The lord chief justice of England or of the Queen’s Bench .traces his descent from the justiciar of the Norman kings. This officer appears first as the lieutenant or deputy of the king, exercising all the functions of the regal office in the .absence of the sovereign. “In this capacity William Fitz-Osbern, the steward of Normandy, and Odo of Bayeux, acted during the Conqueror’s visit to the Continent in 1067; they were left, according to William of Poitiers, the former to govern the north of England, the latter to hold rule in Kent, vice sua ∙, Florence of Worcester describes them as “custodes Angliae,” and Ordericus Vitalis gives to their office the name of “praefectura.” It would seem most probable that William Fitz-Osbern at least was left in his character of steward, and that the Norman seneschalship was thus the origin of the English justiciarship,” Stubbs’s Constitutional History, vol. i. p. 346. The same authority observes that William of Warenne and Richard of Bien-faite, who were left in charge of England in 1074, are named by a writer in the next generation “praecipui Angliae justitiarii”; but he considers the name to have not yet been definitely attached to any particular office, and that there is no evidence to show that officers appointed to this trust exercised any functions at all when the king was at home, or in his absence exercised supreme judicial authority to the exclusion of other high officers of the court. The office became permanent in the reign of William Rufus, .and in the hands of Ranulf Flambard it became coextensive with the supreme powers of government. For some time, however, the title of justiciar seems not to have been •definitely appropriated to this high minister. Judges of the curia regis were occasionally so named, and it was not till the reign of Henry II. that the chief officer of the crown acquired the exclusive right to the title of capitalis or totins Angliae, justitiarûis. Canon Stubbs considers that the English form of the office is to be accounted for by the king’s desire to prevent the administration falling into the hands of an hereditary noble. The early justiciars were •clerics, in whom the possession of power could not become hereditary. The justiciar continued to be the chief officer of state, next to the king, until the fall of Hubert de Burgh (in the reign of King John), described by Mr Stubbs as the last of the great justiciars. Henceforward, according to Mr Stubbs, the office may be regarded as virtually extinct, or it may be said to have survived only in the judicial functions, which were merely part of the official character I of the chief justiciar. He was at the head of the curia i regis, which was separating itself into the three historical ∣courts of common law about the time when the justiciarship I was falling from the supreme place. The chancellor took I the place of the justiciar in council, the treasurer in the ιexchequer, while the two offshots from the curia regis, the [Common Pleas and the Exchequer, received chiefs of their I own. The Queen’s Bench represented the original stock of [the curia regis, and its chief justice the great justiciar. The justiciar may, therefore, be said to have become from a political a purely judicial officer. A similar development ,awaited his successful rival the chancellor.

I The lord chief justice is, next to the lord chancellor, the highest judicial dignitary in the kingdom. The office is .generally the prize of the chief law officer of the Government, and political considerations, therefore, enter largely into the appointment. But the chief justices have been generally worthy of their great position. The list of them contains the names of some of the greatest masters of the common law, among whom pre-eminent rank must be assigned to Hale, Coke, Holt, Mansfield, and Cockburn. Lord Campbell has written the Lives of the Chief Justices, in 3 vols. A list of the lords chief justices will be found in Haydn’s Book of Dignities, 1851. Robert de Brus, said by Fox to be the first judge who took the distinctive title of lord chief justice of the King’s Bench (1268), was the grandfather of Robert the Bruce, king of Scotland.

In the United States the supreme court consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices, any five of whom make a quorum. The salary of the chief justice is $10,500, and that of the associates $10,000.

ADMINISTRATION OF. According to the Mosaic law, there were to be judges in all the cities, whose duty it was likewise to exercise judicial authority in the neighbouring villages; but weighty causes and appeals went up to the supreme judge or ruler of the commonwealth, and, in case of a failure here, to the high priest, Deut. xvii, 8, 9. In the time of the monarchy, weighty causes and appeals went up, of course, to the king, who, in very difficult cases, seems to have consulted the high priest, as is customary at the present day among the Persians and Ottomans. The judicial establishment was reorganized after the captivity, and two classes of judges, the inferior and superior, were appointed, Ezra vii, 25. The more difficult cases, nevertheless, and appeals, were either brought before the ruler of the state, called פחה, or before the high priest; until, in the age of the Maccabees, a supreme, judicial tribunal was instituted, which is first mentioned under Hyrcanus II. This tribunal is not to be confounded with the seventy-two counsellors, who were appointed to assist Moses in the civil administration of the government, but who never filled the office of judges. See SANHEDRIM. Josephus states, that in every city there was a tribunal of seven judges, with two Levites as apparitors, and that it was a Mosaic institution. That there existed such an institution in his time, there is no reason to doubt, but he probably erred in referring its origin to so early a period as the days of Moses. (See _Judges_.) This tribunal, which decided causes of less moment, is denominated in the New Testament κρίσις, or _the judgment_, Matt. v, 22. The Talmudists mention a tribunal of twenty-three judges, and another of three judges; but Josephus is silent in respect to them. The courts of twenty-three judges were the same with the synagogue tribunals, mentioned in John xvi, 2; which merely tried questions of a religious nature, and sentenced to no other punishment than “forty stripes save one,” 2 Cor. xi, 24. The court of three judges was merely a session of referees, which was allowed to the Jews by the Roman laws; for the Talmudists themselves, in describing this court, go on to observe, that one judge was chosen by the accuser, another by the accused, and a third by the two parties conjunctly; which shows at once the nature of the tribunal. The time at which courts were held, and causes were brought before them for trial, was in the morning, Jer. xxi, 12; Psalm ci, 8. According to the Talmudists, it was not lawful to try causes of a capital nature in the night; and it was equally unlawful to examine a cause, pass sentence, and put it in execution on the same day. The last particular was very strenuously insisted on. It is worthy of remark, that all of these practices, which were observed in other trials, were neglected in the tumultuous trial of Jesus, Matt. xxvi, 57; John xviii, 13–18. The places for judicial trials were in very ancient times the gates of cities, which were well adapted to this purpose. (See _Gates_.) Originally, trials were every where very summary, excepting in Egypt; where the accuser committed the charge to writing, the accused replied in writing, the accuser repeated the charge, and the accused answered again, &c, Job xiv, 17. It was customary in Egypt for the judge to have the code of laws placed before him, a practice which still prevails in the east. Moses interdicted, in the most express and decided manner, gifts or bribes, which were intended to corrupt the judges, Exod. xxii, 20, 21; xxiii, 1–9; Lev. xix, 15; Deut. xxiv, 14, 15. Moses also, by legal precautions, prevented capital punishments, and corporal punishments which were not capital, from being extended, as was done in other nations, both to parents and their children, and thus involving the innocent and the guilty in that misery which was justly due only to the latter, Exod. xxiii, 7; Deut. xxiv, 16; Dan. vi, 24. The ceremonies which were observed in conducting a judicial trial, were as follows: 1. The accuser and the accused both made their appearance before the judge or judges, Deut. xxv, 1, who sat with legs crossed upon the floor, which was furnished for their accommodation with carpet and cushions. A secretary was present, at least in more modern times, who wrote down the sentence, and, indeed, every thing in relation to the trial; for instance, the articles of agreement that might be entered into previous to the commencement of the judicial proceedings, Isaiah x, 1, 2; Jer. xxxii, 1–14. The Jews assert that there were two secretaries, the one being seated to the right of the judge, who wrote the sentence of not guilty, the other to the left, who wrote the sentence of condemnation, Matt. xxv, 33–46. That an apparitor or beadle was present, is apparent from other sources. 2. The accuser was denominated in Hebrew שטן, or _the adversary_, Zech. iii, 1–3; Psalm cix, 6. The judge or judges were seated, but both of the parties implicated stood up, the accuser standing to the right hand of the accused: the latter, at least after the captivity, when the cause was one of great consequence, appeared with hair dishevelled, and in a garment of mourning. 3. The witnesses were sworn, and, in capital cases, the parties concerned, 1 Sam. xiv, 37–40; Matt. xxvi, 63. In order to establish the charges alleged, two witnesses were necessary, and, including the accuser, three. The witnesses were examined separately, but the person accused had the liberty to be present when their testimony was given in, Num. xxxv, 30; Deut. xvii, 1–15; Matt. xxvi, 59. Proofs might be brought from other sources; for instance, from written contracts, or from papers in evidence of any thing purchased or sold, of which there were commonly taken two copies, the one to be sealed, the other to be left open, as was customary in the time of Jerom, Jer. xxxii, 10–13. 4. The parties sometimes, as may be inferred from Prov. xviii, 18, made use of the lot in determining the points of difficulty between them, but not without a mutual agreement. The sacred lot of Urim and Thummim was anciently resorted to, in order to detect the guilty, Joshua vii, 14–24; 1 Sam. xiv; but the determination of a case of right or wrong in this way was not commanded by Moses. 5. The sentence, very soon after the completion of the examination, was pronounced; and the criminal, without any delay, even if the offence were a capital one, was hastened away to the place of punishment, Joshua vii, 22, &c; 1 Sam. xxii, 18; 1 Kings ii, 23.

The commission of the peace is addressed to all the justices of the county, and assigns to them the duty of keeping and causing to be kept all ordinances and statutes for the good of the peace and for preservation of the same, and for the quiet rule and government of the people, and further assigns “to you and every two or more of you (of whom any one of the aforesaid A, B, C, D, &c., we will, shall be one) to inquire the truth more fully by the oath of good and lawful men of the county of all and all manner of felonies, poisonings, enchantments, sorceries, arts, magic, trespasses, forestallings, regratings, engrossings, and extortions whatever.” This part of the commission is the authority for the jurisdiction of the justices in sessions. Justices named specially in the parenthetical clause are said to be on the quorum. Justices cannot act beyond the limits of the county for which they are appointed, and the warrant of a justice cannot be executed out of his county unless it be backed, that is, endorsed by a justice of the county in which it is to be carried into execution. A justice improperly refusing to act on his office, or acting partially and corruptly, may be proceeded against by a criminal information, and a justice refusing to act may be compelled to do so by the High Court of Justice. An action will lie against a justice for any act done by him in excess of his jurisdiction, and for any act within his jurisdiction which has been done wrongfully and with malice, and without reasonable or probable cause. But no action can be brought against a justice for a wrongful conviction until it has been quashed. By 18 Geo. II. c. 20 every justice for a county must have an estate of freehold, copyhold, or customary tenure in fee, for life or a given term, of the yearly value of £100. The vast and multifarious duties of the justices cover some portion of every important head of the criminal law, and extend to a considerable number of matters relating to the civil law. A complete guide thereto is Burn’s Justice of the Peace, in 5 large volumes, the thirtieth edition of which was published in 1869.

In the United States these officers are sometimes appointed by the executive, sometimes elected. “In some, perhaps all, of the United States, justices of the peace have jurisdiction in civil cases given to them by local regulations” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary).

The immediate results of justification are (1.) The restoration of amity and intercourse between the pardoned sinner and the pardoning God. For, “being justified by faith, we have peace with God,” and, consequently, unforbidden access to him. The matter and ground of God’s controversy with us being then removed by his act of gracious absolution, we become the objects of his friendship. “Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness; and he was” immediately “called the friend of God,” Jas. ii, 23; and so are all those who are similarly justified. This reconciliation, however, does not extend to their instant and absolute deliverance from all those evils which transgression has entailed on man. They are still liable, for a season, to affliction and pain, to temporal suffering and mortality. These are portions of the original curse from which their justification does not as yet release them. But it entitles them to such supports under all remaining trouble, and to such promises of a sanctifying influence with it, as will, if embraced, “turn the curse into a blessing.” Whom the Lord loveth, he may still chasten, and in very faithfulness afflict them. But these are acts of salutary discipline, rather than of vindictive displeasure. His friendship, not his righteous hostility, is the principle from which they all proceed; and the salvation, not the destruction, of the sufferer is the end to which they are all directed. (2.) Another immediate result of justification is the adoption of the persons justified into the family of God, and their consequent right to eternal life of body and soul. God condescends to become not only their Friend, but their Father; they are the objects not merely of his amicable regard, but of his paternal tenderness. And, admitted to the relation of children, they become entitled to the children’s inheritance; for, “if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together,” Rom. viii, 17. (3.) With these results of justification is inseparably connected another, of the utmost value and importance; namely, _the habitual indwelling of the Holy Spirit_. “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us; that the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles through Jesus Christ; that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith,” Gal. iii, 13, 14. “Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts,” Gal. iv, 6. With the remission of sins, St. Peter also connects, as an immediate result, as a distinct but yet a simultaneous blessing, “the gift of the Holy Ghost,” Acts ii, 38. And in the fifth verse of this chapter, the Holy Ghost is said to be given to those who are justified by faith. Of this indwelling the immediate effects are, (i.) _Tranquillity of conscience_. For he testifies and manifests to those in whom he dwells their free justification and gracious adoption. The spirit which such persons have received is “not the spirit of bondage to fear, but the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God,” Rom. viii, 15, 16. (ii.) _Power over sin_; a prevailing desire and ability to walk before God in holy obedience. No sooner is the Holy Spirit enthroned in the heart, than he begins to make all things new. In his genuine work, purity is always connected with consolation. Those to whom he witnesses their freedom from condemnation he also enables to “walk, not after the flesh, but after the Spirit,” Rom. viii, 1. (iii.) _A joyous hope of heaven._ Their title results from the fact of their adoption; their power to rejoice in hope, from the Spirit’s testimony of that fact. “We, through the Spirit, wait for the hope of righteousness by faith,” and “abound in hope, through the power of the Holy Ghost,” Gal. v, 5; Rom. xv, 13.

To have a complete view of the method by which justification and all its consequent blessings are attained, we must consider the originating, the meritorious, and the instrumental cause of justification. (1.) The originating cause is the grace, the free, undeserved, and spontaneous love of God toward fallen man. He remembered and pitied us in our low estate; for his mercy endureth for ever. “After that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. The grace of God bringeth salvation,” Titus ii, 11; iii, 4, 5. We are “justified freely by his grace,” Rom. iii, 24. But God is wise, and holy, and just, as well as merciful and gracious. And his wisdom determined, that, in order to reconcile the designs of his mercy toward sinners with the claims of his purity and justice, those designs should be accomplished only through the intervention of a divine Redeemer. We are justified “through our Lord Jesus Christ,” Rom. i, 5. (2.) Our Lord Jesus Christ is the sole meritorious cause of our justification. All he did and all he suffered in his mediatorial character may be said to have contributed to this great purpose. For what he did, in obedience to the precepts of the law, and what he suffered, in satisfaction of its penalty, taken together, constitute that mediatorial righteousness, for the sake of which the Father is ever well pleased in him. Now, in this mediatorial righteousness all who are justified have a saving interest. It is not meant that it is personally imputed to them in its formal nature or distinct acts; for against any such imputation there lie insuperable objections both from reason and from Scripture. But the collective merit and moral effects of all which the Mediator did and suffered are so reckoned to our account when we are justified, that, for the sake of Christ and in consideration of his obedience unto death, we are released from guilt, and accepted of God. From this statement of the meritorious cause of justification, it appears that while our pardon is, in its origin, an act of the highest grace, it is also, in its mode, an act most perfectly consistent with God’s essential righteousness, and demonstrative of his inviolable justice. It proceeds not on the principle of abolishing the law or its penalty; for that would have implied that the law was unduly rigorous, either in its precepts or in its sanctions. But it rests on the ground that the law has been magnified and vindicated, and that its penalty, or sufferings, which were fully equivalent to that penalty in a moral view, when the dignity of the sufferer is considered, have been sustained by our voluntary Substitute. Thus “grace reigns through righteousness,” not at the expense of righteousness. “Now, the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe: being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus,” Romans iii, 21–26. (3.) As to the instrumental cause of justification, the merit of the blood of Jesus does not operate necessarily so as to produce our pardon as an immediate and unavoidable effect, but through the instrumentality of faith. The faith by which we are justified is present faith, faith actually existing and exercised. We are not justified by to-morrow’s faith foreseen; for that would lead to the Antinomian notion of justification from eternity, a notion which to mention is to confute. We are not justified by yesterday’s faith recorded or remembered; for that would imply the opinion that justification is irreversible. The justification offered in the Scriptures is a justification upon believing, in which we are never savingly interested until we believe, and which continues in force only so long as we continue to believe. On all unbelievers the wrath of God abides. The atonement of Jesus was indeed accepted, as from him, at the time when it was offered; but it is not accepted, as for us, to our individual justification, until we individually believe, nor after we cease to believe. The OBJECT of justifying faith may be inferred from what has been before said, as to the originating and meritorious causes of justification. It has respect, in general, to all that Christ is set forth in the Gospel as doing or suffering, by the gracious appointment of the Father, in order to our redemption and pardon. But it has respect, in particular, to the atoning sacrifice of Christ, as exhibited by divine authority in the Scriptures, and as attested to be acceptable and sufficient by his resurrection from the dead, and by his mediatorial exaltation at the right hand of God. The acts or exercises of this faith seem to be three; or rather, that faith which is required in order to our justification is a complex act of the mind, which includes three distinct but concurrent exertions of its powers. It includes, (1.) The assent of the understanding to the truth of the testimony of God in the Gospel; and especially to that part of it which concerns the design and efficacy of the death of Jesus as a sacrifice for sin. (2.) The consent of the will and affections to this plan of salvation; such an approbation and choice of it as imply a renunciation of every other refuge, and a steady and decided preference of this. Unbelief is called a disallowing of the foundation laid in Zion; whereas faith includes a hearty allowance of it, and a thankful acquiescence in God’s revealed method of forgiveness. (3.) From this assent of the enlightened understanding, and consent of the rectified will, to the evangelical testimony concerning Christ crucified, results the third thing, which is supposed to be implied in justifying faith; namely, actual trust in the Saviour, and personal apprehension of his merits. When, under the promised leading and influence of the Holy Ghost, the penitent, sinner thus confidently relies and individually lays hold on Christ, then the work of justifying faith is complete; then, and not till then, he is immediately justified. On the whole, it may be said that the faith to which the privilege of justification is annexed, is such a belief of the Gospel, by the power of the Spirit of God, as leads us to come to Christ, to receive Christ, to trust in Christ, and to commit the keeping of our souls into his hands, in humble confidence of his ability and his willingness to save us. The grand doctrine of the Reformation was that of justification by faith, and was therefore held by all the Lutheran and Reformed churches. The Papists assert that man’s inherent righteousness is the meritorious cause of his justification; many Protestant divines have endeavoured to unite the two, and have held that men are justified by faith and good works; and others have equally departed from the opinions of the earliest reformers on the subject of justification, in representing it as resulting from the imputation of Christ’s active and passive righteousness to those that believe, instead of confining the imputation to the moral consequence and effect of both. In other words, that which is reckoned to us in our justification for righteousness is our faith in Christ’s merits, and that not because of any intrinsic value in faith; but only for the sake of those merits. In a mere moral sense man’s sin or righteousness is imputed to him, when he is considered as actually the doer of sinful or of righteous acts. A man’s sin or righteousness is imputed to him in its _legal consequence_, under a government of rewards and punishments; and then to impute sin or righteousness signifies, in a legal sense, to reckon and to account it, to acquit or condemn, and forthwith to punish, or to exempt from punishment. Thus Shimei entreats David, that he would “not impute folly to him,” that is, that he would not punish his folly. In this sense, too, David speaks of the blessedness of the man whose “transgression is forgiven,” and to whom the Lord “imputeth not sin,” that is, whom he forgives, so that the legal consequence of his sin shall not fall upon him. This non-imputation of sin, to a sinner, is expressly called the “imputation of righteousness, without works;” the imputation of righteousness is, then, the non-punishment, or the pardon of sin; and if this passage be read in its connection, it will also be seen, that by “imputing” faith for righteousness, the Apostle means precisely the same thing: “But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness; even as David also describeth the man to whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed is the man whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not sin.” This quotation from David would have been nothing to the Apostle’s purpose, unless he had understood the forgiveness of sins, and the imputation of righteousness, and the non-imputation of sin, to signify the same thing as “counting faith for righteousness,” with only this difference, that the introduction of the term “faith” marks the _manner_ in which the forgiveness of sin is obtained. To have faith imputed for righteousness, is nothing more than to be justified by faith, which is also called by St. Paul, “being made righteous,” that is, being placed by an act of free forgiveness, through faith in Christ, in the condition of righteous men, in this respect, that the penalty of the law does not lie against them, and that they are the acknowledged objects of the divine favour. See FAITH. KADESH-BARNEA, a station of the Israelites, to which they returned again after thirty-eight years, is said to be in the wilderness of Zin, Num. xiii, 21; xx, 1; Deut. xxxii, 51; but in the wilderness of Paran, Num. xii, 16. In the Itinerary it is simply called Rithmah, “the wilderness.” Dr. Hales observes, that Wells, Shaw, the authors of the “Universal History,” &c, have greatly perplexed and obscured the geography of this Itinerary, by supposing that there were two places of this name distinct from each other. They consider the latter of them as situated on the western side of Mount Hor, toward the land of Canaan, and thus confound it with that Kadesh in the land of the Philistines, where Abraham sojourned, Gen. xvi, 13; xx, 1. But that it lay on the east side of Mount Hor, is evident; for why should Moses send messengers from Kadesh to the king of Edom, requesting permission to pass through his territories in the way to Canaan, if they were already at the verge of Palestine, Num. xx, 14? This application, however, was necessary if his territories were situated between Canaan and the Israelites. The true situation of Kadesh is ascertained beyond a doubt, from its lying between Mount Hor and Ezion-Geber, on the Elanitic Gulf, Num. xxxiii, 35–37.