In addition to contributions to Punch and the leading reviews, Hannay issued the following works Biscuits and Grog, Claret Cup, and Hearts are Trumps (1848); King Dobbs (1849); Sketches in Ultramarine·, Singleton Fontenoy (1850); an edition of the Poems of Edgar Allan Poe, to which he prefixed an exquisite essay on the poet’s life and genius (1852); Sands and Shells and Satire and Satirists (1854); Eustace Conyers (1855); Essays from the Quarterly Review (1861); Characters and Criticisms, consisting mainly of his contributions to the Edinburgh Courant (1865); A Course of English Literature (1866); and a family history entitled Three Hundred Years of a Norman House (1867).

. HANNIBAL. Hannibal was a very common Carthaginian name. . Its final syllable bal occurs repeatedly, as a suffix, in Punic names, and is in fact taken from the chief Phoenician deity, Baal. The entire name denotes, according to a probable interpretation, « the favour of Baal.”

The famous Hannibal, the hero of the Second Punic War, was the son of Hamilcar Barca, and was born in 247 b.c. He and his two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, were called by the father “the lion’s brood.” At the age of nine he begged his father, who was leaving Carthage for Spain, to take him with him. The request was granted, but not before he had sworn at that father’s bidding on the altar of sacrifice eternal enmity to Rome. That vow determined his life’s future. In Spain he was bred up in camps under his father’s eye. He was present at the battle in which his father fell in 228 B.c., being then in his nineteenth year. Hamilcar’sson-in-law, Hasdrubal, succeeded to the command. Eightyears afterwards, in 221 b.c., he was struck down by an Iberian assassin. Meantime the young Hannibal had proved himself thoroughly able both “to obey and to command.” It was a matter of course that the soldiers with one voice at once hailed him as their general.

His first object was to complete the work of his father and his father’s successor. Spain, he felt, must be more thoroughly overawed, if it was to be a base of operations against Rome. He pushed into the heart of the country, crossed the Tagus, and crushed the resistance of the tribes of the interior. Two campaigns sufficed for the conquest of all Spain to the south of the Ebro, except Saguntum, a town considerably south of the Ebro and some way to the north of the modern Valencia. It was a Greek colony from Zacynthus (Zante), and had grown into a rich and prosperous place, but, what was now far more important, it was in friendly relations with Rome. To attack it therefore would be like throwing down the gauntlet to the Roman senate and people. But Hannibal was able to tell the home Government at Carthage that the Saguntines were molesting Carthaginian subjects in the neighbourhood. Without awaiting an answer, he began the siege. Roman ambassadors at the solicitation of envoys from Saguntum landed on the coast, but were told by Hannibal that he could not see them. They went on to Carthage, but their remonstrances, though the subject of along debate, were in vain. Eight months passed away, and Saguntum, after a gallant defence, was forced to surrender. Hannibal got a rich booty for his army, and went into winter quarters at New Carthage (Cartagena). Again a Roman embassy went to Carthage and insisted on his being given up. The demand was refused. By the close of the year 219 b.c. the Second Punic War was in fact begun.

Hannibal’s resolution was now taken. He prepared at once to invade Italy. He had a numerous and efficient army and a well-filled exchequer. All who shrank from the expedition he dismissed to their homes. In the spring of 218 b.c. he began his great march from New Carthage with an army of 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse,and 37 elephants. The Ebro was easily crossed. In the country beyond he had some fighting with the native tribes, and there he left Hanno, with a force of 10,000 foot and 1000 horse to secure the passes between Spain and Gaul. Again he sent back all in whom he saw signs of hesitation. With a considerably diminished army he passed the Pyrenees at Bellegarde and encamped at Iliberris (Elne). Some Gallic tribes, alarmed at his advance, had assembled in the neighbourhood, but he soon conciliated their chiefs and persuaded them that he meant them no mischief. So he continued his march without molestation to the Rhone.

Meanwhile the Romans had done little or nothing to check their enemy. At last the consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, arrived at Massilia (Marseilles), and was surprised to find that Hannibal was about to cross the Rhone. But he was too late to oppose the passage, and Hannibal crossed the river probably at some point near the village of Roquemaure. He then followed its course, marching up its left bank to its junction with the Isère at Valence, and entered what was known as the “Island of the Allobroges.” It was from thence that he began his famous passage of the Alps.

The narrative of Polybius, though it raises some difficult questions, has conveyed to most modern students and scholars the impression that Hannibal crossed by the pass of the Little St Bernard. If so, he must have entered Italy by the valley of Aosta. The subject has had a literature of its own devoted to it. The result is that the Little St Bernard Pass may be almost said to have made good its claims to the honour of Hannibal’s memorable march. It was familiar to the ancients, and more than once Gauls had passed through it into the plains of Italy. Such high authorities as Arnold, Niebuhr, and Mommsen regard the question as settled in its favour.

Fifteen days in all were occupied in the passage. If the view above indicated is correct, Hannibal at first made his way over Mont du Chat through the Chevelu Pass, then continued his march up the valley of the Isère, and mounted the St Bernard. He must have descended the mountain by the valley of the Doria. Part of his route, that by which he climbed to the summit, was a narrow defile, and there he was threatened by the mountain tribes which appeared on the heights. At the “white rock,” la roche blanche, as it is still called, he halted his infantry, while the cavalry and beasts of burden were making tneir way during the night to the top of the pass. Next day, the ninth day, he stood with his whole army on the highest point and spoke, it is said, some cheering words to his half-frozen Africans and Spaniards. The descent proved trying and dangerous. From the mountain tribes he had little to fear; it was the mountain slope, covered with recent snow, which caused delay and anxiety. The Italian side of the Alps is considerably steeper than the French side, and a road had to be constructed for the passage of the elephants and horses. This was a work of three days. In three more days they arrived in the valley of Aosta, and were welcomed by the Salassi, a friendly tribe of the Insubrian Gauls. The October of the year 218 b.c. saw the passage of the Alps accomplished and Hannibal with his army encamped in northern Italy.

Thus far he had been successful, but at a tremendous cost. His army was shrunk to a force of 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry,—the former being composed of Libyans and Spaniards in about the proportion of three to two, and the latter being chiefly Numidians, and admirably efficient.

It wa3 now five months since he had set out from New Carthage. His men of course sorely needed rest, and this they had for a brief space amid the friendly tribes of Cisalpine Gaul. One tribe indeed, the Taurini, was hostile, but he soon captured their chief city, thus overawing the remaining tribes in the upper valley of the Po. It was now high time for the Romans to exert themselves. Scipio after quitting Marseilles, whence he had sent on his army into Spain, had hurried back to Italy, and on reaching Placentia took command of the Roman army quartered there. He was indeed numerically weaker than Hannibal, and was deficient in cavalry. Still he advanced up the Po to meet him, and on the Ticino, somewhere, it would seem, near Vercelli, was fought the first engagement of the Second Punic War. It was a cavalry action, and the inferiority of the Romans in this arm was decisively proved. They were driven back with heavy loss, and Scipio himself was severely wounded, being rescued, it is said, by his son, a lad of seventeen, who subsequently became as famous as Hannibal himself, and had the good fortune to be his conqueror. He has gone down to posterity as Scipio Africanus. The defeated general fell back to the walls of Placentia. The Trebia, a southern tributary of the Po, was between hitn and the enemy, and he was soon joined by the other consul, Semproniu3∙ Their united armies numbered not less than 40,000 men. Sempronius was for instantly giving battle; Scipio was still disabled by his wound.

Sempronius had his way, and on a bitterly cold December day the Romans plunged into the swollen waters of the Trebia in the face of a sleet storm and a cutting wind. They fought well, but when taken in flank by Hannibal’s brother Mago, who was lying in ambush amid brambles and bushes in a watercourse, they broke and fled in utter rout.

This decisive victory gave nearly all northern Italy to Hannibal, He let his troops rest during the winter, and added to them a number of Gauls. Early in the spring of 217 b.c. he decided to cross the Apennines and to penetrate into the heart of Italy. The route which he took brought him into the marshy lowlands of the Arno near Lucca and Pisa, and here he and his men had to wade through water for four days. Many of them perished miserably, and Hannibal himself lost an eye from ophthalmia. At last he encamped at Fiesole on high ground. The two consuls Flaminius and Servilius were, with their armies, respectively at Arezzo and Rimini. Flaminius was an impetuous man, and eager to win the glory of settling the war once for all. Hannibal, quitting the valley of the upper Arno, marched past him towards Perugia, ravaging the country and so provoking the Roman general to pursue him. The road from Cortona to Perugia skirts the northern shore of Lake Trasimene, and into this road, which is in fact a mountain defile, the Roman column unwarily entered. They were caught in a trap. Hannibal had posted his light troops on the hills on either side, while he himself blocked the outlet near Passignano with the best of his infantry. As soon as the Romans were in the pass they were assailed on all sides, and the battle soon became a mere massacre. The Roman army was in fact destroyed, and Flaminius was among the slain. We might suppose that Hannibal would have now done well to have marched straight on Rome, and this the Romans expected. But he may well have thought that it would be better to wait the chance of insurrection among the Italian communities. So he marched through Umbria, and again crossed the Apennines into Picenum. He then marched southwards along the coast into Apulia and encamped at Arpi. Meanwhile the Romans had made the famous Fabius Maximus their dictator. After levying an army of four legions, Fabius marched in pursuit of the enemy having first effected a junction with the army under Servilius at Rimini.

From the first Fabius had decided on the policy which earned for him the name of the Cunctator, the Delayer. He dogged his enemy’s steps, but would never risk an engagement. The richest districts of southern Italy were laid waste under his very eyes. But he could not be provoked into any rash movement. Once indeed it seemed as. if Hannibal was himself entrapped. He had been ravaging Campania, and was on the point of retreating into Samnium, when Fabius posted a force at the head of the pass which afforded the only available means for his retreat. Hannibal is said to have driven a multitude of oxen with lighted faggots on their horns up the hills overhanging the road, so as to give the impression that he and his army were retreating over the heights. Fabius’s detachment quitted its position to check the supposed movement, and thus gave Hannibal an opportunity of escaping through the pass. The tactics of Fabius disgusted his men, and when he had to leave them for a time, he found on his return that his master of the horse, Minucius, on the strength of a small success won in his absence, was eager to bring on a general engagement. Fabius gave him a part of the army, with which Minucius ventured on an attack. He was on the brink of destruction when he was rescued by the dictator’s timely interposition. After this Hannibal went into winter quarters at Geronium in the north of Apulia.

In the spring of the next year, 216 B.C., he moved south and pounced on Cannae, where Roman supplies were stored up in great abundance. The town is about 6 miles from the mouth of the Aufidus and about 8 from Canosa. The Romans were now again eager to strike a decisive blow. So a vast army was raised by the consuls of the year, Aemilius Paulus and Terentius Varro, numbering 80,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. Hannibal’s army was probably far inferior numerically. The consuls on arriving in Apulia made Canusium (Canosa) their headquarters. For some few drys the armies faced each other on the banks of the Aufidus. There were some preliminary manoeuvres and skirmishes, till at last Varro, when it came to his turn to command, determined to fight. Both armies crossed the river, and Hannibal’s men were drawn up within a loop which it forms near Cannae. On either flank he stationed a strong body of his veteran infantry. His other infantry, ranged in the centre in a crescent form, was soon driven in by the Roman legions, which had advanced to the attack in very deep formation. But meanwhile Hannibal’s cavalry had put the Roman horse to rout, and had fallen on their rear. The Roman columns were now attacked also on either flank by the Carthaginian infantry. Pressed into a dense mass they were cut down without the possibility of resistance. The carnage is said to have been prolonged for eight hours. The Roman army was all but utterly destroyed. The consul Aemilius Paulus, nearly all the officers, and eighty senators, perished in the slaughter. Varro indeed escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia. The remainder were slain or made prisoners. It was at a comparatively small cost to himself that Hannibal won this great victory.

It might well be thought that such a victory would prove decisive, and that it must have been had Hannibal instantly pushed on to Rome. But he had probably good reasons for not doing so. He was, it must be remembered, as much as 200 miles from Rome; he would have had to march through still hostile populations, and by the time he would have arrived, he must have known that the first panic would have abated, and that the notion of carrying the city by a coup de main was simply preposterous. What he counted on was the dissolution of the Italian confederacy, and a widespread revolt throughout Italy. Nor was he altogether deceived. The disaster of Cannae shook the loyalty of the Italian peoples. Rome was deserted by most of Apulia and Samnium, and almost wholly by the Lucanians and Bruttians. She retained indeed some strong fortresses, as Cales, Fregellae, Casinum, Beneventum, Venusia, and these enabled her armies to maintain their ground. B ut Capua, in Campania, the richest and most powerful city in Italy after Rome itself, was lost to her. Thither Hιnnibal made his way from Cannae, and there he went into winter quarters, which were perhaps too comfortable and luxurious. But the story that his men became utterly demoralized is absurd. They proved in the subsequent years of the war that they could move rapidly and fight bravely. We may indeed well suppose that by this time many of his veteran Spaniards and Africans had been replaced by native Italian soldiers. It is, however, clear that he still had a fine army. It is true indeed that after Cannae his star seems rather to decline, but the explanation of this is that the Romans again reverted to the steady cautious tactics which they had learnt under Fabius. They too. were for the most part well officered. The ablest of their generals was Marcellus. Yet even he never beat his antagonist in anything like a pitched battle. The Romans after Cannae made prodigious efforts. They sent three armies into the field, to watch and to check the enemy’s mavemeuts. They kept themselves in strongly entrenched camps near fortresses which Hannibal had not the means of taking. Some indeed he did capture, as Nuceria, Acerrae, and Casilinum in Campania. At Cumae, Neapolis, and Nola he was foiled. The two years after Cannae, 215 and 214 B,c., passed without much being achieved on either side. Hannibal was vaguely hoping for reinforcements from Carthage, and for the aid of Philip, king of Macedon.

Next year, 213 b.c., he gained a considerable success. Tarentum surrendered, and so did Metapontum and Thurii. At Tarentum indeed the Roman garrison still clung to the citadel, and Hannibal could not dislodge it. From Carthage he had received a reinforcement of some elephants and of 4000 Numidian cavalry, but this did not enable him to resume the offensive with much effect. Meanwhile Capua, besieged by two consular armies, seemed doomed to fall again into Roman hands. One of Hannibal’s subalterns, Hanno, was defeated in the attempt to revictual the place. Hannibal himself hurried to its aid, but he could not bring the Romans to a battle, though he did temporarily raise the siege. The year 212 b.c. was one of mingled success and disaster for Rome. Syracuse that year had to surrender to Marcellus, and Carthage seemed to have quite lost Sicily. Here was an important gain for Rome. But in Spain the two brother Scipios had been cut off by Hasdrubal, who could now cross into Gaul and advance on Italy. And in Italy there had been some serious reverses. It would appear that there were actually six Roman armies in the field against Hannibal. One of these under Fulvius he destroyed in Apulia; another, made up of enfranchised slaves under Gracchus—a proof this of the extremity to which Rome was reduced—he put to rout, Gracchus himself perishing in an ambuscade.

By the spring of 211 b.c. the Romans were besieging Capua with three armies. It was...