A definite period in history distinguished by some special characteristic, such as great literary activity, is generally styled, with some appropriate epithet, an age. It is usual, for example, to speak of the age of Pericles, the Augustan age, the Elizabethan age; of the age of the crusades, the dark ages, the middle ages, the age of steam. Such isolated periods, λvith no continuity or necessary connection of any kind, are obviously quite distinct from the ages or organically-related periods into which certain eminent modern philosophers have divided the whole course of human history. According to Fichte’s scheme there are five ages, distinguished by the relative predominance which instinct, external authority, and reason have in them respectively, instinct being supreme in the first and reason in the last. Comte’s scheme distinguishes three ages according to the state of knowledge in each, and he supposes that we are now entering upon the third of these. In the first age of his scheme knowledge is supernatural or fictitious; in the second it is metaphysical or abstract; in the third it is positive or scientific. Schemes somewhat similar have been proposed by other philosophers, chiefly of France and Germany, and seem to be regarded by them as essential to any complete science of history.

In relation to individual as well as to social life, age is used with a considerable variety of application. It frequently denotes the total duration of life in man, animals, or plants, and in this sense belongs to the subject of Longevity ( q.v. ) It also denotes in man the various periods into which his life may be divided, either from a physiological or from a legal point of view. In the former aspect perhaps the most common division is into the four ages of infancy, youth, manhood, and old age. These again have been increased to six or seven by some physiologists—infancy, childhood, boyhood or girlhood, adolescence, manhood or womanhood, age, and old age or second childhood. While both schemes have a sufficient basis of scientific accuracy, they have also each attracted the fancy of the poet. Ovid in his Metamorphoses (xv. 198-213) makes a beautiful comparison between the four ages of a man’s life and the four seasons of the year, in a passage which has been frequently imitated; and the sevenfold division has been exquisitely cast into poetic form by Shakespeare in As You Like It, act ii. scene 7. The division of human life into periods for legal purposes is naturally more sharp and definite than the foregoing. It would be unscientific in the physiologist to name any precise year for the transition from one of his stages to another, inasmuch as that differs very considerably among different nations, and even to some extent among different individuals of the same nation. But the law must necessarily be fixed and uniform, and even where it professes to proceed according to nature, must be more precise than nature. The Roman law divided human life for its purposes into four chief periods, which had their subdivisions—(1.) Infantia, lasting till the close of the seventh year; (2.) The period between infantia and pubertas, males becoming puberes at fourteen and females at twelve; (3.) Adolescentia, the period between puberty and majority; and (4.) The period after the twenty-fifth year, when males become majores. The first period was one of total legal incapacity; in the second period a person could lawfully do certain specified acts, but only with the sanction of his tutor or guardian; in the third the restrictions were fewer, males being permitted to manage their own property, contract marriage, and make a will; but majority was not reached until the age of twenty-five. By English law there are two great periods into which life is divided— infancy, which lasts in both sexes until the twenty-first year, and manhood or womanhood. The period of infancy, again, is divided into several stages, marked by the growing development both of rights and obligations. Thus at twelve years of age a male may take the oath of allegiance; at fourteen both sexes are held to have arrived at years of discretion, and may therefore choose guardians, give evidence, and consent or disagree to a marriage. A female has the last privilege from the twelfth year, but the marriage cannot be celebrated until the majority of the parties without the consent of parents or guardians. At fourteen, too, both sexes are fully responsible to the criminal law. Between seven and fourteen there is responsibility only if the accused be proved doli capax, capable of discerning between right and wrong, the principle in that case being that malitia supplet oetatem. At twenty-one both males and females obtain their full legal rights, and become liable to all legal obligations. A seat in the British Parliament may be taken at twenty-one. Certain professions, however, demand as a qualification in entrants a more advanced age than that of legal manhood. In the church a candidate for deacon’s orders must be twenty-three, and for priest’s orders twenty-four years of age; and no clergyman is eligible for a bishopric under thirty. In Scotland infancy is not a legal term. The time previous to majority, which, as in England, is reached by both sexes at twenty-one, is divided into two stages: pupilage lasts until the attainment of puberty, which the law fixes at fourteen in males and twelve in females; minority lasts from these ages respectively until twenty-one. Minority obviously corresponds in some degree to the English years of discretion, but a Scotch minor has more personal rights than an English infant in the last stage of his infancy, e.g., he may dispose by will of moveable property, make contracts, carry on trade, and, as a necessary consequence, is liable to be declared a bankrupt. Among foreign nations the law on this matter is somewhat varied. In France the year of majority is twenty-one, and the nubile age, according to the Code Napoleon, eighteen for males and fifteen for females, with a restriction as to the consent of guardians. In Germany majority is usually reached at twenty-four, though in some states (Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemburg, and Baden) the age is twenty-one. In the United States the age qualification for a president is thirty-five, for a senator thirty, and for a representative twenty-five.

in _chronology_, is used for a century, or a period of one hundred years: in which sense it is the same with _seculum_, and differs from _generation_. It is also used in speaking of the times past since the creation of the world. The several ages of the world may be reduced to three grand epochas, viz. the age of the law of nature, called by the Jews the void age, from Adam to Moses. The age of the Jewish law, from Moses to Christ, called by the Jews the present age. And the age of grace, from Christ to the present year. The Jews call the third age, the age to come, or the future age; denoting by it the time from the advent of the Messiah to the end of the world. The Romans distinguished the time that preceded them into three ages: the obscure or uncertain age, which reached down as low as Ogyges king of Attica, in whose reign the deluge happened in Greece; the fabulous or heroic age, which ended at the first olympiad; and the historical age, which commenced at the building of Rome. Among the poets, the four ages of the world are, the golden, the silver, the brazen, and the iron age. Age is sometimes used among the ancient poets in the same sense as _generation_, or a period of thirty years. Thus Nestor is said to have lived three ages, when he was ninety years old. The period preceding the birth of Jesus Christ has been generally divided into six ages. The first extends from the creation to the deluge, and comprehends 1656 years. The second age, from the deluge to Abraham’s entering the land of promise, A. M. 2082, comprehends 426 years. The third age from Abraham’s entrance into the promised land to the Exodus, A. M. 2512, includes 430 years. The fourth age, from the Exodus to the building of the temple by Solomon, A. M. 2992, contains 480 years. The fifth age from the foundation of Solomon’s temple to the Babylonish captivity, A. M. 3416, comprehends 424 years. The sixth age, from the Babylonish captivity to the birth of Jesus Christ, A. M. 4000, the fourth year before the vulgar æra, includes 584 years. Those who follow the Septuagint, or Greek version, divide this period into seven ages, viz. 1. From the creation to the deluge, 2262 years. 2. From the deluge to the confusion of tongues, 738 years. 3. From this confusion to the calling of Abraham, 460 years. 4. From this period to Jacob’s descent into Egypt, 215 years; and from this event to the Exodus, 430 years, making the whole 645 years. 5. From the Exodus to Saul, 774 years. 6. From Saul to Cyrus, 583 years. 7. From Cyrus to the vulgar æra of Christians, 538 years; the whole period from the creation to this period containing 6000 years.

The law of Principal and Agent has its origin in the law of mandate among the Romans, and fortunately even in England the spirit of that system of jurisprudence pervades this branch of the law. The law of agency is thus almost alike throughout the whole British empire, and a branch of the British commercial code, in which it is of great importance that different nations should understand each other’s system, differs only slightly from the law of the rest of Europe.

In a general view of the law of agency it is necessary to have regard to the rights and duties of the principal, the agent, and the public. The agent should not do what he has no authority for; yet if he be seen to have authority, those with whom he deals should not be injured by secret and unusual conditions. The employer is bound by what his agent does in his name, but the public are not entitled to take advantage of obligations which are known to be unauthorised and unusual. The agent is entitled to demand performance by the principal of the obligations undertaken by him within the bounds of his commission, but he is not entitled to pledge him with a recklessness which he would certainly avoid in the management of his own affairs. It is in the regulation of these powers and corresponding checks in such a manner that the legal principle shall apply to daily practice, that the niceties of this branch of the law consist.

Agents are of different kinds, according to their stipu lated r consuetudinary powers. The main restraint in the possible powers of an agent is in the old maxim, delegatus non potest delegare, designed to check the complexity that might be created by inquiries into repeatedly-deputed responsibility. The agent cannot delegate his commission or put another in his place; but in practice this principle is sometimes modified, for it so may arise from the nature of his office that he is to employ other persons for the accomplishment of certain objects. Thus, there is nothing to prevent a commercial agent from sending a portion of the goods entrusted by him to his own agent for disposai

In the general case agency is constituted by the acceptance of the mandate or authority to act for the principal, and the evidence of this may be either verbal or in writing. The English statute of frauds requires an agent to have authority in writing for the purposes of its 1st, 2d, and 3d clauses relating to leases. “And it is a general rule, that an agent who has to execute a deed, or to take or give livery or seisin, must be appointed by deed for that purpose. Moreover, as a corporation aggregate can in general act only by deed, its agent must be so appointed, though it would seem that some trifling agencies, even for corporations, may be appointed without one.” (Smith’s Mercantile Law, B. I. chap. iv.) It is a general rule that those obligations which can only be undertaken by solemn formalities cannot be entered on by a delegate who has not received his authority in writing. But it is often constituted, at the same time that its extent is defined, by mere appointment to some known and recognised function—as where one is appointed agent for a banking establishment, factor for a merchant, broker, supercargo, traveller, or attorney. In these cases, usage defines the powers granted to the agent; and the employer will not readily be subjected to obligations going beyond the usual functions of the office; nor will the public dealing with the agent be bound by private instructions inconsistent with its usual character. While, however, the public, ignorant of such secret limitations, are not bound to respect them, the agent himself is liable for the consequences of transgressing them. Agency may also be either created or enlarged by implication. What the agent has done with his principal’s consent the public are justified in believing him authorised to continue doing. Thus, as a familiar instance, the servant who has continued to purchase goods for his master at a particular shop on credit is presumed to retain authority and trust, and pledges his master’s credit in farther purchases, though he should, without the knowledge of the shopkeeper, apply the articles to his own uses. The law is ever jealous in admitting as accessories of a general appointment to any particular agency the power to borrow money in the principal’s name, to give his name to bill transactions, and to pledge him to guaranties; but all these acts may be authorised by implication, or by being the continuation of a series of transactions, of the same kind and in the same line of business, to which the principal has given his sanction. Thus an employer may, by the previous sanction of such operations, be liable for the bills or notes drawn, indorsed, and accepted by his clerk or other mandatary; nay, may be responsible for the obligations thus incurred after the mandatary’s dismissal, if the party dealing with him knew that he was countenanced in such transactions, and had no reason to suppose that he was dismissed. In questions of this kind the distinction between a general and a special agent is important. A general agent is employed to transact all his principal’s business of a particular kind, at a certain place,—as a factor to buy and sell; a broker to negotiate contracts of a particular kind; an attorney to transact his legal business; a shipmaster to do all things relating to the employment of a ship. Such an agent’s power to do everything usual in the line of business in which he is employed is not limited by any private restriction or order unknown to the party with whom he is dealing. On the contrary, it is incumbent on the party dealing with a particular agent, i.e., one specially employed in a single transaction, to ascertain the extent of his authority. The law applicable to a mercantile agent’s power to pledge or otherwise dispose of the goods entrusted to him being in an unsatisfactory state, a statutory remedy was applied to it by an Act of 1825 (6 Geo. IV. c. 94), which required amendment in 1842 (5 and 6 Vict. c. 39).

The general object of these measures, which appear to extend to Scotland, is to make transactions with an agent in possession of goods as safe as dealing with the owner, to all who treat with him, as purchasers or otherwise, in good faith, and in ignorance of his want of ownership. Thus, when an agent ships goods in his own name, the consignee is entitled to a lien on them for any advances to the agent, or liabilities on bills or notes, if he has not notice by the bill of lading or otherwise at or before the time of the advance or receipt that such person is not the actual and bona fide owner. The presumption in such cases is ownership; and the burden of disproving it, as well as of showing that the consignee was aware of the mere agency, falls on the person questioning the validity. By the statutes, the person entrusted with and in possession of a bill of lading, dock warrant, warehouse-keeper’s certificate, wharfinger’s certificate, or other delivery warrant, is held the owner of the goods it represents, so as to render valid any transaction for their sale or disposition of the goods, or the deposit or pledge thereof, or of any part thereof, to parties ignorant of the limited ownership. Besides their effect in rendering valid, in this more comprehensive manner, operations conducted under the appearance and supposition of absolute ownership, the acts have separate provisions for the security of those who deal with agents, knowing them to be such. The acts, however, must be studied in their very words, which are not remarkable for clearness. The following brief description of their general effect, taken from Chitty’s Collection of Statutes, may be useful:—“First, where goods or documents for the delivery of goods are pledged as a security for present or future advances, with the knowledge that they are not the property of the factor, but without notice that he is acting without authority, in such a case the pledgee acquires an absolute lien. Secondly, where goods are pledged by a factor without notice to the pledgee that they are the property of another, as a security for a pre-existing debt, in that case the pledgee acquires the same right as the factor had. Thirdly, where a contract to pledge is made in consideration of the delivery of other goods or documents of title, upon which the person delivering them up had a lien for a previous advance (which is deemed to be a contract for a present advance), in that case the pledgee acquires an absolute lien to the extent of the value of the goods given up.” The statutes are applicable only to proper mercantile transactions, and not, for example, to advances upon the security of furniture in a furnished house to the apparent owner. (See Smith’s Leading Cases, vol. i. p. 759 sqq., 6th ed.)

The obligations of the principal are—to pay the agent’s remuneration, or, as it is often called, commission, the amount of which is fixed by contract or the usage of trade; to pay all advances made by the agent in the regular course of his employment; and to honour the obligations lawfully undertaken for him. The agent is responsible for the possession of the proper skill and means for carrying out the functions which he undertakes. He must devote to the interests of his employer such care and attention as a man of ordinary prudence bestows on his own—a duty capable of no more certain definition, the application of it as a fixed rule being the function of a jury. He is bound to observe the strictest good faith; and in some instances the law interposes to remove him from temptation to sacrifice his employer’s interests to his own: thus, when he is employed to buy, he must not be the seller; and when employed to sell, he must not be the purchaser. He ought only to deal with persons in good credit, but he is not responsible for their absolute solvency unless he guarantee them. A mercantile agent guaranteeing the payments he treats for is said to hold a del credere commission.

In Scotland the procurators or solicitors who act in the preparation of cases in the various law-courts, and all who take out the attorney licence, are called agents. See Attorney.

In France, the Agents de Change were formerly the class generally licensed for conducting all negotiations, as they were termed, whether in commerce or the money market. Of late the term has been practically limited to those who conduct, like our stockbrokers, transactions in public stock; and it is understood that it is rather as speculators than as agents that the majority of them adopt the profession. The laws and regulations as to courtiers, or those whose functions were more distinctly confined to transactions in merchandise, have been mixed up with those applicable to agents de change. Down to the year 1572 both functions were free; but at that period, partly for financial reasons, a system of licensing was adopted at the suggestion of the Chancellor l’Hôpital. Among the other revolutionary measures of the year 1791, the professions of agent and courtier were again opened to the public. Many of the financial convulsions of the ensuing years, which were due to more serious causes, were attributed to this indiscriminate removal of restrictions, and they were reimposed in 1801. From that period regulations have been made from time to time as to the qualifications of agents, the security to be found by them, and the like. They are now regarded as public officers, appointed, with certain privileges and duties, by the government, to act as intermediaries in negotiating transfers of public funds and commercial stocks, and for dealing in metallic currency.