The art of war divides itself into two distinct branches —the first relating to the military institutions of nations, the manner in which armies are raised, their composition, characteristics, organisation, and government; the second to their employment in war. The first, commonly known as the administration or organisation of armies, is that of which this article treats. A modern army is a vast and complicated machine, so constructed that the whole aggregate force of its numerous parts may be exerted in any direction and on any point required. It is our province to describe this machine in a state of rest, explaining the construction, purpose, and combination of its several parts, but leaving its action to be treated of elsewhere (see War).

In the earliest stage of civilisation the army is identical with the tribe or nation. Every man is a warrior; even women and children accompany the expeditions, prepare and carry food, and bear such share as they are fitted for. In more settled communities the able-bodied men only take the field, while the women, the children, and the aged remain at home to watch the herds and till the fields. Production is still so small that no division of duties among the men is necessary. The armies consist of the whole male population, collected under their chiefs and hearts of families, or under warriors who have specially distinguished themselves. Such were some of the earliest armies mentioned in history, and such are still the armies of the savage nations with whom our colonial empire brings us in contact,—well fitted for petty warfare between neighbouring tribes or nations, when the assailants confine themselves to raids for plunder and captives, but not for distant expeditions or prolonged operations. As population and industry increase, a division of labour becomes both possible and necessary. A select portion of the inhabitants are specially devoted to military service, either permanently 01 for a time, while the remainder give undivided attention to pacific pursuits. Standing armies and permanent organisation are thus introduced, and lead to improvements in administration and progress in the art of war, till finally we attain to the perfection of modern organisation.

History points to Egypt as the first country in which a regular military organisation was established, and the warrior class, as such, distinguished from the rest of the population. By its earliest laws the revenues of the state were divided into three equal parts, of which one went to the priests, one to the king, and one to the warriors. Sesostris seems to have been the great military organiser of Egypt. Trained by his father from childhood to war, he early distinguished himself in military expeditions against the Arabians and against Lybia, and mounted the throne with visions of universal conquest. To pave the way for such schemes, he gave Egypt a military organisation, dividing it into thirty-six provinces, and establishing a militia or warrior class, called Kalasires and Harmatopoii, to each of whom was allotted land sufficient for the maintenance of himself and his family. These formed the nucleus of the vast army, amounting, according to Diodorus Siculus, to 600,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war chariots, with which he undertook the conquest of the world. We read that the command of this army was given to the companions of the king, who, like himself, had been trained to arms under his father, and that a strict discipline was maintained and a military code established which forbade corporal punishment, appealing to the higher instincts of the soldier; but of the details of organisation and administration by which so vast an army was moved and fed we can learn little. With this army, aided by a powerful fleet, Sesostris first subdued Ethiopia, and then extended his conquests eastward as far as the Ganges; thence turning northwards and westwards, he swept over the Punjab, the table-land of Tartary, and the north shores of the Caspian, and descended through Sarmatia and Dacia into Thrace. Finally, he overran Asia Minor, and having conquered the Assyrian empire and seated himself, on the throne of Ninus and Semiramis, returned in triumph to Egypt after a nine years’ absence, and devoted the rest of his life to the peace and prosperity of his kingdom. Such are the accounts handed down by the ancient historians; and if any faith is to be attached to tnem, it seems clear that he did actually raise and maintain large armies, and with them carry out prolonged and distant expeditions, extending over several years, without interrupting the industry and progress of his own country— facts which in themselves prove a high degree of national and military organisation.

The martial spirit of Egypt, however, seems to have expired with its first and greatest conqueror, and as a nation it has distinguished itself in the arts of peace rather than those of war: the country became the prey of conquerors and the battle-field of other nations, and the palm of military supremacy passed successively into the hands of the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Medes, and the Persians. The first two nations present no special features in their military systems; their armies, like those of Egypt, consisted mainly of infantry, horsemen and chariots forming but a small though highly-prized element. But the Persian empire introduces us to a more highly developed military organisation, and a Bystem of standing armio closely resembling those of modern times. Drawn from a hardy and nomadic race, its armies at first consisted mainly of cavalry, and owed much of their success to the consequent ease and rapidity of their movements. Constantly extending their power by fresh conquests, the warlike Persians established themselves as garrisons in the subjected provinces, gladly exchanging their own barren mountain lands for these rich and fertile countries, and for some time remained a distinctly conquering and military race. Their empire attained its highest power under Cyrus and Cambyses; the former, the founder of the great Persian empire, uniting on his head the crowns of Babylon, Media, and Persia, while the latter still further extended the empire by the conquest of Egypt. Cyrus seems to have been the founder of that complete military organisation of which we gather details from Xenophon and other writers. To each province of the empire was allotted a certain number of soldiers as garrison or standing army. These troops, formed originally of native Persians only, were called the king’s troops. They comprised two classes: the one devoted exclusively to garrisoning the fortified towns and castles, the other distributed throughout the country. To each province was appointed a military commander, responsible for the number and efficiency of the troops in his district; while the satrap, a civil governor, was answerable for their subsistence and pay. Annual musters of these troops were held either by the king in person or by generals deputed for the purpose, and invested with full powers. This organisation seems to have fully answered its original purpose, that of holding a vast empire acquired by conquest, and promptly repelling inroads or putting down insurrections. But when a great foreign war was contemplated, the standing army was augmented by a levy throughout the empire, and each province and tributary nation furnished its quota of men, horses, and provisions. The extent of the empire made such a levy a matter of time. Thus the preparations for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes took three w hole years; and the heterogeneous and unorganised mass of men of all nations so brought together was a source of weakness rather than strength. That the warlike Persians, whose reputation rose so high under Cyrus, who were distinguished for their powers of endurance, and a daring courage which despised stratagem and delighted in single combats, should within a century have failed so disgracefully against the Greeks, has often been matter of wonder. Something, doubtless, was due to the fact that their reputation was won over effeminate races,* very different from their later antagonists; something also to the degeneracy induced among themselves by years of success and luxury. But it must also be borne in mind that the vast hosts over which the Greeks gained such easy victories comprised but a very small proportion of the true Persians—of the race which had given Cyrus his conquests. The cavalry alone seems to have retained its national character, and with it something of its high reputation, even to the days of Alexander. Nevertheless, the first contact between the Asiatic and the Greek proved that the crown of military glory had passed to the western nation.

The earliest knowledge we have of the military institutions of the Greeks is derived from the pages of Homer. They are glimpses only that we obtain, but they suffice to distinguish many of their characteristics. Their compact formations and subordination and silence in the ranks are contrasted with the looser formation and noisy attacks of the Trojans. Their armies consisted almost entirely of infantry. The leaders fought either on foot, like the rest, or from chariots; and single combats between the chiefs on the two sides were common, and often served to open the battle. We have sketched for us the traits of a hardy, independent, enterprising race, sometimes cruel and quarrelsome, but gallant, high-spirited, and intelligent, and well fitted to become distinguished as soldiers. How these qualities were developed, till the Greek armies and Greek tactics acquired a renown which has lasted to our day, we learn from the laws of Lycurgus and Solon, and from the ample details handed down by Xenophon, Thucydides, and other historians.

By the laws of Athens every free man was liable to military service. It was not only his duty but his distinction and privilege. The slave worked, the freeman devoted his time to military exercises and to the gymnasium. At eighteen his name was enrolled on the list of fighting men; for two years his duties were confined to home service, and especially to the guarding of Athens; from his twentieth to his fortieth year he was liable to service wherever the good of the state might require. The collectors of taxes, the singers at some theatres, and a few others, were alone exempted. The only privilege granted to the wealthy was that of serving in the cavalry. The infantry, of which the army was mainly composed, consisted of three classes. First were the heavy troops, “hoplitai,” armed with a spear, a dagger, a corslet, and a large oval shield. These formed the phalanx or main line of battle, and were composed entirely of free citizens, natives of Attica. Secondly, the light troops, “psiloi,” armed with javelins, but carrying little defensive armour, and no shields. These were destined for skirmishing and covering the movements of the phalanx, and were mostly slaves, who followed their masters, serving among the “hoplitai,” to war. Thirdly, there were “gumnetai,” or irregular light troops, carrying no defensive armour, but provided with javelins, bows and arrows, and slings, to harass the enemy; these usually consisted of slaves or foreign troops. Besides these there was another class, “peltastai,” so called from the light shield or target (pelta) which they carried, and intermediate between thp “hoplitai” and “psiloi.” 1 The cavalry consisted entirely of the wealthier Athenians, and was intelligent and enterprising. Each of the tribes of Athens had its own military commander, chosen from itself, and elected for the year only; and an Athenian army thus obeyed ten chiefs (“strategoi ”) of equal rank. These commanded by turns for the day, while the ten together formed a council of war to consult and decide in cases of emergency. Practically the inconvenience of such a system was obviated by leaving nine of the ten behind, or by the appointment of a “polemarch,” a sort of permanent chief of the staff, who carried great weight in the councils.

The Spartans owed much of their specially soldierly qualities to the institutes of Lycurgus, which had for their aim to form a nation of warriors, and develop to the utmost those physical and moral qualities which render men invincible. Discipline, unquestioning obedience, uncomplaining endurance, and contempt of danger, were the principles inculcated on the young Spartan from his earliest years, while his body was strengthened by every exercise and trained to every fatigue. As with the Athenians, military service was the first duty of every citizen of Sparta. The age of enrolment was twenty instead of eighteen; but the service lasted till sixty, and was more severe. In peace as in war, the Spartan lived as if in presence of the enemy. War time was, indeed, his relaxation, for he was then accompanied by slaves, carriages, and beasts of burden, and relieved of every labour or fatigue, to keep him fresh for battle. Cavalry was held in disremite in Süarta: their infantrv was formed 1 The distinction between the psiloi and the peltαstαi is not clear, and it would almost seem that they were the same class of troops, the first name being applied to them when used as light troops, the second when formed, in close order and attached to the phalanx.

in five “moras,” or regiments, corresponding to the five tribes; later, a sixth, which included a small force of cavalry, was added. The armies were usually commanded by the kings of Sparta; when one only was formed, one king remained at home. The king was accompanied by a bodyguard, comprising the winners of the prizes at the athletic games, and had attached to him two polemarchs, or chief staff officers, and three administrative officers, who relieved him of all care of details, leaving him free to devote his mind to the great task of his command.

The phalanx, formed of the Jωplitai, or heavy-armed infantry, drawn up eight deep, was the basis of all Greek tactics. The Spartan and Athenian phalanx differed slightly in interior organisation and subdivision, but the general principles were the same. For marching and manoeuvring the ranks stood at open order, that is, 6 feet apart; for attack at close order, or 3 feet apart; and for defence at locked order, or 1∣ feet apart. The number of men in each phalanx, and the number of phalanxes into which the battle-array was divided, varied according to circumstances; but from 2000 to 4000 seems to have been the usual strength of a phalanx. The peltastai and light troops and the cavalry formed round or in rear of the phalanx; the light troops remaining in front and harassing the enemy till the actual moment of collision, and then falling back to the flanks or rear. In counting the forces engaged in a battle, it was usual to reckon only the hoplitai, who answered to the knights and men-at-arms of the Middle Ages; but the peltastai and light troops generally equalled, and often considerably exceeded, the former in numbers. The Athenian phalanx was less compact than that of Sparta, but more formidable in its attack, the offensive being best suited to the national character of the former, while the passive courage and endurance of the latter shone especially in the defensive. At Marathon and in subsequent battles the Athenians advanced to the attack at a run, while the advance of the Spartans was always deliberate and slow. The Thebans, under the direction of Epaminondas, modified the phalanx, forming it on a narrower front, with greater depth, and the soldiers standing so close in the ranks that they could not turn. This gave more weight at the point of impact, and the Theban column of attack, fifty deep" crushed the Lacedemonian phalanx, only eight deep, when opposed to it at Leuctra and Mantinaea. Xenophon compares the effect to that of a heavy vessel striking a light one amidships with her bow, and dashing her to pieces by the collision. The Macedonian phalanx was a combination and adaptation of the various earlier Greek forms.

The Greek armies were essentially militia. A few guards and garrisons were maintained, but no standing armies like those of Persia; and the troops by whom such perfection in tactics was attained, and such brilliant victories were won, were only called under arms when occasion required, and returned to their civil life when the danger was over. By constant wars, however, this militia had acquired all the character of a regular army; and the Spartan forces especially differed only in not receiving pay for their services. Beyond their own country the warlike reputation and soldierly qualities of the Greeks made them highly prized as mercenaries, and large numbers adopted that profession. Thus we hear of Greek troops in the pay of the Egyptian kings in the time of Cambyses, and later the garrisons of the Persian towns in Asia Minor were mainly furnished by them; while Xenophon and the ten thousand Greeks who engaged under Cyrus the Younger did more to spread the fame of the arms of Greece than even the great victories of Marathon and Plataea, and, by exposing the weakness of the Persian empire, paved the way for the future conquests of Alexander.

Macedon, inhabited by rude but hardy shepherds and hunters, and far behind its southern neighbours in civilisation, had made no mark in history till Philip ascended its throne. But this monarch, who combined the highest military qualities with a far-seeing shrewdness which was fettered by no strict principles of honour, had no sooner established himself than he devoted all his energies to raising the military power of his country and extending his authority. The experience of his wars with the Athenians and other nations of Greece taught him that he could only overcome them by a discipline and training superior to their own, and he early saw that such was not to be given to a mere militia force. He set himself, therefore, to form a standing army, to which he gave an organisation, copied, but improved, from that of his adversaries. By force of arms, by treachery, or by policy, he increased his power and influence till it embraced all Greece; and he was about to make war on Persia at the head of her united armies when his death put an end to his ambitious projects. But his son Alexander had all his father’s military genius and ambition, and at the same time inherited the instrument he required in the highly-trained army so carefully prepared. Within a year he had chastised the Thracians in the north, stamped out the Greek revolt by the storming and destruction of Thebes, and received at Corinth from the representatives of the southern states the chief command over their united forces; and in the following year crossed the Hellespont at the head of an army of 35,000 men, and commenced that career of conquest which was not to cease till he had carried his victorious arms over India, and founded the largest empire the world had yet known. The army with which these astonishing campaigns were won was composed of native-born Macedonians, of their allies, and of mercenaries. The infantry was divided into heavy and light...