen imputed them to some occult power of magic: and thus applied what has no existence in nature, in order to account for a phenomenon that existed out of its common course. The stories of the Jews, who confessed the miracles, but denied what they were intended to establish, are too ridiculous to be mentioned. We must not, however, omit to take notice of the wicked and blasphemous cavil of the Pharisees, and the noble reply which our Lord made to it. They could not deny the fact, but they imputed it to the agency of an infernal spirit: This fellow,” said they, doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils. And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand: and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself; how shall then his kingdom stand?” Matt. xii, 24–26. The purity of the doctrine which was taught by our blessed Lord was totally adverse to the kingdom of darkness. It tended to overthrow it, by the introduction of principles far different from those which Satan would inspire, and by prosecuting objects totally opposite to those which that wicked and malignant spirit would tempt us to pursue: so that in proportion to the prevalence of the kingdom of Christ, the kingdom of Satan would of course be diminished. Now, supposing miracles to be in the power of an infernal spirit, can it be imagined that he would communicate an ability of performing them to persons who were counteracting his designs? Would he by them give credit to a cause that tended to bring his own into disgrace? Thus, as our Saviour appealed to miracles as proofs of his power; so he appealed to the inherent worth and purity of the doctrines they were intended to bear witness to, as a proof that the power was of God. In this manner do the external and internal evidences give and receive mutual confirmation and mutual lustre. The truth of the Christian religion does not, however, wholly depend on the miracles wrought by its divine Founder, though sufficient in themselves to establish his claims: but, in order to give the evidence of miracles the strongest force they could possibly acquire, that evidence was extended still farther; and the same power that our Lord possessed was communicated to his disciples, and their more immediate successors. While yet on earth he imparted to them this extraordinary gift, as the seal of their commission, when he sent them to preach the Gospel: and after his glorious resurrection and ascension into heaven, they were endowed with powers yet more stupendous. Sensible of the validity of this kind of evidence, the Apostles of our Lord, with the same artless simplicity, and the same boldness of conscious integrity, which distinguished their great Master, constantly insisted upon the miracles they wrought, as strong and undeniable proofs of the truth of their doctrines. Thus the miracles of our blessed Lord may be justly considered as the evidence of his divine mission and character. If we consider their nature, their greatness, and their number; and if to this consideration we add that which respects their end and design, we must acknowledge that no one could have performed them, unless God was with him. They were too public to be the artifices of imposture; too substantial and too numerous to afford the slightest suspicion of undesigned and fortuitous coincidence. In a word, supposing that the Most High should in any instance so far counteract the common laws of nature, as to produce a miracle; and should design that miracle as a monument to future times of the truth of any peculiar doctrine, we cannot conceive any mode of communicating it more effectual than that which he has chosen. Stronger proofs could not be afforded, consistently with the design of the Gospel, which is not to overpower our understandings by an irresistible and compulsory light, but to afford us such rational evidence as is sufficient to satisfy moral inquirers, who are endowed with faculties to perceive the truth; but at the same time who also have power totally to resist it, and finally to forfeit all its blessings. These miracles were of a nature too palpable to be mistaken. They were the objects of sense, and not the precarious speculations of reason concerning what God might do; or the chimerical suggestions of fancy concerning what he did. The facts were recorded by those who must have known whether they were true or false. The persons who recorded them were under no possible temptations to deceive the world. We can only account for their conduct on the supposition of their most perfect conviction and disinterested zeal. That they should assert what they knew to be false; that they should publish it with so much ardour; that they should risk every thing dear to humanity, in order to maintain it; and at last submit to death, in order to attest their persuasion of its truth in those moments when imposture usually drops its mask, and enthusiasm loses its confidence; that they should act thus in opposition to every dictate of common sense, and every principle of common honesty, every restraint of shame, and every impulse of selfishness, is a phenomenon not less irreconcilable to the moral state of things than miracles are to the natural constitution of the world. Falsehood naturally entangles men in contradiction, and confounds them with dismay: but the love of truth invigorates the mind; the consciousness of integrity anticipates the approbation of God; and conscience creates a fortitude, to which mere unsupported nature is often a stranger.
How long miracles were continued in the church, has been a matter of keen dispute, and has been investigated with as much anxiety as if the truth of the Gospel depended upon the manner in which it was decided. Assuming, as we are here warranted to do, that real miraculous power was conveyed in the way detailed by the inspired writers, it is plain, that it may have been exercised in different countries, and may have remained, without any new communication of it, throughout the first, and a considerable part of the second century. The Apostles, wherever they went to execute their commission, would avail themselves of the stupendous gift which had been imparted to them; and it is clear, not only that they were permitted and enabled to convey it to others, but that spiritual gifts, including the power of working miracles, were actually conferred on many of the primitive disciples. Allusions to this we find in the epistles of St. Paul; such allusions, too, as it is utterly inconceivable that any man of a sound judgment could have made, had he not known that he was referring to an obvious fact, about which there could be no hesitation. Of the time at which several of the Apostles died, we have no certain knowledge. St. Peter and St. Paul suffered at Rome about A. D. 66, or 67; and it is fully established, that the life of John was much longer protracted, he having died a natural death, A. D. 100, or 101. Supposing that the two former of these Apostles imparted spiritual gifts till the time of their suffering martyrdom, the persons to whom they were imparted might, in the course of nature, have lived through the earlier part of the second century; and if John did the same till the end of his life, such gifts as were derived from him might have remained till more than the half of that century had elapsed. That such was the fact, is asserted by ancient ecclesiastical writers. Whether, after the generation immediately succeeding the Apostles had passed away, the power of working miracles was anew communicated, is a question, the solution of which cannot be nearly so satisfactory. The probability is, that there was no such renewal; and this opinion rests upon the ground that natural causes were now sufficient to accomplish the end for which miracles were originally designed; and it does not appear to have been any part of the scheme of the blessed Author of our religion, that, solely for the purpose of hastening that conversion of the nations which might gradually be accomplished, miracles should be wrought, when these could be of no use in establishing after ages in the faith.
[1,119 words — estimated reading time: 7 minutes]
CONCEPTION. By this is meant, that the human nature of Jesus Christ was formed, not in the ordinary method of generation, but out of the substance of the Virgin Mary, by the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost. The evidence upon which this article of the Christian faith rests is found in Matt. i, 18–23, and in the more particular narration which St. Luke has given in the first chapter of his Gospel. If we admit this evidence of the fact, we can discern the emphatical meaning of the appellation given to our Saviour when he is called the seed of the woman,” Gen. iii, 15; we can perceive the meaning of a phrase which St. Luke has introduced into the genealogy of Jesus, Luke iii, 23, and of which, otherwise, it is not possible to give a good account, ων, ὡς ενομιζετο, ὑιος Ιωσηφ; [being, as was supposed, the son of Joseph;] and we can discover a peculiar significancy in an expression of the Apostle Paul, Gal. iv, 4, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman.” The conception of Jesus is the point from which we date the union between his divine and human nature; and, this conception being miraculous, the existence of the person in whom they are united, was not physically derived from Adam. But, as Dr. Horsley speaks in his sermon on the incarnation, the union with the uncreated Word is the very principle of personality and individual existence in the son of Mary. According to this view of the matter, the miraculous conception gives a completeness and consistency to the revelation concerning Jesus Christ. Not only is he the Son of God, but, as the Son of man, he is exalted above his brethren, while he is made like them. He is preserved from the contamination adhering to the race whose nature he assumed; and when the only begotten Son, who is in ...the bosom of the Father, was made flesh, the intercourse which, as man, he had with God, is distinguished, not in degree only, but in kind, from that which any prophet ever enjoyed, and it is infinitely more intimate, because it did not consist in communications occasionally made to him, but arose from the manner in which his human nature had its existence.
[383 words — estimated reading time: 3 minutes]
MIRAGE. See Light, vol. xiv. p. 600.
[7 words — estimated reading time: 1 minute]
MIRAMON, Miguel, a Mexican soldier of French extraction, was born in the city of Mexico, September 29, 1832, and shot along with the emperor Maximilian at Queretaro, June 19, 1867. While still a student he helped to defend the military academy at Chapultepec against the forces of the United States; and, entering the army in 1852, he rapidly came to the front during the civil wars that disturbed the country. It was largely due to Miramon’s support of the ecclesiastical party against Alvarez and Comonfort that Zuloagawas raised to the presidency; and in 1859 he was called to succeed him in that office. Decisively beaten, however, by the Liberals, he fled the country in 1860, and spent some time in Europe earnestly advocating foreign intervention in Mexican affairs; and when he returned it was as a partisan of Maximilian. His ability as a soldier was best shown by his double defence of Puebla in 1856.
[156 words — estimated reading time: 1 minute]
MIRANDA, Francesco (1754-1816), was born at Santa Fé in New Granada in 1754. He entered the army, and served against the English in the American War of Independence. The success of that war inspired him with a hope of being the Washington of his own country, and a belief that the independence of Spanish America would increase its material prosperity. With these views he began to scheme a revolution, but his schemes were discovered and he had only just time to escape to the United States. Thence he went to England, where he was introduced to Pitt, but chiefly lived with the leading members of the opposition—Fox, Sheridan, and Romilly. Finding no help in his revolutionary schemes, he travelled over the greater part of Europe, notably through Austria and Turkey, till he arrived at the court of Russia, where he was warmly received, but from which he was dismissed, though with rich presents, at the demand of the Spanish ambassador, backed up by the envoy of France. The news of the dispute between England and Spain about Nootka Sound in 1790 recalled him to England, where he saw a good deal of Pitt, who had determined to make use of him to “insurge” the Spanish colonies, but the peaceful arrangement of the dispute again destroyed his hopes. In April 1792 he went to Paris, with introductions to Pétion and the leading Girondists, hoping that men who were working so hard for their own freedom might help his countrymen in South America. France had too much to do in fighting for its own freedom to help others; but Miranda’s friends sent him to the front with the rank of general of brigade. He distinguished himself under Dumouriez, was intrusted in February 1793 with the conduct of the siege of Maestricht, and commanded the left wing of the French army at the disastrous ...battle of Neerwinden. Although he had given notice of Dumouriez’s projected treachery, he was put on his trial for treason on May 12. He was unanimously acquitted, but was soon again thrown into prison, and not released till after the 9th Thermidor. He again mingled in politics, and was sentenced to be deported after the struggle of Vendémiaire. Yet he escaped, and continued in Paris til) the coup d’état of Fructidor caused him finally to take refuge in England. He now found Pitt and Dundas once more ready to listen to him, and the latter sent a special minute to Colonel Picton, the governor of Trinidad, to assist General Miranda’s schemes in every possible way; but, as neither of them would or could give him substantial help, he went to the United States, where President Adams gave him fair words but nothing more. Once more he returned to England, where Addington might have done something for him but for the signature of the peace of Amiens in 1802. At the peace, though in no way amnestied, he returned to Paris, but was promptly expelled by the First Consul, who was then eager to be on good terms with the court of Spain. Disappointed in further efforts to get assistance from England and the United States, he decided to make an attempt on his own responsibility and at his own expense. Aided by two American citizens, Colonel Smith and Mr Ogden, he equipped a small ship, the “Leander,” in 1806, and with the help of the English admiral Sir A. Cochrane made a landing near Carâcas, and proclaimed the Colombian republic. He had some success, and would have had more had not a false report of peace between France and England caused the English admiral to withdraw his support. At last in 1810 came his opportunity; the events in Spain which brought about the Peninsular War had divided the authorities in Spanish America, some of whom declared for Joseph Bonaparte, others for Ferdinand VII., while others again held to Charles IV. At this moment Miranda again landed, and had no difficulty in getting a large party together who declared a republic both in Venezuela and New Granada or Colombia. But Miranda’s desire that all the South American colonies should rise, and a federal republic be formed, awoke the selfishness and pride of individual provincial administrations, and thus weakened the cause, which further was believed to be hateful to heaven owing to a great earthquake on March 26, 1812. The count of Monte Verde, the Bourbon governor, had little difficulty in defeating the dispirited forces of Miranda, and on July 26 the general capitulated on condition that he should be deported to the United States. The condition was not observed; Miranda was moved from dungeon to dungeon, and died in 1816 at Cadiz.
There are allusions to Miranda’s early life in nearly all memoirs of the time, but they are not generally very accurate. For his trial see Bûchez et Roux, Histoire Parlementaire, xxvii. 26-70. For his later life see Biggs, History of Miranda's Attempt in South America, London, 1809; and Veggasi, Revolucion de la Columbia.
[849 words — estimated reading time: 5 minutes]
