This primary vowel-sound (the sound of a in father) is produced by keeping the passage through which the air is vocalised between the glottis and the lips in the most open position possible. In sounding all other vowels, the airchannel is narrowed by the action either of the tongue or the lips. But here neither the back of the tongue is raised (as it is in sounding o and other vowels), so that a free space is left between the tongue and the uvula, nor is the front of the tongue raised (as in sounding e ), so that the space is clear between the tongue and the palate. Again, no other vowel is pronounced with a wider opening of the lips; whereas the aperture is sensibly reduced at each side when we sound o, and still more when we sound u (that is, yoo). The whole channel, therefore, from the glottis, where the breath first issues forth to be modified in the oral cavity, to the lips, where it finally escapes, is thoroughly open. Hence arises the great importance of the sound, by reason of its thoroughly non-consonantal character. All vowels may be defined as open positions of the speech-organs, in which the breath escapes without any stoppage, friction, or sibilation arising from the contact of those organs, whereas consonants are heard when the organs open after such contact more or less complete. Now, all vowels except a are pronounced with a certain contraction of the organs; thus, in sounding the i (the English e -sound), the tongue is raised so as almost to touch the palate, the passage left being so close, that if the tongue were suffered for a second to rest on the palate, there would be heard not i but y ; and a similar relation exists between u and w. This is commonly expressed by calling y and w semi-vowels. We might more exactly call i and u consonantal-vowels; and as an historic fact, i does constantly pass into y, and u into w, and vice versa. But no consonant has this relation to the a -sound; it has absolutely no affinity to any consonant; it is, as we have called it, the one primary essential vowel.

The importance of this sound may be shown by historical as well as by physiological evidence. We find by tracing the process of phonetic change in different languages, that when one vowel passes into another, it is the pure α-sound which thus assumes other forms, whereas other vowels do not pass into the a -sound, though sometimes the new sound may have this symbol. Roughly speaking, we might express the general character of vowel change by drawing two lines from a common point, at which a is placed. One of these lines marks the progress of an original a (ah- sound ) through e (a -sound), till it sinks finally to i (e -sound); the other marks a similar degradation, through o to u (oo -sound). This figure omits many minor modifications, and is subject to some exceptions in particular languages. But it represents fairly in the main the general process of vowel-change. Now, we do not assert that there ever was a time when a was the only existing vowel, but we do maintain that in numberless cases an original a has passed into other sounds, whereas the reverse process is excessively rare. Consequently, the farther we trace back the history of language, the more instances of this vowel do we find; the more nearly, if not entirely, does it become the one starting point from which all vowel-sound is derived.

It is principally to the effort required to keep this sound pure that we must attribute the great corruption of it in all languages, and in none more than our own. Indeed, in English, the short a -sound is never heard pure; it is heard in Scotland, e.g., in man, which is quite different from the same word on English lips. We have it, however, long in father, &c., though it is not common. It has passed into a great many other sounds, all of which are denoted in a most confusing way by the original symbol, and some by other symbols as well. Thus a denotes—(1.) The English vowel-sound in man, perhaps the most common of all the substitutes, dating from the 17th century. (2.) It appears in want; for this sound o is also employed, as in on. (3.) A more open sound is heard in all (also denoted by au in auk, and aw in awl). (4.) Very commonly it represents the continental e, as in ale (here also we have the symbol ai in ail). (5.) It is found in dare and many similar words, where the sound is really the e of den, prolonged in the utterance; here also ai is sometimes an equivalent, as in air. Then (6) there is a sound which is not that of a either in man or in father, but something between the two. It is heard in such words as ask, pass, grant, &c. All these may be, and often are, pronounced with the sound either of man or of father; still, we do often hear in them a clearly distinguishable intermediate sound, which ought to have a special symbol. Lastly (7), there is the dull sound heard in final unaccentuated syllables, e.g., in the word final itself. It is that to which all unaccentuated syllables tend; but it is also often heard even in monosyllables, where it is represented by every other vowelsymbol in the language, e.g., in her, sir, son, sun. This Protean sound is commonly called the neutral vowel; it occurs in all languages, but perhaps in none so frequently as in English. This great variety of sounds, which are all denoted among us by one symbol, clearly shows the insufficiency of our written alphabet.

As in English, so in Sanskrit, the short «Λ-sound was lost, and was replaced regularly by the neutral sound. This was regarded by the grammarians as inherent in every consonant, and therefore was only written at the beginning of a word; in fact, it is the smallest amount of vowelsound requisite to float a consonant. Long a, however, kept its sound pure, and does so still in the vernaculars of India. In Latin the sound was probably pure, both short and long, and it has been preserved so in the Romance languages down to the present day. In Greek there was considerable variation, proved in one case at least by a variation of symbol; in Ionic a commonly passed into η, a symbol which probably denoted the modern Italian open e; but possibly the close e, that is, the English a in ale. On the other hand, it is probable that the Doric a approximated to an o, being sounded as a in our word want; and it is likely that this variation was the πλατειασμός which the grammarians attribute to the Dorians. This is commonly supposed to have been the retention of α where the Ionic had η ; but that was not peculiar to the Dorians, being common to all the Greeks except the Ionians. In the north of Europe we find a similar tendency to give to a an o -sound; thus in Norse, aa is sounded as an open o. By a further extension in the north of England, at least in such parts as have been specially exposed to Norwegian influence, au has the sound of o; e.g., law is pronounced lo.

A is frequently used as a prefix in lieu of some fuller form in old English. Thus it stands for the preposition on (O.E. an) in away, again, afoot, asleep; for off in adown (O.E. of-dune); and seems to be intensive in athirst (O.E. of-thirst). Sometimes, especially with verbs, it represents the old English â which in old High German appears as ur or er, and in modern German as er, which signifies the completion of an action, as in erwachen, to which awake corresponds. Frequently no special force seems to be added by the prefix, as in abide, arise, &c. Sometimes a appears as the representative of the prefix commonly used in past participles, which has the form ge in German, and ge and y in old English, e.g., in ago or agone; compare aware (O.E. gewaere), among (O.E. gemang), &c. A also stood for the preposition an (on) in such expressions (now obsolete) as a-doing, a-making, where doing and making are verbal nouns. Lastly, it represents the prepositions on or of in the phrases now-a-days, Jack-a-lantern, and others.

The place that A occupies in the alphabet accounts for its being much employed as a mark or symbol. It is used, for instance, to name the sixth note of the gamut in music; in some systems of notation it is a numeral (see Arithmetic); and in Logic it denotes a universal affirmative proposition (see Logic). In algebra, a and the first letters of the alphabet are employed to represent known quantities. Al marks the best class of vessels in Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping. In the old poets, “ A per se” is found, meaning the highest degree of excellence; as when Chaucer calls Creseide “the floure and A per se of Troye and Grece.”

A was the first of the eight literoe nundinales at Rome, and on this analogy it stands as the first of the seven Dominical letters.

It is often used as an abbreviation, as in A.D. for anno domini, A.M. for ante meridiem, A.B. and A. Μ. for artium baccalaureus and artium magister. In commerce A stands for accepted.

similar instance occurs in the prophecy, recorded in Psalm cx, 3, which explicitly foretels the abundant increase of the Gospel on its first promulgation. This kind of allegory, however, sometimes assumes a more regular and perfect form, and then occupies the whole subject and compass of the discourse. An example of this kind occurs in Solomon’s well known allegory, Eccles. xii, 2–6, in which old age is so admirably depicted. There is also, in Isaiah xxviii, 24–29, an allegory, which, with no less elegance of imagery, is more simple and regular, as well as more just and complete, both in the form and the method of treating it. Another kind of allegory is that which, in the proper and more restricted sense, may be called a parable; and consists of a continued narration of some fictitious event, accommodated, by way of similitude, to the illustration of some important truth. The Greeks call these allegories αινοι or apologues, and the Latins _fabulæ_, or fables. (See _Parable_.) The third species of allegory, which often occurs in the prophetic poetry, is that in which a double meaning is couched under the same words, or when the same discourse, differently interpreted, designates different events, dissimilar in their nature, and remote as to time. These different relations are denominated the literal and mystical senses. This kind of allegory, which the learned prelate calls mystical, seems to derive its origin from the principles of the Jewish religion; and it differs from the two former species in a variety of respects. In these allegories the writer may adopt any imagery that is most suitable to his fancy or inclination; but the only proper materials for this allegory must be supplied from the sacred rites of the Hebrews themselves; and it can only be introduced in relation to such things as are immediately connected with the Jewish religion, or their immediate opposites. The former kinds partake of the common privileges of poetry; but the mystical allegory has its foundation in the nature of the Jewish economy, and is adapted solely to the poetry of the Hebrews. Besides, in the other forms of allegory, the exterior or ostensible imagery is mere fiction, and the truth lies altogether in the interior or remote sense; but in this allegory each idea is equally agreeable to truth. The exterior or ostensible image is itself a reality; and although it sustains another character, it does not wholly lay aside its own. There is also a great variety in the use and conduct of the mystical allegory; in the modes in which the corresponding images are arranged, and in which they are obscured or eclipsed by one another. Sometimes the obvious or literal sense is so prominent and conspicuous, both in the words and sentiments, that the remote or figurative sense is scarcely permitted to glimmer through it. On the other hand, the figurative sense is more frequently found to beam forth with so much perspicuity and lustre, that the literal sense is quite cast into the shade, or becomes indiscernible. Sometimes the principal or figurative idea is exhibited to the attentive eye with a constant and equal light; and sometimes it unexpectedly glares upon us, and breaks forth with sudden and astonishing coruscations, like a flash of lightning bursting from the clouds. But the mode or form of this figure which possesses the chief beauty and elegance, is, when the two images, equally conspicuous, run, as it were, parallel throughout the whole poem, mutually illustrating and correspondent to each other. The learned author has illustrated these observations by instances selected from Psalms ii, and lxxii. He adds, that the mystical allegory is, on account of the obscurity resulting from the nature of the figure, and the style of the composition, so agreeable to the nature of the prophecy, that it is the form which it generally, and indeed lawfully, assumes, as best adapted to the prediction of future events. It describes events in a manner exactly conformable to the intention of prophecy; that is, in a dark, disguised, and intricate manner, sketching out, in a general way, their form and outline; and seldom descending to a minuteness of description and exactness of detail.

tree resembling the peach tree in its leaves and blossoms, but the fruit is longer and more compressed, the outer green coat is thinner and drier when ripe, and the shell of the stone is not so rugged. This stone, or nut, contains a kernel, which is the only esculent part. The whole arrives at maturity in September, when the outer tough cover splits open and discharges the nut. From the circumstance of its blossoming the earliest of any of the trees, beginning as soon as the rigour of winter is past, and before it is in leaf, it has its Hebrew name _shakad_, which comes from a verb signifying _to make haste_, _to be in a hurry_, or _to awake early_. To the forwardness of the almond tree there seems to be a reference in Jeremiah: “The word of the Lord came unto me, saying, Jeremiah, what seest thou? And I said, I see a rod of an almond tree. Then said the Lord unto me, Thou hast well seen: for I will hasten my word to perform it;” or rather, “I am hastening, or watching over my word to fulfil it,” Jer. i, 11, 12. In this manner it is rendered by the Seventy; and by the Vulgate, _Vigilabo ego super verbum meum_. [I will watch over my word.] This is the first vision with which the Prophet was honoured; and his attention is roused by a very significant emblem of that severe correction with which the Most High was hastening to visit his people for their iniquity; and from the species of tree to which the rod belonged, he is warned of its near approach. The idea which the appearance of the almond rod suggested to his mind, is confirmed by the exposition of God himself: “I am watching over, or on account of, my word to fulfil it;” and this double mode of instruction, first by emblem, and then by exposition, was certainly intended to make a deeper impression on the mind both of Jeremiah and of the people to whom he was sent. It is probable that the rods which the princes of Israel bore, were scions of the almond tree, at once the ensign of their office, and the emblem of their vigilance. Such, we know from the testimony of Scripture, was the rod of Aaron; which renders it exceedingly probable, that the rods of the other chiefs were from the same tree. The hoary head is beautifully compared by Solomon to the almond tree, covered in the earliest days of spring with its snow white flowers, before a single leaf has budded: “The almond tree shall flourish, and the grasshopper shall be a burden, and desire shall fail,” Eccl. xii, 5. Man has existed in this world but a few days, when old age begins to appear, sheds its snows upon his head, prematurely nips his hopes, darkens his earthly prospects, and hurries him into the grave.

transparent gem, of a colour which seems composed of a strong blue and deep red; and, according as either prevails, affords different tinges of purple, sometimes approaching to violet, and sometimes even fading to a rose colour. The stone called amethyst by the ancients was evidently the same with that now generally known by this name; which is far from being the case with regard to some other gems. The oriental is the hardest, scarcest, and most valuable. It was the ninth stone in the pectoral of the high priest, and is mentioned as the twelfth in the foundations of the New Jerusalem.

second argument is furnished by the prohibition of blood for food, after animals had been granted to man for his sustenance along with the “herb of the field.” This prohibition is repeated by Moses to the Israelites, with this explanation:--“I have given it upon the altar to make _an atonement_ for your souls.” From this it has indeed been argued, that the doctrine of the atoning power of blood was new, and was then, for the first time, announced by Moses, or the same reason for the prohibition would have been given to Noah. To this we may reply, 1. That unless the same be supposed as the ground of the prohibition of blood to Noah, as that given by Moses to the Jews, no reason at all can be conceived for this restraint being put upon the appetite of mankind from Noah to Moses. 2. That it is a mistake to suppose, that the declaration of Moses to the Jews, that God had “given them the blood for an atonement,” is an _additional reason_ for the interdict, not to be found in the original prohibition to Noah. The whole passage in Lev. xvii, is, “And thou shalt say to them, Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among you, that eateth any manner of blood, I will even set my face against that soul that eateth blood, and I will cut him off from among his people: FOR THE LIFE of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it upon the altar, to make atonement for your souls: _for it is the_ BLOOD (or LIFE) that maketh atonement for the soul.” The great reason, then, of the prohibition of blood is, that it is the LIFE; and what follows respecting atonement is _exegetical_ of this reason; the life is in the blood, and the blood or life is given as an atonement. Now, by turning to the original prohibition in Genesis, we find that precisely the same reason is given: “But the flesh with the blood, which is _the life_ thereof, shall ye not eat.” The reason, then, being the same, the question is, whether the exegesis added by Moses must not necessarily be understood in the general reason given for the restraint to Noah. Blood is prohibited for this cause, that it is the _life_; and Moses adds, that it is “the blood,” _or life_, “which makes atonement.” Let any one attempt to discover any cause for the prohibition of blood to Noah, in the mere circumstance that it is “the life,” and he will find it impossible. It is no reason at all, moral or instituted, except that as it was _life_ substituted for _life_, the life of the animal in sacrifice for the life of man, and that it had a sacred appropriation. The manner, too, in which Moses introduces the subject is indicative that, although he was renewing a prohibition, he was not publishing a “new doctrine;” he does not teach his people that God had then given, or appointed, blood to make atonement; but he prohibits them from eating it, because he had made this appointment, without reference to time, and as a subject with which they were familiar. Because the blood was the life, it was sprinkled upon, and poured out at, the altar: and we have in the sacrifice of the paschal lamb, and the sprinkling of its blood, a sufficient proof, that, before the giving of the law, not only was blood not eaten, but was appropriated to a sacred sacrificial purpose. Nor was this confined to the Jews; it was customary with the Romans and Greeks, who, in like manner, poured out and sprinkled the blood of victims at their altars, a rite derived, probably, from the Egyptians, as they derived it, not from Moses, but from the sons of Noah. The notion, indeed, that the blood of the victims was peculiarly sacred to the gods, is impressed upon all ancient Pagan mythology. If, therefore, the distinction of animals into clean and unclean existed before the flood, and was founded upon the practice of animal sacrifice, we have not only a proof of the antiquity of that practice, but that it was of divine institution and appointment, since almighty God gave laws for its right and acceptable performance. Still farther, if animal sacrifice was of divine appointment, it must be concluded to be typical only, and designed to teach the great doctrine of moral atonement, and to direct faith to the only true sacrifice which could take away the sins of men;--“the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,”--the victim “without spot,” who suffered the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God. See SACRIFICES.

comforting and abiding persuasion of present acceptance by God, through Christ, we may therefore affirm, must in various degrees follow true faith. In support of this view, the following remarks may be offered:-- If it is the doctrine of the inspired records, that man is by nature prone to evil, and that in practice he violates that law under which as a creature he is placed, and is thereby exposed to punishment;--if also it is there stated, that an act of grace and pardon is promised on the conditions of repentance toward God, and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ;--if that repentance implies consideration of our ways, a sense of the displeasure of Almighty God, contrition of heart, and consequently trouble and grief of mind, mixed, however, with a hope inspired by the promise of forgiveness, and which leads to earnest supplication for the actual pardon of sin so promised, it will follow from these premises--either, 1. That forgiveness is not to be expected till after the termination of our course of probation, that is, in another life; and that, therefore, this trouble and apprehension of mind can only be assuaged by the hope we may have of a favourable final decision on our case;--or, 2. That sin is, in the present life, forgiven as often as it is thus repented of, and as often as we exercise the required and specific acts of trust in the merits of our Saviour; but that this forgiveness of our sins is not in any way made known unto us: so that we are left, as to our feelings, in precisely the same state as if sin were not forgiven till after death, namely, in grief and trouble of mind, relieved only by hope;--or, 3. The Scriptural view is, that when sin is forgiven by the mercy of God through Christ, we are, by some means, assured of it, and peace and satisfaction of mind take the place of anxiety and fear. The first of these conclusions is sufficiently disproved by the authority of Scripture, which exhibits justification as a blessing attainable in this life, and represents it as actually experienced by true believers. “Therefore being justified by faith.” “There is _now_ no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus.” “Whosoever believeth is justified from all things,” &c. The quotations might be multiplied, but these are decisive. The notion that though an act of forgiveness may take place, we are unable to ascertain a fact so important to us, is also irreconcilable with many scriptures in which the writers of the New Testament speak of an experience, not confined personally to themselves, or to those Christians who were endowed with spiritual gifts, but common to all Christians. “Being justified by faith we have _peace_ with God.” “We joy in God, by whom we have received the _reconciliation_.” “Being reconciled unto God by the death of his Son.” “We have not received the spirit of bondage again unto fear, but the spirit of adoption, by which we cry, Abba, Father.” To these may be added innumerable passages which express the comfort, the confidence, and the joy of Christians; their “friendship” with God; their “access” to him; their entire union and delightful intercourse with him; and their absolute confidence in the success of their prayers. All such passages are perfectly consistent with deep humility, and self-diffidence; but they are irreconcilable with a state of hostility between the parties, and with an unascertained and only hoped-for restoration of friendship and favour. An assurance, therefore, that the sins which are felt to “be a burden intolerable” are forgiven, and that the ground of that apprehension of future punishment which causes the penitent to “_bewail_ his manifold sins,” is taken away by restoration to the favour of the offended God, must be allowed, or nothing would be more incongruous and impossible than the comfort, the peace, the rejoicing of spirit, which in the Scriptures are attributed to believers. Few Christians of evangelical views have, therefore, denied the possibility of our becoming assured of the favour of God in a sufficient degree to give substantial comfort to the mind. Their differences have rather respected the means by which the contrite become assured of that change in their relation to Almighty God, whom they have offended, which in Scripture is expressed by the term justification. The question has been, (where the notion of an assurance of eternal salvation has not been under discussion,) by what means the assurance of the divine favour is conveyed to the mind. Some have concluded that we obtain it by _inference_, others by the _direct testimony_ of the Holy Spirit to the mind. See HOLY SPIRIT.

similar custom is observed among the Hindoos. The husband and wife, on the day of their marriage, being both in the same palanquin, go about seven and eight o’clock at night, accompanied with all their kindred and friends; the trumpets and drums go before them; and they are lighted by a number of flambeaux; immediately before the palanquin walk many women, whose business it is to sing verses, in which they wish them all manner of prosperity. They march in this equipage through the streets for the space of some hours, after which they return to their own house, where the domestics are in waiting. The whole house is illumined with small lamps; and many of those flambeaux already mentioned are kept ready for their arrival, beside those which accompany them, and are carried before the palanquin. These flambeaux are composed of many pieces of old linen, squeezed hard against one another in a round figure, and thrust down into a mould of copper. The persons that hold them in one hand have in the other a bottle of the same metal with the copper mould, which is full of oil, which they take care to pour out from time to time upon the linen, which otherwise gives no light. The Roman ladies also were led home to their husbands in the evening by the light of torches. A Jewish marriage seems to have been conducted in much the same way; for in that beautiful psalm, where David describes the majesty of Christ’s kingdom, we meet with this passage: “And the daughter of Tyre shall be there with a gift; even the rich among the people shall entreat thy favour. The king’s daughter is all-glorious within; her clothing is of wrought gold. She shall be brought unto the king in raiment of needle work; the virgins, her companions that follow her, shall be brought unto thee. With gladness and rejoicing shall they be brought: they shall enter into the king’s palace,” Psalm xlv, 12, &c. In the parable of the ten virgins, the same circumstances are introduced: “They that were foolish took their lamps, and took no oil with them: but the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps. While the bridegroom tarried,” leading the procession through the streets of the city, the women and domestics that were appointed to wait his arrival at home, “all slumbered and slept. And at midnight there was a cry made, Behold, the bridegroom cometh! Go ye out to meet him. Then all those virgins arose and trimmed their lamps. And the foolish said unto the wise, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are gone out,” Matt. xxv, 6. The following extract from Ward’s “View of the Hindoos” very strikingly illustrates this parable: “At a marriage, the procession of which I saw some years ago, the bridegroom came from a distance, and the bride lived at Serampore, to which place the bridegroom was to come by water. After waiting two or three hours, at length, near midnight, it was announced, as if in the very words of Scripture, ‘Behold, the bridegroom cometh! Go ye out to meet him.’ All the persons employed now lighted their lamps, and ran with them in their hands to fill up their stations in the procession; some of them had lost their lights, and were unprepared; but it was then too late to seek them, and the cavalcade moved forward to the house of the bride, at which place the company entered a large and splendidly illuminated area, before the house covered with an awning, where a great multitude of friends dressed in their best apparel were seated upon mats. The bridegroom was carried in the arms of a friend, and placed on a superb seat in the midst of the company, where he sat a short time, and then went into the house, the door of which was immediately shut, and guarded by Sepoys. I and others expostulated with the door keepers, but in vain.”

few additional remarks will cast some light upon some passages of Scripture: the station of the accused was in an eminent place in the court, that the people might see them, and hear what was alleged against them, and the proofs of it, together with the defence made by the criminals. This explains the reason of the remark by the Evangelist Matthew, concerning the posture of our Lord at his trial: “Jesus stood before the governor;” and that, in a mock trial, many ages before the birth of Christ, in which some attention was also paid to public forms, Naboth was set on high among the people, 1 Kings xxi, 9. The accusers and the witnesses also stood, unless they were allowed to sit by the indulgence of the judges, when they stated the accusation, or gave their testimony. To this custom of the accusers rising from their seats, when called by the court to read the indictment, our Lord alludes in his answer to the scribes and Pharisees, who expressed a wish to see him perform some miracle: “The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it,” Matt. xii, 42. According to this rule, which seems to have been invariably observed, the Jews who accused the Apostle Paul at the bar of Festus the Roman governor, “stood round about,” while they stated the crimes which they had to lay to his charge, Acts xxv, 7. They were compelled to stand as well as the prisoner, by the established usage of the courts of justice in the east. The Romans often put criminals to the question, or endeavoured to extort a confession from them by torture. Agreeably to this cruel and unjust custom, “the chief captain commanded Paul to be brought into the castle, and bade that he should be examined by scourging,” Acts xxii, 24. It was usual, especially among the Romans, when a man was charged with a capital crime, and during his arraignment, to let down his hair, suffer his beard to grow long, to wear filthy, ragged garments, and appear in a very dirty and sordid habit; on account of which they were called _sordidati_. When the person accused was brought into court to be tried, even his near relations, friends, and acquaintances, before the court voted, appeared with dishevelled hair, and clothed with garments foul and out of fashion, weeping, crying, and deprecating punishment. The accused sometimes appeared before the judges clothed in black, and his head covered with dust. In allusion to this ancient custom, the Prophet Zechariah represents Joshua, the high priest, when he appeared before the Lord, and Satan stood at his right hand to accuse him, as clothed with filthy garments, Zech. iii, 3. After the cause was carefully examined, and all parties impartially heard, the public crier, by command of the presiding magistrate, ordered the judges to bring in their verdict. The most ancient way of giving sentence, was by white and black sea shells, or pebbles. This custom has been mentioned by Ovid in these lines:-- _Mos erat antiquis, niveis atrisque lapillis, His damnare reos, illis absolvere culpa._ “It was a custom among the ancients, to give their votes by white or black stones; with these they condemned the guilty, with those acquitted the innocent.” In allusion to this ancient custom, our Lord promises to give the spiritual conqueror “a white stone,” Rev. ii, 17; the white stone of absolution or approbation. When sentence of condemnation was pronounced, if the case was capital, the witnesses put their hands on the head of the criminal, and said, “Thy blood be upon thine own head.” To this custom the Jews alluded, when they cried out at the trial of Christ, “His blood be on us and on our children.” Then was the malefactor led to execution, and none were allowed openly to lament his misfortune. His hands were secured with cords, and his feet with fetters; a custom which furnished David with an affecting allusion, in his lamentation over the dust of Abner: “Thy hands were not bound, nor thy feet put in fetters,” 2 Sam. iii, 34; that is, he was put treacherously to death, without form of justice.

place of lonely desolation, where The screeching tribe and pelicans abide, And the dun ravens croak mid ruins drear, And moaning owls from man the farthest hide.

branch of palm was a signal of victory, and was carried before conquerors in the triumphs. To this, allusion is made, Rev. vii, 9: and for this purpose were they borne before Christ in his way to Jerusalem, John xii, 13. From the inspissated sap of the tree, a kind of honey, or dispse, as it is called, is produced, little inferior to that of bees. The same juice, after fermentation, makes a sort of wine much used in the east. It is once mentioned as wine, Num. xxviii, 7; Exodus xxix, 40; and by it is intended the strong drink, Isaiah v, 11; xxiv, 9. Theodoret and Chrysostom, on these places, both Syrians, and unexceptionable witnesses in what belongs to their own country, confirm this declaration. This liquor,” says Dr. Shaw, which has a more luscious sweetness than honey, is of the consistence of a thin syrup, but quickly grows tart and ropy, acquiring an intoxicating quality, and giving by distillation an agreeable spirit, or _arâky_, according to the general name of these people for all hot liquors, extracted by the alembic.” Its Hebrew name is שכר, the σικερα of the Greeks; and from its sweetness, probably, the _saccharum_ of the Romans. Jerom informs us that in Hebrew any inebriating liquor is called _sicera_, whether made of grain, the juice of apples, honey, dates, or any other fruit.” This tree was formerly of great value and esteem among the Israelites, and so very much cultivated in Judea, that, in after times, it became the emblem of that country, as may be seen in a medal of the Emperor Vespasian upon the conquest of Judea. It represents a captive woman sitting under a palm tree, with this inscription, _Judea capta_;” [Judea captivated;] and upon a Greek coin, likewise, of his son Titus, struck upon the like occasion, we see a shield suspended upon a palm tree, with a Victory writing upon it. Pliny also calls Judea _palmis inclyta_, renowned for palms.” Jericho, in particular, was called the city of palms,” Deut. xxxiv, 3; 2 Chron. xxviii, 15; because, as Josephus, Strabo, and Pliny, have remarked, it anciently abounded in palm trees. And so Dr. Shaw remarks, that, though these trees are not now either plentiful or fruitful in other parts of the holy land, yet there are several of them at Jericho, where there is the conveniency they require of being often watered; where, likewise, the climate is warm, and the soil sandy, such as they thrive and delight in. Tamar, a city built in the desert by Solomon, 1 Kings ix, 18; Ezekiel xlvii, 19; xlviii, 28, was probably so named from the palm trees growing about it; as it was afterward by the Romans called Palmyra, or rather Palmira, on the same account, from _palma_, a palm tree.”

knowledge of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, or the science of natural history, was always an object of interest. We are informed that Solomon himself had given a description of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, 1 Kings iv, 33. Traces of philosophy, strictly so called, that is, the system of prevailing moral opinions, may be found in the book of Job, in the thirty-seventh, thirty-ninth, and seventy-third Psalms; also in the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, but chiefly in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, and the writings of the son of Sirach. During the captivity, the Jews acquired many new notions, particularly from the Mahestani, and appropriated them, as occasion offered, to their own purposes. They at length became acquainted with the philosophy of the Greeks, which makes its appearance abundantly in the book of Wisdom. After the captivity, the language in which the sacred books were written was no longer vernacular. Hence arose the need of an interpreter on the sabbatic year, a time when the whole law was read, and also on the Sabbath in the synagogues, which some think had been recently erected, in order to make the people understand what was read. These interpreters learned the Hebrew language at the schools. The teachers of these schools, who, for the two generations preceding the time of Christ, had maintained some acquaintance with the Greek philosophy, were not satisfied with a simple interpretation of the Hebrew idiom, as it stood, but shaped the interpretation so as to render it conformable to their philosophy. Thus arose contentions, which gave occasion for the various sects of Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes. In the time of our Saviour, divisions had arisen among the Pharisees themselves. No less than eighteen nice questions, if we may believe the Jewish rabbins, were contested at that period between the schools of Hillel and Shammai; one of which questions was an inquiry, what cause was sufficient for a bill of divorce. If the Shammai and Hillel of the Talmud are the same with the learned men mentioned in Josephus, namely, Sameas and Pollio, who flourished thirty-four years before Christ, then Shammai or Sameas is undoubtedly the same with the Simeon who is mentioned, Luke ii, 25–35; and his son Gamaliel, so celebrated in the Talmud, is the same with the Gamaliel mentioned, Acts v, 34; xxii, 3. Anciently, learned men were denominated among the Hebrews חכמים, as among the Greeks they were called σοφοὶ, _wise men_. In the time of Christ, the common appellative for men of that description was γραμματεὺς, in the Hebrew סופר, _a scribe_. They were addressed by the honorary title of _rabbi_, רבי, great,” or master.” The Jews, in imitation of the Greeks, had their seven wise men, who were called _rabboni_. Gamaliel was one of the number. They called themselves the children of wisdom; expressions which correspond very nearly to the Greek φιλόσοφος, Matthew xi, 19; Luke vii, 35. The heads of sects were called fathers;” the disciples were denominated sons,” or children,” Matt. xii, 27; xxiii, 1–9. The Jewish teachers, at least some of them, had private lecture rooms; but they also taught and disputed in synagogues, in temples, and, in fact, wherever they could find an audience. The method of these teachers was the same with that which prevailed among the Greeks. Any disciple who chose might propose questions, upon which it was the duty of the teachers to remark and give their opinions, Luke ii, 46. The teachers were not invested with their functions by any formal act of the church, or of the civil authority: they were self-constituted. They received no other salary than some voluntary present from the disciples, which was called an honorary,” τιμὴ, _honorarium_, 1 Tim. v, 17. They acquired a subsistence, in the main, by the exercise of some art or handicraft. That they took a higher seat than their auditors, although it was probably the case, does not follow, as is sometimes supposed, from Luke ii, 46. According to the Talmudists, they were bound to hold no conversation with women, and to refuse to sit at table with the lower class of people, Matt. ix, 11; John iv, 27. The subjects on which they taught were numerous, commonly intricate, and of no great consequence; of which there are abundant examples in the Talmud. St. Paul bids the Colossians beware lest any man should spoil them through philosophy and vain deceit;” that is, a vain and deceitful philosophy, such as was popular in that day, and had been compounded out of all preceding systems, Grecian and oriental. An explanation of this philosophy is given under GNOSTICS, and CABBALA. On these ancient systems of pretended wisdom, Dr. Burton justly remarks: “Philosophy is indeed the noblest stretch of intellect which God has vouchsafed to man; and it is only when man forgets that he received his reasoning powers from God, that he is in danger of losing himself in darkness when he sought for light. To measure that which is infinite, is as impossible in metaphysics as in physics. If it had not been for revelation, we should have known no more of the Deity than the Heathen philosophers knew before: and to what did their knowledge amount? They felt the necessity of a First Cause, and they saw that that Cause must be intrinsically good; but when they came to systems, they never went farther than the point from which they first set out, that evil is not good, and good is not evil. The Gnostics thought to secure the triumph of their scheme by veiling its weaker points in mystery, and by borrowing a part from almost every system. But popular, and even successful, as this attempt may have been, we may say with truth, that the scheme which flattered the vanity of human wisdom, and which strove to conciliate all opinions, has died away, and is forgotten; while the Gospel, the unpresuming, the uncompromising doctrine of the Gospel, aided by no human wisdom, and addressing itself not merely to the head, but to the heart, has triumphed over all systems and all philosophers; and still leads its followers to that true knowledge which some have endeavoured to teach ‘after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.’”

second objection is, that as God is infinitely wise and good, his wisdom and justice will lead him to bestow whatever is fit for us without praying; and if any thing be not fit for us, we cannot obtain it by praying.” To this Dr. Paley very well replies, that it may be agreeable to perfect wisdom to grant that to our prayers which it would not have been agreeable to the same wisdom to have given us without praying for.” This, independent of the question of the authority of the Scriptures which explicitly enjoin prayer, is the best answer which can be given to the objection; and it is no small confirmation of it, that it is obvious to every reflecting man, that for God to withhold favours till asked for, tends,” as the same writer observes, to encourage devotion among his rational creatures, and to keep up and circulate a knowledge and sense of their dependency upon him.” But it is urged, God will always do what is best from the moral perfection of his nature, whether we pray or not.” This objection, however, supposes that there is but one mode of acting for the best, and that the divine will is necessarily determined to that mode only; both which positions,” says Paley, presume a knowledge of universal nature, much beyond what we are capable of attaining.” It is, indeed, a very unsatisfactory mode of speaking, to say, God will always do what is best; since we can conceive him capable in all cases of doing what is still better for the creature, and also that the creature is capable of receiving more and more from his infinite fulness for ever. All that can be rationally meant by such a phrase is, that, in the circumstances of the case, God will always do what is most consistent with his own wisdom, holiness, and goodness; but then the disposition to pray, and the act of praying, add a new circumstance to every case, and often bring many other new circumstances along with them. It supposes humility, contrition, and trust, on the part of the creature; and an acknowledgment of the power and compassion of God, and of the merit of the atonement of Christ: all which are manifestly new positions, so to speak, of the circumstances of the creature, which, upon the very principle of the objection, rationally understood, must be taken into consideration. But if the efficacy of prayer as to ourselves be granted, its influence upon the case of others is said to be more difficult to conceive. This may be allowed without at all affecting the duty. Those who bow to the authority of the Scriptures will see, that the duty of praying for ourselves and for others rests upon the same divine appointment; and to those who ask for the reason of such intercession in behalf of others, it is sufficient to reply, that the efficacy of prayer being established in one case, there is the same reason to conclude that our prayers may benefit others, as any other effort we may use. It can only be by divine appointment that one creature is made dependent upon another for any advantage, since it was doubtless in the power of the Creator to have rendered each independent of all but himself. Whatever reason, therefore, might lead him to connect and interweave the interests of one man with the benevolence of another, will be the leading reason for that kind of mutual dependence which is implied in the benefit of mutual prayer. Were it only that a previous sympathy, charity, and good will, are implied in the duty, and must, indeed, be cultivated in order to it, and be strengthened by it, the wisdom and benevolence of the institution would, it is presumed, be apparent to every well constituted mind. That all prayer for others must proceed upon a less perfect knowledge of them than we have of ourselves, is certain; that all our petitions must be, even in our own mind, more conditional than those which respect ourselves, though many of these must be subjected to the principles of a general administration, which we but partially apprehend; and that all spiritual influences upon others, when they are subject to our prayers, will be understood by us as liable to the control of their free agency, must also be conceded; and, therefore, when others are concerned, our prayers may often be partially or wholly fruitless. He who believes the Scriptures will, however, be encouraged by the declaration that the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man,” for his fellow creatures, availeth much;” and he who demands something beyond mere authoritative declaration, as he cannot deny that prayer is one of those instruments by which another may be benefited, must acknowledge that, like the giving of counsel, it may be of great utility in some cases, although it should fail in others; and that as no man can tell how much good counsel may influence another, or in many cases say whether it has ultimately failed or not, so it is with prayer. It is a part of the divine plan, as revealed in his word, to give many blessings to man independent of his own prayers, leaving the subsequent improvement of them to himself. They are given in honour of the intercession of Christ, man’s great Advocate;” and they are given, subordinately, in acceptance of the prayers of Christ’s church, and of righteous individuals. And when many or few devout individuals become thus the instruments of good to communities, or to whole nations, there is no greater mystery in this than in the obvious fact, that the happiness or misery of large masses of mankind is often greatly affected by the wisdom or the errors, the skill or the incompetence, the good or the bad conduct, of a few persons, and often of one.

second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate, that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of meaning. If, however, the term _contingent_ in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated. Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is, whether they _will_ happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether free or constrained, whether they _must_ happen or not. Those who advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen or not. If contingency meant _uncertainty_, the sense in which such theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it _can_ have no other result, it _cannot_ happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It _will_ not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why _can_ it not happen otherwise? _Can_ is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise, nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of man afar off.” “But if a contingency _will_ have a given result, to that result it _must_ be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it _must_ be determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free agent that he _will_ act in some particular manner; but it by no means follows from what _will_ be, whether foreseen or not, that it _must_ be. The third theory amounts, in brief, to this, that the foreknowledge of God must be supposed to differ so much from any thing of the kind which we perceive in ourselves, and from any ideas which we can possibly form of that property of the divine nature, that no argument respecting it can be grounded upon our imperfect notions; and that all controversy on subjects connected with it, is idle and fruitless. But though foreknowledge in God should be admitted to be something of a very different nature” to the same quality in man, yet as it is represented as _something_ equivalent to foreknowledge, whatever that something may be, since in consequence of it, prophecies have actually been uttered and fulfilled, and of such a kind, too, as relate to actions for which men have in fact been held accountable; all the original difficulty of reconciling contingent events to this something, of which human foreknowledge is a kind of shadow,” as a map of China is to China itself,” remains in full force. The difficulty is shifted, but not removed. It may, therefore, be certainly concluded, if at least the Holy Scriptures are to be our guide, that the omniscience of God comprehends his certain prescience of all events however contingent; and if any thing more were necessary to strengthen the argument above given, it might be drawn from the irrational, and, above all, the unscriptural consequences, which would follow from the denial of this doctrine. These are forcibly stated by President Edwards:--“It would follow from this notion, (namely, that the Almighty doth not foreknow what will be the result of future contingencies,) that as God is liable to be continually repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a Being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterward, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.” Socinus and his early followers would not allow that God possesses any knowledge of future contingencies. The schoolmen, in reference to this species of knowledge in God, invented that called _scientia media_, and which they define as that by which God knows _sub conditione_, what men or angels will do according to the liberty which they have, when they are placed in these or those circumstances, or in this or in that order of things.” When Gomarus, the opponent of Arminius, found that his opinion concerning the object of reprobation was clogged with this absurdity--that it made God to be the author of Adam’s sin, he very astutely took refuge in this conditionate foreknowledge, and, in his corrected theses on predestination, published after the death of Arminius, he describes it as that by which God, through the infinite light of his own knowledge, foreknows some future things, not absolutely, but as placed under a certain condition.” Walæus, the celebrated antagonist of Episcopius, had recourse to the same expedient. This distinction has been adopted by very few of those who espouse the doctrines of general redemption; and who believe that every event, how contingent soever to the creature, is, with respect to God, certainly foreknown. An old English divine thinks, that, “in the sacred Scriptures certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of knowledge, of things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the well known example of David in Keilah, 1 Sam. xxii, 12, and of Chorazin and Bethsaida, Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13, consult, among other sayings of the same description, the answer of our Saviour to the chief priests and scribes, who had asked, ‘Art thou the Christ? Tell us.’ And he said unto them, ‘If I tell you, ye will not believe.’ In the subsequent verse he adds, ‘If I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go,’ Luke xxii, 67, 68. You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself.” This kind of knowledge might very well be included in that of _scientia visionis_, because the latter ought to include, not what God will do and what his creatures will do under his appointment, but what they will do by his permission as free agents, and what he will do, as a consequence of this, in his character of Governor and Lord. But since the predestinarians had confounded _scientia visionis_ with a predestinating decree, the _scientia media_ well expressed what they had left quite unaccounted for, and which they had assumed did not really exist,--the actions of creatures endowed with free will, and the acts of Deity which from eternity were consequent upon them. If such actions do not take place, then men are not free; and if the rectoral acts of God are not consequent upon the actions of the creature in the order of the divine intention, and the conduct of the creature is consequent upon the foreordained rectoral acts of God, then we reach a necessitating eternal decree, which in fact, the predestinarian contends for; but it unfortunately brings after it consequences which no subtleties have ever been able to shake off,--that the only _actor_ in the universe is God himself; and that the only distinction among events is, that one class is brought to pass by God directly, and the other indirectly, not by the agency, but by the mere instrumentality, of his creatures.

curious controversy on this subject arose among the Dissenters in the end of the seventeenth century. Whether singing in public worship had been partially discontinued during the times of persecution to avoid informers, or whether the miserable manner in which it was performed gave persons a distaste to it, so it appears, that in 1691, Mr. Benjamin Keach published a tract entitled, “The Breach Repaired in God’s Worship: or, Psalms, Hymns, &c, proved to be a Holy Ordinance of Jesus Christ.” To us it may appear strange that such a point should be disputed; but Mr. Keach was obliged to labour earnestly, and with a great deal of prudence and caution, to obtain the consent of his people to sing a hymn at the conclusion of the Lord’s Supper. After six years more, they agreed to sing on the thanksgiving days; but it required still fourteen years more before he could persuade them to sing every Lord’s day; and then it was only after the last prayer, that those who chose it might withdraw without joining in it! Nor did even this satisfy these scrupulous consciences; for, after all, a separation took place, and the inharmonious seceders formed a new church in May’s Pond, where it was above twenty years longer before singing the praises of God could be endured. It is difficult at this period to believe it; but Mr. Ivimey quotes Mr. Crosby, as saying, that Mr. Keach’s was the first church in which psalm singing was introduced. This remark, however, must probably be confined to the Baptist churches. The Presbyterians, it seems, were not quite so unmusical; for the Directory of the Westminster divines distinctly stated, that “it is the duty of Christians to praise God publicly by singing of Psalms together in the congregation.” And beside the old Scotch Psalms, Dr. John Patrick, of the Charter house, made a version which was in very general use among Dissenters, Presbyterians, and Independents, before it was superseded by the far superior compositions of Dr. Watts. These Psalms, however, like those of the English and Scotch establishment, were drawled out in notes of equal length, without accent or variety. Even the introduction of the triple-time tunes, probably about the time of Dr. Watts’s psalms, gave also great offence to some people, because it marked the accent of the measure. Old Mr. Thomas Bradbury used to call this time “a long leg and a short one.” The beautiful compositions of Dr. Watts, Mr. C. Wesley, and others, have produced a considerable revolution in modern psalmody. Better versions of the Psalms, and many excellent collections of hymns, are now in use, and may be considered as highly important gifts bestowed upon the modern church of God.

fact, buried under such a mass of fables as the translation of the Septuagint has been by the historians who have pretended to record it, necessarily loses all its historical character, which, indeed, we are fully justified in disregarding altogether. Although there is no doubt but that some truth is concealed under this load of fables, yet it is by no means an easy task to discern the truth from what is false: the following, however, is the result of our researches concerning this celebrated version:-- It is probable that the seventy interpreters, as they are called, executed their version of the Pentateuch during the joint reigns of Ptolemy Lagus and his son Philadelphus. The pseudo Aristeas, Josephus, Philo, and many other writers whom it were tedious to enumerate, relate that this version was made during the reign of Ptolemy II., or Philadelphus; Joseph Ben Gorion, however, among the rabbins, Theodoret, and many other Christian writers, refer its date to the time of Ptolemy Lagus. Now, these two traditions can be reconciled only by supposing the version to have been performed during the two years when Ptolemy Philadelphus shared the throne with his father; which date coincides with the third and fourth years of the hundred and twenty-third Olympiad, that is, about B. C. 286 and 285. Farther, this version was neither made by the command of Ptolemy, nor at the request nor under the superintendence of Demetrius Phalereus; but was voluntarily undertaken by the Jews for the use of their countrymen. It is well known, that, at the period above noticed, there was a great number of Jews settled in Egypt, particularly at Alexandria: these, being most strictly observant of the religious institutions and usages of their forefathers, had their sanhedrim or grand council composed of seventy or seventy-two members, and very numerous synagogues, in which the law was read to them on every Sabbath; and as the bulk of the common people were no longer acquainted with Biblical Hebrew, the Greek language alone being used in their ordinary intercourse, it became necessary to translate the Pentateuch into Greek for their use. This is a far more probable account of the origin of the Alexandrian version than the traditions above stated. If this translation had been made by public authority, it would unquestionably have been performed under the direction of the sanhedrim, who would have examined and perhaps corrected it, if it had been the work of a single individual, previously to giving it the stamp of their approbation, and introducing it into their synagogues. In either case the translation would probably be denominated the Septuagint, because the sanhedrim was composed of seventy or seventy-two members. It is even possible that the sanhedrim, in order to ascertain the fidelity of the work, might have sent to Palestine for some learned men, of whose assistance and advice they would have availed themselves in examining the version. This fact, if it could be proved, for it is offered as a mere conjecture, would account for the story of the king of Egypt’s sending an embassy to Jerusalem: there is, however, one circumstance which proves that, in executing this translation, the synagogues were originally in contemplation, namely, that all the ancient writers unanimously concur in saying that the Pentateuch was first translated. The five books of Moses, indeed, were the only books read in the synagogues until the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria; who having forbidden that practice in Palestine, the Jews evaded his commands by substituting for the Pentateuch the reading of the prophetic books. When, afterward, the Jews were delivered from the tyranny of the kings of Syria, they read the law and the prophets alternately in the synagogues; and the same custom was adopted by the Hellenistic or Græcising Jews. But, whatever was the real number of the authors of the version, their introduction of Coptic words, such as οἴφι ἄχι ρεμφὰν, &c, as well as their rendering of ideas purely Hebrew altogether in the Egyptian manner, clearly prove that they were natives of Egypt. Thus, they express the creation of the world, not by the proper Greek word κτίσις, but by γένεσις, a term employed by the philosophers of Alexandria to express the origin of the universe. The Hebrew word _thummim_, Exodus xxviii, 30, which signifies “perfections,” they render ἀλήθεια, _truth_. The difference of style also indicates the version to have been the work not of one but of several translators, and to have been executed at different times. The best qualified and most able among them was the translator of the Pentateuch, who was evidently master of both Greek and Hebrew: he has religiously followed the Hebrew text, and has in various instances introduced the most suitable and best chosen expressions. From the very close resemblance subsisting between the text of the Greek version and the text of the Samaritan Pentateuch, Louis De Dieu, Selden, Whiston, Hassencamp, and Bauer, are of opinion that the author of the Alexandrian version made it from the Samaritan Pentateuch. And in proportion as these two correspond, the Greek differs from the Hebrew. This opinion is farther supported by the declarations of Origen and Jerom, that the translator found the venerable name of Jehovah, not in the letters in common use, but in very ancient characters; and also by the fact that those consonants in the Septuagint are frequently confounded together, the shapes of which are similar in the Samaritan, but not in the Hebrew, alphabet. This hypothesis, however ingenious and plausible, is by no means determinate; and what militates most against it is, the inveterate enmity subsisting between the Jews and Samaritans, added to the constant and unvarying testimony of antiquity, that the Greek version of the Pentateuch was executed by Jews. There is no other way by which to reconcile these conflicting opinions than by supposing either that the manuscript used by the Egyptian Jews approximated toward the letters and text of the Samaritan Pentateuch, or that the translators of the Septuagint made use of manuscripts written in ancient characters. Next to the Pentateuch, for ability and fidelity of execution, ranks the translation of the book of Proverbs, the author of which was well skilled in the two languages: Michaëlis is of opinion that, of all the books of the Septuagint, the style of the Proverbs is the best, the translator having clothed the most ingenious thoughts in as neat and elegant language as was ever used by a Pythagorean sage, to express his philosophical maxims. The Septuagint version, though originally made for the use of the Egyptian Jews, gradually acquired the highest authority among the Jews of Palestine, who were acquainted with the Greek language, and subsequently also among Christians: it appears, indeed, that the legend above confuted, of the translators having been divinely inspired, was invented in order that the LXX. might be held in the greater estimation. Philo, the Jew, a native of Egypt, has evidently followed it in his allegorical expositions of the Mosaic law; and though Dr. Hody was of opinion that Josephus, who was a native of Palestine, corroborated his work on Jewish antiquities from the Hebrew text, yet Salmasius, Bochart, Bauer, and others, have shown that he has adhered to the Septuagint throughout that work. How extensively this version was in use among the Jews, appears from the solemn sanction given to it by the inspired writers of the New Testament, who have in very many passages quoted the Greek version of the Old Testament. Their example was followed by the earlier fathers and doctors of the church, who, with the exception of Origen and Jerom, were unacquainted with Hebrew: notwithstanding their zeal for the word of God, they did not exert themselves to learn the original language of the sacred writings, but acquiesced in the Greek representation of them, judging it, no doubt, to be fully sufficient for all the purposes of their pious labours. The Greek Scriptures were the only Scriptures known to or valued by the Greeks. This was the text commented on by Chrysostom and Theodoret: it was this which furnished topics to Athanasius, Nazianzen, and Basil. From this fountain the stream was derived to the Latin church, first by the Italic or Vulgate translation of the Scriptures, which was made from the Septuagint, and not from the Hebrew; and, secondly, by the study of the Greek fathers. It was by this borrowed light that the Latin fathers illumined the western hemisphere; and, when the age of Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory, successively passed away, this was the light put into the hands of the next dynasty of theologists, the schoolmen, who carried on the work of theological disquisition by the aid of this luminary, and none other. So that, either in Greek or in Latin, it was still the Septuagint Scriptures that were read, explained, and quoted as authority, for a period of fifteen hundred years.

“heart of stone” may be understood several ways. Job, xli, 24, speaking of the leviathan, says, that “his heart is as firm as a stone, yea as hard as a piece of the nether millstone:” that is, he is of a very extraordinary strength, boldness, and courage. It is said, 1 Sam. xxv, 37, that Nabal’s heart died within him, and he became as a stone, when he was told of the danger he had incurred by his imprudence; his heart became contracted or convulsed, and this was the occasion of his death. Ezekiel, xxxvi, 26, says, that the Lord will take away from his people their heart of stone, and give them a heart of flesh; that is, he will render them contrite, and sensible to spiritual things. “I will give him a white stone,” Rev. ii, 17; that is, I will give him full and public pardon and absolution. It is spoken in allusion to an ancient custom of delivering a white stone to such as they acquitted in judgment. They used likewise to give a white stone to such as conquered in the Grecian games.

As the beauty of Sarah, which she retained so long as quite to conceal her real age from observers, attracted so much notice as to lead to her forcible seizure, once by Pharaoh in Egypt, and again by Abimelech in Palestine, it may appear strange, that, as in the east women are generally kept in seclusion, and seldom appear without veils, she exposed herself to observation. But to this day the Arab women do not wear veils at home in their tents; and Sarah’s countenance might have been seen in the tent by some of the officers of Pharaoh and Abimelech, who reported her beauty to their masters.

Executions in the east are often very prompt and arbitrary, when resulting from royal authority. In many cases the suspicion is no sooner entertained, or the cause of offence given, than the fatal order is issued; the messenger of death hurries to the unsuspecting victim, shows his warrant, and executes his orders that instant in silence and solitude. Instances of this kind are continually occurring in the Turkish and Persian histories. When the enemies of a great man among the Turks have gained influence enough over the prince to procure a warrant for his death, a _capidgi_, the name of the officer who executes these orders, is sent to him, who shows him the order he has received to carry back his head; the other takes the warrant of the grand signior, kisses it, puts it on his head in token of respect, and then, having performed his ablutions and said his prayers, freely resigns his life. The _capidgi_, having strangled him, cuts off his head, and brings it to Constantinople. The grand signior’s order is implicitly obeyed; the servants of the victim never attempt to hinder the executioner, although these _capidgis_ come very often with few or no attendants. It appears from the writings of Chardin, that the nobility and grandees of Persia are put to death in a manner equally silent, hasty, and unobstructed. Such executions were not uncommon among the Jews under the government of their kings. Solomon sent Benaiah as his _capidgi_, or executioner, to put Adonijah, a prince of his own family, to death; and Joab, the commander-in-chief of the forces in the reign of his father. A _capidgi_ likewise beheaded John the Baptist in prison, and carried his head to the court of Herod. To such silent and hasty executioners the royal preacher seems to refer in that proverb, “The wrath of a king is as messengers of death; but a wise man will pacify it,” Prov. xvi, 14: his displeasure exposes the unhappy offender to immediate death, and may fill the unsuspecting bosom with terror and dismay, like the appearance of a _capidgi_; but by wise and prudent conduct a man may sometimes escape the danger. From the dreadful promptitude with which Benaiah executed the commands of Solomon on Adonijah and Joab, it may be concluded that the executioner of the court was as little ceremonious, and the ancient Jews, under their kings, nearly as passive, as the Turks or Persians. The Prophet Elisha is the only person on the inspired record who ventured to resist the bloody mandate of the sovereign; the incident is recorded in these terms: “But Elisha sat in his house, and the elders sat with him; and the king sent a man from before him; but ere the messenger came to him, he said to the elders, See how this son of a murderer hath sent to take away mine head? Look ye, when the messenger cometh, shut the door and hold him fast at the door; is not the sound of his master’s feet behind him?” 2 Kings vi, 32. But if such mandates had not been too common among the Jews, and in general submitted to without resistance, Jehoram had scarcely ventured to despatch a single messenger to take away the life of so eminent a person as Elisha. Criminals were at other times executed in public; and then commonly without the city. To such executions without the gate, the Psalmist undoubtedly refers in this complaint: “The dead bodies of thy saints have they given to be meat unto the fowls of the heaven; the flesh of thy saints unto the beasts of the earth; their blood have they shed like water round about Jerusalem, and there was none to bury them,” Psalm lxxix, 2, 3. The last clause admits of two senses: 1. There was no friend or relation left to bury them. 2. None were allowed to perform this last office. The despotism of eastern princes often proceeds to a degree of extravagance which is apt to fill the mind with astonishment and horror. It has been thought, from time immemorial, highly criminal to bury those who had lost their lives by the hand of an executioner, without permission. In Morocco, no person dares to bury the body of a malefactor without an order from the emperor; and Windus, who visited that country, speaking of a man who was sawn in two, informs us, that his body must have remained to be eaten by the dogs if the emperor had not pardoned him; an extravagant custom to pardon a man after he is dead; but unless he does so, no person dares bury the body. To such a degree of savage barbarity it is probable the enemies of God’s people carried their opposition, that no person dared to bury the dead bodies of their innocent victims. In ancient times, persons of the highest rank and station were employed to execute the sentence of the law. They had not then, as we have at present, public executioners; but the prince laid his commands on any of his courtiers whom he chose, and probably selected the person for whom he had the greatest favour. Gideon commanded Jether, his eldest son, to execute his sentence on the kings of Midian; the king of Israel ordered the footmen who stood around him, and who were probably a chosen body of soldiers for the defence of his person, to put to death the priests of the Lord; and when they refused, Doeg, an Edomite, one of his principal officers. Long after the days of Saul, the reigning monarch commanded Benaiah, the chief captain of his armies, to perform that duty. Sometimes the chief magistrate executed the sentence of the law with his own hands; for when Jether shrunk from the duty which his father required, Gideon, at that time the supreme magistrate in Israel, did not hesitate to do it himself. In these times such a command would be reckoned equally barbarous and unbecoming; but the ideas which were entertained in those primitive ages of honour and propriety, were in many respects extremely different from ours. In Homer, the exasperated Ulysses commanded his son Telemachus to put to death the suitors of Penelope, which was immediately done. The custom of employing persons of high rank to execute the sentence of the law, is still retained in the principality of Senaar, where the public executioner is one of the principal nobility; and, by virtue of his office, resides in the royal palace.

The intentional offering up of Isaac is not to be supposed as viewed by Abraham as an act sanctioned by the Pagan practice of human sacrifice. The immolation of human victims, particularly of that which was most precious, the favourite, the first-born child, appears to have been a common usage among many early nations, more especially the tribes by which Abraham was surrounded. It was the distinguishing rite among the worshippers of Moloch; at a later period of the Jewish history, it was practised by a king of Moab; and it was undoubtedly derived by the Carthaginians from their Phenecian ancestors on the shores of Syria. Where it was an ordinary usage, as in the worship of Moloch, it was in unison with the character of the religion, and of its deity. It was the last act of a dark and sanguinary superstition, which rose by regular gradation to this complete triumph over human nature. The god, who was propitiated by these offerings, had been satiated with more cheap and vulgar victims; he had been glutted to the full with human suffering and with human blood. In general it was the final mark of the subjugation of the national mind to an inhuman and domineering priesthood. But the Mosaic religion held human sacrifices in abhorrence; and the God of the Abrahamitic family, uniformly beneficent, had imposed no duties which entailed human suffering, had demanded no offerings which were repugnant to the better feelings of our nature. The command to offer Isaac as “a burnt offering,” was for these reasons a trial the more severe to Abraham’s faith. He must therefore have been fully assured of the divine command; and he left the mystery to be explained by God himself. His was a simple act of unhesitating obedience to the command of God; the last proof of perfect reliance on the certain accomplishment of the divine promises. Isaac, so miraculously bestowed, could be as miraculously restored; Abraham, such is the comment of the Christian Apostle, “believed that God could even raise him up from the dead.”

The wide and deep impression made by the character of Abraham upon the ancient world is proved by the reverence which people of almost all nations and countries have paid to him, and the manner in which the events of his life have been interwoven in their mythology, and their religious traditions. Jews, Magians, Sabians, Indians, and Mohammedans have claimed him as the great patriarch and founder of their several sects; and his history has been embellished with a variety of fictions. One of the most pleasing of these is the following, but it proceeds upon the supposition that he was educated in idolatry: “As Abraham was walking by night from the grotto where he was born, to the city of Babylon, he gazed on the stars of heaven, and among them on the beautiful planet Venus. ‘Behold,’ said he within himself, ‘the God and Lord of the universe!’ but the star set and disappeared, and Abraham felt that the Lord of the universe could not thus be liable to change. Shortly after, he beheld the moon at the full: ‘Lo,’ he cried, ‘the Divine Creator, the manifest Deity!’ but the moon sank below the horizon, and Abraham made the same reflection as at the setting of the evening star. All the rest of the night he passed in profound rumination; at sunrise he stood before the gates of Babylon, and saw the whole people prostrate in adoration. ‘Wondrous orb,‘ he exclaimed, ‘thou surely art the Creator and Ruler of all nature! but thou, too, hastest like the rest to thy setting!--neither then art thou my Creator, my Lord, or my God!’”

But among the Jews, the bridegroom was not always permitted to accompany his bride from her father’s house; an intimate friend was often sent to conduct her, while he remained at home to receive her in his apartment. Her female attendants had the honour to introduce her; and whenever they changed the bride’s dress, which is often done, they presented her to the bridegroom. It is the custom, and belongs to their ideas of magnificence, frequently to dress and undress the bride, and to cause her to wear on that same day all the clothes made up for her nuptials. These circumstances discover the force of St. John’s language, in his magnificent description of the Christian church in her millennial state: “And I, John, saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband,” Rev. xxi, 2.

Those that were invited to the marriage were expected to appear in their best and gayest attire. If the bridegroom was in circumstances to afford it, wedding garments were prepared for all the guests, which were hung up in the antechamber for them to put on over the rest of their clothes, as they entered the apartments where the marriage feast was prepared. To refuse, or even to neglect, putting on the wedding garment, was reckoned an insult to the bridegroom; aggravated by the circumstance that it was provided by himself for the very purpose of being worn on that occasion, and was hung up in the way to the inner apartment, that the guests must have seen it, and recollected the design of its suspension. This accounts for the severity of the sentence pronounced by the king, who came in to see the guests, and found among them one who had neglected to put it on: “And he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding garment? And he was speechless,” Matt. xxii, 11, because it was provided at the expense of the entertainer, and placed full in his view. “Then said the king to the servants, Bind him hand and foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” The following extract will show the importance of having a suitable garment for a marriage feast, and the offence taken against those who refuse it when presented as a gift. “The next day, Dec. 3d, the king sent to invite the ambassadors to dine with him once more. The Mehemander told them, it was the custom that they should wear over their own clothes the best of those garments which the king had sent them. The ambassadors at first made some scruple of that compliance; but when they were told that it was a custom observed by all ambassadors, and that no doubt the king would take it very ill at their hands if they presented themselves before him without the marks of his liberality, they at last resolved to do it; and, after their example, all the rest of the retinue.”