LAW
THE present article will be limited to the consideration of the phenomena presented for study by positive laws.
The objects which laws ought to subserve, the principles of legislation, the sphere of law, the province of government, and other topics of a similar nature which are generally to be found in writings professing to treat of law in the abstract have been discussed under the heading Government and elsewhere. It will be convenient, and it will be following the lines of a very remarkable development of English thought, to take actual laws as positive facts, without reference to their goodness or badness, and examine, so far as it can be done within the limits at our command, the character which they present when looked at from different points of view. This conception of the science of law, which is closely related to the scientific ideas of the time, has been developed by the efforts of the modern school of English jurists. In former times the science of law meant anything but science as we have been taught to conceive it by physical philosophers. It meant if anything a philosophy of legal principles not necessarily related to any system of actual law. A philosophy of laws actually existing in fact is what we in England at least should now consider the science of law to be. By universal consent the somewhat shifting term jurisprudence has been limited to this meaning. Jurisprudence is the science of positive laws. The present article will attempt to present simply the leading principles and conclusions of jurisprudence....
The human race may be conceived as parcelled out into a number of distinct groups or societies, differing greatly in size and circumstances, in physical and moral characteristics of all kinds. But they all resemble each other in this that they reveal on examination certain rules of conduct in accordance with which the relations of the members inter se are governed. Such rules we may for the present, without anticipating a somewhat difficult discussion, term laws. Each society has its own system of laws, and all the systems, so far as they are known, constitute the appropriate subject matter of jurisprudence. The jurist may deal with it in the following ways. He may first of all examine the leading conceptions common to all the systems, or in other words define the leading terms common to them all. Such are the terms law itself, right, duty, property, crime, and so forth, which, or their equivalents, may, notwithstanding delicate differences of connotation, be regarded as common terms in all systems. That kind of inquiry is what is known in England as analytical jurisprudence. It regards the conceptions with which it deals as fixed or stationary, and aims at expressing them distinctly and exhibiting their logical relations with each other. What is really meant by a right and by a duty, and what is the true connexion between a right and a duty, are types of the questions proper to this inquiry. Shifting our point of view, but still regarding systems of law in the mass, we may consider them, not as stationary, but as changeable and changing, we may ask what general features are exhibited by the record of the change. This, somewhat crudely put, may serve to indicate the field of historical jurisprudence. In its ideal condition it would require an accurate record of the history of all legal systems as its material. As yet the record is exceedingly incomplete, and the results are proportionately limited. But whether the material be abundant or scanty, the method is the same. It seeks the explanation of institutions and legal principles in the facts of history. Its aim is to show how a given rule came to be what it is. The legislative source—the emanation of the rule from a sovereign authority—is of no importance here; what is important is the moral source—the connexion of the rule with the ideas prevalent during contemporary periods. This method, it is evident, involves, not only a comparison of successive stages in the history of the same system, but a comparison of different systems, of the Roman with the English, of the Hindu with the Irish, and so on. The historical method as applied to law may be regarded as a special example of the method of comparison. The comparative method is really employed in all generalizations about law; for, although the analysis of legal terms might be conducted with exclusive reference to one system, the advantage of testing the result by reference to other systems is obvious. But, besides the use of comparison for purposes of analysis and in tracing the phenomena of the growth of laws, it is evident that for the purposes of practical legislation the comparison of different systems may yield important results. Laws are contrivances for bringing about certain definite ends, the larger of which are identical in all systems. The comparison of these contrivances not only serves to bring their real object, often obscured as it is in details, into clearer view, but enables legislators to see where the contrivances are deficient, and how they may be improved.
The “science of law,” as the expression is generally used, means the examination of laws in general in one or other of the ways just indicated. It means an investigation of laws which exist or have existed in some given society in fact—in other words, positive laws; and it means an examination not limited to the exposition of particular systems. Analytical jurisprudence is in England associated chiefly with the name of John Austin (q.v.), whose Province of Jurisprudence Determined systematized and completed the work begun in England by Hobbes, and continued at a later date and from a different point of view by Bentham. The best view of the subject will be obtained by taking Austin’s principal positions in outline, and considering the criticisms which later jurists have bestowed upon them.
Austin’s first position is to distinguish between laws properly so called and laws improperly so called. In any of the older writers on law, we find the various senses in which the word is used grouped together as variations of one common meaning. Thus Blackstone advances to his proper subject, municipal laws, through (1) the laws of inanimate matter, (2) the laws of animal nutrition, digestion, &c., (3) the laws of nature, which are rules imposed by God on men and discoverable by reason alone, and (4) the revealed or Divine law, which is part of the law of nature directly expounded by God. All of these are connected by this common element that they are “rules of action dictated by some superior being.” And some such generalization as this is to be found at the basis of most treatises on jurisprudence which have not been composed under the influence of the analytical school. Austin disposes of it by the distinction that some of those laws are commands, while others are not commands. The so-called laws of nature are not commands; they are uniformities which resemble commands only in so far as they may be supposed to have been ordered by some intelligent being. But they are not commands in the only proper sense of that word,—they are not addressed to reasonable beings, who may or may not will obedience to them. Laws of nature are not addressed to anybody, and there is no pos sible question of obedience or disobedience to them. Austin accordingly pronounces them laws improperly so called, and confines his attention to laws properly so called, which are commands addressed by a human superior to a human inferior.
This distinction seems so simple and obvious that the energy and even bitterness with which Austin insists upon it now seems superfluous. But the indiscriminate identification of everything to which common speech gives the name of a law was, and still is, a fruitful source of confusion. Blackstone’s statement that when God “put matter into motion He established certain laws of motion, to which all movable matter must conform,” and that in those creatures that have neither the power to think nor to will such laws must be invariably obeyed, so long as the creature itself subsists, for its existence depends on that obedience, imputes to the law of gravitation in respect of both its origin and its execution the qualities of an Act of Parliament. On the other hand the qualities of the law of gravitation are imputed to certain legal principles which, under the name of the law of nature, are asserted to be binding all over the globe, so that “no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this.” Nonsense like this so exasperated Austin that he never fails to stigmatize the use of “natural laws” in the sense of scientific facts as improper, or as metaphorical. A later writer has pointed out that law in the scientific sense has acquired a position of its own, from which it is impossible to dislodge it, and which involves none of the ambiguities and confusions against which Austin protested. It would be as reasonable for the man of science as for the jurist to set up his own conception of law as the only legitimate one. There is perhaps only one field of inquiry where the two opposed conceptions of law are still to be found entangled. The “laws of political economy” still hover in the minds of many between the jural and the scientific conception. Certain economical principles appear to have acquired a double character,—that of scientific generalizations, and that of rules which may be disobeyed. Measures are pronounced to be a violation of the laws of political economy, with a vague implication that these being laws of nature any violation of them must be particularly heinous.
Having eliminated metaphorical or figurative laws, we restrict ourselves to those laws which are commands. This word is the key to the analysis of law, and accordingly a large portion of Austin’s work is occupied with the determination of its meaning. A command is an order issued by a superior to an inferior. It is a signification of desire distinguished by this peculiarity that “the party to whom it is directed is liable to evil from the other, in case he comply not with the desire.” “If you are able and willing to harm me in case I comply not with your wish, the expression of your wish amounts to a command.” Being liable to evil in case I comply not with the wish which you signify, I am bound or obliged by it, or I lie under a duty to obey it. The evil is called a sanction, and the command or duty is said to be sanctioned by the chance of incurring the evil. The three terms command, duty, and sanction are thus inseparably connected. As Austin expresses it in the language of formal logic, “each of the three terms signifies the same notion, but each denotes a different part of that notion, and connotes the residue.”
All commands, however, are not laws. That term is reserved for those commands which oblige generally to the performance of acts of a class. A command to your servant to rise at such an hour on such a morning is a particular command, but not a law or rule; a command to rise always at that hour is a law or rule. Of this distinction it is sufficient to say in the meantime that it involves, when we come to deal with positive laws, the rejection of particular enactments to which by inveterate usage the term law would certainly be applied. On the other hand it is not, according to Austin, necessary that a true law should bind persons as a class. Obligations imposed on the grantee of an office specially created by parliament would imply a law; a general order to go into mourning addressed to the whole nation for a particular occasion would not be a law.
So far we have arrived at a definition of laws properly so called. Austin holds superiority and inferiority to be necessarily implied in command, and such statements as that “laws emanate from superiors” to be the merest tautology and trifling. Elsewhere he sums up the characteristics of true laws as ascertained by the analysis thus :— (1) laws, being commands, emanate from a determinate source; (2) every sanction is an evil annexed to a command; and (3) every duty implies a command, and chiefly means obnoxiousness to the evils annexed to commands.
Of true laws, those only are the subject of jurisprudence which are laws strictly so called, or positive laws. Austin accordingly proceeds to distinguish positive from other true laws, which are either laws set by God to men or laws set by men to men, not, however, as political superiors nor in pursuance of a legal right. The discussion of the first of these true but not positive laws leads Austin to his celebrated discussion of the Utilitarian theory. The laws set by God are either revealed or unrevealed, i.e., either expressed in direct command, or made known to men in one or other of the ways denoted by such phrases as the “light of nature,” “natural reason,” “dictates of nature,” and so forth. Austin maintains that the principle of general utility, based ultimately on the assumed benevolence of God, is the true index to such of His commands as He has not chosen to reveal. His exposition of the meaning of the principle is a most valuable contribution to moral science, though he rests its claims ultimately on a basis which many of its supporters would disavow. And the whole discussion is now generally condemned as lying outside the proper scope of the treatise, although the reason for so condemning it is not always correctly stated. It is found in such assumptions of fact as that there is a God, that He has issued commands to men in what Austin calls the “truths of revelation,” that He designs the happiness of all His creatures, that there is a predominance of good in the order of the world—which do not now command universal assent. It is impossible to place these propositions on the same scientific footing as the assumptions of fact with reference to human society on which jurisprudence rests. If the “Divine laws” were facts like Acts of Parliament, it is conceived that the discussion of their characteristics would not be out of place in a scheme of jurisprudence.
The second set of laws properly so called, which are not positive laws, consists of three classes:—(1) those which are set by men living in a state of nature; (2) those which are set by sovereigns but not as political superiors, e.<∕., when one sovereign commands another to act according to a principle of international law; and (3) those set by subjects but not in pursuance of legal rights. This group, to which Austin gives the name of positive morality, helps to explain his conception of positive law. Men are living in a state of nature, or a state of anarchy, when they are not living in a state of government or as members of a political society. “Political society” thus becomes the central fact of the theory, and some of the objections that have been urged against it arise from its being applied to conditions of life in which Austin would not have admitted the existence of a political society. Again, the third set in the group is intimately connected with positive laws on the one hand and rules of positive morality which are not even laws properly so called on the other. Thus laws set by subjects in consequence of a legal right are clothed with legal sanctions, and are laws positive. A law set by guardian to ward, in pursuance of a right which the guardian is bound to exercise, is a positive law pure and simple; a law set by master to slave, in pursuance of a legal right which he is not bound to exercise, is, in Austin’s phraseology, to be regarded both as a positive moral rule and as a positive law. On the other hand the rules set by a club or society, and enforced upon its members by exclusion from the society, but not in pursuance of any legal right, are laws, but not positive laws. They are imperative and proceed from a determinate source, but they have no legal or political sanction. Closely connected with this positive morality, consisting of true but not positive laws, is the positive morality whose rules are not laws properly so called at all, though they are generally denominated laws. Such are the laws of honour, the laws of fashion, and, most important of all, international law.
Nowhere does Austin’s phraseology come more bluntly into conflict with common usage than in pronouncing the law of nations (which in substance is a compact body of well-defined rules resembling nothing so much as the ordinary rules of law) to be not laws at all, even in the wider sense of the term. That the rules of a private club should be law properly so called, while the whole mass of international jurisprudence is mere opinion, shocks our sense of the proprieties of expression. Yet no man was more careful than Austin to observe these proprieties. He recognizes fully the futility of definitions which involve a painful struggle with the current of ordinary speech. But in the present instance the apparent paralogism cannot be avoided if we accept the limitation of laws properly so called to commands proceeding from a determinate source. And that limitation is so generally present in our conception of law that to ignore it would be a worse anomaly than this. No one finds fault with the statement that the so-called code of honour or the dictates of fashion are not, properly speaking, laws. We repel the same statement applied to the law of nature, because it resembles in so many of its most striking features—in the certainty of a large portion of it, in its terminology, in its substantial principles—the most universal elements of actual systems of law, and because, moreover, the assumption that brought it into existence was nothing else than this, that it consisted of those abiding portions of legal systems which prevail everywhere by their own authority. But, though “positive morality” may not be the best phrase to describe such a code of rules, the distinction insisted on by Austin is unimpeachable.
The elimination of those laws properly and improperly so called which are not positive laws brings us to the definition of positive law, which is the keystone of the system. Every positive law is “set by a sovereign person, or sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that person or body is sovereign or superior.” Though possibly sprung directly from another source, it is a positive law, by the institution of that present sovereign in the character of a political superior. The question is not as to the historical origin of the principle, but as to its present authority. “The legislator is he, not by whose authority the law was first made, but by whose authority it continues to be law.” This definition involves the analysis of the connected expressions sovereignty, subjection, and independent })olitical society, and of determinate body,— which last analysis Austin performs in connexion with that of commands. These are all excellent examples of the logical method of which he was so great a master. The broad results alone need be noticed here. In order that a given society may form a society political and independent, the generality or bulk of its members must be in a habit of obedience to a certain and common superior; whilst that certain person or body of persons must not be habitually obedient to a certain person or body. All the italicized words point to circumstances under which it might be difficult to say whether a given society is political and independent or not. Several cf these Austin has discussed,— e.g., the state of things in which a political society yields obedience which may or may not be called habitual to some external power, and the state of things in which a political society is divided between contending claimants for sovereign power, and it is uncertain which shall prevail, and over how much of the society. So long as that uncertainty remains we have a state of anarchy. Further, an independent society to be political must not fall below a number which can only be called considerable. Neither then in a state of anarchy, nor in inconsiderable communities, nor among men living in a state of nature, have we the proper phenomena of a political society. The last limitation goes some way to meet the most serious criticism to which Austin’s system has been exposed, and it ought to be...
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a rule of action; a precept or command, coming from a superior authority, which an inferior is bound to obey. The manner in which God governs rational creatures is by a law, as the rule of their obedience to him, and this is what we call God’s moral government of the world. The term, however, is used in Scripture with considerable latitude of meaning; and to ascertain its precise import in any particular place, it is necessary to regard the scope and connection of the passage in which it occurs. Thus, for instance, sometimes it denotes the whole revealed will of God as communicated to us in his word. In this sense it is generally used in the book of Psalms, i, 2; xix, 7; cxix; Isaiah viii, 20; xlii, 21. Sometimes it is taken for the Mosaical institution distinguished from the Gospel, John i, 17; Matt. xi, 13; xii, 5; Acts xxv, 8. Hence we frequently read of the law of Moses as expressive of the whole religion of the Jews, Heb. ix, 19; x, 28. Sometimes, in a more restricted sense, for the ritual or ceremonial observances of the Jewish religion. In this sense the Apostle speaks of the law of commandments contained in ordinances,” Eph. ii, 15; Heb. x, 1; and which, being only a shadow of good things to come,” Christ Jesus abolished by his death, and so in effect destroyed the ancient distinction between Jew and Gentile, Gal. iii, 17. Very frequently it is used to signify the decalogue, or ten precepts which were delivered to the Israelites from Mount Sinai. It is in this acceptation of the term that the Lord Jesus declares he came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it,” Matt. v, 17; and he explains its import as requiring perfect love to God and man, Luke x, 27. It is in reference to this view that St. Paul affirms, By the deeds of the law shall no flesh living ...be justified; for by the law is the knowledge of sin,” Rom. iii, 20. The language of this law is, The soul that sinneth it shall die,” and Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written,” or required, in the book of the law, to do them,” Gal. iii, 10. To deliver man from this penalty, Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being himself made a curse for us,” Gal. iii, 13. The law, in this sense, was not given that men should obtain righteousness or justification by it, but to convince them of sin, to show them their need of a Saviour, to shut them up, as it were, from all hopes of salvation from that source, and to recommend the Gospel of divine grace to their acceptance, Gal. iii, 19–25. Again, the law often denotes the rule of good and evil, or of right and wrong, revealed by the Creator and inscribed on man’s conscience, even at his creation, and consequently binding upon him by divine authority; and in this respect it is in substance the same with the decalogue. That such a law was connate with, and, as it were, implanted in, man, appears from its traces, which, like the ruins of some noble building, are still extant in every man. It is from those common notions, handed down by tradition, though often imperfect and perverted, that the Heathens themselves distinguished right from wrong, by which they were a law unto themselves, showing the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness,” Rom. ii, 12–15, although they had no express revelation. The term law, is, however, eminently given to the Mosaic law; on the principles and spirit of which, a few general remarks may be offered. The right consideration of this divine institute, says Dr. Graves, will surround it with a glory of truth and holiness, not only worthy of its claims, but which has continued to be the light of the world on theological and moral subjects, and often on great political principles, to this day. If we examine the Jewish law, to discover the principle on which the whole system depends, the primary truth, to inculcate and illustrate which is its leading object, we find it to be that great basis of all religion, both natural and revealed, the self-existence, essential unity, perfections, and providence of the supreme Jehovah, the Creator of heaven and earth. The first line of the Mosaic writings inculcates this great truth: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” When the lawgiver begins to recapitulate the statutes and judgments he had enjoined to his nation, it is with this declaration: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord,” Deut. vi, 4; or, as it might be more closely expressed, Jehovah our Elohim, or God, is one Jehovah. And at the commencement of that sublime hymn, delivered by Moses immediately before his death, in which this illustrious prophet sums up the doctrines he had taught, the wonders by which they had been confirmed, and the denunciations by which they were enforced, he declares this great tenet with the sublimity of eastern poetry, but at the same time with the precision of philosophic truth: Give ear,” says he, O ye heavens, and I will speak: and hear, O earth, the words of my mouth. My doctrine shall drop rain: my speech shall distil as the dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass,” Deut. xxxii, 1, &c. What, is that doctrine so awful, that the whole universe is thus invoked to attend to it? so salutary as to be compared with the principle whose operation diffuses beauty and fertility over the vegetable world? Hear the answer: Because I will publish the name of Jehovah; ascribe ye greatness unto our God. He is the rock, his work is perfect: a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he.” This, then, is one great leading doctrine of the Jewish code. But the manner in which this doctrine is taught displays such wise accommodation to the capacity and character of the nation to whom it is addressed, as deserves to be carefully remarked. That character by which the supreme Being is most clearly distinguished from every other, however exalted; that character from which the acutest reasoners have endeavoured demonstratively to deduce, as from their source, all the divine attributes, is self-existence. Is it not then highly remarkable, that it is under this character the Divinity is described on his first manifestation to the Jewish lawgiver? The Deity at first reveals himself unto him as the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob; and therefore the peculiar national and guardian God of the Jewish race. Moses, conscious of the degeneracy of the Israelites, their ignorance of, or their inattention to, the true God, and the difficulty and danger of any attempt to recall them to his exclusive worship, and to withdraw them from Egypt, seems to decline the task; but when absolutely commanded to undertake it, he said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, _I am that I am_: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, _I Am_ hath sent me unto you,” Exod. iii, 13, 14. Here we observe, according to the constant method of the divine wisdom, when it condescends to the prejudices of men, how in the very instance of indulgence it corrects their superstition. The religion of names arose from an idolatrous polytheism; and the name given here directly opposes this error, and in the ignorance of that dark and corrupted period establishes that great truth, to which the most enlightened philosophy can add no new lustre, and on which all the most refined speculations on the divine nature ultimately rest, the self-existence, and, by consequence, the eternity and immutability, of the one great Jehovah. But though the self-existence of the Deity was a fact too abstract to require its being frequently inculcated, his essential unity was a practical principle, the sure foundation on which to erect the structure of true religion, and form a barrier against the encroachments of idolatry: for this commenced not so frequently in denying the existence, or even the supremacy, of the one true God, as in associating with him for objects of adoration inferior intermediate beings, who were supposed to be more directly employed in the administration of human affairs. To confute and resist this false principle was, therefore, one great object of the Jewish scheme. Hence the unity of God is inculcated with perpetual solicitude; it stands at the head of the system of moral law promulgated to the Jews from Sinai by the divine voice, heard by the assembled nation, and issuing from the divine glory, with every circumstance which could impress the deepest awe upon even the dullest minds: I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage; thou shalt have no other gods beside me,” Exod. xx, 2, 3. And in the recapitulation of the divine laws in Deuteronomy, it is repeatedly enforced with the most solemn earnestness: Hear, O Israel, The Lord our God is one Lord,” Deut. vi, 4. And again: Unto thee it was showed, that thou mightest know that the Lord he is God; there is none else beside him. Know, therefore, this day, and consider it in thine heart, that the Lord he is God in heaven above, and in the earth beneath: there is none else,” Deut. iv, 35, 39. This self-existent, supreme and only God is moreover described as possessed of every perfection which can be ascribed to the Divinity: Ye shall be holy,” says the Lord to the people of the Jews; for I the Lord your God am holy,” Lev. xix, 2. Ascribe ye,” says the legislator, greatness unto our God; he is the rock; his work is perfect; a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he,” Deut. xxxii, 4. And in the hymn of thanksgiving on the miraculous escape of the Israelites at the Red Sea, this is its burden: Who is like unto thee, O Lord, among the gods? who is like unto thee, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders?” Exod. xv, 11. And when the Lord delivered to Moses the two tables of the moral law, he is described as descending in the cloud, and proclaiming the name of the Lord: And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed, The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty,” Exod. xxxiv, 6, 7. But to teach the self-existence, the unity, the wisdom, and the power of the Deity, nay, even his moral perfections of mercy, justice, and truth, would have been insufficient to arrest the attention, and command the obedience of a nation, the majority of which looked no farther than mere present objects, and at that early period cherished scarcely any hopes higher than those of a temporal kind,--if, in addition to all this, care had not been taken to represent the providence of God as not only directing the government of the universe by general laws, but also perpetually superintending the conduct and determining the fortune of every nation, of every family, nay, of every individual. It was the disbelief or the neglect of this great truth which gave spirit and energy, plausibility and attraction, to the whole system of idolatry. While men believed that the supreme God and Lord of all was too exalted in his dignity, too remote from this sublunary scene, to regard its vicissitudes with an attentive eye, and too constantly engaged in the contemplation of his own perfections, and the enjoyment of his own independent and all-perfect happiness, to interfere in the regulation of human affairs, they regarded with indifference that supreme Divinity who seemed to take no concern in their conduct, and not to interfere as to their happiness. However exalted and perfect such a Being might appear to abstract speculation, he was to the generality of mankind as if he did not exist; as their happiness or misery were not supposed to be influenced by his power, they referred not their conduct to his direction. If he delegated to inferior beings the regulation of this inferior world; if all its concerns were conducted by their immediate agency, and all its blessings or calamities distributed by their immediate determination; it seemed rational, and even necessary, to supplicate their favour and submit to their authority; and neither unwise nor unsafe to neglect that Being, who, though all-perfect and supreme, would, on this supposition appear, with respect to mankind, altogether inoperative. In truth, this fact of the perpetual providence of God extending even to the minutest events, is inseparably connected with every motive which is offered to sway the conduct of the Jews, and forcibly inculcated by every event of their history. This had been manifested in the appointment of the land of Canaan for the future settlement of the chosen people on the first covenant which God entered into with the Patriarch Abraham; in the prophecy, that for four hundred years they should be afflicted in Egypt, and afterward be thence delivered; in the increase of their nation, under circumstances of extreme oppression, and their supernatural deliverance from that oppression. The same providence was displayed in the destruction of the Egyptians in the Red Sea; the travels of the thousands of Israel through the wilderness, sustained by food from heaven; and in their subsequent settlement in the promised land by means entirely distinct from their own strength. Reliance on the same providence was the foundation of their civil government, the spirit and the principle of their constitution. On this only could they be commanded to keep the sabbatic year without tilling their land, or even gathering its spontaneous produce; confiding in the promise, that God would send his blessing on the sixth year, so that it should bring forth fruit for three years, Lev. xxv, 21. The same faith in Divine Providence alone could prevail on them to leave their properties and families exposed to the attack of their surrounding enemies; while all the males of the nation assembled at Jerusalem to celebrate the three great festivals, enjoined by divine command, with the assurance that no man should desire their land when they went up to appear before the Lord their God thrice in the year, Exodus xxxiv, 24. And, finally, it is most evident, that, contrary to all other lawgivers, the Jewish legislator renders his civil institutions entirely subordinate to his religious; and announces to his nation that their temporal adversity or prosperity would entirely depend, not on their observance of their political regulations; not on their preserving a military spirit, or acquiring commercial wealth, or strengthening themselves by powerful alliances; but on their continuing to worship the one true God according to the religious rites and ceremonies by him prescribed, and preserving their piety and morals untainted by the corruptions and vices which idolatry tended to introduce. Such was the theology of the Jewish religion, at a period when the whole world was deeply infected with idolatry; when all knowledge of the one true God, all reverence for his sacred name, all reliance on his providence, all obedience to his laws, were nearly banished from the earth; when the severest chastisements had been tried in vain; when no hope of reformation appeared from the refinements of civilization or the researches of philosophy; for the most civilized and enlightened nations adopted with the greatest eagerness, and disseminated with the greatest activity, the absurdities, impieties, and pollutions of idolatry. Then was the Jewish law promulgated to a nation, who, to mere human judgment, might have appeared incapable of inventing or receiving such a high degree of intellectual and moral improvement; for they had been long enslaved to the Egyptians, the authors and supporters of the grossest idolatry; they had been weighed down by the severest bondage, perpetually harassed by the most incessant manual labours; for the Egyptians made their lives bitter with hard bondage, in mortar, and in brick, and in all manner of service in the field,” Exod. i, 14. At this time, and in this nation, was the Mosaic law promulgated, teaching the great principles of true religion, the self-existence, the unity, the perfections, and the providence of the one great Jehovah; reprobating all false gods, all image worship, all the absurdities and profanations of idolatry. At this time, and in this nation, was a system of government framed, which had for its basis the reception of, and steady adherence to, this system of true religion; and establishing many regulations, which would be in the highest degree irrational, and could never hope to be received, except from a general and thorough reliance on the superintendence of Divine Providence, controlling the course of nature, and directing every event, so as to proportion the prosperity of the Hebrew people, according to their obedience to that law which they had received as divine. It is an obvious, but it is not therefore a less important remark, that to the Jewish religion we owe that admirable summary of moral duty, contained in the ten commandments. All fair reasoners will admit that each of these must be understood to condemn, not merely the extreme crime which it expressly prohibits, but every inferior offence of the same kind, and every mode of conduct leading to such transgression; and, on the contrary, to enjoin opposite conduct, and the cultivation of opposite dispositions. Thus, the command, Thou shalt not kill,” condemns not merely the single crime of deliberate murder, but every kind of violence, and every indulgence of passion and resentment, which tends either to excite such violence, or to produce that malignant disposition of mind, in which the guilt of murder principally consists: and similarly of the rest. In this extensive interpretation of the commandments, we are warranted, not merely by the deductions of reason, but by the letter of the law itself. For the addition of the last, Thou shalt not covet,” proves clearly that in all, the dispositions of the heart, as much as the immediate outward act, is the object of the divine Legislator; and thus it forms a comment on the meaning, as well as a guard for the observance, of all the preceding commands. Interpreted in this natural and rational latitude, how comprehensive and important is this summary of moral duty! It inculcates the adoration of the one true God, who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is;” who must, therefore, be infinite in power, and wisdom, and goodness; the object of exclusive adoration; of gratitude for every blessing we enjoy; of fear, for he is a jealous God; of hope, for he is merciful. It prohibits every species of idolatry; whether by associating false gods with the true, or worshipping the true by symbols and images. Commanding not to take the name of God in vain, it enjoins the observance of all outward respect for the divine authority, as well as the cultivation of inward sentiments and feelings suited to this outward reverence; and it establishes the obligation of oaths, and, by consequence, of all compacts and deliberate promises; a principle, without which the administration of laws would be impracticable, and the bonds of society must be dissolved. By commanding to keep holy the Sabbath, as the memorial of the creation, it establishes the necessity of public worship, and of a stated and outward profession of the truths of religion, as well as of the cultivation of suitable feelings; and it enforces this by a motive which is equally applicable to all mankind, and which should have taught the Jew that he ought to consider all nations as equally creatures of that Jehovah whom he himself adored; equally subject to his government, and, if sincerely obedient, entitled to all the privileges his favour could bestow. It is also remarkable, that this commandment, requiring that the rest of the Sabbath should include the man-servant, and the maid-servant, and the stranger that was within their gates, nay, even their cattle, proved that the Creator of the universe extended his attention to all his creatures; that the humblest of mankind were the objects of his paternal love; that no accidental differences, which so often create alienation among different nations, would alienate any from the divine regard; and that even the brute creation shared the...
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LAW OF NATIONS. See International Law.
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LAWES, Henry (1595-1662), a prominent member of the school of early English musicians, which culminated in Purcell, and was nipped in the bud by his early death, was born at Dinton in Wiltshire in December 1595, and received his musical education from John Cooper, better known under his Italian pseudonym Giovanni Coperario, a famous composer of the day. In 1626 he was received as one of the gentlemen of the chapel royal, which place he held till the Commonwealth put a stop to church music. But even during that songless time Lawes continued his work as a composer, and the famous collection of his vocal pieces, Ayres and Dialogues for One, Two, and Three Voyces, was published in 1653, being followed by two other books under the same title in 1655 and 1658 respectively. When in 1660 the king returned, Lawes once more entered the royal chapel, and composed an anthem for the coronation of Charles II. His death took place October 11, 1662. Lawes’s name has become known beyond musical circles by his friendship with Milton, whose Cornus he supplied with incidental music for the performance of the masque in 1634. The poet in return immortalized his friend in the famous sonnet beginning :—
Harry, whose tuneful and well-measured song First taught our English music how to span Words with just note and accent, not to scan With Midas’ cars, committing short and long....
In these lines, Milton, with a musical perception not common amongst poets, exactly indicates the great merit of Lawes, which distinguishes his compositions from those of many of his contemporaries and successors. His careful attention to the words of the poet, the manner in which his music seems to grow from those words, the perfect coincidence of the musical with the metrical accent, all put Lawes’s songs on a level with those of Schumann or Liszt or any modern composer. At the same time he is by no means wanting in genuine melodic invention, and his concerted music shows the learned contrapuntist.
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