FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, The, is the name of a well-known ecclesiastical organization which includes a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of Scotland. In one sense the Free Church dates its existence from the Disruption of 1843, in another it claims to be the rightful representative of the National Church of Scotland as it was reformed in 1560. In order to indicate the nature of the grounds on which, this claim is made, it will be necessary briefly to point out how the leading facts of the ecclesiastical history of Scotland during the last 320 years are accentuated and construed by those who read them in a Free Church sense.
In that history the Free Churchman sees three great reforming periods. In his view these deserve to be called reforming on many accounts, but most especially because in them the independence of the church, her inherent scriptural right to exercise a spiritual jurisdiction in which she is responsible to her Divine Head alone, was both earnestly asserted and practically maintained. The first reformation extended from 1560, when the church freely held her first General Assembly, and of her own authority acted on the First Book of Discipline, to 1592, when her Presbyterian order was finally and fully ratified by the parliament. The second period began in 1638, when after 20 years of suspended animation, the Assembly once more shook off Episcopacy, and terminated in 1649, when the parliament of Scotland confirmed the church in her liberties in a larger and ampler sense than before. The third period began in 1834, when the Assembly made use of what the church believed to be her rights in passing the Veto and Chapel Acts. It culminated in the Disruption of 1843....
The fact that the church, as led first by Knox and afterwards by Melville, claimed an inherent right to exercise a spiritual jurisdiction is notorious. More apt to be overlooked is the comparative freedom with which that right was actually used by the church irrespective of state recognition. That recognition was not given until after the queen’s resignation in 1567; but, for several years before it came, the church had been holding her Assemblies and settling all questions of discipline, worship, and administration as they arose, in accordance with the first book of polity or discipline which had been drawn up in 1560. Further, in 1581 she, of her own motion, adopted a second book of a similar character, in which she expressly claimed an independent and exclusive jurisdiction or power in all matters ecclesiastical, “which flows directly from God and the Mediator Jesus Christ, and is spiritual, not having a temporal head on earth, but only Christ the only king and governor of his church;” and this claim, though directly negatived in 1584 by the “Black Acts,” which included an Act of Supremacy over estates spiritual and temporal, continued to be asserted by the Assemblies, until at last it also was practically allowed in the Act of 1592. This legislation of 1592, however, did not long remain in force. An Act of Parliament in 1606, which “reponed, restored, and reintegrated” the estate of bishops to their ancient dignities, prerogatives, and privileges, was followed by several Acts of various subservient assemblies, which, culminating in that of 1618, practically amounted to a complete surrender of jurisdiction by the church itself. For twenty years no Assemblies whatever were held. This interval must necessarily be regarded from the Presbyterian point of view as having been one of very deep depression. But a second reformation, characterized by great energy and vigour, began in 1638. The proceedings of the Assembly of that year, afterwards tardily and reluctantly acquiesced in by the state, finally issued in the Acts of Parliament of 1649, by which the Westminster standards were ratified, lay-patronage was abolished, and the coronation oath itself framed in accordance with the principles of Presbyterian church govern ment. Another period of intense reaction soon set in. No Assemblies were permitted by Cromwell after 1653; and, soon after the Restoration, Presbytery was temporarily overthrown by a series of rescissory Acts. Nor was the Revolution Settlement of 1690 so entirely favourable to the freedom of the church as the legislation of 1649 had been. Prelacy was abolished, and various obnoxious statutes were repealed, but the Acts rescissory were not cancelled; presbyterianism was re-established, but the statutory recognition of the Confession of Faith took no notice of certain qualifications under which that document had originally been approved by the Assembly of 1647; the old rights of patrons were again discontinued, but the large powers which had been conferred on congregations by the Act of 1649 were not wholly restored. Nevertheless the great principle of a distinct ecclesiastical jurisdiction, embodied in the Confession of Faith, was accepted without reservation, and a Presbyterian polity effectively confirmed both then and at the ratification of the treaty of Union. This settlement, however, did not long subsist unimpaired. In 1712 the Act of Queen Anne, restoring patronage to its ancient footing, was passed in spite of the earnest remonstrances of the Scottish people. For many years afterwards (until 1784) the Assembly continued to instruct each succeeding commission to make application to the king and the parliament for redress of the grievance. But meanwhile a new phase of Scottish ecclesiastical politics commonly known as Moderatism had been inaugurated, during the prevalence of which the church became even more indifferent than the lay patrons themselves to the rights of her congregations with regard to the “calling” of ministers. From the Free Church point of view, the period from which the secessions under Erskine and Gillespie are dated was also characterized by numerous other abuses on the Church’s part which amounted to a practical surrender of the most important and distinctive principles of her ancient Presbyterian polity. Towards the beginning of the present century there were many circumstances, both within and without the church, which conspired to bring about an evangelical and popular reaction against this reign of “Moderatism.” The result was a protracted struggle, which is commonly referred to as the Ten Years’ Conflict, and which has been aptly described as the last battle in the long war which for nearly 300 years had been waged within the church itself, between the friends and the foes of the doctrine of an exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction. That final struggle may be said to have begun with the passing in 1834 of the “Veto” Act, by which it was declared to be a fundamental law of the church that no pastor should be intruded on a congregation contrary to the will of the people, and by which it was provided that the simple dissent of a majority of heads of families in a parish should be enough to warrant a presbytery in rejecting a presentee. The question of the legality of this measure soon came to be tried in the civil courts; and it was ultimately answered in a sense unfavourable to the church by the decision (1838) of the Court of Session in the Auchterarder case, to the effect that a presbytery had no right to reject a presentee simply because the parishioners protested against his settlement, but was bound to disregard the veto (see Chalmers, vol. v. pp. 376, 377). This decision elicited from the Assembly of that year a new declaration of the doctrine of the spiritual independence of the church. The “exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts in regard to the civil rights and emoluments secured by law to the church and the ministers thereof” was acknowledged without qualification; and continued implicit obedience to their decisions with reference to these rights and emoluments was pledged. At the same time it was insisted on “that, as is declared in the Confession of Faith of this National Established Church, ‘the Lord Jesus Christ, as King and Head of the church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of church officers distinct from the civil magistrate;’ and that in all matters touching the doctrine, discipline, and government of the church her judicatories possess an exclusive jurisdiction, founded on the Word of God, which power ecclesiastical” (in the words of the Second Book of Discipline) “flows immediately from God and the Mediator the Lord Jesus Christ, and is spiritual, not having a temporal head on earth, but only Christ, the only spiritual King and Governor of His Kirk.” And it was resolved to assert, and at all hazards defend, this spiritual jurisdiction, and firmly to enforce obedience to the same upon the officebearers and members of the church. The decision of the Court of Session having been confirmed by the House of Lords early in 1839, it was decided in the Assembly of that year that the church, while acquiescing in the loss of the temporalities at Auchterarder, should reaffirm the principle of non-intrusion as an integral part of the constitution of the Reformed Church of Scotland, and that a committee should be appointed to confer with the Government with a view to the prevention, if possible, of any further collision between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities. While the conference with the Government had no better result than an unsuccessful attempt at compromise by means of Lord Aberdeen’s Bill, which embodied the principle of a dissent with reasons, still graver complications were arising out of the Marnoch and other cases, the nature of which has been briefly indicated in vol. v. as above. In the circumstances it was resolved by the Assembly of 1842 to transmit to the Queen, by the hands of the lord high commissioner, a “claim, declaration, and protest,” complaining of the encroachments of the Court of Session, and also an address praying for the abolition of patronage. The home secretary’s answer (received in January 1843) gave no hope of redress. Meanwhile the position of the evangelical party had been further hampered by the decision of the Court of Session declaring the ministers of chapels of ease to be unqualified to sit in any church court. A final appeal to parliament by petition was made in March 1843, when, by a majority of 135 (211 against 76), the House of Commons declined to attempt any redress of the grievances of the Scottish Church. At the first session of the following General Assembly (18th May 1843) the reply of the nonintrusion party was made in a protest, signed by upwards of 200 commissioners, to the effect that since, in their opinion, the recent decisions of the civil courts, and the still more recent sanction of these decisions by the legislature, had made it impossible at that time to hold a free Assembly of the church as by law established, they therefore “protest that it shall be lawful for us, and such other commissioners as may concur with us, to withdraw to a separate place of meeting, for the purpose of taking steps for ourselves and all wsho adhere to us—maintaining with us the Confession of Faith and standards of the Church of Scotland as heretofore understood—for separating in an orderly way from the Establishment, and thereupon adopting such measures as may be competent to us, in humble dependence on God’s grace and the aid of His Holy Spirit, for the advancement of His glory, the extension of the gospel of our Lord and Saviour, and the administration of the affairs of Christ’s house according to His holy word.” The reading of this document was followed by the withdrawal of the entire non-intrusion party to another place of meeting, where the first Assembly of the Free Church was constituted, with Dr Thomas Chalmers as moderator. This Assembly sat from the 18th to the 30th of May, and transacted a large amount of important business. On Tuesday the 23d, 396 ministers and professors publicly adhibited their names to the Act of Separation and Deed of Demission by which they renounced all claim to the benefices they had held in connexion with the Establishment, declaring them to be vacant, and consenting to their being dealt with as such. By this impressive proceeding, the signatories voluntarily surrendered an annual income amounting to fully £100,000.
The first care of the voluntarily disestablished church was to provide incomes for her clergy and places of worship for her people. As early as 1841 indeed the leading principle of a “sustentation fund” for the support of the ministry had been announced by Dr Candlish; and at “Convocation,” a private unofficial meeting of the members of the evangelical or non-intrusion party held in November 1842, Dr Chalmers was prepared with a carefully matured scheme according to which “each congregation should do its part in sustaining the whole, and the whole should sustain each congregation.” Between November 1842 and May 1843, 647 associations had been formed; and at the first Assembly it was announced that upwards of £17,000 had already been contributed. At the close of the first financial year (1843-44) it was reported that the fund had exceeded £61,000. It was participated in by 583 ministers; and 470 drew the full equal dividend of £105. Each successive year showed a steady increase in the gross amount of the fund; but owing to an almost equally rapid increase of the number of new ministerial charges participating in its benefits, the stipend payable to each minister did not for many years reach the sum of £150 which had been aimed at as a minimum. Thus in 1844-45 the fund had risen to £76,180, but the ministers had also increased to 627, and the equal dividend therefore was only £122. During the first ten years the annual income averaged £84,057; during the next decade £108,643; and during the third £130,246. The mini mum of £150 was reached at last in 1868; and since then the balance remaining after that minimum has been provided has been treated as a surplus fund, and distributed among those ministers whose congregations have contributed at certain specified rates per member. In 1878 the total amount received for this fund was upwards of £177,000; in this 1075 ministers participated. The full equal dividend of £157 was paid to 766 ministers; and additional grants of £36 and £18 were paid out of the surplus fund to 632 and 129 ministers respectively.
To provide for the erection of the buildings which, it was foreseen, would be necessary, a general building fund, in which all should share alike, was also organized, and local building funds were as far as possible established in each parish, with the result that at the first Assembly a sum of £104,776 was reported as already available. By May 1844 a further sum of £123,060 had been collected, and 470 churches were reported as completed or nearly so. In the following year £131,737 was raised, and 60 additional churches were built. At the end of four years considerably more than 700 churches had been provided.
During the winter session 1843-44 the divinity students who had joined the Free Church continued their studies under Dr Chalmers and Dr Welsh; and at the Assembly of 1844 arrangements were made for the erection of suitable collegiate buildings. The New College, Edinburgh, was built in 1847 at a cost of £46,506; and divinity halls have subsequently been set up also in Glasgow and Aberdeen. In 1878 there were 13 professors of theology, with an aggregate of 230 students,—the numbers at Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen respectively being 129, 69, and 32.
A somewhat unforeseen result of the Disruption was the necessity for a duplicate system of element ιry schools. At the 1813 Assembly it was for the first time announced by Dr Welsh that “schools to a certain extent must be opened to afford a suitable sphere of occupation for parochial and still more for private teachers of schools, who are threatened with deprivation of their present office on account of their opinions upon the church question.” The suggestion was taken up with very great energy, and with the result that in May 1845 280 schools had been set up, while in May 1847 this number had risen to 513, with an attendance of upwards of 44,000 scholars. In 1869 it was stated in an authoritative document laid before members of parliament that at that time there were connected with and supported by the Free Church 598 schools (including two normal schools), with 633 teachers and 64,115 scholars. The school buildings had been erected at a cost of £220,000, of which the committee of privy council had contributed £35,000, while the remainder had been raised by voluntary effort. Annual payments made to teachers, &c., as at 1869, amounted to £16,000. The total sum expended by the Free Church since the Disruption for educational purposes has beennotless than £600,000. In accordance with certain provisions of the Education Act of 1872 most of the schools of the Free Church were voluntarily transferred, without compensation, to the local school boards.
It has been already seen that during the period of the Ten Years’ Conflict the non-intrusion party strenuously denied that in any one respect it was departing from acknowledged principles of the National Church. It continued to do so after the Disruption. In 1846, however, it was found to have become necessary, “in consequence of the late change in the outward condition of the church,” to amend the “questions and formula” to be used at the licensing of probationers and the ordination of office-bearers. These were amended accordingly; and at the same time it was declared that, “while the church firmly maintains the same scriptural principles as to the duties of nations and their rulers in reference to true religion and the Church of Christ for which she has hitherto contended, she disclaims intolerant or persecuting principles, and does not regard her Confession of Faith, or any port ion thereof when fairly interpreted, as favouring intolerance or persecution, or consider that her office-bearers by subscribing it profess any principles inconsistent with liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment.” The main difference between the “formula” of the Free Church and that of the Established Church is that the former refers to the Confession of Faith simply as “approven by General Assemblies of this Church,” while the latter describes it as “approven by the General Assemblies of this National Church, and ratified by law in the year 1690, and frequently confirmed by divers Acts of Parliament since that time.” The former inserts an additional clause,—“I also approve of the general principles respecting the jurisdiction of the church, and her subjection to Christ as her only Head, which are contained in the Claim of Right and in the Protest referred to in the questions already put to me;” and also adds the words which are here distinguished by italics,—“And I promise that through the grace of God I shall firmly and constantly adhere to the same, and to the utmost of my power shall in my station assert, maintain, and defend the said doctrine, worship, discipline, and government of this church by kirk-sessions, presbyteries, provincial synods, and general assemblies, together with the liberty and exclusive jurisdiction thereof ; and that I shall, in my practice, conform myself to the said worship and submit to the said discipline [and] government, and exclusive jurisdiction, and not endeavour directly or indirectly the prejudice or subversion of the same.” In the year 1851 an Act and Declaration anent the publication of the subordinate standards and other authoritative documents of the Free Church of Scotland was passed, in which the historical fact is recalled that the Church of Scotlaud had formally consented to adopt the Confession of Faith, catechisms, directory of public worship, and form of church government agreed upon by the Westminster Assembly; and it is declared that “these several formularies, as ratified, with certain explanations, by divers Acts of Assembly in the years 1645, 1646, and particularly in 1647, this church continues till this day to acknowledge as her subordinate standards of doctrine, worship, and government.’’
In 1858 circumstances arose which, in the opinion of many, seemed fitted to demonstrate to the Free Church that her freedom was an illusion, and that all her sacrifices had been made in vain. Mr John Macmillan, minister of Cardross, accused of immorality, had been tried and found guilty by the Free Presbytery of Dumbarton. Appeal having been taken to the synod, an attempt was there made to revive one particular charge, of which he had been finally acquitted by the presbytery; and this attempt was successful in the General Assembly. That ultimate court of review did not confine itself to the points appealed, but went into the merits of the whole case as it had originally come before the presbytery. The result was a sentence of suspension. Mr Macmillan, believing that the Assembly had acted with some irregularity, applied to the Court of Session for an interdict against the execution of that sentence; and for this act he was summoned to the bar of the Assembly to say whether or...
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FREE IMPERIAL CITIES is the ordinary English translation of Freie Reichs-Städte, a technical expression in German history. In Germany, as in other countries of Europe, a considerable number of towns succeeded, in the midst of the dynastic confusion of the Middle Ages, in maintaining or acquiring more or less complete independence of the state or sovereign within whose territory they were situated. This they effected partly by forming defensive leagues with each other, and partly by procuring, in return for service or money, privileges and protection from the successive occupants of the imperial throne. Of these free towns a certain proportion rose by commerce and industry to a position of great influence, and ultimately took rank along with kingdoms and principalities as integral members of the body politic of the empire. They first appear distinctly in this character in the reign of Henry VII. (1308- 1313). Their number was continually fluctuating, for their liberties were almost as easily lost as they were with difficulty acquired. Most of them had to maintain a continual conflict by war or diplomacy with the ecclesiastical or secular potentates of their district, and not unfrequently their interests were betrayed by the emperors themselves. Mainz, which in the 13th century was at the head of the Rheinisches Städtebund, or confederation of the cities of the Rhine, was conquered in 1462, and subjected to the bishop’s see; Zwickau, Altenburg, and Chemnitz, put in pawn first by Frederick II. and afterwards by several of the later emperors, thus fell into the hands of the dukes of Saxony; other free cities placed themselves of their own accord under the control of prince or bishop; some, as Donauworth, were deprived of their privileges by the emperors on account of ...real or alleged offences; others again were separated from the empire by foreign conquest, as Hainault or Hagenau, Colmar, Schlett-stedt, Weissenburg, Landau, and Besançon by Louis XIV.; and Basel notably preferred to cast in its lot with the rising confederation of Switzerland. At the diet of Augsburg in 1474 the free imperial cities divided themselves for the first time into two benches, the Rhenish and the Swabian, the former also including those of Alsace, Wetterau, Thuringia, and Saxony, and the latter those of Franconia. They were formally constituted the third collegium of the diet by the peace of Westphalia in 1648. At the time of the French Revolution they still numbered 51,—the Rhenish bench comprising Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle or Aachen, Lübeck, Worms, Spires, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Goslar, Bremen, Hamburg, Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, Dortmund, Friedberg, and Wetzlar; and the Swabian bench, Ratisbon or Regensburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Esslingen, Reutlingen, Nördlingen, Rothenburg on the Tauber, Schwäbisch-Hall, Roth weil, Ueberlingen, Heilbronn, Gmünd, Memmingen, Lindau, Dinkelsbühl, Biberach, Ravensburg, Schweinfurt, Kempten, Windsheim, Kaufbeuem, Weil, Wangen, Isny, Pfullendorf, Offenburg, Leutkirchen, Wimpfen, Weissenburg in the Nordgau, Giengen, Gengenbach, Zeíl on the Hammerbach, Buchhorn, Ahlen, Buchau, Bopfingen. A large proportion of these towns had then at least as little claim to their exceptional position as the pocket-burghs of England before the passing of the Reform Act. By the decision of the imperial deputation of 1803 (Reichsdeputationshauptschluss) Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Worms, and Spires were assigned to France; only six, Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Augsburg, Frankfort-on-the-
Main, and Nuremberg were allowed to retain their Reichsfreiheit, or, in other words, to hold directly of the empire. On the dissolution of the empire in 1806, Augsburg and Nuremberg were given to Bavaria, and Frankfort was made the seat of Count Dahlberg, the archbishop and electoral prince of Mainz, who was appointed primate of the confederation of the Rhine. On the establishment of the German confederation in 1815, Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Frankfort were recognized as free cities, and the first three still hold that position in the new German empire; but Frankfort, in consequence of the part it took in the war of 1866, has been degraded to the rank of an ordinary Prussian town.
In the earlier centuries of their existence the free cities of the empire were under the jurisdiction of two imperial officers, one of whom, the imperial advocate or Reichsvogt, took charge of criminal cases, and the other, the imperial procurator or Reichs-Schultheiss or Schuldheiss, dealt with the civil cases. As time went on many of the cities purchased the right of filling these offices with members of the principality; and in several instances the imperial authority fell practically into desuetude except when it was roused into action by peculiar circumstances, such as a dispute between the citizens and their magistrates. The internal constitution of the cities was organized after no common type; but there w ere several of them whose privileges were drawn up in imitation of those of Cologne, which had been one of the very first to assert its independence.
See J. J. Moser, Rcichsstädtisches Handbuch, Tübingen, 1732; D. Hänlein, Anmerkungen über die Geschichte der Reichsstädte, Ulm, 1775; Á. Wendt, Beschreibung der kaiserl. freien Reichsstädte, Leipsic, 1804; G. W. Hugo, Die Mediatisirung der deutschen Reichsstädte, Carlsruhe, 1838; Ñ adz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte.
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FREE TRADE. This expression has been appropriated, in a somewhat technical manner, to denote an unimpeded intercourse between such manufacturing and commercial communities as, having reciprocal interests, are under separate governments, and thereupon have separate financial systems. Thus the term is not applied to the facilities which town and country, labourer and capitalist, have obtained for reciprocal exchange, though these facilities have been acquired only in comparatively recent times. It is not used to describe the commercial intercourse of the three kingdoms, though restraints on the trade between Scotland and Ireland on the one side and England on the other were remitted, long after a political union between the three kingdoms had been effected, very grudgingly and very cautiously. Again, if we speak of free trade in land or free trade in banking, we use the term in a different sense from that in which it has been employed since the time of Adam Smith. But the phrase is technically used to designate such a commercial intercourse between any particular country, its colonies, and foreign countries, as gives the maximum of facilities for reciprocal exchange, and in the least degree attempts to make a fiscal system the means for stimulating and assisting domestic industry by protective enactments....
Free trade in the sense given to it above is advocated on two principal grounds, the one economical, the other political; and all arguments alleged in favour of it can be brought under one or other of these topics. It is resisted similarly for economical and political reasons,— not, indeed, in contradiction to those which are adduced in its favour, for these are absolutely irrefragable, but on the grounds that the industries of a country ought not to be defined by merely economical reasons, and that there are political interests which will not indeed annul, but must materially modify the universal and undeviating application of the free-trade principle. It will be the object of the present article to give a brief account of the controversy between the advocates of commercial freedom and those of commercial restraint, and to show how events, due to opinions which have long become obsolete, have strengthened the position of those who urge that the restraint of trade is and should be part of the function of Government. It is perhaps necessary, however, to meet an objection at once which might be taken, if it were not anticipated. Every civilized Government rightly and properly undertakes the supervision of contracts,—prohibiting some altogether, regulating others with less or greater strictness, and assuming the right to give an equitable interpretation to all; the application of the principles of equity to contracts being the most important improvement which modern civilization has induced on jurisprudence. Thus the law of civilized nations forbids any contract which would reduce one of the contracting parties to permanent slavery, though it compels the fulfilment of bargains which involve the temporary servitude of one of the parties. Again, it nullifies immoral bargains, though it does not profess to follow the consequences which a bargain that is prima facie innocent may have. Again, it subjects some callings to a police, either by exacting, in the case of certain professions, evidence of the individual’s capacity, or by guarding continuously against any abuse which may arise from the exercise of a calling specially open to abuse, as in the case of houses for public entertainment, and the issue of paper money by banks. Furthermore, it subjects even simple contracts to revision,—as, for example, cases in which exorbitant charges are made for loans. In these instances, and in others like them, a Government is only carrying out its primary duty in protecting its people from force or fraud, by controlling the free action of those who may inflict a serious injury on others. To define the extent indeed, to which such interference is necessary or desirable, is one of the hardest questions in what may be called the casuistry of politics. A country may be so overgoverned by a watchful administration as to lose, to a greater or less extent, the spirit of enterprise or initiation, and thereby to be weakened in the legitimate rivalry of nations. But, on the other hand, it may be still more seriously weakened by the destruction of credit or confidence,—a result which is very likely to ensue when fraud is successful and unpunished.
Similarly a Government may control or prohibit intercourse between nations. If individuals have rights at all, one of the most obvious and important of these rights is that of choosing a market for their labour. But a Govern ment would be admittedly justified in prohibiting the emigration of such artisans as are employed in the manufacture of munitions of war to a country with which itself was at war. It does more when it does not allow its harbours to be a refuge or a market for belligerents’ ships, and prevents private individuals from supplying munitions of war to combatants. A fortiori, it would not allow its subjects to sell such goods to its enemies as might enable those enemies to protract their defence. It is a question whether it is not entitled to prohibit, or at least restrain, the exportation of that over which it is able to exercise a monopoly, though it is very seldom, if indeed it is ever the case, that any country is in so advantageous a position. And, lastly, it is allowed that a Government may make the commercial intercourse of its subjects a matter of bargain with the Government of other countries, though such expedients, from an economical point of view, have been subjected to very adverse criticism. Free trade, then, must be innocuous and not hostile to the general public good.
Between nations, free trade represents the well-known principle of the Division of Employments. The advantages which result from the natural or spontaneous division of employments, and the loss which ensues from a forced division of employments, are the commonplaces of economists. But the fact that exactly the same principle rules the distribution of production over such parts of the world as are occupied by industrial agents is not so frequently insisted on. That there are several commodities which a country cannot produce at all, or can only produce under circumstances so disadvantageous as to involve disproportionate expense or loss, is admitted by every Government, however anxious it may be to develop native industry by protective regulations. No European Government, however imperfectly civilized, would attempt to direct its home industries into the production of tea, coffee, and chocolate, or to domesticate elephants for the sake of their ivory, or to breed ostriches for the sake of their plumes, or to maintain a race of wild hogs in order to obtain a due supply of bristles from native sources. But there are in most countries a number of industries the continuity of which Governments have attempted, and still attempt, to promote, by hindering the free entrance of foreign-made articles of the same kind. It will be found that, historically, this practice has had its origin in what is now understood to be a delusion as to the true functions of the currency.
The restraint of production and trade was a policy which ancient civilization never adopted. The great statesman of Athens congratulates his audience on the fact that, thanks to the extended commerce of their country, they are as familiar with the use of foreign products as they are with those of domestic industry, and use them even as freely as the country of their origin does. The public opinion of Greece was profoundly shocked when, as a measure of political animosity, Athens excluded a Greek city, Megara, from its market. The oldest public document preserved in the Roman archives was a commercial treaty with Carthage (Polybius, xii. 22), in which Roman merchants are indeed restrained from traffic in certain districts, more, we may be certain, from fear of the Carthaginian occupation of Italy thin for other reasons, for the treaty expressly exempts traffic from tolls, and prescribes that Carthage shall build no factories in Latium. Nor is there any record of restraint put upon the distribution of the precious metals, except in one oration of Cicero, where the orator, defending his client from a charge of extorting money from the Asiatic Jews, comments on the public policy of hindering this people from disturbing the money market by sending great remittances of specie to Jerusalem.
Perhaps the explanation of the fact that the civilization of antiquity did not interfere with the process of international exchange is to be found in the prevalence of slavery. Setting aside for a moment the historical origin of modern protection, the influence and apparent truth of the mercantile system of which we shall speak immediately, there is a radical difference between ancient and modern civilization,—that in the former slavery was deemed natural, in the latter it has been seen to be mischievous and felt to be detestable. In modern societies, therefore, the free labourer is a factor in the interpretation of economical forces; in ancient ones,he counted for nothing, or next to nothing. To have prohibited free trade in the products of foreign labour at Athens would have been to give advantage to one class of slave-holders in opposition or in contrast to another class of slave-holders, and was not to be thought of. To prohibit free trade between England and France, or England and the United States, is, in appearance at least, to assist the home labour of the country which adopts protection against the rivalry of free labour in another country which might undersell its rivals. Protection in ancient times would have been seen to be naked selfishness; in modern times, it may seem to be a genuine and disinterested patriotism. And it may be observed that, for this and for other reasons, most slave-holding countries have been indifferent to protective regulations, or even unfriendly to them. This fact is sufficiently illustrated by the contrast of opinion in the northern and southern States of the American Union before the war of secession.
The control of production and trade in modern Europe is historically due to the development of what Adam Smith called the mercantile system, i.e., the effort of Government to secure as far as possible the largest possible amount of specie within the country whose affairs it administered. It is easy to discover the origin of this policy. To a Government which spends, but does not produce, the possession of treasure is of the greatest utility and service. To an individual who produces and trades, still more to one who trades only, treasure is, as a rule, the least valuable instrument of traffic, as it is an article from which, as it is affected by the least possible variation in value, the least amount of profit can be anticipated by those who deal in it as an article of trade. A trader in the Middle Ages would have readily accepted the doctrine that money was wealth as far as regarded every one but himself; as far as he was concerned, he wished to get rid of his money as soon as he could, in exchange for goods, on which he might secure his profits. The doctrine that the machinery of international trade supplied the process by which the precious metals were distributed, and that therefore, if trade were to exist, the attempts of Government to restrain the exportation of money were mischievous or nugatory, was argued as early as the middle of the 14 th century by Sanuto the Venetian, and by Oresme the bishop of Lisieux, in language as precise as any used by Turgot or Adam Smith. The reasonings, however, by which protective theories were upheld, the mean and malignant arguments of restraint, as Adam Smith calls them, were always strengthened in England up to thirty years ago, by suggesting the hideous consequences which would come on the nation from a drain of gold. Protection had its origin in the reputed duty of Government towards the currency. Once established, it created artificial interests whose existence was a loss to the whole community, but whose maintenance seemed to be the satisfaction of a contract entered into between the Government and the industry which the Government had called into being or had stimulated.
It will be clear that if any particular industry is of such a character as to be very conveniently carried out by the inhabitants of a particular community or district, if the producer fears no rival in the home market, and still more if he dreads no competition in a foreign market, any protection accorded to his industry most be wholly superfluous.
He might even contemplate an export duty with equanimity, though of course an export duty would be destructive of his foreign market if he had real rivals, and he would generally And that such a duty would not only limit the consumption of his produce, but would call a rivalry into existence. It is equally clear that if a protective duty were imposed on the importation of foreign commodities into a country which has already a marked superiority over other countries in these commodities, the regulation would have no effect in increasiug either the profits of the producer or the cost of the article to the consumer,—that, in short, the enactment would be absolutely nugatory. It will be also plain that, in every country, there are certain commodities which are effectually shielded from foreign rivalry by the cost of carriage, and that such commodities possess the superiority which other products enjoy from the peculiar facilities which a particular country has in manufacturing them. A protective system then is inevitably concerned with such products as are liable to foreign rivalry, and a foreign rivalry can only be defeated at the cost of the consumer. But as the protective regulation can affect prices in that country only which imposes the regulation, it is obvious that the only person who can be made to bear the increased cost which the protective restraint imposes will be the home consumer. If the produce could find a market at home, there would be no need of the assistance; if it cannot subsist at home without a machinery which guarantees the profit of the producer, the domestic consumer is the only person who can be made to contribute the fund from which the profit is made.
The positions stated above receive a significant but complete illustration from the economical history of England. A century ago the English landowners were free traders, the English merchants protectionists. Adam Smith rested all his hopes of a better system on the former class, but despaired of any co-operation from the latter. Twenty years after the Wealth of Nations was published, the mercantile and manufacturing classes, with few exceptions, were free traders; the landowners, with few exceptions, were protectionists. The explanation of the change in sentiment is to be found in the change of interests. Up to the middle of the 18th century England exported considerable quantities of agricultural produce,—sometimes naturally, at other times under the wholly indefensible stimulus of a bounty on exportation. Now it needs very little intelligence to discover that the profits of an exporter, or at any rate the extension of his trade, depend largely on the variety of imports which he can obtain in exchange for his goods. A country which puts no hindrance on imports always deals to the greatest advantage, and the advantage decreases with restraint. If a country refused to admit any import but one, i.e., money, it would sell its exports in the worst possible market, and for the least possible value, receiving in return an article which the machinery of its trade takes the most effectual possible means to depreciate. Hence the landowners of the 18th century, like the agriculturists of the western and southern States of America now, were free-traders, because free trade was their best hope of profit. The manufacturers, on the other hand, were profoundly afraid of foreign rivalry, even the rivalry of the British colonies, even the rivalry of Ireland. Perhaps the most grotesque illustration of this fear was the law which directed under strict penalties that the dead should be buried in woollen, in order to encourage the woollen manufactures.
The change of sentiment was due to the great mechanical industries of the 18th century. The discoveries of Ark wright, of Watt, of Hargreaves, Of Crompton, gave England a practical monopoly of textile fabrics, and subsequently of other products nearly as important. No doubt the Berlin and Milan decrees interfered with the Continental trade of England, though it is well known that Napoleon’s soldiers were clothed, in spite of these decrees, in the produce of north-eastern and west country looms. But in other parts of the world England had no rivals, while her supremacy on sea, after the great victory of Trafalgar, guaranteed her traffic. Hence, when the merchant and manufacturer, especially the latter, discovered that protection had ceased to be an advantage to them, and discovered also, for the reasons given above, that the restraint of imports was a disadvantage to production and exportation, the principles of free trade made rapid progress in the manufacturing districts of England. But on the other hand, the very reverse opinion influenced the minds of the landowners. Owing partly to the succession of late harvests, partly to the rapid growth of population consequent upon manufacturing enterprise, partly to the restriction of Continental supply, the result of war, of the great drain which war made on the agricultural population of Europe, and of hindrances put on the import of food,—rents and farmers’ profits rose with amazing rapidity, and the Corn Law of 1815 was enacted in order to secure, if possible, the permanence of such rents and profits. The partisans of free trade and protection weιe only by accident allied to the great historical parties of English public life. The struggle for free trade was really one between town and country, as hereafter efforts in the same direction will get their advocates from the same classes.
It may be believed that, in England at least, the question of protection to manufactures is finally settled, though there are not wanting persons who advocate reciprocity, co-ordinate taxation on foreign products, retaliatory duties on reputed bounties, and the like. But the traditions of legislation are too firmly fixed, and the benefits of free trade experienced during the past thirty years are so generally admitted, that the advocacy of the exploded theory of protection is looked on as a harmless wshim wshich has no chance of popularity. It is not perhaps equally clear that the English people are quite safe against the revival of protection to agriculture under the pretence of sanitary restraint, for that which is the inevitable result of protection to manufacture, the limitation of voluntary consumption, is not so markedly developed from the protection which may be accorded to articles of necessary consumption.
When trade is restrained in those articles of foreign origin which may be produced, though under less advantageous circumstances, at home, and the product is an article in which the use may, to a limited extent only, be economized, the following results ensue :—Prices rise, and profits rise,—of course, at the expense of the consumer; wages, however, do not rise, for in so far as wages are determined by the competition of employers for services, the tendency is towards a reduction of wages, seeing that the use of the product is not increased but rather stinted. Now, the extra profits which protection accords might be secured to those who are already employed in the particular industry thus favoured only if the producers have a natural monopoly in the produce of their calling, as was practically the case with the English landowners during the existence of the corn laws, or if the law restrains other persons from competing against them, as was the case in England with Eastern produce during the continuance of the East India Company’s chartered trade. If such an advantage be not accorded, capital makes its way to the favoured industry'; or, to be more accurate, an increasing’number of employers compete for the exceptional profit. Such an operation may in some degree raise the rate of wages, though here again, unless the labour be protected by some arrangement, such as apprenticeship, or by the machinery of a strict trade union, the same cause which attracted the energies of the employer will rapidly, even more rapidly, supply what may be needed in the way of labour. Generally, indeed, the check to such a decline in wages is supplied by trades unions, which are, as the industrial experience of the United States has proved, the inevitable outcome of a protective system in a country where combinations of labour are not prohibited by law. In England up to 1824 they were prohibited.
In course of time then, and generally at an early period, the...
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